Search

The annexation of Crimea undoubtedly marked yet another turning point in Russian history. Vladimir Putin's move may well be compared to the Soviet military's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The [...]

The 2008-09 financial crisis demonstrated that gas and oil exports could no longer serve as Russia's engine of economic progress and the source of a steady rise in personal incomes. Russia needed to dramatically change its investment climate through deep institutional reforms that would boost economic liberty, expand the rule of law and property rights, diminish corruption, and create more political choices for its citizens. Such reforms are all the more urgent now as Russia's economy is slowing to a crawl and trust in President Vladimir Putin is steadily declining. Yet the Kremlin has chosen to address these challenges with authoritarian consolidation, buying short-term stability at the expense of the country's longer-term prosperity and progress. Elements of the Kremlin's massive propaganda campaign include militarized patriotism and patriotic education; a selective recovery of Soviet symbols and ideals; the ultraconservative Russian Orthodox Church as the moral foundation of the regime; the promotion of a culture of subservience; and the intimidation, stigmatization, and repression of civil society and its vanguard, nongovernmental organizations. Yet instead of producing the consolidation and unity expected by the Kremlin, this campaign may yield polarization, radicalism, and violence that will prevent the country's peaceful and inclusive transition to a more dignified version of citizenship., After the impressive growth of national and personal incomes between 2000 and 2008, Russia's economy has slowed sharply: at most, only 1.5 to 2.0 percent growth is projected for this [...]

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY A NOTE ON THE METHODOLOGY AND THE LIMITATIONS OF APPLICABILITY BACKGROUND US Policy Russia's 'New' Middle-Class Protesters A Literature Review: Civil Society and Grass-Roots Organizations and Movements [...]

Civic unrest is a moving target. For experts and policymakers alike, the dilemma is captured in idioms as well-worn as they are accurate: a flash in the pan or the tip of an iceberg? Do demonstrations and rallies manifest intense but fleeting anger and frustration, or do they represent an enduring and widening trend that may eventually force major reforms or even a regime change? Russia's backsliding on democracy and human rights has for a decade been largely ignored or benignly neglected in relations between Washington and Moscow. A new generation of politically active Russians and an enduring prodemocracy movement would necessitate crafting an effective approach that reaffirms the moral essence of US foreign policy., The 'Mink Coats' or the Middle Class? Having reached their crescendo on Prospekt Sakharova and Bolotnaya Square between December 2011 and February 2012, by this summer, the Russian rallies have [...]

Last July, Daniel Vajdic and 1 traveled through Russia to interview leaders of six grass-roots organizations and movements. Among the many fascinating themes that have emerged from the nearly forty hours of interviews, perhaps the most powerful is these individuals' conviction that the meaningful and lasting liberalization of the country may be ensured by only a mature, self-aware civil society, able and willing to control the executive. The main avenue for such a change would not be a political revolution in the conventional sense, nor would it be brought from above by a good tsar or a hero. 1nstead, the hope is predicated on a deeply moral transformation from within. Effecting such an evolution toward enlightened and morally anchored democratic citizenship appears to be the overarching meta-goal of the organizations, above and beyond their daily agendas. This objective is all the more remarkable because it diverges from the Russian historical tradition and political culture., How close these and many other grass-roots organizations and movements have come to achieving the goal of democratic citizenship may be tested very soon as the Vladimir Putin regime appears [...]

Last July, Daniel Vajdic and I traveled through Russia to interview leaders of six grass-roots organizations and movements. In three weeks, we traversed Russia from the far east to the [...]

In the past decade, Russia has experienced explosive growth in the spread of the Internet and its applications. As in other authoritarian regimes, where the national media are state controlled, censored, or self-censored, the Russian 'net' has become 'a shelter in the world of censorship.' (1) In this 'shelter' capacity, 'Ru.net,' as it is known in Russia, is reminiscent of samizdat (literally, 'self-publishing'), an underground network of banned fiction and nonfiction copied and clandestinely disseminated in the Soviet Union in the 1960s and 1970s. Samizdat was central to preserving at least a trickle of uncensored information during the bleakest years of the Brezhnev 'stagnation,' and in doing so paved the way for perestroika and glasnost. In breaking outside the perimeter of officially sanctioned public debate, Ru.net harks back to its legendary predecessor. It thus may be named nyetizdat, since in Russian 'no' and 'net' have an identical spelling and sound. (2) Growing daily in penetration and sophistication, nyetizdat is a major and evolving factor in Russian politics today and, even more so, tomorrow., Of course, just as today's authoritarian Russia is not the totalitarian Soviet Union of the 1970s, so too does nyetizdat differ from samizdat, not only in its medium but also [...]

In Moscow, a striking contrast exists between signs of economic revival after the 2008-2009 crisis and the general pessimism among intellectuals, opposition leaders, top analysts, entrepreneurs, and media figures. An investigation of this paradox points to several explanations. Unlike a few years ago, there is a pervasive sense that the political and economic model Vladimir Putin offered the country--stability in exchange for 'guided/sovereign democracy,' sustained by state-guided oil- and gas-driven growth--is nearly exhausted. Disillusionment with President Dmitri Medvedev's ability to translate liberal rhetoric into action and implement meaningful reforms adds to the despondence. The presidential election of 2012, which some view as no more than carefully scripted political theater, offers no hope for change. While the elite's rapidly diminishing loyalty to the Kremlin is by no means a sign of an imminent crisis, it is a necessary and significant component of any radical change in the future. At the moment, the circumstances point to the gradual erosion of legitimacy and political institutions--or a sudden collapse of the regime, like the recent Egyptian antiauthoritarian revolt., Reflecting the general economic upturn, Moscow is in the midst of yet another of the minibooms it has undergone since the first signs of post-Soviet economic revival in 1997. One [...]