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We examine the economic mechanisms that limited arbitrage between the cash and forward markets of agency MBS, and whether asset purchases of the Federal Reserve

The Term Auction Facility (TAF), the first auction-based liquidity initiative by the Federal Reserve during the global financial crisis, was aimed at improving conditions in the dollar money market and bringing down the significantly elevated London interbank offered rate (Libor). The effectiveness of this innovative policy tool is crucial for understanding the role of the central bank in financial stability, but academic studies disagree on the empirical evidence of the TAF effect on Libor. We show that the disagreement arises from mis-specifications of econometric models. Regressions using the daily level of the Libor-OIS spread as the dependent variable miss either the permanent or temporary TAF effect, depending on whether the dummy variable indicates the events of the TAF or the regimes before and after an TAF event. Those regressions also suffer from the unit-root problem and produce unreliable test statistics. By contrast, regressions using the daily change in the Libor-OIS spread are robust to the persistence of the TAF effect and the unit-root problem, consistently producing reliable evidence that the downward shifts of the Libor-OIS spread were associated with the TAF. The evidence indicates the efficacy of the TAF in helping the interbank market to relieve liquidity strains.

We examine the financial conditions of dealers that participated in two of the Federal Reserve's lender-of-last-resort (LOLR) facilities—the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF)—that provided liquidity against a range of assets during 2008–2009. Dealers with lower equity returns and greater leverage prior to borrowing from the facilities were more likely to participate in the programs, borrow more, and, in the case of the TSLF, at higher bidding rates. Dealers with less liquid collateral on their balance sheets before the facilities were introduced also tended to borrow more. The results suggest that both financial performance and balance sheet liquidity play a role in LOLR utilization.

We examine sources of systemic risk (threshold size, complexity, and interconnectedness) with factors constructed from equity returns of large financial firms, after accounting for standard risk factors. From the factor loadings and factor returns, we estimate the implicit government subsidy for each systemic risk measure, and find that, from 1963 to 2006, only our big-versus-huge threshold size factor, TSIZE, implies a positive implicit subsidy on average. Further, pre-2007 TSIZE-implied subsidies predict the Federal Reserve’s liquidity facility loans and the Treasury’s TARP loans during the crisis, both in the time series and the cross section. TSIZE-implied subsidies increase around the bailout of Continental Illinois in 1984 and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, as well as around changes in Fitch Support Ratings indicating higher probability of government support. Since 2007, however, the relative share of TSIZE-implied subsidies falls, especially after Lehman’s failure, whereas complexity and interconnectedness-implied subsidies are substantial, resulting in an almost sevenfold increase in total implicit subsidies. The results, which survive a variety of robustness checks, indicate that the market’s perception of the sources of systemic risk changes over time.

We find that banks subject to the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) create less liquidity per dollar of assets in the post-LCR period than banks not subject to the LCR, in part because LCR banks make fewer loans. However, we also find that LCR banks are more resilient, as they contribute less to fire-sale risk relative to non-LCR banks. For large banks, we estimate the net after-tax benefits from reduced lending and fire-sale risk to be about 1.4 percent of assets from second-quarter 2013 through fourth-quarter 2014. Our findings, which we show are unlikely to result from capital regulations, highlight the trade-off between lower liquidity creation and greater resilience from liquidity regulations.

We provide empirical evidence for the existence, magnitude, and economic cost of stigma associated with banks borrowing from the Federal Reserve's Discount Window (DW) during the 2007–2008 financial crisis. We find that banks were willing to pay a premium of around 44 basis points (bps) across funding sources (126 bps after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers) to avoid borrowing from the DW. DW stigma is economically relevant as it increased some banks' borrowing cost by 32 bps of their pre-tax return on assets (ROA) during the crisis. The implications of our results for the provision of liquidity by central banks are discussed.

Macro announcements change the equilibrium risk-free rate. We find that Treasury prices reflect part of the impact instantaneously, but intermediaries rely on their customer order flow after the announcement to discover the full impact. This customer flow informativeness is strongest when analyst macro forecasts are most dispersed. The result holds for 30-year Treasury futures trading in both electronic and open-outcry markets. We further show that intermediaries benefit from privately recognizing informed customer flow, as their own-account trading profitability correlates with customer order access. © Copyright © Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington 2012.

This paper examines the relation between information transmission and cross-autocorrelations. We present a simple model, where informed trading is transmitted from large to small stocks with a lag. In equilibrium, large stock illiquidity induced by informed trading portends stronger cross-autocorrelations. Empirically, we find that the lead-lag relation increases with lagged large stock illiquidity. Further, the lead from large stock order flows to small stock returns is stronger when large stock spreads are higher. In addition, this lead-lag relation is stronger before macro announcements (when information-based trading is more likely) and weaker afterward (when information asymmetries are lower).

In responding to the severity and broad scope of the financial crisis that began in 2007, the Federal Reserve has made aggressive use of both traditional monetary policy instruments and innovative tools in an effort to provide liquidity. In this paper, I examine the Fed’s actions in light of the underlying financial amplification mechanisms propagating the crisis — in particular, balance sheet constraints and counterparty credit risk. The empirical evidence supports the Fed’s views on the primacy of balance sheet constraints in the earlier stages of the crisis and the increased prominence of counterparty credit risk as the crisis evolved in 2008. I conclude that an understanding of the prevailing risk environment is necessary in order to evaluate when central bank programs are likely to be effective and under what conditions the programs might cease to be necessary.

The rapid growth of the Credit Default Swap (CDS) market combined with increased defaults in recent years has led to increased usage of auctions when default occurs. We examine all the CDS auctions conducted to date and evaluate their efficacy by comparing auction outcomes to prices of bonds in the secondary market. The auctions appear to have served their purpose, as we see no evidence of inefficiency in the process: participation is high, open interest is low, and the prices were similar to the prices observed before and after in the bond market. We qualify our conclusions by observing that few auctions have taken place so far.

We examine implications of time-varying correlation and covariance between excess equity returns and consumption growth for the equity premium of the G7 countries. We find that the correlation and covariance are higher when there is a negative shock to labor income and a positive shock to returns. The combined effect is that the correlation and covariance are countercyclical and so is the equity premium. We test asset pricing models with time-varying consumption risk and find that the conditional price of risk is generally positive. These results survive several robustness checks. Our results highlight the importance of labor income for understanding dynamics of the equity premium.

Newly available transaction data are available for comparison of trading costs in the U.S. Treasury bond market with U.S. corporate and municipal bond markets. The mean bid-ask spread per $100 par value is estimated at 23 cents for municipal bonds, 21 cents for corporate bonds, and 8 cents for Treasury bonds. Maturity, trade size, and credit ratings are key determinants of the bid-ask spread. After controlling for credit risk, the bid-ask spread is not statistically different between corporate and Treasury markets but it is higher for municipal bonds relative to Treasuries.

Although brokers' trading is endemic in securities markets, the form of this trading differs between markets. Whereas in some securities markets, brokers may trade with their customers in the same transaction (simultaneous dual trading or SDT), in other markets, brokers are only allowed to trade after their customers in a separate transaction (consecutive dual trading or CDT). We show theoretically that informed and noise traders are worse off and brokers are better off while market depth is lower in the SDT market. Thus, given a choice, traders prefer fewer brokers in the SDT market compared to the CDT market. With free entry, however, market depth may be higher in the SDT market provided its entry cost is sufficiently low relative to the CDT market. We study order flow internalization by broker-dealers, and show that, in the free entry equilibrium, internalization hurts retail customers and market quality.

ANDY BROOKS: An exchange throughout history has performed a number of unique functions in the trading of securities. These functions have included finding the opening and closing process; halts; dissemination of news; pending news; dealing with the order of balances, sources of information on supply and demand; aggregation of buyers and sellers; price discovery; transparency; speed; fair and orderly markets; reconciliation; and arbitration. These and much more might have been seen as unique in the past. However, I am not sure that is the case today. I want to start by asking each of our panelists this question: In your view, what makes an exchange unique? Let’s start with Al.

We examine the financial conditions of dealers that participated in two of the Federal Reserve’s lender-of-last-resort (LOLR) facilities -- the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) -- that provided liquidity against a range of assets during 2008-09. Dealers with lower equity returns and greater leverage prior to borrowing from the facilities were more likely to participate in the programs, borrow more, and--in the case of the TSLF -- at higher bidding rates. Dealers with less liquid collateral on their balance sheets before the facilities were introduced also tended to borrow more. There also appear to be some interaction effects between financial performance and balance sheet liquidity in explaining dealer behavior. The results suggest that both financial performance and balance sheet liquidity play a role in LOLR utilization.

This article examines the provision of liquidity in futures markets as price volatility changes. We find that customer trading costs do not increase with volatility. However, for three of the four contracts studied, the nature of liquidity supply changes with volatility. Specifically, for relatively inactive contracts, customers as a group trade more with each other and less with market makers, on higher volatility days. By contrast, for the most active contract, trading between customers and market makers increases with volatility. We also find that market makers' income per contract decreases with volatility for one of the least active contracts in our sample, but is not significantly affected by volatility for the other contracts. These results are consistent with the idea that, for high-cost, inactive contracts, market makers react to temporary increases in volatility by raising their bid-ask spreads significantly, and customers provide increased liquidity through standing limit orders. An implication of our results is that electronic systems, where market maker participation is not required, are able to supply adequate liquidity during volatile periods. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 21:1–17, 2001

JEL Classification numbers G12, G14, G15 In contrast to most other countries, Chinese foreign class B shares trade at an average discount of about 60 percent to the prices at which domestic A shares trade. We argue that one reason for the large price discount of B shares is because foreign investors have less information on Chinese stocks than domestic investors. We develop a model, incorporating both informational asymmetry and market segmentation, and derive a relative pricing equation for A shares and B shares. We show theoretically that an A share index security, tradable by foreigners, increases the liquidity of B shares. Our empirical study of Chinese stocks supports the predictions of our model. Specifically, we show that our model-based proxies for informational asymmetry explain a significant portion of the cross-sectional variation of the B share discounts.

This paper studies the degree of impact of stock prices listed on the New York Stock Exchange and Tokyo Stock Exchange regarding price behavior in Asian stock markets. Our evidence shows that the pattern and magnitude of impact varies. Returns in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia are more sensitive than those in Taiwan, Korea and Thailand. The response patterns in the Asian markets suggest that foreign influence is significantly correlated to the degree of market openness.

I show that dual trading reduces the net order flow and market depth. Trading volume and gross (of commission fees) profits of informed traders are lower with dual trading, while trading volume and gross losses of uninformed traders are unaffected. When the broker′s commission income is independent of the customer′s trading volume, the competitive commission fee is lower with dual trading. The utility of uninformed traders (net of commission fees) increases with dual trading, while the net profits of informed traders decrease. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G12, G13, D82.

Following the financial crisis of 2007, many global financial firms faced difficulties in borrowing U.S. dollars (USD). We estimate the premium global banks paid to obtain USD (the “USD basis”) by the rate banks pay to swap euros into USD in the foreign exchange (FX) market, while fully hedging the FX risk, relative to the interbank rate for borrowing USD. We find that the bank basis is higher the day following increases in CDS prices and in asymmetric information measures. Controlling for fundamental risk, the basis is lower the day after successful borrowing at the Fed’s dollar liquidity facilities and it is higher for European banks following an unanticipated decrease in repo funding amounts, implying that USD funding constraints were binding for European banks during the crisis. Our results show that increased asymmetric information and “repo runs” (through unanticipated withdrawals of repo funding) combined to increase bank funding costs during the crisis.

We find that the firms included in the S&P 500 index are characterized by large increases in earnings, appreciation in market value and positive price momentum in the period preceding their index inclusion. This strong pre-inclusion performance predicts (1) the permanent increase of market value and (2) the change in return comovement, reflected in declines of size, value and momentum betas, following index inclusion. Non-event firms with similar performance experience similar appreciation in value and changes in comovement coincident with the event firms. Contrary to the consensus in the literature, our results indicate that – after accounting for the firms’ extraordinary pre-inclusion performance – index inclusion has no permanent effect on value and comovement.

This paper examines the over-the-counter (OTC) interest rate derivatives (IRD) market in order to inform the design of post-trade price reporting. Our analysis uses a novel transaction-level data set to examine trading activity, the composition of market participants, levels of product standardization, and market-making behavior. We find that trading activity in the IRD market is dispersed across a broad array of product types, currency denominations, and maturities, leading to more than 10,500 observed unique product combinations. While a select group of standard instruments trade with relative frequency and may provide timely and pertinent price information for market participants, many other IRD instruments trade infrequently and with diverse contract terms, limiting the impact on price formation from the reporting of those transactions. Nonetheless, we find evidence of dealers hedging rapidly after large interest rate swap trades, suggesting that, for this product, a price-reporting regime could be designed in a manner that does not disrupt market-making activity.

It is shown that the models of Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992, Rev. Finan. Stud.5(2), 307–329) and Kyle (1985, Econometrica53, 1315–1335) are equivalent in the following sense: the equilibrium values of market depth, the expected total trading volume and the expected price level are the same in the two models. Equivalence exists whenever the uniformed traders hedge all of their endowments of risky shares. This occurs under two sets of parameter configurations. In both cases, the linear equilibrium in the hedger model always exists. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers; G12, G14, D82.

Ongoing regulatory reform efforts aim to make the over-the-counter derivatives market more transparent by introducing public reporting of transaction-level information, including price and volume of trades. However, to date there has been a scarcity of data on the structure of trading in this market. This paper analyzes three months of global credit default swap (CDS) transactions and presents findings on the market composition, trading dynamics, and level of standardization. We find that trading activity in the CDS market is relatively low, with a majority of reference entities for single-name CDS trading less than once a day. We also find that a high proportion of CDS transactions conform to standardized contractual and trading conventions. Examining the dealer’s role as market maker, we find that large trades with customers are generally not rapidly offset by further trades in the same reference entity, suggesting that hedging of large positions, if taking place, occurs over a longer time horizon. Through our analysis, we provide a framework for regulators and policymakers to consider the design of the public reporting regime and the necessary improvements to data collection to facilitate meaningful price reporting for credit derivatives.

We provide empirical evidence for the existence, magnitude, and economic impact of stigma associated with discount window liquidity provision by the Federal Reserve. We find that during the height of the financial crisis banks were willing to pay a premium of at least 37 basis points (150 basis points after Lehman’s bankruptcy) on average to borrow from the Term Auction Facility (TAF) rather than from the discount window. The incidence of stigma varied with bank characteristics and market conditions. Finally, we find that discount window stigma is economically relevant since it increased banks’ borrowing costs during the crisis. Our results have important implications for the provision of liquidity by central banks.

ASANI SARKER: We now have a new forecasting tool! It is in the very title of Bob Schwartz’s next conference (laughter). The forecast clearly worked well for this year’s conference because, of course, it is cleverly titled ‘volatility’ –and volatility, as you all well know, is major financial news today. Volatility is significantly present in today’s challenging markets. So, if the title of next year’s conference is, say, ‘Negative Skewness of Returns,’ then we are really in for big trouble! However, if it is ‘Positive Skewness of Returns,’ then we can be very happy about the future (laughter)!

This paper examines the mechanism by which the incorporation of information into prices leads to cross-autocorrelations in stock returns. We present a simple model where trading on private information occurs first in the large stocks and is transmitted to small stocks with a lag. Such trading impacts large stock liquidity, so that, in equilibrium, large stock illiquidity portends stronger cross-autocorrelations. Empirically, we find that the lead-lag relation between large and small stocks increases with lagged illiquidity indicators of large stocks. Further, order flows in large stocks significantly predict returns of small stocks when large stock spreads are high, at both the market and industry levels. In addition, the role of order flow and liquidity in predicting small stock returns is stronger prior to macro announcements (when information-based trading is more likely).

New York Fed economists Asani Sarkar and Jeffrey Shrader examine the Federal Reserve’s recent liquidity actions in the context of studies on financial amplification mechanisms, whereby an initial financial sector shock triggers substantially larger shocks elsewhere in the sector and in the broader economy. Presented at "Central Bank Liquidity Tools and Perspectives on Regulatory Reform" a conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, February 19-20, 2009.

The small decline in the value of mortgage-related assets relative to the large total losses associated with the financial crisis suggests the presence of financial amplification mechanisms, which allow relatively small shocks to propagate through the financial system. We review the literature on financial amplification mechanisms and discuss the Federal Reserve’s interventions during different stages of the crisis in light of this literature. We interpret the Fed’s early-stage liquidity programs as working to dampen balance sheet amplifications arising from the positive feedback between financial constraints and asset prices. By comparison, the Fed’s later-stage crisis programs take into account adverse-selection amplifications that operate via increases in credit risk and the externality imposed by risky borrowers on safe ones. Finally, we provide new empirical evidence that increases in the Federal Reserve’s liquidity supply reduce interest rates during periods of high liquidity risk. Our analysis has implications for the impact on market prices of a potential withdrawal of liquidity supply by the Fed.

We develop a new likelihood-based approach to signing trades in the absence of quotes. This approach is equally efficient as the existing Markov-chain Monte Carlo methods, but more than ten times faster. It can address the occurrence of multiple trades at the same time and allows for analysis of settings in which trade times are observed with noise. We apply this method to a high-frequency data set of thirty-year U.S. Treasury futures to investigate the role of the market maker. Most theory characterizes the market maker as an uninformed, passive supplier of liquidity. Our findings suggest, however, that some market makers actively demand liquidity for a substantial part of the day and that they are informed speculators

We provide robust evidence of a deviation in the covered interest rate parity (CIP) relation since the onset of the financial crisis in August 2007. The CIP deviation exists with respect to several different dollar-denominated interest rates and exchange rate pairings of the dollar vis-a-vis other currencies. The results show that our proxies for margin conditions and for the cost of capital are significant determinants of the CIP deviations, especially during the crisis period. The supply of dollars by the Federal Reserve to foreign central banks via reciprocal currency arrangements (swap lines) reduced CIP deviations at this time. Following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, uncertainty about counterparty risk became a significant determinant of CIP deviations, and the swap lines program no longer affected the CIP deviations significantly. These results indicate a breakdown of arbitrage transactions in the international capital markets that owes partly to lack of capital and partly to heightened counterparty credit risk. Central bank interventions helped reduce the funding liquidity risk of global institutions.

Corporate default rates have been unusually low in recent years, both relative to historical rates and to forecasts of economists and ratings agencies. We examine the hypothesis that financial innovation has provided new financing options for distressed firms, which are consequently able to postpone or avoid default. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that in recent years the incidence of early default has decreased, even after controlling for business cycle effects. Next, we estimate a model for predicting aggregate monthly defaults and find that, if financial innovation is ignored, there is evidence of a structural break in recent years. Focusing on the most recent sample, we find that increased structured financing (i.e., high-yield CLO and CDO issuances) predict increased distance to default. Moreover, the component of distance to default explained by financing is positively related to future defaults, whereas the residual unexplained part is negatively related to future defaults. In contrast, increased traditional financing (i.e., banks’ commercial and industrial lending and commercial paper issuance) is negatively related to the distance to default. These results are consistent with more stringent monitoring of borrowers by traditional lenders. However, incorporation of both structured and traditional financing improves the default prediction model, especially in the recent sample. Our findings highlight the important role of financing in credit risk modeling and management.

Facing a shortage of U.S. dollars and a growing need to support their dollar-denominated assets during the financial crisis, international firms increasingly turned to the foreign exchange swap market and other secured funding sources. An analysis of the ensuing strains in the swap market shows that the dollar "basis"--the premium international institutions pay for dollar funding--became persistently large and positive, chiefly as a result of the higher funding costs paid by smaller firms and non-U.S. banks. The widening of the basis underscores the severity and breadth of the crisis as markets designed to facilitate the flow of dollars faltered and institutions worldwide struggled to obtain funds.

textabstractWe develop a new likelihood-based approach to sign trades in the absence of quotes. It is equally efficient as existing MCMC methods, but more than 10 times faster. It can deal with the occurrence of multiple trades at the same time, and noisily observed trade times. We apply this method to a high-frequency dataset of the 30Y U.S. treasury futures to investigate the role of the market maker. Most theory characterizes him as an uninformed passive liquidity supplier. Our results suggest that some market makers actively demand liquidity for a substantial part of the day and are informed speculators.

The rapid growth of the credit default swap (CDS) market and the increased number of defaults in recent years have led to major changes in the way CDS contracts are settled when default occurs. Auctions are increasingly the mechanism used to settle these contracts, replacing physical transfers of defaulted bonds between CDS sellers and buyers. Indeed, auctions will become a standard feature of all recent CDS contracts from now on. In this paper, we examine all of the CDS auctions conducted to date and evaluate their efficacy by comparing the auction outcomes to prices of the underlying bonds in the secondary market. The auctions appear to have served their purpose, as we find no evidence of inefficiency in the process: Participation is high, open interest is low, and the auction prices are close to the prices observed in the bond market before and after each auction has occurred. We qualify our conclusions by noting that relatively few auctions have taken place thus far.

We examine how investor heterogeneity affects the relation between liquidity changes and yield spread changes, using newly-available trade data for more than 3,700 bonds of 635 issuers. We find that, for retail trades, liquidity is a significant determinant of yield spreads and adds substantially to the explanatory power of regressions, after accounting for issuer and market risk. Further, the impact of liquidity is inversely related to retail traders' expected holding period. In contrast, for institutional trades, liquidity and yield spreads are essentially unrelated at all holding periods. We further find, for retail traders, the return premia to holding illiquid bond portfolios is positive and concave in the expected holding period, as predicted by Amihud and Mendelson (1986). Moreover, retail traders earn greater return premia than institutions for the same holding period. Thus, the market at least partially compensates retail investors for the greater illiquidity of their bond trades. Our results point to the importance of investor heterogeneity for understanding the determinants of credit risk.

The Term Auction Facility (TAF), the first auction-based liquidity initiative by the Federal Reserve during the global financial crisis, was aimed at improving conditions in the dollar money market and bringing down the significantly elevated London interbank offered rate (Libor). The effectiveness of this innovative policy tool is crucial for understanding the role of the central bank in financial stability, but academic studies disagree on the empirical evidence of the TAF effect on Libor. We show that the disagreement arises from misspecifications of econometric models. Regressions using the daily level of the Libor-OIS spread as the dependent variable miss either the permanent or temporary TAF effect, depending on whether the dummy variable indicates the events of the TAF or the regimes before and after a TAF event. Those regressions also suffer from the unit-root problem and produce unreliable test statistics. By contrast, regressions using the daily change in the Libor-OIS spread are robust to the persistence of the TAF effect and the unit-root problem, consistently producing reliable evidence that the downward shifts of the Libor-OIS spread were associated with the TAF. The evidence indicates the efficacy of the TAF in helping the interbank market to relieve liquidity strains.

Signed customer order flow correlates with permanent price changes in equity and nonequity markets. We exploit macro news events in the 30Y treasury futures market to identify causality from customer flow to riskfree rates. We remove the positive feedback trading part and establish that, in the 15 minutes subsequent to the news, intermediaries rely on customer orders to determine a substantial part of the announcement's effect on riskfree rates, i.e. one-third relative to the instantaneous effect. They appear to benefit from privately observing informed customers, as, in the cross-section, their own-account trade profitability correlates with access to customer flow, controlling for volatility, competition, and the macro ``surprise''.

This paper examines the mechanism through which the incorporation of information into prices leads to cross-autocorrelations in stock returns. The lead-lag relation between large and small stocks increases with lagged spreads of large stocks. Further, order flows in large stocks significantly predict the returns of small stocks when large stock spreads are high. This effect is consistent with the notion that trading on common information takes place first in the large stocks and is then transmitted to smaller stocks with a lag, suggesting that price discovery takes place in the large stocks.

In this paper, we infer motives for trade initiation from market sidedness. We define trading as more two-sided (one-sided) if the correlation between the numbers of buyer- and seller-initiated trades increases (decreases), and assess changes in sidedness (relative to a control sample) around events that identify trade initiators. Consistent with asymmetric information, trading is more one-sided prior to merger news. Consistent with belief heterogeneity, trading is more two-sided (1) before earnings and macro announcements with greater dispersions of analyst forecasts and (2) after earnings and macro news events with larger announcement surprises. A simultaneous equation system is used to examine the co-determinacy of sidedness, the bid-ask spread, volatility, the number of trades, and the order imbalance.

Customer order flow correlates with permanent price changes in equity and non-equity markets. We examine macro news events in the thirty-year Treasury futures market to identify causality from customer flow to risk-free rates. We remove the positive feedback trading effect and establish that, in the fifteen minutes subsequent to the news, intermediaries rely on customer orders to determine a substantial part of the announcement’s effect on risk-free rates—about one-third relative to the instantaneous effect. Intermediaries appear to benefit from privately observing informed customers, since their own-account trade profitability correlates with access to customer flow, controlling for volatility, competition, and the macro “surprise.”