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This study performs a meta-regression analysis of studies examining the efficacy of arms embargoes in stopping weapons transfers to target countries. Based on the existing body of literature, the effectiveness of arms embargoes remains a subject of debate, contingent on both the rigorous enforcement of the embargo by the sender and the embargo-busting practices of exporting countries. Drawing upon a dataset comprising over 150 estimates, the findings of this analysis suggest that there is only a weak, yet statistically significant, negative impact of arms embargoes on arms transfers to target states. This result implies that, on average, arms embargoes are only successful to a limited extent in impeding or reducing the arms trade with these nations. However, the findings also demonstrate that there is substantial heterogeneity in the embargo effect reported across the primary studies, indicating that certain embargoes still exhibit strong efficacy. Specifically, comprehensive obligatory arms embargoes that are imposed by multiple senders substantially reduce the major conventional arms transfers to target states, particularly within the first year of their imposition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conventional arms control imposes costs and benefits on states in civil wars: it restricts their own armament and that of rebel groups. I argue that the benefits outweigh the costs because states design conventional arms control measures that primarily curb rebels' armament. I investigate these arguments through regression analyses of United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voting records and a content analysis of UNGA speeches. While I find a positive relationship between civil wars and support for conventional arms control in the aggregate, I also show that states in civil wars consider both the benefits and the costs of arms control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: The purpose of this study is to analyze the dynamic changes of the arms trade network not only from the network structure but also the influence mechanism from the aspects of the economy, politics, security, strategy and transaction costs. Design/methodology/approach: The study employs the Temporal Exponential Random Graph Model and the Separable Temporal Exponential Random Graph Model to analyze the endogenous network structure effect, the attribute effect and the exogenous network effect of 47 major arms trading countries from 2015 to 2020. Findings: The results show that the international arms trade market is unevenly distributed, and there are great differences in military technology. There is a fixed hierarchical structure in the arms trade, but the rise of emerging countries is expected to break this situation. In international arms trade relations, economic forces dominate, followed by political, security and strategic factors. Practical implications: Economic and political factors play an important role in the arms trade. Therefore, countries should strive to improve their economic strength and military technology. Also, countries should increase political mutual trust and gain a foothold in the industrial chain of arms production to enhance their military power. Originality/value: The contribution of this paper is to analyze the special trade area of arms trade from a dynamic network perspective by incorporating economic, political, security, strategic and transaction cost factors together into the TERGM and STERGM models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Arms transfers result from economic and political motives, with the latter often dominating the former. While this is accepted knowledge for the post‐World War II period, it seems not to apply earlier. Much existing research argues that in the interwar years, weapons were traded as purely commercial goods because governments had neither the ability nor willingness to control and direct arms transfers. We reassess this idea and argue that, while formal control was largely absent, governments could steer weapons shipments nonetheless because arms producers depended on them as main customers, sales agents, and financiers of their export business. Anecdotal evidence suggests that governments actively used this influence. To test whether interwar arms transfers were the result of political or commercial interests, we use newly collected, historical data on the small arms trade and inferential network analysis methods. Our results suggest that although economic drivers existed throughout the interwar period, political considerations were especially influential when international relations were hostile at the start and end of the period. This research contributes to our understanding of international economic relations between the world wars and of the drivers of arms transfers across time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Arms-exporting countries – even those that are liberal democracies – sell weapons to governments that violate human rights. Does the public support the provision of weapons to human rights violators? We examine public attitudes on arms exports through a survey experiment in Israel – a major arms exporter that is often criticized for arming repressive governments. Our analysis finds that human rights violations substantially increase the public's opposition to the sale of arms – by 21 percentage points. Furthermore, opposition to the arms sale arises even when the recipient country carries economic or strategic importance. Overall, we find a public preference for arms exports constrained by ethical concerns – a preference that is often at odds with governments' export practice. This study enhances our understanding of the domestic politics of the arms trade, which has received little scholarly attention, but increases in importance with rising public scrutiny and criticism of arms sales. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the relationship between the transparency of defense sector companies and the results obtained by defense sectors in various countries. To do so, the Defense Companies Index (DCI) and the Defense Sector Transparency Index (GDI), developed by Transparency International in 2020, are used. Through a quantitative methodology, which jointly analyses these indices, the aim is to understand both the contribution of private companies to the defense sector's transparency and the impact that the transparency of the defense sector has on companies in the industry. The results show a clear positive association in the case of public companies. In contrast, the association is not so evident in private companies, leading to the identification of four categories that reflect positive, neutral, or negative links between these companies and transparency in the defense sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The primary purpose of this article is the analysis of the evolution of bilateral relations between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) and the Russian Federation in the field of military cooperation. It gives answers to following research questions: 1) what is the role of defence collaboration in bilateral ties, 2) what are the most essential elements of Russia-Vietnam military relations, 3) what are the common reasons/ incentives for developing links regarding arms trade, 4) do the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and invasion of Ukraine in 2022 change goals of Vietnamese politics towards Moscow, 5) How do Chinese and US factor affect military cooperation between Russia and Vietnam? The theses of this paper assume that: 1) the government in Hanoi maintains friendly relations with Moscow on the political level in the face of the conflict in Ukraine and continues military cooperation, however Russian arms exports to Vietnam has declined, 2) Vietnam diversifies weapon trade partners expanding cooperation with Israel, Belarus, US and South Korea, but Russia still remains crucial arms importer for Hanoi. The analysis is focused mainly on the situation from 2002 to the present, and intends to examine the evolution of military cooperation between Hanoi and Moscow after the signing of the Declaration on Strategic Partnership. The article includes a short overview of Russia-Vietnam relations emphasizing its strong historical background. Paper is also focused on important arms trade contracts, agreements on military cooperation, includes statistics published by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) to show the scale of collaboration, and points out major challenges for future cooperation.

While ambiguity is a common feature of international obligations, there is a strong theoretical anticipation that ambiguities may be exploited, and obligations circumvented, under competing interests. This article largely backs this anticipation. The article scrutinises how ambiguous arms export control obligations are handled under strong incentives for arms export. The empirical case explored is the UK government's arms exports to Saudi Arabia during the war in Yemen. Exports continued despite evidence that the Saudi-led coalition was violating international humanitarian law (IHL) in Yemen, and despite obligations not to export if there is a risk that the exported equipment can be used in IHL violations. A resulting legal challenge against the UK government provides valuable information about the role of ambiguity in the implementation of arms export controls. Drawing on primary sources from the legal process, this article argues that the UK government has taken advantage of linguistic ambiguity. The article also argues that the government has engaged in the continuous construction of ambiguity around events in Yemen and around the ideal parameters for arms trade risk assessment. Together, these strategies have facilitated continued arms exports to Saudi Arabia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Networks are ubiquitous in economic research on organizations, trade, and many other areas. However, while economic theory extensively considers networks, no general framework for their empirical modeling has yet emerged. We thus introduce two different statistical models for this purpose – the Exponential Random Graph Model (ERGM) and the Additive and Multiplicative Effects network model (AME). Both model classes can account for network interdependencies between observations, but differ in how they do so. The ERGM allows one to explicitly specify and test the influence of particular network structures, making it a natural choice if one is substantively interested in estimating endogenous network effects. In contrast, AME captures these effects by introducing actor-specific latent variables affecting their propensity to form ties. This makes the latter a good choice if the researcher is interested in capturing the effect of exogenous covariates on tie formation without having a specific theory on the endogenous dependence structures at play. After introducing the two model classes, we showcase them through real-world applications to networks stemming from international arms trade and foreign exchange activity. We further provide full replication materials to facilitate the adoption of these methods in empirical economic research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The India-Russia strategic partnership has been characterized by a longstanding and mutually beneficial defence relationship that has spanned over fifty years. This partnership has witnessed a notable shift from a buyer-seller dynamic to joint development and production of cutting-edge weaponry. Consequently, a significant portion of India's defence arsenal is comprised of Soviet/Russian weapons systems. However, as India aims to diversify its sources of arms imports and promote greater self-reliance in defence production, Russia's prominent position in India's defence considerations is diminishing. Moreover, recent challenges stemming primarily from the Ukraine conflict have cast a shadow over this defence relationship.The focus is increasingly shifting towards how both countries can navigate practical and perceptual issues in their partnership. Furthermore, the exclusivity that India once enjoyed as the sole recipient of state-of-the-art Russian defence technology in its region, giving it a qualitative advantage over its adversaries, has been diluted with Russia now supplying advanced weaponry to China. Consequently, the Indo-Russian defence partnership is currently facing a significant test.This article critically examines and analyzes the ongoing trends in the India-Russia defence relationship and explores the implications arising from these developments. It seeks to shed light on the evolving dynamics and challenges that both countries must address in order to sustain and strengthen their defence partnership.

Progress made in European defence-industrial integration has been subjected to the hardest test with the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. The conflict has had profound implications for European defence industries across the board and spurred on massive investment into the sector. Based on extensive analysis of procurements, adopted policies, and shifts in discourse, we argue that the practical steps undertaken by Central and Eastern European (CEE) defence industries in the wake of the conflict are disintegrational. This is contrary to many discernible indicators which align with European integrational initiatives in defence. Moreover, the paper argues that the pattern of decisions taken by Central and Eastern European countries reinforces structural barriers to potential future European defence-industrial integration. The findings are significant to EU-wide, regional, and bilateral defence-industrial co-operation as well as national defence industrial strategies in reaction to the ongoing war in Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditionally, a grand strategy lays out the trade-offs a state must make in pursuit of security, thereby setting all aspects of foreign policy, from trade deals to defence budgets. This essay argues that the trade-offs embodied in a deal as complex, expensive, and long-lasting as AUKUS will manifest themselves in Australia's grand strategy for decades to come. Going forward, Australia's naval procurement decisions will shape its grand strategy, rather than vice versa. The essay makes three related points. First, Australia's costly reneging on France in favour of the US is the most important aspect of the deal to date. Even if these nuclear submarines are never built (a not entirely remote possibility), this shift in investment will determine Australia's approach to the world for a generation. Second, understanding this approach requires acknowledging that arms deals, even between allies, are tough, zero-sum negotiations requiring all parties to give up something of value. Given this, the essay makes the final point that Australia, and any other country entering AUKUS in the future, will pay in autonomy as much as in dollars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars and policymakers agree that major powers have leverage over their more junior partners. Giving security assistance or providing arms is supposed to increase this leverage. However, major powers often hit roadblocks when trying to influence the behaviour of their junior partners. This article demonstrates that junior partners are often successful in constraining the behaviour of the major power partners, and have particular success in extracting additional resources from their major partners. This article develops the concept of loyalty coercion to explain that leverage is based on rhetorical and symbolic moves, rather than material preponderance. It then uses cases of US arms sales to show that weapons transfers did not lead to US leverage, instead opened opportunities for junior partner influence. The article contributes to scholarly and policy perspectives on alliance management and reputation, and leverage in world politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We explore the possibilities and limitations of models of the demand for military expenditures, as against additional kinds of cross-country analyses, with an empirical focus on the Indo-Pacific region. Our research bridges a gap between the Defence Economics and International Relations literatures by developing testable security alignment hypotheses and by testing these hypotheses in three ways: with demand modelling on total expenditures, with analyses on estimated stocks of imported armaments, and with qualitative analyses of trends in defence cooperation between states. We find consistent evidence across research methods of an increase in threat perceptions towards China since around 2012 and of balancing behaviour by US allies and by two non-allies. As compared to standard demand modelling, our hypothesis-based mixed methods approach allows for a clearer treatment of samples with mixed and shifting security alignments and of states that stabilise or reduce expenditures in the face of rising threat perceptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Throughout the Yemeni Civil War, western states have supplied weapons used in the indiscriminate bombing campaign conducted by the Saudis. In defence of their actions, British politicians have argued that they are exchanging weapons for influence, and using the influence obtained to encourage compliance with humanitarian law. An additional premise in the argument is that Britain is using its influence more benignly than alternative suppliers would use theirs if Britain were not on the scene. The idea is that Britain is substituting itself for other, less scrupulous, interveners. I argue that, regardless of whether British substitution intervention could be justified in this way..., it is not in fact justified, because Britain has not plausibly used its influence to secure an amount of good sufficient to offset the various harms that its actions have created (or to discharge the expanded duties of rescue that greater influence entails). In addition, the article identifies the various forms that substitution intervention can take, and shows how the concept reveals hitherto neglected reasons to both support and oppose intervention in foreign conflicts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates the role that the arms trade connected to Hispanic American Independence Wars played in the transformations at the origins of 19th century globalization. It looks specifically at how arms supplies to governments encouraged the early post-mercantilist development of South American commerce, and some of the domino effects of such development. This turning point in economic history is analyzed through the biographical trajectories of merchants who were well positioned between geopolitics and trade, and who had “imperial” functions without being formally involved in imperialist projects. Business and political correspondence, notarial documents, and customs registers from archives in Europe and the Americas reveal the workings of networks and business affairs of global merchants whose companies were major arms importers in Buenos Aires during the years leading to Chile’s liberation. The threads of John McNeile’s (an important but neglected figure) and David DeForest’s networks hook onto the principal economic and political laboratories of the countries from whence most arms were imported: Great Britain and the United States. They reached Chile and Peru from Buenos Aires and remained crucial to the liberation campaigns, encouraging further commercial expansion along the American Pacific coast and toward Asia, and pioneering financial adventures. Relations between commercial houses active in Hispanic America and Asia reveal British and US transpacific networks and ties between Hispanic American and Asian commerce and economies. The article thus shows how, by bringing together fragmented and scattered sources from both sides of the Atlantic, the significance of the arms trade in South America as a driving force of globalization emerges.

In this article, I examine social media output from three of the largest arms manufacturers (by profit): Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon, all based in the United States. I ask: how, if at all, are women represented? What do these representations do? To answer these questions, I examine all of the tweets sent by these manufacturers over a three-month period and find that the Twitter content (1) normalizes women within the company context, (2) presents the companies as empowering and inspiring, and (3) shows the companies to be places for individual women to succeed. Central to all of these representations is intersectionality, with the companies depicting women of color frequently, especially Black women. I argue that the social media output of arms manufacturers helps to "make possible" the arms trade by presenting these companies as neoliberal, multicultural feminist beacons of social progress, rendering ambivalent criticisms about the suffering inflicted by their products. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most scholarship on the arms trade of the late nineteenth century has focused on the big players in the industry; the 'Merchants of Death' whose activities are said to have made war inevitable. However this article focusses on a smaller, but no less troubling, aspect of the arms business: the trade in new and surplus military rifles and on one largely forgotten dealer; Auguste Schriever of Liège. Using contemporary reporting and the order records of the mighty ŒWG at Steyr, I will outline some of the deals that made him a significant figure in the arms trade. He was trusted by Ferdinand Mannlicher and was so respected by his rivals that they felt the need to spy on him. He was also accused of selling rifles to pirates in the far east and to an Emperor who used them to resist colonial powers and enslave his own people. My article begins to shine a light on this enigmatic figure and on to the complex and hidden trade in military rifles in this period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The end of the Cold War era has ushered in a century in which great military powers like the US, China, and Russia continue to dominate the arms trade, yet minor powers are also investing heavily in arms manufacturing and technologies and profiting from lucrative arms transfers. Changes in the arms trade have fostered cooperative international regulatory practices and agreements, but recent conflicts in Yemen, Syria, Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Ukraine highlight the need for strong end-use monitoring, post-shipment verification, and international accountability for dubious trade deals. This study analyzes changes in top arms producers, new complexities in arms regulation due to advancing technologies and artificial intelligence, arms-control policies of international organizations and top arms producers, and the risks of poor regulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing scholarship examines the moral status of markets, identifying some markets as "noxious"—markets deemed morally objectionable due to the background conditions preceding exchange or the resulting consequences. This literature primarily focuses on market exchanges between private parties. We broaden the analysis to include government markets—markets involving exchanges where either the buyer or seller, or both, are government officials. We develop a general theoretical framework to understand the conditions under which government markets are likely to be more or less noxious. We then apply the framework to the international arms trade to demonstrate its usefulness for understanding noxious government markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Arms export control measures are an important tool to defend the universality of human rights, democracy and to prevent conflicts. The European Union (EU) has a long tradition of striving towards these goals. One of the most important outcomes regarding such is the 2008 Council Common Position (CP) defining Common Rules Governing Control of Exports of Military Technology and Equipment. This article focuses on the implementation and effectiveness of this CP. In particular, it investigates whether EU countries have applied and enforced human rights principles in arms export practices following the approval of the CP or whether a pro-market and pro-export approach have prevailed. In this way, it fills a lack of organic analysis on the impact of the CP. Secondly, for the first time, it compares EU-level regulation impact with that at the global level, in order to assess the 'net value' of the EU regulation at the international level also from a diachronic perspective. Lastly, a comparison with the national level offers suggestions for mutual reinforcing. By using quantitative methods, the research aims to offer empirical evidence concerning the EU arms export control regimes and their effectiveness and to contribute to the present debate about the means at the EU's disposal to defend the universality of human rights and promote democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents on general Russian exports to the 16 states in the Southern Africa Development Community, considered by regime type, as well as trade in arms with these states, to determine whether Russia's commercial ties have been proportionally greater with authoritarian, democratic, or hybrid regimes. The findings indicate a potential 'differentiated courtship' between Russia and Southern Africa's different regime types. Respectively, Russia's overall trade was concentrated among democracies ahead of authoritarian regimes and hybrid regimes, in line with each regime type's proportion of regional GDP. On the other hand, Russian arms exports followed a different pattern, in that authoritarian regimes purchased arms at a magnitude slightly beyond that regime type's proportion of the Southern African regional GDP. The research also found that 60% of all hybrid regimes purchased Russian arms, evincing the highest frequency of importing Russian arms (albeit at small dollar amounts) among all three regime types. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper makes use of interdependence theory to analyse the historical development of the economic relations between the GCC countries and the United States. The focus will be on oil and arms trade between the GCC countries and the United States. The results show that while the military and security dependence of the GCC countries on the United States remains relatively intact, the dependence of the United States on the natural resources of the GCC region has decreased. In light of this, the paper suggests that the historical interdependence between the GCC countries and the United States has recently evolved into a unilateral dependence and that the GCC countries' natural resources are directed towards Asian countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The United Kingdom imposed an arms embargo on Chile in 1974 but not on Argentina after the 1976 coup, despite brutal military dictatorships in both countries. What explains this difference? What can this difference reveal about the determinants of government decisions regarding arms exports? Using mainly archival evidence, this article demonstrates that this difference is explained by a stronger advocacy network in the United Kingdom campaigning on Chile, which was largely due to a greater identification of the British left with the Chilean struggle. The hub of this network was the Chile Solidarity Campaign, which mediated the influence of the transnational anti-Pinochet movement on the UK government. These findings suggest that shared values or identities make transnational issues more likely to resonate with domestic audiences. Evidence also indicates the importance of activists' connections with gatekeepers, focus on specific arms deals, and demonstrated causal chains between arms exports and repression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes a new trend in the arms export policy of modern France – an increasing share of European countries in the geographical structure of sales. Based on statistics and examples, regional priorities of French export before Emmanuel Macron’s presidency are identified; the reasons for the turn towards Europe at present stage and its possible limits are studied. The author draws attention to the fact that until recently, the Middle East and Asia have been key partners of France, providing two thirds of international demand for the products of French defense industry. However, today their role is declining in favor of the EU countries: Belgium, Romania, Greece, etc., with which Paris has signed a series of major contracts in 2018–2021. This development primarily stems from a difficult foreign policy context forcing the EU members to allocate more funds for defense needs, as well as from temporary difficulties in France’s relations with Middle Eastern clients. The author concludes that the «Europeanization» of sales is likely to continue but it is too early to talk about a full reorientation of French exports towards Europe. A more realistic task Paris de facto solves is to balance its export structure by diversifying the range of customers.

This article assesses the impact of a new form of defense cooperation – formal weapons cooperation agreements, or WCAs – on the global arms trade. WCAs are bilateral framework agreements that establish comprehensive guidelines on the development, production, and exchange of conventional arms. Substantively, WCAs regulate such core areas as procurement and contracting, defense-based research and development, and defense industrial cooperation. These agreements have proliferated dramatically since the mid-1990s. They now number nearly 700, with 30–40 new WCAs signed each year. Newly collected data are used to analyze the effect of WCAs on import and export of conventional weapons. To control for interdependencies in the formation of WCAs, and to account for the mutually endogenous relationship between WCAs and weapons flows, WCAs are modeled as an interdependent network that coevolves with the individual-level arms trade activity of states. The analysis shows that, over the 1995–2010 period, WCAs have significantly increased weapons flows.

This article assesses the impact of a new form of defense cooperation – formal weapons cooperation agreements, or WCAs – on the global arms trade. WCAs are bilateral framework agreements that establish comprehensive guidelines on the development, production, and exchange of conventional arms. Substantively, WCAs regulate such core areas as procurement and contracting, defense-based research and development, and defense industrial cooperation. These agreements have proliferated dramatically since the mid-1990s. They now number nearly 700, with 30–40 new WCAs signed each year. Newly collected data are used to analyze the effect of WCAs on import and export of conventional weapons. To control for interdependencies in the formation of WCAs, and to account for the mutually endogenous relationship between WCAs and weapons flows, WCAs are modeled as an interdependent network that coevolves with the individual-level arms trade activity of states. The analysis shows that, over the 1995–2010 period, WCAs have significantly increased weapons flows.

The European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) is considered as a key element in the quest for a European Security and Defence Union. The EDTIB strategy initiated in 2007 aimed to lead to greater integration of the fragmented national defence industries of EU member-states, achieve economies through the coordination of defence industrial policy, the pooling of resources in the production and acquisition of weapons systems and better serve the political objectives of European defence. The paper examines the extent to which EU27 member-states satisfy their demand for arms through the procurement of EDTIB origin defence inputs. Moreover, it explores whether a process of convergence is present in terms of the share of EDTIB origin imports in the total arms imports of the EU member-states. The presence or not of a convergence process is examined empirically using β- and club convergence methodologies. In broad terms, the findings point to a process of convergence albeit at different speeds, as indicated by the club-convergence analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fiscal-military hubs were cities characterized by the clustering of specific expertise and resources, which became centres where states, and semi-state and non-state actors arranged the transfer of war-making resources in early modern Europe. Using this concept enables the study of the business of war to shift the locus beyond the state towards a transnational history, while integrating political, military, economic, and cultural aspects that have generally been studied separately. By examining the hub, we can untangle the full complexity of this business, and reveal its actors, networks, assets, prices, routes, culture, and rules of conduct. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union succeeded in establishing an important sphere of influence in the Middle East. However, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia began to rapidly lose its influence in the 1990s in the Middle East. The process of Russia’s transformation into an important actor again in the region took place in the 2010s. Moscow’s policy toward the civil war in Syria has increased Russian influence in Syria and enabled it to be more actively involved in the developments in the Middle East. Similar to the Soviet era, Russia’s increasing influence in the Middle East in recent years, was largely achieved by military means. This study aims to analyze the recent transformation of Russia’s military presence in the region, which is the most important indicator of its influence in the Middle East. In addition, in order to evaluate the success of its return to the Middle East, Russia’s military influence in the region was compared with the influence of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. As a result of the evaluation, it was concluded that Russia managed to reestablish a sphere of influence in the Middle East. The biggest factor behind this success of Russia is the rapid development of its military relations with Syria and Egypt in the 2010s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two decades of 'terror' crises have seen politicians, legal professionals and scholars struggle to cope with atrocities organised around some joke. From the alt-right smirk of the Christchurch killer at his televised court arraignment to the 'Danish cartoons' and the targeting of the satirical Charlie Hebdo magazine in France, a series of funny-not-so-funny international 'incidents' prompt us to ponder the cartoon nature of politics. Our investigation into cartooning, contextualised as part of ongoing war efforts, reveals a cultural-economic project that peddles weapons for conflicts against caricatured Muslim adversaries. To illustrate this point, we examine copycat cartoon tropes and conclude that while international cartoon politics is nothing new, cartoon contests and terrorist show-trials indicate an ever-greater reification hand-in-glove with the arms trade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International commerce can be determined by the political climate between the exporter and the importer. Arms transfers are a much complex process, where beyond economic factors, alliance ties, security perception and defence planning are also considered. Still, they might not be independent of political relations. This paper aims to capture the arms supplier-recipient relations between the Visegrád countries and Russia, the United States and Germany from 1999 to 2020. More specifically, how do the two factors affect each other: are good political relations necessary for arms deals? Or do arms deals facilitate a friendly political climate? Our conclusion is as follows. On the one hand, a cooperative political climate increases the probability of arms deals, but they are not a necessity, as mutual benefits and security perceptions can override the current political climate. On the other hand, however, arms transfers can deepen cooperation or alleviate the existing differences between the parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]