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The 1970s were a pivotal decade for the US economy: deindustrialization broke the power of the labor unions and made possible the redistribution of income in favor of corporate profits; globalization and offshore investments opened alternatives to domestic nonfinancial capital accumulation; domestic productivity growth declined; and labor-saving technology empowered superstar corporations to rapidly gain market share. This book argues that the persistent fall in profitability, leading to the stagflation crisis, was a direct result of the transition from the Fordist phase of capital accumulation, based on large-scale manufacturing, to the neoliberal phase and the rising power of finance. Neoliberalism restored the power of rentiers but not the profit rates of nonfinancial corporations. Falling accumulation rates weakened the growth capacity of nonfinancial corporate firms and secular stagnation became the norm. Neo-Keynesian economists, Larry Summers and Paul Krugman, explained the persistence of secular stagnation with arguments borrowed from Alvin Hansen in the 1930s, such as the declining birth rate or the falling relative prices of investment goods, hence a shortfall of demand. In the Classical paradigm, profitability drives capital accumulation and falling profitability slows down growth. As the accumulation rate declined and the capacity growth diminished, breakdowns in supply links, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, prevented large infusions of purchasing power to find matching levels of supply, hence the stagflation crisis returned. The book will be a great asset to researchers and scholars interested in the development of Classical Political Economy concerning issues related to inflation, stagnation, growing inequality, and the next phase of neoliberalism.

From the mid-1980s, investors in the US increasingly directed capital towards the financial sector at the expense of non-financial sectors, lured by the perception of higher profits. This flow of capital inflated asset prices, creating the stock market and housing bubbles which burst when the imbalance between stagnant incomes and rising debts triggered the banking meltdown. Profitability and the Great Recession analyses these trends in profitability and capital accumulation, which the authors identify as the root cause of the financial crisis, in the context of the US and other major OECD countries.Drawing on insights from Adam Smith, David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill and Karl Marx, the authors interpret the relationship between capital accumulation and profitability trends through the conceptual lens of classical political economy. The book provides extensive empirical evidence of declining rates of US non-financial corporate accumulations from the mid-1960s and profitability trends in that sector falling from post-war highs. In contrast to this, it is shown that there was a vigorous rise of profitability in the financial sector from a 1982 trough to the early part of the twenty-first century, which led to the bloating of that sector. The authors conclude that the long-term falling accumulation trend in the non-financial corporate sector, highlighted by the bankruptcy of major automobile corporations, stands out as the underlying force that transformed the financial crisis into a fully-fledged Great Recession. This book will be of interest to students and researchers in the areas of economics, political economy, business and finance.