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How should the state justify its coercive rules? Public reason liberalism endorses a public justification requirement: Justifications offered for authoritative regulations must be acceptable to all members of the relevant public. However, as a criterion of legitimacy, the public justification requirement is epistemically unreliable: It prioritizes neither the exclusion of false beliefs nor the inclusion of true beliefs in justifications of political rules. This article presents an epistemic alternative to the public justification requirement. Employing epistemological theories of argumentation, we demonstrate how this approach enables assessing the epistemic quality of justifications of political rules, even when the truth is difficult to establish. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this essay, we explore the ways in which argumentation theory can be applied to multimodal advertising. In our discussion we emphasize "auditory" advertisements: advertisements that depend on non-verbal sounds. We show how key tools developed by argumentation theorists (KC tables, argument diagrams, and argument schemes) can be used to analyze and assess advertisements of this sort. Doing so demonstrates one way in which standard methods of argument analysis and evaluation can be applied to one important multimodal genre. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Agencies involved in generating regulatory policies promote evidence‐based regulatory impact assessments (RIAs) to improve the predictability of regulation and develop informed policy. Here, we analyze the epistemic foundations of RIAs. We frame RIA as reasoning that connects various types of knowledge to inferences about the future. Drawing on Stephen Toulmin's model of argumentation, we situate deductive and inductive reasoning steps within a schema we call the impact argument. This approach helps us identify inherent uncertainties in RIAs, and their location in different types of reasoning. We illustrate the theoretical section with impact assessments of two recent legislative proposals produced by the European Commission. We argue that the concept of "evidence‐based regulatory impact assessment" is misleading and should be based on the notion of "regulatory impact assessment as evidential reasoning," which better recognizes its processual and argumentative nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

So far, fake news has been mostly associated with fabricated content that intends to manipulate or shape opinions. In this manuscript, we aim to establish that the perception of information as fake news is influenced by not only fabricated content but also by the rhetorical device used (i.e., how news authors phrase the message). Based on argumentation theory, we advance that fallacies – a subset of well-known deceptive rhetorical devices – share a conceptual overlap with fake news and are therefore suitable for shedding light on the issue's grey areas. In a first two-by-two, between-subject, best-worst scaling experiment (case 1), we empirically test whether fallacies are related to the perception of information as fake news and to what extent a reader can identify them. In a second two-by-two experiment, we presume that a reader believes that some of a sender's messages contain fake news and investigate recipients' subsequent reactions. We find that users distinguish nuances based on the applied fallacies; however, they will not immediately recognise some fallacies as fake news while overemphasising others. Regarding users' reactions, we observe a more severe reaction when the message identified as fake news comes from a company instead of an acquaintance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While agent-based modelling languages naturally implement concurrency, the currently available languages for argumentation do not allow to explicitly model this type of interaction. In this paper we introduce a concurrent language for handling agents arguing and communicating using a shared argumentation space. We also show how to perform high-level operations like persuasion and negotiation through basic belief revision constructs, and present a working implementation of the language and the associated web interface. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to discuss a well-known concept from argumentation theory, namely the principle of charity. It will show that this principle, especially in its contemporary version as formulated by Donald Davidson, meets with some serious problems. Since we need the principle of charity in any kind of critical discussion, we propose the way of modifying it according to the presupponendum—the rule written in the sixteenth century by Ignatius Loyola. While also corresponding with pragma-dialectical rules, it also provides additional content. This will be termed the dialectical principle of charity, and it offers a few steps to be performed during an argument in order to make sure that the participants understand each other well and are not deceived by any cognitive bias. The meaning of these results could be of great significance for argumentation theory, pragma-dialectics and the practice of public discourse as it enhances the principle of charity and makes it easier to apply in argumentation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the relationship between argumentation theory and dialogic pedagogy. Arguments made in everyday discourse tend to be enthymematic, i.e., containing implicit premises. Thus, dialogue is often necessary to uncover hidden assumptions. Furthermore, evaluating logical arguments involves dialectical and dialogic processes. We articulate the role of critical questions in this process and present the Critical Questions Model of Argument Assessment (CQMAA) as a (mostly) comprehensive framework for evaluating arguments. Students can be taught to ask and discuss these critical questions. Yet to facilitate and sustain discussion of these questions, teachers need additional tools drawn from dialogic pedagogy. We draw on Robin Alexander’s conceptual framework for this purpose as well as Michaels and O’Connor’s work on Academically Productive Talk. Alexander’s framework includes six pedagogical principles and eight repertoires of talk. We focus specifically on teacher and student talk moves and propose that critical questions should be considered an important subset of productive talk moves that can bring rigor and purpose to classroom argumentation. Other talk moves are also needed to help students construct arguments, listen and engage with one another, and help sustain discussion of the critical questions. The CQMAA provides both a theoretical and practical link between (1) logical analysis and critique and (2) dialogic teaching. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 'The making of argumentation theory' van Eemeren and van Haaften describe the contributions made to the five components of a full-fledged research program of argumentation theory by four prominent approaches to the discipline: formal dialectics, rhetoric/pragmalinguistics, informal logic, and pragma-dialectics. Most of these approaches do not contribute to all components, but to some in particular. Starting from the pragma-dialectical view of the relationship between dialectical reasonableness and rhetorical effectiveness – the crucial issue in argumentation theory – van Eemeren and van Haaften explain the positions taken by representatives from the approaches discussed and indicate where they differ from the pragma-dialectical approach. It transpires that approaches focusing on dialectical reasonableness are, next to pragma-dialectics, formal dialectics and informal logic; approaches focusing on rhetorical effectiveness are, next to pragma-dialectics, rhetoric and pragmalinguistics, and the informal logician Tindale. When it comes to the relationship between dialectical reasonableness and rhetorical effectiveness, some interest in it is shown in rhetoric and pragmalinguistics, but only in pragma-dialectics and in Tindale's work is it a real focus. The main difference between Tindale's view and the pragma-dialectical view is that in pragma-dialectics the decisive role in deciding about reasonableness is assigned to a code of conduct for reasonable argumentative discourse and in Tindale's approach this role is assigned to Tindale's interpretation of the Perelmanian universal audience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper advocates the use of modern argumentation theories in Islamic theological discourse. While the Islamic tradition has its own argumentation theories, modern terminology and theory can aid in interpretive understanding and critical analysis. The article focuses on ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s (d. 415/1025) Tathbīt, which utilizes the rational methods of kalām and radd to counter Christianity. The author exemplarily analyzes ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s argument against the Christian claim of the divine nature of Jesus and argues for historical theological texts to be examined for their argumentativeness, as well as for the value of analytical and argumentation theories in understanding the history and development of argumentative theology.

The Covid-19 pandemic has been accompanied by an excess of accurate and inaccurate information (infodemic) that has prevented people from finding reliable guidance in decision-making. Non-professional but popular science communicators—some with a political agenda—supply the public with scientific knowledge regarding Covid-19. This kind of communication represents a worrisome force in societal discourses on science-related political issues. This article explores online content (N = 108 articles) of two popular German “alternative news” media (NachDenkSeiten and PI News) that present and evaluate biomedical research concerning Covid-19. Using thematic analysis, we investigated how scientific evidence was presented and questioned. Regarding the theoretical background, we drew on the concept of “evidencing practices” and ideas from argumentation theory. More specifically, we studied the use of the following three evidencing and counterevidencing practices: references to Data/Methods, references to Experts/Authorities, and Narratives. The results indicate that the studied alternative news media generally purport to report on science using the same argumentation mechanisms as those employed in science journalism in legacy media. However, a deeper analysis reveals that argumentation directions mostly follow preexisting ideologies and political agendas against Covid-19 policies, which leads to science coverage that contradicts common epistemic authorities and evidence. Finally, we discuss the possible implications of our findings for audience views and consider strategies for countering the rejection of scientific evidence.

This special issue represents some of the recent developments within argumentation studies. The following overview provides some historical context for the five papers which constitute this special issue. The Aristotelian roots of modern argumentation studies are briefly presented, as well as some further developments within Greek and Roman rhetoric. Furthermore, the most important developments in argumentation studies during the last few decades are sketched. Several modern approaches to argumentation theory are introduced, among them Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca's New Rhetoric, Toulmin's model of argumentation, formal dialectics, fallacy theory, informal logic, the Argumentum Model and Pragma-Dialectics. Finally, the thematic focus of the five papers is described. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The timed concurrent language for argumentation (tcla) is a framework to model concurrent interactions between communicating agents that reason and take decisions through argumentation processes, also taking into account the temporal duration of the performed actions. Time is a crucial factor when dealing with dynamic environments in real-world applications, where agents must act in a coordinated fashion to reach their own goals. However, modelling complex interactions and concurrent processes may be challenging without the help of proper languages and tools. In this paper, we discuss the use of tcla for practical purposes and provide a working implementation of the language, endowed with a user interface available online, that serves the dual purpose of aiding the research in this field and facilitating the development of multi-agent systems based applications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction. The paper scrutinizes abduction through the lens of the argumentation theory. Abduction is treated as an argument with a special argumentative scheme. Argumentation schemes are seen as stereotypical patterns of common types of arguments used in everyday discourse. The main issue of this publication is to specify the scheme of abductive argument and supply it with so-called critical questions. Such questions should identify, reconstruct and evaluate abduction in dialogs.Methodology and sources. At first, I analyze D. Walton and S. Yu & F. Zenker’s patterns of abductive argument, scrutiny their advantages and disadvantages. Then, based on the results of relatively new logical and philosophical investigations, I systemize the peculiarities of abduction. The role of D. Gabbay and J. Wood’s model is especially emphasized.Results and discussion. Both approaches (D. Walton and S. Yu & F. Zenker) are not free of problems. However, several recent logico-epistemological specifications of abduction can reduce them. I mean the position that abduction preserves ignorance and presumes J. Wood’s conclusionality relation. This reasoning is weak and cannot be distinguished from other arguments. These proposals and almost unknown (with interrogative conclusion) Ch. S. Peirce’s scheme of abduction produce a core of argumentative scheme.Conclusion. I provide a version of argumentative scheme of abduction with the set of critical questions. Its formal structure is defined as a move from the consequent to antecedent with the investigand mood conclusion while the material side is seen as reasoning from surprise to investigation. Modified D. Gabbay and J. Wood’s model clarifies the controversial aspects of this argumentative scheme. It also specifies critical questions functions since they lose their traditional role of evaluation.

The current legal paradigm assumes that legal decisions must be justified. Judges use arguments as tools to accomplish this justification. Thus, this research presents an analysis to explain and illustrate arguments of statutory interpretation, given that the plain language of legal rules is not always sufficient to give all the answers needed for a legal decision. The theoretical analysis presented here, based on the relevant literature, aims to review some of the main concepts necessary for legal arguments of statutory interpretation and their possible relation to argument schemes. The reviewed arguments schemes advance arguments that avoid absurd results, as well as those that reflect the legislation’s purpose and the legislator’s intention. Overall, this study demonstrates how one can present arguments or evaluate and reconstruct them in the legal field. Specifically, reviewing argument schemes for legal arguments of statutory interpretation can help refine some of the main features of legal argumentation and highlight the necessary interpretation to accomplish them.

Following and extending Searle's speech act theory, both Pragma-Dialectics and the Linguistic Normative Model of Argumentation characterize argumentation as an illocutionary act. In these models, the successful performance of an illocutionary act of arguing depends on the securing of uptake, an illocutionary effect that, according to the Searlean account, characterizes the successful performance of any illocutionary act. However, in my view, there is another kind of illocutionary effect involved in the successful performance of an illocutionary act of arguing, which affects both the speaker's and the hearer's set of rights, obligations, and entitlements. In order to give an account of this second type of effect, I will argue that it is necessary to distinguish two levels in the analysis of the illocutionary act of arguing. The first one is related to the illocutionary effect of securing of uptake and thus to the speech act performed by the speaker, while the second one allows us to account for the changes produced by the performance of the illocutionary act of arguing in the deontic modal competence of both the speaker and the hearer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Nazariyat: Journal for the History of Islamic Philosophy & Sciences / Nazariyat Islam Felsefe Bilim Tarihi Arastirmalari Dergisi is the property of Ilmi Etudler Dernegi (ILEM) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper analyses a hitherto unknown technique of using logic diagrams to create argument maps in eristic dialectics. The method was invented in the 1810s and -20s by Arthur Schopenhauer, who is considered the originator of modern eristic. This technique of Schopenhauer could be interesting for several branches of research in the field of argumentation: Firstly, for the field of argument mapping, since here a hitherto unknown diagrammatic technique is shown in order to visualise possible situations of arguments in a dialogical controversy. Secondly, the art of controversy or eristic, since the diagrams do not analyse the truth of judgements and the validity of inferences, but the persuasiveness of arguments in a dialogue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates how political candidates in the Eastern Cape Province in South Africa employed means of strategic manoeuvring during the provincial election campaigns of 2019. It assumes the framework of the extended pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation, by first reconstructing the argumentation structure, identifying the means of strategic manoeuvring, and finally, critically analysing the prototypical speech acts in the political campaign discourse. The data were collected from the isiXhosa newspaper I’solezwe LesiXhosa during the campaign from February to April 2019. The findings demonstrate commissives and assertives as the prototypical speech acts in the political argumentative discourse in the Eastern Cape Province. In addition, dissociation is manifested in multiple contexts to persuade the audience of the standpoint that the opposition parties are more visionary than the incumbent party, African National Congress.

This article explores the relationship between argumentation theory and dialogic pedagogy. Arguments made in everyday discourse tend to be enthymematic, i.e., containing implicit premises. Thus, dialogue is often necessary to uncover hidden assumptions. Furthermore, evaluating logical arguments involves dialectical and dialogic processes. We articulate the role of critical questions in this process and present the Critical Questions Model of Argument Assessment (CQMAA) as a (mostly) comprehensive framework for evaluating arguments. Students can be taught to ask and discuss these critical questions. Yet to facilitate and sustain discussion of these questions, teachers need additional tools drawn from dialogic pedagogy. We draw on Robin Alexander’s conceptual framework for this purpose as well as Michaels and O’Connor’s work on Academically Productive Talk. Alexander’s framework includes six pedagogical principles and eight repertoires of talk. We focus specifically on teacher and student talk moves and propose that critical questions should be considered an important subset of productive talk moves that can bring rigor and purpose to classroom argumentation. Other talk moves are also needed to help students construct arguments, listen and engage with one another, and help sustain discussion of the critical questions. The CQMAA provides both a theoretical and practical link between (1) logical analysis and critique and (2) dialogic teaching.

Arguments and explanations are two kinds of speech that have not always been properly distinguished. Currently, emphasis has been placed, both in the pedagogy of science and in argumentation studies, on the necessity of differentiating them in order to properly grasp the nature of explanations and arguments. Demarcation criteria between both of them have been most explicitly proposed in argumentation theory. However, here I will argue that the criteria that are typically used in argumentation theory to distinguish between an argument and an explanation (which I call the "standard distinction") suffer from several problems. On the one hand, in certain relevant cases the criteria provide no guidance or yield questionable results. On the other hand, the criteria of distinction have been limited to the domain of theoretical argumentation, ignoring the peculiarities of the practical domain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dealing with uncertain, contradicting, and ambiguous information is still a central issue in Artificial Intelligence (AI). As a result, many formalisms have been proposed or adapted so as to consider non-monotonicity. A non-monotonic formalism is one that allows the retraction of previous conclusions or claims, from premises, in light of new evidence, offering some desirable flexibility when dealing with uncertainty. Among possible options, knowledge-base, non-monotonic reasoning approaches have seen their use being increased in practice. Nonetheless, only a limited number of works and researchers have performed any sort of comparison among them. This research article focuses on evaluating the inferential capacity of defeasible argumentation, a formalism particularly envisioned for modelling non-monotonic reasoning. In addition to this, fuzzy reasoning and expert systems, extended for handling non-monotonicity of reasoning, are selected and employed as baselines, due to their vast and accepted use within the AI community. Computational trust was selected as the domain of application of such models. Trust is an ill-defined construct, hence, reasoning applied to the inference of trust can be seen as non-monotonic. Inference models were designed to assign trust scalars to editors of the Wikipedia project. Scalars assigned to recognised trustworthy editors provided the basis for the analysis of the models' inferential capacity according to evaluation metrics from the domain of computational trust. In particular, argument-based models demonstrated more robustness than those built upon the baselines despite the knowledge bases or datasets employed. This study contributes to the body of knowledge through the exploitation of defeasible argumentation and its comparison to similar approaches. It provides publicly implementations for the designed models of inference, which might be a useful aid to scholars interested in performing non-monotonic reasoning activities. It adds to previous works, empirically enhancing the generalisability of defeasible argumentation as a compelling approach to reason with quantitative data and uncertain knowledge. • Replicable comparison of non-monotonic reasoning approaches using quantitative data. • Inference of the ill-defined construct of computational trust using real-world data. • Defeasible argumentation presented more robust inferences. • Literature review on knowledge-based systems and non-monotonic extensions. • Robust results analysed with two large real-world datasets and two knowledge-bases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates how political candidates in the Eastern Cape Province in South Africa employed means of strategic manoeuvring during the provincial election campaigns of 2019. It assumes the framework of the extended pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation, by first reconstructing the argumentation structure, identifying the means of strategic manoeuvring, and finally, critically analysing the prototypical speech acts in the political campaign discourse. The data were collected from the isiXhosa newspaper I'solezwe LesiXhosa during the campaign from February to April 2019. The findings demonstrate commissives and assertives as the prototypical speech acts in the political argumentative discourse in the Eastern Cape Province. In addition, dissociation is manifested in multiple contexts to persuade the audience of the standpoint that the opposition parties are more visionary than the incumbent party, African National Congress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista da Faculdade de Direito da Uerj is the property of Editora da Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (EdUERJ) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Biuletyn Polskiego Towarzystwa Językoznawczego is the property of Polish Linguistic Society and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The interpretation of religious texts is an area of research in which rhetoric and the use of arguments play a central role. The analysis of the persuasive message expressed in many biblical passages, the reconstruction of the implicit messages conveyed by the texts, and the justification of an interpretation are questions that concern directly argumentation studies. The pragmatic dimension of arguments, the instruments developed for bringing to light implicit assumptions and conclusions, and the methods for justifying an interpretative claim can be important resources for biblical studies and applications that can open new research paths. This introduction outlines the crossroad between the two fields and the possible directions of future inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Tekst i Dyskurs is the property of University of Warsaw and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The Requirements Engineering (RE) process starts with initial requirements elicited from stakeholders—however conflicting, unattainable, incomplete and ambiguous—and successively refines them until a consistent, complete, valid, and unambiguous specification is reached. This is achieved by balancing stakeholders' viewpoints and preferences to reach compromises through negotiation. Several frameworks have been developed to support this process in a structured way, such as KAOS, i*, and RationalGLR. However, none provides the means to model the dialectic negotiation inherent to the RE process, so that the derivation of specifications from requirements is fully explicit and traceable. To address this gap, we propose CaRE, a refinement calculus for requirements engineering based on argumentation theory. CaRE casts the RE refinement problem as an iterative argument between all relevant stakeholders, who point out defects (ambiguity, incompleteness, etc.) of existing requirements, and then propose suitable refinements to address them, thereby leading to the construction of a refinement graph. This graph is then a conceptual model of the RE process. The semantics of refinement graphs is provided using Argumentation Theory, enabling reasoning over the RE process and the automatic computation of software specifications. An alternate semantics is also presented based on abduction and using Horn Theory. The application of CaRE is showcased with an extensive example from the railway domain, and a prototype tool for identifying specifications in a refinement graph is presented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the argumentative retort “Just Google it” in response to cases of epistemic exploitation. Critical assessments of the reply often examine the phrase from an argumentation theory standpoint, which views it as at best rude and at worst a violation of argumentative norms. However, these critiques ignore one of the functions of the term—to avoid epistemic exportation. The response may be a useful tool for Black individuals to offload some epistemic burdens concerning racial arguments, but due to racially biased search engine algorithms, the phrase has the high potential to exacerbate racial disagreements. Directing disagreeing interlocutors to “Google” anti-Black oppression and having them self-research unjust institutions runs the substantial risk of reinforcing an interlocutor’s original stance, due to the ways in which search engine algorithms utilize word embedding. Rather than using the phrase “Just Google it,” this paper concludes with a few alternative suggestions to combat epistemic exploitation.

The environment around general-purpose service robots has a dynamic nature. Accordingly, even the robot’s programmer cannot predict all the possible external failures which the robot may confront. This research proposes an online incremental learning method that can be further used to autonomously handle external failures originating from a change in the environment. Existing research typically offers special-purpose solutions. Furthermore, the current incremental online learning algorithms cannot generalize well with just a few observations. In contrast, our method extracts a set of hypotheses, which can then be used for finding the best recovery behavior at each failure state. The proposed argumentation-based online incremental learning approach uses an abstract and bipolar argumentation framework to extract the most relevant hypotheses and model the defeasibility relation between them. This leads to a novel online incremental learning approach that overcomes the addressed problems and can be used in different domains including robotic applications. We have compared our proposed approach with state-of-the-art online incremental learning approaches, an approximation-based reinforcement learning method, and several online contextual bandit algorithms. The experimental results show that our approach learns more quickly with a lower number of observations and also has higher final precision than the other methods. Note to Practitioners—This work proposes an online incremental learning method that learns faster by using a lower number of failure states than other state-of-the-art approaches. The resulting technique also has higher final learning precision than other methods. Argumentation-based online incremental learning generates an explainable set of rules which can be further used for human-robot interaction. Moreover, testing the proposed method using a publicly available dataset suggests wider applicability of the proposed incremental learning method outside the robotics field wherever an online incremental learner is required. The limitation of the proposed method is that it aims for handling discrete feature values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article tackles the question: can the Presumption of Innocence (PoI) be a presumption? Whereas many criminal law theorists rejection such a notion, I draw inspiration from argumentation theorists and philosophers—in particular, Petar Bodlović and Edna Ullmann-Margalit—and argue in favour of it; indeed, argumentation theory often holds the PoI out as a paradigmatic presumption. My argument proceeds in three sections. I first show that criminal law theorists writing on the PoI have understood presumptions as evidentiary devices in the form of a modus ponens. On that understanding, the PoI cannot be a presumption. Attention is then drawn to the field of argumentation theory, which teaches us that there are other types of presumptions that are non-evidentiary, not in the form of a modus ponens, require a tentative commitment to q, and require an agent to proceed (act) as if q ; viz practical presumptions. The PoI can be understood as such. Finally, it is argued that the PoI, insofar as it requires a tentative commitment to q (here, 'the defendant is innocent'), can be thought of as a propositional imagining of q (ie, an agent presuming innocence is to propositionally imagine the defendant's innocence). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of IUG Journal of Humanitarian Research is the property of Islamic University of Gaza and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)