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This article examines China's evolving role in the Arctic and the potential for Sino–Russian cooperation in the region. Recently, China has been increasingly assertive in its Arctic ambitions, engaging in partnerships and projects with various Arctic nations, including Russia. By identifying the main elements of China's Arctic strategy—its priorities, goals and approaches—this study aims to shed light on how China seeks to expand its influence in this geopolitically significant area. Additionally, the article explores current trends in Sino–Russian relations, especially in light of the geopolitical changes and tensions that have arisen in the past two years. With a focus on sustainable development, it assesses how China and Russia might align their interests and collaborate in the Arctic. The research highlights the potential synergies between these two major international players, investigating how they could navigate shared interests, manage risks, and promote stability in the region amidst complex global challenges. By analyzing these dynamics, the article seeks to contribute to a deeper understanding of the strategic interplay between China and Russia in the Arctic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reviews the current state of the Arctic policy of the Republic of Korea, which, like other states, has increased interest in the Arctic region in recent years, as well as its plan of activities in the Arctic and Antarctic for the coming years. The Republic of Korea needs to gradually develop an Arctic strategy at the government level to promote national interests in the Arctic region. The scientific significance of the article is related to the translation into Russian and analysis of the “Polar Activities Promotion Act for 20232027”, published in February 2023 by the Korean Institute of Marine Science & Technology Promo-tion. The article discusses the content and timing of the country’s 3 main polar policies: research and dis-covery, climate change forecasting, and polar development. In addition, 5 main strategies for promoting the Republic of Korea in the polar region are discussed, including: expanding the area of research of the territory, developing plans to solve environmental and climate problems, creating a polar industrial base, creating a network of cooperation with foreign countries and between industrial and scientific organiza-tions within the country, developing an interstate dialogue on polar activities.

The Arctic region is warming four times faster than the rest of the planet, with the inevitable result that the economy, natural resources, ocean and land sustenance and all human security factors now require rapid adjustment by both government and population. The circumpolar nations have taken pride in an era of peaceful cooperation. Working together for the common good is a deliberate choice of the circumpolar nations but also a necessity because of the extremely harsh climate that prevails in the Arctic lands and waters. Over the past decade Russia has developed many military bases, extended over the whole of its lengthy northern seacoast. The Arctic is a major economic base for Russia. Undersea, the submarine patrols of the Cold War, by both Russia and the United States, had been drastically reduced. Now military exercises in and near the Arctic are extensive; Chinese military vessels have entered the North Pacific. While military resources of individual countries have occasionally entered the Arctic area, there formerly was genuine support for the ideal of a demilitarized Arctic. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a clear indication that Russia is unpredictable and aggressive. Russia could choose aggressive action in the Arctic. The entire Arctic region is thus destabilized while it waits for the future to unfold. This is a brief review of the current situation of Arctic organizations and countries that intend to benefit by the opening of the Arctic. The composite situation provides a way to discern the ongoing destabilization of the Arctic

With climate change, melting sea ice and snow in the Arctic increase the probability that states engage in activities there. The prosperity of Arctic activities serves as a reminder to the international community that the issue of Arctic governance must be prioritised to avoid Arctic unsustainable development. As a major stakeholder besides the Arctic states, it is necessary to study China's role in Arctic governance for its sustainable development to provide a reference for the diplomatic decision-making of other states. The paper selects international law as a perspective. It discusses China's engagement in the development of international law related to the theme from the global, regional, and bilateral/multilateral levels. At the global level, China's national role is characterized by engaging in global governance under the international rule of law for guarding the international order based on international law. At the regional level, China maintains the role of supporting and engaging in the Arctic Council, both before and after its establishment. At the bilateral and multilateral levels, China, as an Arctic stakeholder pursuing cooperation, has achieved many cooperation results. The paper holds that under China's national roles, China's engagement has affected the development of international law referred to the theme to some extent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russia's war against Ukraine in February 2022 was the end of the Arctic cooperation between states and others as we knew it, despite the fact that Russia's illegal actions are not occurring in the Arctic region. Russia's attack on Ukraine caused pronounced security fears and responses, particularly from the European and North American countries, including the other Arctic states. This naturally affected Arctic cooperation because it is precisely in the Arctic region that Russia is such a vastly central actor. For example, the region's pre-eminent inter-governmental forum, the Arctic Council, is struggling to continue its activities in full, as the seven western Arctic states paused participating in meetings held in and activities involving Russia. On the other hand, the first in-person meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP) under the Central Arctic Ocean (CAO) fisheries agreement in late November 2022 successfully adopted its COP Rules of Procedure by consensus, including Russia. The purpose of this article is to investigate how adversely Arctic international cooperation in inter-governmental forums and treaties has suffered due to the Ukraine war, utilising a qualitative research methodology to collect internal and sensitive information from key informants. In particular, the article aims to find an answer to the following question: In which types of Arctic inter-governmental structures have the states been able to continue the cooperation and for what reasons? The hypothesis that will be tested in this article is whether treaty-based cooperation has fared better than cooperation founded on soft law. This article will flesh out the current state of Arctic cooperative frameworks and actual cooperative activities under them, analysing three soft law-based cooperative frameworks, including the Arctic Council and several treaty-based cooperative frameworks, such as the CAO fisheries agreement and Arctic Science Cooperation Agreement. This article is based on the facts as of 22 February 2023. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2008, the European Union has unsuccessfully tried to obtain permanent observer status in the Arctic Council, the central cooperation forum in the Arctic. The analysis shows that the EU's failures in this area are connected both with its location mostly outside of the region and remoteness from the northern realities, as well as global geopolitical tensions. However, the EU has had de facto observer ad hoc status since 2013, allowing it to participate in almost all formats of interaction in the Arctic Council. Considering this fact, the permanent observer status has rather a symbolic meaning and is equivalent to joining a kind of “privileged Arctic club”. An analysis of the EU's functioning in its relations with the Arctic Council and its members shows that the EU is ready to adapt and listen to the opinion of the Arctic countries in order to become a legitimate Arctic actor. The Arctic Council is of uneven importance for the different EU member states: Denmark, Finland and Sweden are full members, several countries are permanent observers, but most EU countries are not interested in the Arctic issues. Because of this multifaceted nature, the collective EU is more of an extra-regional player on the platform, but one with serious Arctic claims. The EU is actively working on a common Arctic policy. It is represented in the Arctic Council by the Ambassador-at-Large for Arctic Affairs, introduced in 2017, who acts in coordination with the European Commission and the member states concerned. The EU's overall approach is not unsuccessful: it has managed to engage more member states on the Arctic vector, and European expertise and input on sustainable development issues is already becoming an integral part of the AC's work and promises to evolve further.

Abstract Ongoing changes in the Arctic, primarily related to the region's physical and human environment, as a result of climate change, have both opened up new opportunities and posed threats to the governments and inhabitants of the region. A number of soft-law instruments, with the aim of ensuring the wellbeing of the region and combating the negative challenges of climate change, have been developed since the 1990s. This article will examine the synergy between three existing forms of Arctic soft-law governance in a select number of cases and will, in turn, provide suggestions as to how they may be improved. It will also analyse the motivation behind using soft law mechanisms, as opposed to formal international organisations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The possibility of conflict among nations has dominated discussions of the future of the Arctic. Are there no opportunities for cooperation? This article explores the avenues and incentives for Arctic cooperation through the common issues outlined in the strategy statements of the five coastal Arctic states. Incentives to cooperate can be found in all the thematic areas examined: sovereignty, scientific research, resource development, shipping, and environmental concerns. Cooperation is already occurring on some salient issues. Additional cooperation may occur as issues become increasingly pressing. From this perspective, Arctic conflict is by no means inevitable. Numerous avenues for cooperation exist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]