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Consciousness remains a formidable challenge. Different theories of consciousness have proposed vastly different mechanisms to account for phenomenal experience. Here, appealing to aspects of global workspace theory, higher-order theories, social theories, and predictive processing, we introduce a novel framework: the self-organizing metarerpresentational account (SOMA), in which consciousness is viewed as something that the brain learns to do. By this account, the brain continuously and unconsciously learns to redescribe its own activity to itself, so developing systems of metarepresentations that qualify target first-order representations. Thus, experiences only occur in experiencers that have learned to know they possess certain first-order states and that have learned to care more about certain states than about others. In this sense, consciousness is the brain’s (unconscious, embodied, enactive, nonconceptual) theory about itself., info:eu-repo/semantics/published

This study is part of a larger attempt to explore how the brain produces conscious experience. Our main objective here was to take advantage of a neural signature conveyed by the steady-state visual evoked potentials (SSVEP) technique (1) to explore the extent to which complex visual images can be processed in the absence of consciousness and (2) to determine whether this tool can be used to shed light on participants’ phenomenal experience of these images. To this end, we embedded faces within sequences of non-face stimuli and manipulated their contrast to create a subliminal condition. Our results were threefold. First, we show that a significant brain activation can be delineated with the SSVEP tool even when participants report being unable to see the stimuli. In this subliminal condition, the brain response was confined to the back of the scalp. Second, we observe that the face signal increases in magnitude and propagates bilaterally along a posterior-to-anterior axis as image contrast increases. Third, we suggest that SSVEP could be used as a novel instance of a no-report paradigm because it requires no overt behavioural response, and because at some contrast levels and electrodes, its outputs (signal magnitude and scalp topography) predict people’s self-reported phenomenal experience.

Can people categorize complex visual scenes unconsciously? The possibility of unconscious perception remains controversial. Here, we addressed this question using psychophysical methods applied to unmasked visual stimuli presented for extremely short durations (in the μsec range) by means of a custom-built modern tachistoscope. Our experiment was composed of two phases. In the first phase, natural or urban scenes were either absent or present (for varying durations) on the tachistoscope screen, and participants were simply asked to evaluate their subjective perception using a 3-points scale (absence of stimulus, stimulus detection or stimulus identification). Participants' responses were tracked by means of two staircases. The first psychometric function aimed at defining participants' proportion of subjective detection responses (i.e. not having seen anything vs. having seen something without being able to identify it), while the second staircase tracked the proportion of subjective identification rates (i.e. being unaware of the stimulus' category vs. being aware of it). In the second phase, the same participants performed an objective categorization task in which they had to decide, on each trial, whether the image was a natural vs. an urban scene. A third staircase was used in this phase so as to build a psychometric curve reflecting the objective categorization performance of each participant. In this second phase, participants also rated their subjective perception of each stimulus on every trial, exactly as in the first phase of the experiment. Our main result is that objective categorization performance, here assumed to reflect the contribution of both conscious and unconscious trials, cannot be explained based exclusively on conscious trials. This clearly suggests that the categorization of complex visual scenes is possible even when participants report being unable to consciously perceive the contents of the stimulus., SCOPUS: ar.j, info:eu-repo/semantics/published