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The analysis of six cases of successful or failed institutionalization of civilian control in this chapter allows for a systematic tracing of the strategies of political control used by civilians; how they were linked to structural determinants; and how such strategies affected the reform of post-authoritarian civil–military relations. The three successful cases (South Korea, Chile, and Spain) show that there were important differences in the mix of strategies, particularly regarding the early-on prioritization of the role of the defense ministry and an emphasis on the democratic socialization of the military. However, control strategies that played an important role in cases of weakly institutionalized civilian control, such as the co-optation of military elites, were of little importance in the three successful countries. Second, governments in South Korea, Chile, and Spain first emphasized weak strategies but later adopted new, more robust instruments of ensuring the military’s subordination, possible because of the maturing of democratic institutions, the growth of civil societies, and good socioeconomic performance, which strengthened the legitimation of democratic institutions and political authorities. In contrast, the most striking similarity among the three cases of stagnant or weakly institutionalized civilian control (the Philippines, Russia, and Madagascar) was the attempt to personalize and centralize political control by the incumbent president. All three countries had weak civil societies and democratic institutions; a challenging economic environment; and a potential for mass discontent. In all three cases, civil–military relations were mainly dependent on the incumbent’s ability to co-opt elites in various sectors of society.

This book examines the conditions under which new democracies succeed or fail in establishing firm and lasting civilian control of the military. It introduces a multidimensional conceptual framework to evaluate the degree of civilian control in new democracies and to trace developments over time. The theory of civilian control in new democracies proposed in this book integrates rationalist, structuralist, and institutionalist arguments into a coherent model to explain when, how, and through which causal mechanism new democracies succeed or fail in establishing and sustaining civilian control over the military. This theory is tested on an original dataset on civilian control over the military in 66 countries that have undergone a democratization from authoritarianism at least once in the period from 1974 to 2010. The study traces the effects of different degrees of civilian control on the survival and democratic quality of third wave democracies. In a multi-method design, we combine large-N statistical analyses with detailed case study narratives of several countries. The study establishes a comprehensive understanding of the conditions and processes under which third wave democracies succeeded or failed in establishing firm and lasting civilian control of the military—and its consequences for the survival and quality of the new democratic structures, processes, and practices.

This chapter complements the statistical analyses in Chapter 5 with case studies to understand how the degree of civilian control affects the survival and quality of democracy in third wave democracies. First, the chapter contextualizes the statistical findings in greater detail by delving into the 18 instances of breakdown of third wave democracies from 1974–2010, distinguishing three distinct military roles as (i) perpetrator, (ii) partner, or (iii) bystander in processes of democratic regime breakdown. Second, two process tracing case studies of Brazil (weak civilian control and low democratic quality) and Taiwan (strong civilian control and high democratic quality) uncover how the development of civilian control has affected the quality of democratic institutions and processes in both countries. Overall, weak civilian control and, especially, an extensive military role in the provision of internal security are likely to lead to impingements on citizens’ political rights, civil liberties, and the rule of law. Supporting comparative case evidence from Portugal, Romania, South Africa, and Turkey reiterates the crucial importance of civilian control, not only for democratic survival, but also for the quality of third wave democracies. In sum, the case study evidence uncovered in this chapter corroborates the theoretical arguments outlined in the second chapter of this book.

This chapter describes and explains empirical patterns of civil–military relations in 71 democracy spells in 66 third wave democracies in the period 1974 to 2010. The descriptive analysis demonstrates that overall, third wave democracies have been rather successful in ensuring civilian control over Elite Recruitment and Public Policy. In contrast, National Defense and Military Organization exhibit a generally lower degree of civilian control. The chapter also shows that post-communist countries in Eastern Europe and Eurasia started out with comparatively strong traditions of civilian control and registered only moderate changes in levels of civilian control. In contrast, Latin America is the one region in which third wave democracies, on average, had the most difficult initial conditions in terms of civilian control. Despite robust changes in the post-authoritarian period, this still is the region with the lowest average degree of civilian control. In Southern Europe, third wave democracies also inherited weak institutions of civilian control but experienced the greatest change and achieved the highest average degree of civilian control in 2010. The statistical analysis finds that civil society strength and economic development are the strongest predictors of civilian control, both in the aggregate as well as across all five individual decision-making areas. In contrast, initial conditions such as praetorian legacies and military control over the mode and outcome of the democratic transition seem less relevant for explaining civilian successes in establishing civilian control over their militaries when controlling for other factors, at least in the long run.

The chapter lays out a concept of civilian control over the military in new democracies which differentiates and operationalizes five partial areas of civilian control: elite recruitment, public policy, internal security, national defense, and military organization. The theoretical model argues that the establishment of civilian control in new democracies is best explained by the interplay between civilian control strategies and the effects of three sets of conditions that can hamper or facilitate the institutionalization of civilian control: initial conditions, civilian bargaining power, and factors that shape the military bargaining power vis-à-vis civilian authorities. This analytical differentiation allows the systematic integration of an agency-model of civil–military reforms with the institutional and structural explanations that dominate the existing literature. In the remainder of the chapter, the authors discuss the relationship between the survival of democracy and the quality of different partial regimes of the “embedded democracy” on the one hand, and the strength or weakness of civilian control on the other. Two main causal mechanisms link civilian control to the breakdown of new democracies. The first is the supplantment or displacement of a democratic government or regime by the armed forces. The second is the “weak democracy” syndrome, through which the military either partners with civilian elites in the overthrow of democracy or remains a bystander while civilian incumbents move against the democratic order.

The final chapter summarizes the findings and discusses their implications for the academic study and political practice of reforming civil–military relations in new democracies. First, the chapter concludes that the more central a decision-making area is for the working of democracy, the more negative is the impact of weak civilian control on the survival and quality of democracy. Second, the more central a decision-making area is for the military’s key interests, the more difficult it is to institutionalize civilian control. Third, changes in civil–military relations in new democracies are driven by civilians who need to act prudently, systematically making use of the strategic resources at their disposal to institutionalize civilian control. These findings have a number of implications for domestic and international reformers. Civilians should adopt a gradualist approach to civil–military reforms that favors coalition building, recognizes the legitimate interests of the military, and concentrates first on ensuring the military’s acceptance of democracy and keeping the military out of the political processes of elite selection and policymaking before attempting to expand their authority into the matters of defense and military policy. External democracy promoters should recognize the crucial importance of civil–military relations for democratic stability and quality and should support domestic civilians in their attempts at institutionalizing civilian control. They, in particular, should emphasize the benefits of a gradual approach towards the restructuring of civil–military relations, and offer training and resources to strengthen civil society and build up effective civilian expertise in defense ministries and parliamentary committees.

This chapter addresses the question whether the degree of civilian control is correlated with the survival and breakdown of democracy and democratic quality in the third wave. Multivariate statistical analyses confirm that democratic survival is more likely if civilian authorities achieve a high degree of civilian control of the military. In contrast, where democratic governments lack the effective capacity to rein in the armed forces, the likelihood for a democratic breakdown remains high. To account for effects of weak or declining degree of civilian control on the quality of democracy, we statistically evaluate the relationship between civilian control and different partial regimes of the “embedded democracy.” We find that the overall degree of civilian control is a crucial determinant of political rights and civil liberties. Findings suggest that countries in which the military does not enjoy much political influence and is under the control of the democratically elected authorities do better in ensuring the political rights and civil liberties of their citizens. In contrast, the overall degree of civilian control had no effect on horizontal accountability and electoral integrity, though civilian control over Elite Recruitment has a strong, positive effect on democratic quality of the electoral regime of an embedded democracy. As suggested by extant literature on democratic quality and consolidation, socioeconomic development, measured by the GDP p.c., is the single most powerful predictor of democratic quality across all four partial regimes.

In this chapter, the authors present their arguments in favor of studying civil–military relations in third wave democracies. Normatively and functionally, civilian control of the military is a crucial institutional prerequisite of the consolidated, “embedded democracy.” For democracy to survive, the power of the armed guardians of state security must be limited by strong institutions of control. Civil–military relations are thus a vital topic for democratization and autocratization studies and international and comparative politics, as well as conflict and security studies. Yet, the importance of the topic contrasts with the scarcity of carefully specified theories and systematic theory testing that would allow to identify the conditions under which elected governments and democratically established institutions succeed or fail in ensuring civilian control of the military. Moreover, studies on civilian control of the military and democracy often fall into the “fallacy of coup-ism,” equating civilian control with the absence of military coups d’état. In contrast, the authors argue that civilian control is best defined as the exercise of the will of the country’s elected leadership over the armed forces: why theories of civilian control should center on civilian leaders as relevant actors who can initiate change in civil–military relations. They argue that the effects of different degrees of civilian control on democratic political regimes should differ by substantive decision-making areas and affect different partial regimes of a democratic regime democracy in different ways. Finally, the chapter briefly introduces the data and explains the structure and contents of the following chapters.

Drei Argumentationsschritte strukturieren dieses Kapitel. Zuerst wird ein Uberblick der historischen Ursprunge der elf Staaten Sudostasiens von der Kolonialzeit bis in die Gegenwart geboten. Hierdurch werden die kritischen Vorbedingungen herausgearbeitet, die die Entwicklung der heutigen politischen Systeme beeinflusst haben und sie bis in die Gegenwart pragen. Sodann folgt ein Uberblick zum Stand der Sudostasienforschung im Spannungsfeld von politikwissenschaftlicher Komparatistik und kulturwissenschaftlicher Regionalforschung. Abschliesend skizziert und kommentiert das Kapitel drei einflussreiche Forschungsdebatten aus den letzten zwei Dekaden: Die sogenannte „Asiatische-Werte“-Debatte, konkurrierende Analysen der Ursprunge und Entwicklung von Demokratie und Diktatur in der Region, sowie Analysen der Politischen Okonomie Sudostasiens.

Democracy is at a crucial juncture worldwide as an increasing number of democracies are experiencing a loss of democratic quality. This development raises concerns about a deconsolidation of democr...

In 2018, ever-incumbent Prime Minister Hun Sen scored a landslide victory in the Cambodian general elections. Three factors in particular explain this outcome. First, the elimination of the main opposition party, whose strategy of a peaceful election boycott failed. Second, favorable economic conditions and government handouts of spoils to constituencies that traditionally supported the opposition. Third, the weak leverage of the United States and the EU, and the Hun Sen regime’s strong links with China.

This study suggests that the implementation of democratic procedures and practices in a number of Southeast Asian countries has helped to manage national identity problems, while the levels of quality of democracy have also been affected by issues of national identity. The chapter argues that the transition from authoritarian rule to electoral democracy (first transition) has often opened-up political space for democratizing national identities in Southeast Asia, whereas the lack of progress in the second transition, from democratically elected governments to liberal and fully consolidated democratic regimes, has complicated mutually shared agreement about identity with consequences in conflicts about their content and comprehensiveness as well as their impact on domestic and foreign policies.