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How does external support to insurgents influence the likelihood that the latter will get involved in violent clashes against other rebel groups? In this article, we outline a theoretical framework...

Ethnicity, like race, religion, and nationality, is a feature of group identity that is contested. There are literatures devoted to each, and in each there are those who see the origins of identity and affiliation in ancestry and deeply rooted affect and those who see these as socially constructed and instrumentally used by elites. Yet all recognize that the ancestral is socially constructed and that social constructions make use of existing cultural features, and that the vertical cleavages of race, religion, ethnicity, and nationality dominate the horizontal ones of class. This generates implications for institutional changes, for the pursuit of extraterritorial interests, for the selection of explanatory narratives for conflict when multiple attributions are possible, for intra-communal conflict, and for policies for ethnic conflict regulation.

The world has more ethnic groups than states and many ethnic groups are split across two or more states. One implication is that many ethnic conflicts are international phenomena in which transborder ethnic kin are involved. States concerned with co-ethnics or co-religionists in neighbouring countries are pursuing interests not included in our standard models of international politics. States that pursue such extraterritorial interests define national security and national survival in terms broader than merely maintaining the physical and territorial integrity of the state. Threats to their ethnic and religious brethren are seen as threats to them. And because such threats are seen as particularistic they also affect foreign policy alignments and the functioning of the balance of power.

Confusion surrounds how best to describe today the architecture of the liberal international order, its challenges, and prospects. The Liberal Order’s various and changing configurations its distributions of power, as well as the variety of major actors, portend consequences for the operation of the international system. Although structural approaches remain dominant in international relations analysis, it is evident that there is an interaction of structure, the distribution, and redistribution of power, and agency—the diplomatic actions, norms, and rules of international politics. Historical and existing institutions, ongoing debates, and political efforts all point to the role of agency in global governance. The ongoing search for order was the basis for the Peace of Westphalia, the Concert of Europe, the effort to construct collective security following World War I, the Western liberal order of the Cold War, and global governance constructions of the post-Cold War era. The continuing existence and direction of the liberal international order are proving difficult to determine. There are rising powers and growing geopolitical rivalry. There are many new nonstate actors affecting international politics. And, there is current U.S. policy that puts in question its collaborative role and its continuing leadership. The many architectures of global governance, even competing ones, underline that structure alone is not determinative. In addition, debates over what course to take imply that the force of circumstance does not make one and only choice possible and inevitable, and that the search for order is ongoing and omnipresent.

Current economic and political developments spotlight the relationship between domestic and global governance and the impact of globalization on both. A key question is whether a sovereign state system, democratic governments, and an integrated global marketplace can coexist. The paper assesses analytic materialist arguments for their incompatibility and the key assumptions on which they rest. The paper describes the extant pressures operating to limit each of the three: how sovereignty and democracy work to constrain globalization, how globalization and sovereignty generate a democratic deficit, and how globalization and democracy lead to limitations upon, and even the transcendence of, sovereignty. How to make the three compatible, and failing that, which facet to restrain, characterizes political contestation in a globalizing age. Global and domestic governance reflect the need to reconcile the combined implications of globalization, sovereignty, and democracy, and to do so by restraining, limiting, or transforming one or more of these features.

“Long data”, i.e., temporal data disaggregated to short time intervals to form a long time series, is a particularly interesting type of “big data”. Financial data are often available in this form (e.g., many years of daily stock prices), but until recently long data for other social, and even other economic, processes have been rare. Over the last decade, however, long data have begun to be extracted from (digitized) text, and then used to assess or formulate micro-level and macro-level theories. The UN Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery (UNSFIR) collected a long data set of incidents of collective violence in 14 Indonesian provinces during the 14 year period 1990–2003. In this paper we exploit the “length” of the UNSFIR data by applying several time series analysis methods. These reveal some previously unobserved features of collective violence in Indonesia—including periodic components and long time correlations—with important social/political interpretations and consequences for explanatory model building.

This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that US power and preferences following World War II led to bilateralism in Asia and multilateralism in Western Europe. It argues that the challenges facing the United States in both regions were similar, as were US policies meant to address them. With some lag, the United States supported the economic recovery of the regional powers it had defeated (Germany and Japan), saw the restoration of regional trade as a prerequisite, sought military bases to assure postwar security, and envisioned rearming its former foes as part of its security strategy. The outcomes in the two regions reflected the preferences and reservations of regional actors. The critical differences between the regions were structural. The existence of middle powers was critical in Europe, the return of colonial powers to Asia precluded regional arrangements in the short term, and geostrategic differences shaped the requisites for regional security.

This paper argues that economics sanctions, whether positive or negative, require market power on the part of the sanctioning state(s) and entail distributional consequences. As a result, sanctions result in the growth of state power and the monitoring and punishing of one's own allies and citizens. Similarly, countermeasures on the part of sanctioned states also entail market power and result in both the growth of state power and unintended as well as intended distributional consequences. The political requisites for both sides imply that democracies have a more difficult time imposing sanctions and autocracies the easiest in adopting countermeasures. Since outcomes are the combined result of sanctions and countermeasures, and given the incentives of sanctioned states in adopting countermeasures, even comprehensive sanctions have differential consequences and result in targeted outcomes and targeted sanctions generate unintended collateral damage.

International politics today is as much institutional as intergovernmental. International institutions can be found in every functional domain and in every region in the world. Modern reality consists of an alphabet soup of institutions which includes the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This article argues that disagreement about definitions, about how old or new the phenomenon, and about its exact impact cannot mask the reality of a growing number and the role of international institutions. How much and how adequately these institutions of international governance tame anarchy is open to question, but the world is witnessing an increase in supranational governance, created by states and in which states increasingly live. Understanding and explaining international politics increasingly requires incorporating the role of international institutions. Scholarship on international institutions is growing and developing commensurately.

The Study of International relations has historically been extraordinarily interdisciplinary and in many ways the least insular subfield in the social sciences. Scholars have drawn models from all of the other social science disciplines and from all of the other subfields of political science, the traditional home of the subfield. In the same vein, the work of scholars whose primary intellectual home is in other fields has been recognized and adopted as one’s own by the field.

In 1997-98 Thailand, Korea, and Indonesia were attacked by international financial interests convinced that the countries were not running their economies properly. The trio had borrowed heavily in hard currency, and were unable to repay their debts, at least in the short term. Money flowed out of Bangkok, Seoul, and Jakarta; currencies plummeted in value and interest rates went sky-high; unemployment spurted upward. The Indonesian government fell, and the others barely averted collapse. The IMF insisted on draconian measures before providing financial assistance. With much greater reserves, even China and Japan skated near financial peril. The lesson was clear: no country is large enough to withstand huge financial drains imposed by the globalization of the world economy. To paraphrase the English poet, John Donne: No country is an island entire unto itself. Each is part of the main. Globalization has the effect of incapacitating states as autonomous units. Under its influence, states have come to rely on distant markets for raw materials, production, and finance, and have thereby become dependent on economic forces they do not control. In a globalized world, national governments are not able to insulate their citizens from the effects of world inflation and depression, causing unemployment and low growth.

Male and female Long-Evans rats were housed in inhalation chambers and exposed to vapors of nitromethane (NM) at either 100 or 200 ppm. The animals were exposed 7 hr per day, 5 days per week for 2 years. Control groups of rats were also housed in a similar inhalation chamber, but NM was not introduced into the chamber. The animals were observed daily for signs of pharmacologic or toxicologic effect and body weights were recorded periodically. At the 2-year termination of the exposure period, clinical laboratory examinations (serum chemistry and hematology) were performed on selected animals and all surviving animals were sacrificed. All animals were necropsied and subjected to a thorough histopathologic examination. During the study there were no pharmacologic effects from exposure to NM at either 100 or 200 ppm. There was no effect on mortality on either sex at either exposure level. Body weights of male rats exposed to NM were not significantly different from those of control rats, but the body weights of female rats of both exposure groups were slightly less than their controls. There was no effect of exposure of rats of either sex to either level of NM on hematology. There were no clinically significant effects on serum chemistry. There were no effects of exposure to NM on organ weights. There were no significant differences in the nonneoplastic or neoplastic pathology related to exposure to NM.

Comminuted fractures of the distal inch of the radius have always been difficult to stabilize. Closed reduction and plaster cast fixation frequently result in recurring deformity and some loss of wrist function. A method of closed pinning with proper placement of multiple small Kirschner wires to supplement plaster cast fixation in selected comminuted fractures helps retain anatomical position of the major fragments of the distal end of the radius. This method is sound in principle and we recommend its use in the treatment of severly comminuted fractures of the distal end of the radius.

Fasting plasma amino acid levels and 24hour amino acid losses in the dialysate were measured in six nondiabetic female and six diabetic male patients on CAPD. Comparison of their plasma amino acid values with sex matched controls showed that CAPD did not restore the plasma amino acid levels of these patients to normal, and that the abnormalities in the non-diabetics were more marked than in the diabetics. The daily total amino acid losses in the dialysate were small relative to protein intake, averaged 2.25 9 per day and were similar for the non-diabetic and diabetics. The concentrations of most amino acids in the dialysate were proportional to their plasma concentrations. Loss of amino acids in the dialysate does not account for the abnormal plasma patterns of CAPD patients.

Twenty-eight anemic control dogs were subjected to isolated cerebral hypoxemic (PO2,35+/-5 mm Hg) perfusion for 2 hours. All were found to have functional pulmonary impairment. Two hours later, twenty were sacrificed and found to have the bilateral anatomic complex of the respiratory distress syndrome (RDS). All those not sacrificed expired within 20 hours with progressive respiratory distress and at autopsy had the bilateral anatomic complex. Twenty-three beagles with chronic denervation (autotransplantation) of the left lung also were subjected to the 2 hour isolated cerebral arterial hypoxemic perfusion. Minimal pulmonary functional impairment was measurable in all. Ten of sixteen were long-term survivors. The six that succumbed did not appear to suffer respiratory deaths. These six, as well as seven sacrificed 2 hours after perfusion, had the anatomic complex of RDS in the normally innervated right lungs. However, the denervated left lungs were anatomically normal. These findings are offered as additional evidence that RDS has a centrineurogenic etiology. We postulate the following sequence: "shock" causes cerebral (probably hypothalamic) cellular oxygen deprivation and dysfunction; there is autonomically mediated, increased resistance of the pulmonary venules ("postcapillary sphincters"); this leads to capillary hypertension, congestion, hemorrhage, edema, surfactant inactivation, and atelectasis. Pulmonary denervation blocks this sequence and protects the lung.

The paper reviews the theoretical formulations and the empirical tests of the proposition that external conflict increases internal cohesion. Literature from sociology, anthropology, psychology, and political science is discussed. Though it is often assumed to be true and is easily illustrated, the empirical studies suggest that there are a number of intervening variables and that the hypothesis is not uniformly true. While hardly adequate, these empirical studies provide a subtler specification of the hypothesis, knowledge of which can lead researchers to structure their studies differently. Examples of this are provided and other areas of application are also discussed.

It is perhaps a paradox that history, the discipline which is closest to the raw stuff of politics, economics, and international affairs, has produced so little in agreed conclusions about such matters. Historians have managed to disagree about issues of great importance even though the data at their fingertips would seem to provide a substantial foundation for accord. Certain scholars have declared that World War I occurred because of an imbalance in international power (Hinsley, 1962); others have declared that it resulted from too great a balance (Langer, 1953). The question of responsibility for the war is still unresolved: Albertini, Fischer, and his disciples see Germany at fault; Langer, Fay, Turner, Ritter, and others believe the blame must be more evenly distributed. The divergence over World War I is magnified when one approaches World War I1 and the Cold War. Here "revisionist" contend with "traditional" interpretations, and there is no end to the argument in sight. Paul Schroeder contends in his companion piece in this issue that the assumptions and methods of our work in the Situational Analysis Project are questionable and fail to meet historical requirements. We propose to show in rejoinder that the assumptions and methods we have used are fully cognizant of the difficulties he mentions, and indeed have bcen designed to overcome some of the

The study of regimes can contribute to our understanding of international politics only if regimes represent more than international organizations and less than all international relations. The conceptualization of regimes developed here accepts the realist image of international politics, in which autonomous self-interested states interact in an anarchic environment. Yet there are situations in which rational actors have an incentive to eschew unconstrained independent decision making, situations in which individualistic self-interested calculation leads them to prefer joint decision making (regimes) because independent self-interested behavior can result in undesirable or suboptimal outcomes. These situations are labeled dilemmas of common interests and dilemmas of common aversions. To deal with these, states must collaborate with one another or coordinate their behavior, respectively. Thus there are different bases for regimes, which give rise to regimes with different characteristics. Coordination is self-enforcing and can be reached through the use of conventions. Collaboration is more formalized and requires mechanisms both to monitor potential cheating and to insure compliance with the regime. The article elucidates the assumptions of such an interest-based approach to regimes, assimilates alternative explanations into this framework, and develops the implications for regime maintenance and change.

Six non-diabetic CAPD patients were infused over six hours with two litres of a dialysis solution containing 2 g/ dl amino acids (a mixture of essentials and non-essentials). The osmolality of the solution and the amount of ultrafiltration it induced were simiiar to that of a 4.25 g% dextrose Dianeal solution (control), suggesting that an amino acid solution is an efficient osmotic agent. By the end of the six-hour infusion, 80 to 90% of the amino acids present in the dialysis solution had been absorbed. One hour after the infusion was instituted, plasma amino acid levels increased threefold and subsequently decreased to near the initial value by the sixth hour. The amino acid solution was as effective as the dextrose solution in removing urea nitrogen, creatinine and potassium. Our data indicate that intraperitoneal administration of amino acids is effective and well-tolerated in patients on CAPD. We believe further work should be done to determine whether long-term administration of amino acids by this route will improve the nutritional status of these patients and prevent the side effects of daily absorption of large amounts of glucose.

The haloed line effect is a technique where when a line in three-dimensional space passes in front of another line, a gap is produced in the projection of the more distant line. The gap is produced as if an opaque halo surrounded the closer line. This method for approximate hidden-line-elimination is advantageous because explicit surface equations are not necessary. The relative depth of lines, axes, curves and lettering is easily perceived. This technique is especially suitable for the display of finite element grids, three-dimensional contour maps and ruled surfaces. When the lines or curves on a surface are closer than the gap size, the gaps produced close up to produce a complete hidden-line-elimination. A simple but efficient implementation is described which can be used in the rendering of a variety of three-dimensional situations.

Liberal international trade regimes do not emerge from the policies of one state, even a hegemonic one. Trade liberalization among major trading states is, rather, the product of tariff bargains. Thus, hegemons need followers and must make concessions to obtain agreements. The liberal trade regimes that emerged in both the 19th and the 20th centuries were founded on asymmetric bargains that permitted discrimination, especially against the hegemon. The agreements that lowered tariff barriers led to freer trade not free trade; resulted in subsystemic rather than global orders; and legitimated mercantilistic and protectionist practices of exclusion and discrimination, and thus did not provide a collective good. Moreover, these trade agreements (and trade disputes as well) had inherently international political underpinnings and did not reflect economic interests alone. Trade liberalization also required a certain internal strength on the part of the government. Furthermore, only a complete political rupturing of relations, such as occurs in wartime, can destroy such a regime. A hegemon's decline cannot do so alone. These arguments are developed in a historical reassessment of the evolution of the international trading order since 1820. Eras commonly seen as liberal, such as the 1860s, are shown to have included a good deal of protection, and eras seen as protectionist, such as the 1880s, are shown to have been much more liberal than is usually believed.

This essay is an analysis of the implications of misperception—the inaccurate assessment by one actor of the other actor's preferences—in international relations. The author finds that misperception cannot affect the choice of an actor with a dominant strategy, although it can affect that actor's expectations as long as both actors are self-interested and seek to maximize their own payoffs. Misperception creates conflict only in a narrowly circumscribed range of situations, and even then the misperceived actor has no incentive to mask its true preferences. An actor who deceives does so in order to facilitate coordination through the other's misperception of its preferences, and thus to avoid conflict—not to create it. Three possible outcomes can occur when both actors misperceive, and in only one of the three does misperception cause conflict that would otherwise be avoidable. In a formal analysis of the limited set of situations that characterize international crises, misperception is found neither to create conflict nor to lead to the escalation of crisis into war.

Male and female Sprague-Dawley rats were exposed by inhalation to 2-nitropropane at a concentration of 25 ppm for 7 hr per day, 5 days per week over a period of 22 months. Groups of animals were killed periodically during the study for interim evaluations and all animals remaining alive were killed after 22 months of exposure. Histologic preparations were made from all major organs and tissues from each animal and examined microscopically. No incidence of benign or malignant tumors, nor any lesion, nor the onset of any disease was observed which could be attributed to the exposure to 2-nitropropane. The pattern of tumor formation which was observed was similar to that usually observed in the aging rat, in particular, the multiple endocrine tumor syndrome. The distribution of tumors and other lesions was similar in control and exposed groups of rats.

Anemic beagles were subjected to 40 mm Hg hemorrhagic shock for 2 hours, which uniformly induced the pulmonary lesions of the "respiratory distress syndrome" (RDS) bilaterally in all six controls. For six subjects with complete denervation of the left lung 2 months previously, the shock regimen induced the lesions in the normally innervated right lungs; all reimplanted, denervated left lungs remained anatomically intact. This is presented as additional evidence for a centrineurogenic etiology for RDS.

Summary The cerebral metabolic equivalent of the stagnant hypoxia of shock was produced in fifty subjects of seven different species of laboratory animal (dogs, calves, pigs, sheep, goat, rabbits, and rhesus monkeys). A benign perfusion technic was used to deliver autologous venous blood with a pO 2 of 35 mm Hg, while maintaining normal systemic arterial pO 2 , pressure, volume, and the like. The pathophysiologic complex of the acute respiratory distress syndrome developed in each. Newborn animals had a particularly fulminant course, with a pulmonary picture indistinguishable from that of clinical hyaline membrane disease. These pulmonary complications have a centrineurogenic basis. We postulate the sequence to be as follows: impaired cerebral oxidative metabolism with derangement of hypothalamic function; autonomically mediated, increased pulmonary venular resistance; engorged and hypertensive capillaries; hemorrhage and edema; inactivation of surfactant and atelectasis; and hyaline membranes. This appears to be a universal, species-independent phenomenon.