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In the study of electoral politics and political behavior in the developing world, India is often considered to be an exemplar of the centrality of contingency in distributive politics, the role of ethnicity in shaping political behavior, and the organizational weakness of political parties. Whereas these axioms have some empirical basis, the massive changes in political practices, the vast variation in political patterns, and the burgeoning literature on subnational dynamics in India mean that such generalizations are not tenable. In this article, we consider research on India that compels us to rethink the contention that India neatly fits the prevailing wisdom in the comparative politics literature. Our objective is to elucidate how the many nuanced insights about Indian politics can improve our understanding of electoral behavior both across and within other countries, allowing us to question core assumptions in theories of comparative politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses clientelism, distributive politics, and political economy of party network and development in urban slums of India, effect of varied density and partisan balance of clientelistic networks on public services provision, and bargaining for public infrastructure and services. Topics discussed include party linkages and development based on clientelistic relations with politicians, local development influenced by party networks, and strategies used to secure development.