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Ecological life choices, influenced by the individual morality-driven reflection on nature, ecosophy, seems to be a perfect embodiment of Charles Taylor’s strong evaluations. The purpose of the following text is to establish the linkage between these two, seemingly entirely separate concepts, which have never before been brought side by side. The article portrays ecosophy as a possible part of the strong evaluations. It also indicates the relationship between the theoretical and practical dimension of the two concepts, which not only have the possibility of coexisting within the same person, but also mutually reinforce each other’s realizations. To explore the issue, I primarily used selected publications by the authors mentioned in the title: Arne Naess and Charles Taylor. It was the analysis of these works that led me to the thesis of the application of one term in the other and to the final conclusions and doubts. The latter, concerning, among other things, the differences in the understanding of particular words used by the two contemporary philosophers, will become a trigger for further consideration of the applications of strong evaluations. These doubts will also open the door to a discussion of ecosophy on a different ground than up until now.

Though many scholars acknowledge that the life and philosophy of Gandhi influenced Arne Naess and his eco-philosophy (deep ecology), the influence of Gandhi on Naess and his eco-philosophy (deep ecology) has largely been neglected in the available literature. The present paper argues that Gandhi’s impact was profoundly important and influenced some key concepts, such as the Self and self-realization of deep ecology. It is explained that most of the scholars have ignored Gandhi in the process of understanding different influences on Naess and his eco-philosophy (deep ecology) because they find Hindu, especially Advaita Vedanta philosophy, incompatible with some of the basic concepts of Naess’s eco-philosophy (deep ecology). However, it is argued that it is not proper and correct to see Gandhi as either Hindu or Vedantic to understand the influence of Gandhi on some key concepts of deep ecology. It is further explained that the influence of Gandhi on Naess is more appropriately explained and understood when Gandhi’s ideas of Self and Self-realization are seen in this light of Mahayana Buddhist philosophy [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of XVIIe Siècle is the property of Presses Universitaires de France and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article explores representations of natural phenomena in the second novel in the James Bond series, Ian Fleming's Live and Let Die (London: Penguin, [1954] 2008). Several critics have noted the enjoyment Fleming derived from his Jamaican home, adjacent to the ocean. His relationship with the ocean and nature, particularly birds, is evident in his writing. Although the novel is firmly in the thriller/spy genre, the many references to natural phenomena provide the reader with points of reflection about humanity and the environment. The article demonstrates that although Fleming wrote in the thriller/spy genre, a significant element of his writing has value in the field of ecocriticism. The article draws on critic Greg Garrard, who refers to those who use nature for their own purposes as the Cornucopians. Other critics whose work informs this reading of Fleming's novel include Arne Naess, a central figure in Deep Ecology, and Rachel Carson, who pioneered our understanding of the human relationship with the oceans. The work of Jacques-Yves Cousteau (whom Fleming knew personally) and Peter Godfrey-Smith is also considered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The environment is the medium (spatial-cultural-political-social) that surrounds the individual, affects him and is affected by him, and the environment in which the individual lives is the only recourse in front of him to preserve his existence. Man, in pursuit of achieving and maintaining his survival, must preserve the rest of the other non-human assets in order to preserve the ecosystem, by making him a member of the earth’s society equal in value to the rest of the other creatures in the environment. Rather, he considers nonhuman beings to have a feeling just like humans, and this means that man is on the same level as other beings, and if rights are related to the right to life and existence, then man should not go beyond his limits because other assets have the right to exist. On the same path, Nice became clear when he emphasized that man must preserve the environment in which he lives by reducing technology and making strong political decisions related to production and curtailing the capitalist system, and spreading a deep ecological culture based on deep questions, and Nice presented a set of conditions for the use of technology In society so that he can preserve the environment and not harm other assets, and he emphasized that if rights relate to the right to exist and survive, then the human being will prevail and meet the basic needs that preserve his existence, even if it is at the expense of some types of non-human assets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the dichotomy of humans/nature paves the way for human beings' supremacy to treat nature as they desire, this dichotomy has obtained a primary role in environmental ethics. Discerning the entanglement of human beings and nature, the deep ecology movement by criticizing this dichotomy, provided some useful results for environmental ethics, worth to mention the uprising against the humans' aggressive dominance in culture and civilization in Western countries, true humane self-realization through self-transcendence, and the consideration of the rehabilitation of missing rights of nonhuman beings. Despite these valuable points, this movement has some deficiencies which can be cured by the reformation of its ideas through a religious-theological perspective. Having no coherence philosophy that results in vague and general claims about ecological issues, the absence of a comprehensive program as a ground for a specific life hierarchy, neglecting the high status of humanity, and its ineffectiveness in undeveloped countries are among the deficiencies of this movement. This article explains these issues analytically.

The increasing global warming and the loss of biodiversity should concern us all. Some feel that outdoor activities, which take place in natural surroundings, should have a special obligation to change. In this article I present an example of what an outdoor life practice that responds to the ecological crisis could look like. I use the simple Norwegian outdoor life called friluftsliv, and the deep ecological version suggested by philosopher and climber Arne Næss (1912–2009) as an example and case. Naessian friluftsliv is interesting and relevant in three ways. First, Naess gave a philosophical basis for friluftsliv, building on deep ecology and Spinozism. Second, he presented content, norms and guidelines for a deep ecological friluftsliv. And third, he gave examples of such friluftsliv through his own practice of simple life in nature. Naess thus presents a radical alternative to present-day resource-consuming and specialized outdoor activities and nature sports. Finally, Naess's version of deep ecological friluftsliv is discussed in relation to alternative theoretical approaches and to critical questions concerning friluftsliv as practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The time has come to consider whether experimental philosophy's ("x-phi") early arguments, debates, and conceptual frameworks, that may have worn well in its early days, fit with the diverse range of projects undertaken by experimental philosophers. Our aim is to propose a novel taxonomy for x-phi that identifies four paths from empirical findings to philosophical consequences, which we call the "fourfold route." We show how this taxonomy can be fruitfully applied even at what one might have taken to be the furthest edges of possible applications of x-phi in metaphysics and formal philosophy. Ultimately, the fourfold route helps us understand a different kind of empirical fact: the development of x-phi itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the contemporary food system using ethical philosophy, in hopes that this may help elucidate how to move forward in righting a system that leaves a wake of hunger, obesity, and environmental degradation.  I have chosen to focus on the work of Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess, concentrating on his ecological ethics because of the way in which agriculture represents the meeting of, and blurring between, the human and the natural realms.  My research first involved a survey of popular and academic works on the contemporary food system, focusing on broader analyses of political-economy, human and environmental impacts, and historical development.  My research also involved a survey of Arne Naess’s work, from his earlier writings and articulation of Deep Ecology in the middle of the 20th century until his death in 2009.  My research found that the main obstacle to building a more just food system is not a lack of ethical clarity, but rather the structural barriers of the capitalist economic system.  I argue that ecological ethics must be a catalyst for systematic change, and that the possibility of the immediate realization of an ecological ethos is quite limited within the current political-economic system.

In 1985 Kurt Vonnegut produced a satirical novel entitled Galapagos, in which the author explored a possible earth set one million years in the future. Human beings “have quietly evolved into sleek, furry creatures with flippers, and small brains.”[1] Vonnegut posits a world in which human logic, derived from the functioning of three-kilogramme brains, has resulted in the downfall of the species, prior to the evolution of the seal-like creatures. This article explores the novel from an ecocritical perspective, including references to the work of Greg Garrard, Rachel Carson and Arne Naess. Charles Darwin’s work is also considered, because the novel’s title and setting allude to his work on evolution. This article will argue that Vonnegut believes human beings should change their thought and behaviour patterns if we are to have an optimistic future. [1] This quote is from the blurb on the back cover of the Flamingo edition, 1994. https://doi.org/10.19108/KOERS.85.1.2491

Dance and somatic educators have an important role to play addressing estrangement from the natural world. In this article, author Robert Bettmann considers how an experiential education model may apply to design of public eco-somatic programmes, and how such programmes may empower practitioners within broader efforts to reconnect humanity to the natural world. Many eco-somatic programmes focus on transmission of information from a teacher directly to a student in a natural context, and an experiential education curriculum model may encourage design of more self-guided approaches appropriate for larger groups. The author reviews theories at the intersection of dance, somatics, and the environment, including the theory of Somatic Ecology, and the example of the Anacostia Swim Club. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In terms of their substantive research interests and their epistemological approach, the sociology of knowledge and the history of knowledge show significant enough similarities to allow shared theory development. In this article, I argue that the recent work by Jeffrey C. Alexander on 'dramatic intellectuals' can offer a useful point of departure for such an undertaking. Alexander's interest in the way intellectuals provide meaning-making narratives for their audiences can be seen as not unlike the interest of historians of knowledge in examining how knowledge circulates in society. Indeed, one can go as far as to claim Alexander's postulates about dramatic intellectuals to constitute a theory of knowledge circulation. To demonstrate the point and the relevance of his work to the sociology and history of knowledge more in general, two brief case studies are presented: that of the Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss and that of the Swedish philosopher Ingemar Hedenius. Many of their activities in the early post-war period, it is shown, can be viewed as attempts at meaning-construction through narratives formulated to help the broader public orient itself in the world in difficult times. The argument is made that the sociology of knowledge and the history of knowledge need, accordingly, to pay more attention to the central category of meaning in the study of intellectuals and their audiences. This can be profitably done by departing from the observation of Alexander's that what enables knowledge to circulate in society is its dramatic conveyance through well-formulated meaning-making narratives that help social actors make sense of their circumstances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines how, in the early years of the post-war period, the Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss (1912–2009) set about to reform the so-called Examen Philosophicum degree at the University of Oslo, based on the experiences he and his circle of students underwent during World War II and under the Nazi German occupation of Norway from 1940 to 1945. (Examen Philosophicum is a preparatory degree that all Norwegian university students still today have to complete before going on to further study in their subject). Næss’s hope was that thanks to his reform, future students would be less likely to fall prey to authoritarian and anti-democratic teachings. The argument is developed that Næss’s reform proposals were, for him, a way to process the cultural trauma of the war and occupation for Norwegian society. They, and Næss’s educational ideas more broadly, are contrasted with the ideas of the Christian and conservative thinkers in the so-called Annen front (Second Front) group who looked to the heritage of the Western antiquity and Christianity as the means for dealing with the trauma of the war and the occupation. In conclusion, some parallels are drawn to how, at around the same time, the Danish philosopher Jørgen Jørgensen (1894–1969) approached the problem in post-occupation Denmark, engaging prominently in the country’s so-called Democracy Debate of 1945–1946. The article takes its theoretical point of departure in Jeffrey Alexander’s work on cultural trauma.

Arne Naess was one of the first philosopher who try to find out a way to resolve the ecological crisis through philosophy. By analysing some of the main point of Naess‘ philosophy, the essay shows that his main interest was to legitimize the ecological movement. Philosophy becomes a political instrument and assumes a tragical character, because it takes on an impossible project. For Naess philosophy should provide a new total view to change man‘s attitude to nature. This analysis could help us to find out some critical points of a philosophy that try to be useful in the ecological crisis.

In recent decades the concept of sustainability has gained great prominence in the public debate and academic research as well. Today, it is a fundamental concept to address the complex crisis we are facing at planetary scales. However, after several decades, its definition is still associated with vague and ambiguous notions that are ultimately decimating its role as a guiding framework for a more sustainable living. There is still an important gap between its theory and its praxis. The article generates a philosophical deconstruction of the sustainability concept as a necessary action to address this difficulty. This examination allows to philosophically reconstruct fundamental characteristics of its content. The article suggests and argues that a relevant component of sustainability is its regulatory function in the sphere of human relations. It suggests that sustainability is a regulative idea that works as a guide - a working concept - in the case of dilemmas that stem from the problem of maintaining responsibility towards future generations and the environment. From this standpoint, the article explores key aspects of sustainability as an ethically grounded concept and finally reflects about some applicative and educational implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The objective of the paper is to present philosophical positions arguing the unity of nature: from the pantheistic doctrine of the Stoics and the version of pantheism proposed by G. Bruno and B. Spinoza, through the Leibniz concept which assumes that every element of nature is spiritual and capable of intentional actions, to contemporary doctrines. One of the concepts – the “deep ecology” of A. Naess, emphasizes the need for the subjective treatment of every element of nature – people, animals and plants; it postulates the specific equality of all species. The assumptions of eco-philosophy are perfectly in line with the findings of contemporary nature researchers proving that the bonds between individual elements of a given ecosystem are deeper than previously assumed, forming a complex multi-level network. A violation of the precisely developed balance can have far-reaching negative effects including for humankind. Modern philosophers stress that people responsible for shaping ecological policy should aim at protecting entire ecosystems, and they should ensure the maintenance of its balance. This philosophical message can be dedicated especially to the politicians responsible for the decision on the unprecedented logging of the Bialowieza Forest.

In this paper, we discuss Næss's concept of ecological self in light of the process of identification and the idea of self-realization, in order to understand the asymmetrical relationship among human beings and nature. In this regard, our hypothesis is that Næss does not use the concept of the ecological self to justify ontology of processes, or definitively overcome the idea of individual entities in view of a transpersonal ecology, as Fox argues. Quite the opposite: Næss's ecological self is nothing but an echo of the theme of the home and of belonging to a place (i.e., dwelling), and, therefore, it deals with a positive relationship of the individual with its environment. This allows us to reshape environmental ethics starting from environmental ontology, and recalling the primacy of the latter on the former: the very theoretic background of an ethical view might only be a suitable interpretation of human nature and properties, starting from a relational viewpoint that may help understanding us our asymmetrical relationships with the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Experimental philosophy often draws its data from questionnaire-based surveys of ordinary intuitions. Its proponents are keen to identify antecedents in the work of philosophers who have referred to intuition and everyday understanding [e.g. Knobe, Joshua, and Shaun Nichols, 'An Experimental Philosophy Manifesto'. In Experimental Philosophy, edited by Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols, 3-14. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007]. In this context, 'Empirical Semantics', pioneered by Arne Naess early in the twentieth century, offers striking parallels. Naess believed that much contemporary philosophy was unempirical because it made no reference to ordinary understanding or use of language. In response, he attempted large-scale studies of ordinary understanding of philosophically significant terms [e.g. Naess, Arne. 'Truth' as Conceived by Those Who Are Not Professional Philosophers. Oslo: Jacob Dybwad, 1938]. This article will compare Empirical Semantics and experimental philosophy, and assess what such a comparison reveals that might not be apparent from a consideration of either in isolation. It will concentrate on two points of comparison: the wider philosophical ambitions of the two approaches, and the types of criticisms they have encountered. Naess was straightforwardly interested in folk intuitions as philosophical data, whereas many experimental philosophers are also interested in explaining the intuitions themselves. A comparison of the different types of criticism reveals attitudes to philosophical practice which have recurred across a time period of some eighty years, and those which are more specific to historical context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Alfred Tarski’s refinement of an account of truth into a formal system that turns on the acceptance of Convention-T has had a lasting impact on philosophical logic, especially work concerning truth, meaning, and other semantic notions. In a series of studies completed from the 1930s to the 1960s, Arne Næss collected and analysed intuitive responses from non-philosophers to questions concerning truth, synonymy, certainty, and probability. Among the formulations of truth studied by Næss were practical variants of expressions of the form “p’ is true if and only if p’. This paper calls attention to a series of experimental results Næss overlooked in his original study. These data collectively suggest that acceptance of expressions of the form “p’ is true if and only if p’ varies according to what kind of statement p is. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In the present paper we want to argue that Wearable Robots (i.e., technological devices used to restore the possibility of walking and re-establishing "normal" human life) should not necessarily be anthropomorphic, in order to respect human autonomy, freedom and nature. Moreover, we argue that this non-anthropomorphism does not necessarily lead to transhumanism. To adequately discuss this topic, we are called to consider various aspects embedded in the question: the difference between restoring and enhancing, i.e., the difference between considering human nature as normative, or will (or wish) as the main criterion of choice; the difference between exceeding the limits of human nature (i.e., human enhancement) and restoring human functions and finally, the nature of the function itself. We will introduce a "weak" notion of autonomy and freedom, dealing with rehabilitation and motility, in order to assess the use of Wearable Robots in rehabilitative medicine. Hence we will argue that the less constraints that patients have, the freer they are. All these aspects also imply an anthropological and ecological view, since they have to do with the relationship of the human being with its environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Text zkoumá základní charakteristiky filosofického konceptu Arne Naesse, přibližuje jejich spojitost s osobností autora i vybranými rysy historického vývoje evropské kultury první poloviny 20. století a snaží se poukázat na jisté rozporuplné tendence Naessovy ekosofie T.

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The poetry of the Welsh writer John Barnie (born in Abergavenny, southeast Wales, in 1941) is significantly haunted by the inhumanity of the places in which humanity must make its way. From his earliest work, Barnie's writing has figured an anti-arcadian struggle in which the transience of human life is set against the vast processes of evolutionary biology and geological change. Whilst acknowledging humanity's potential impact on non-human life as well as the attraction of human language itself, Barnie's basic position is that the human will always, ultimately, be swept away by non-human forces. As such, his artistic vision is rooted in the sense of a fundamental incommensurability between human beings and their inhuman locales — a position that Barnie articulates most fully in his verse novel, Ice (2001), which figures a post-apocalyptic and absolutely unforgiving non-human world with which humanity is locked in brutal and hopeless conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents the idea of deep incarnation in outline. In dialogue with Wentzel van Huyssteen's interpretation of imago Dei and Christology on the one hand and with Arne Næss's notion of deep ecology on the other hand, it is claimed that evolutionary continuity is as important for Christology as is the evolutionary distinctiveness of the human species. Without a strong continuity between the historical figure of Jesus and the cosmos at large, we end up in a culturally confined Christology. But without referring to the unique human identity of Jesus Christ, we would speak of a Logos principle thinly spread over the universe rather than of Jesus Christ as the living divine bond in and between everything that exists. Incarnation is 'deep' both in contradistinction to a purely anthropocentric Christology and as opposed to more shallow proposals of a universalist Christology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Today people seem to have endless consumption needs while the world we live in is finite with limited resources. This easily leads to an ecological crisis. Arne Naess and different representatives of the current „deep ecology" ask and explain „ecological wisdom "in an attempt to find a solution for this crisis. This situation considers the basic dispute between the choice of human lifestyles, such as affirming the value of personal wealth, against the best interest of nature and natural resources. It is asked: What are the implications between the growth of consumption and the exploitation of nature? The present article takes up the difficult task of presenting basic ideas of deep ecology in the context of other ecological theories and praxis. It characterizes the dispute between deep ecology and different proposals of preservation of nature and the resolution of the global ecological crisis. Furthermore, it represents a critical analysis of the philosophical basis of deep ecology and points to the Christian/Franciscan attitudes of brotherhood towards our „smaller brothers" - the plants and animals.

This paper focuses on the assertion of the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess (1989: 20) that "ethics follow from how we experience the world." I discuss what the statement might mean when applied to Naessian Deep Ecology. There follows a discussion of the close cohesion between experience and practice in Naessian thought. I attend to Naess's descriptions of the relationship between mystical nature experience and "ecological enlightenment," in which he suggests that an intense union with nature will lead the experiencing individual to enact Deep Ecological thought, as Naess formulates it. I seek to amplify the definition of mystical nature experience with reference to William James's The Varieties of Religious Experience, and particularly to James's assertions about the effects of religious experience on individual action. Naess (1986: 225-239) has cited James's work as a significant influence on his understanding of the terms "self" and "experience." Is Naess advocating a need to reeducate people to experience nature, in the hope that environmental awareness will increase accordingly? What experience of nature would inspire an environmental ethic? I conclude by arguing that Naess's reformative agenda stands in a complex relationship to the emphasis on individual, mystical nature experience as the catalyst to "ecological enlightenment." This complexity has not been satisfactorily resolved within Naessian Deep Ecology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]