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After many years of discussion and debate, Saint Lucia finally acceded to the appellate jurisdiction of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) on 20 July 2023, thereby jettisoning the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) and marking a landmark and historical milestone in its political and constitutional development. While, in the end, the legislative process appeared straightforward, the broader journey was fraught with complexity and interrupted periods of progress. This article provides a detailed analysis of the significant historical moments during 1997–2023 that contributed towards Saint Lucia's accession. This period included the initial motivations for the accession, Saint Lucia Constitutional Reform Commission, the Attorney General's Reference of 2013, the intervening years of minimal action (2013–2020), and the final process characterised by debates and opposition protests. The period collectively contributed to Saint Lucia's journey of accession to the CCJ as its final appellate court. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the appellate jurisdiction for transfers of venue in federal court, particularly examining the limitations of the "physical transfer" rule in the digital era. Topics include the challenges posed by the current rule, the potential vulnerabilities in the system that arose in Defense Distributed v. Platkin, and proposed solutions to improve the appellate review of transfer orders.

Manufactured finality is an umbrella term for the various ways that federal litigants try to create a final, appealable decision. And it has an uncertain future after the Supreme Court's decision in Microsoft Corp. 73 . Baker. Yet existing studies of manufactured finality have failed to appredate its nuances. Several different varieties of manufactured finality exist. Each applies in different contexts, implicates different interests, and has different prospects for future use after Microsoft. In this Article, I comprehensively detail the variables that go into manufactured finality, create a typology of the various forms of manufactured finality that appear in the courts of appeals, and address Microsoft's impact on each of those forms. In the course of doing so, I raise two larger issues. The first concerns how we define finality. The predominant conception of finality looks to the substance of a district court's decision, asking if that court has actually disposed of all claims in an action. The law of appellate jurisdiction might be improved by shifting the focus to asking simply whether the district court has finished with an action. The second issue concerns the role that litigants play in determining when they can appeal. As things stand, courts have essentially complete control over those matters. Experience with manufactured finality suggests that litigants should have some say in identifying proper opportunities for interlocutory appeals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article looks back at the court-packing crisis faced by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1937. It highlights the proposal of then U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt for the reorganization of the federal judiciary, as well as proposed alternatives to the proposal including Congressional override of Supreme Court decisions, advisory opinions, voting rules for legislations, limitations on tenure of justices, compulsory retirement, judicial pensions, and restrictions on appellate jurisdiction.

There are “haves” and “have-nots” in the federal appellate courts, and the “haves” get more attention. For decades, the courts have used a triage regime under which they distribute judicial attention selectively: some appeals receive a lot of judicial attention, and some appeals receive barely any. What this Article reveals is that this triage system produces demonstrably unequal results, depending on the circuit handling the appeal and whether the appellant has counsel or not. Together, these two factors produce significant disparities: in one circuit, for example, an unrepresented appellant receives, on average, a decision less than a tenth the length of a similarly situated, represented appellant in another circuit. Compounding that, in most federal circuits, thousands of decisions issued annually in unrepresented appeals—especially those involving incarcerated persons—are not available on free court websites. That renders some decisions functionally unusable by those facing the greatest barriers to accessing justice in federal court. This Article both unearths these systemic inequities and calls for greater attention to their consequences. These disparities not only threaten dignitary harm to litigants, but they also risk a disparate impact on the development of the law. The courts—and Congress, if need be—should realign the existing triage regime to prioritize procedural justice values alongside efficiency. At a minimum, this Article argues for transparency reforms to better assess the effect of the federal appellate triage regime on marginalized litigants. More controversially, it also argues that Congress should establish minimum and uniform standards for federal appellate decision-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A recent case offers an opportunity to consider two types of impeachable dispositions in insolvency law. One is the transfer of a trader's business under section 34(1) of the Insolvency Act, and the other is the common-law actio Pauliana from which the entire law of impeachable dispositions derives. In the first place, the nature of the application is characterised as an attempt to reverse the transfer of the business and assets. A common feature of section 34(1) and the actio Pauliana is spotted: they straddle sequestration or winding-up. Compliance with sections 34(1) and (2) of the Insolvency Act is discussed, and the trader's celebration of doing so is then ruined by the pervasive menace of the actio Pauliana, the defence of necessity supplying a sword to cut the Gordian knot. The central insight of the judgment about section 34(1) - the relative meaning of the word "void" - is shown to be well-articulated by a widely followed juristic insight into administrative validity. Some of the finer details of the ambit of the word "void" are then teased out. The uneasy relationship between section 34(1) and sections 26, 29, 30, and 31 of the Insolvency Act and the actio Pauliana is explored, and an answer to a dilemma over the application of section 34(1) ventured. As for applying the requirements of the actio Pauliana to the facts, a comprehensive, nuanced approach considering both the two relevant possibilities is proposed, rather than the single choice plumped for in the judgment apparently because it is the more usual one. The closing remarks underline the wisdom of thoroughly planning, discussing, and creating a Plan B for the client in the pleadings and executing the procedural requirements and administration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1988, the U.S. Supreme Court created the "Prison Mailbox Rule, " which assesses the timeliness of incarcerated litigants' filings based on the day they hand them to prison authorities. The rule reduces the structural barriers to filing while imprisoned. Although Houston v. Lack highlighted the unique challenges that pro se incarcerated litigants face, the Prison Mailbox Rule's subsequent federal codifications did not limit its benefits to pro se litigants, despite purportedly "reflecting" the Houston decision. Federal circuit courts of appeal today are split on whether represented people in prison can benefit from the Prison Mailbox Rule, leaving both litigants and judges with the "unenviable" task of determining who is represented by counsel. At the conflict's core is a disagreement about whether incarcerated or freed litigants are in the same position when represented by counsel. This Note argues that, even when represented, people in prison face significant barriers to filing that outside litigants do not. Moreover, Houston never explicitly limited the rule to pro se litigants, and the rule's policy justifications apply equally to those represented by counsel. Accordingly, this Note advocates for the Supreme Court to explicitly hold that all incarcerated litigants are entitled to the benefits of the Prison Mailbox Rule. This bright-line rule would enable courts to apply the Prison Mailbox Rule consistently and predictably, removing a barrier to filing for people in prison. Indeed, that is what the Prison Mailbox Rule was created to do. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, the legitimacy of the United Kingdom's Supreme Court has come under increasing pressure, with critics accusing the Court of unduly entering the domain of "politics." Using the September 2019 Miller/Cherry "prorogation" judgment as a case study, this article analyzes the tension underpinning the criticisms. In particular, it makes two theoretical claims. First, three normative worries guide attempts to distance adjudicative judgment from the political sphere. Courts should not disrespect settled law (the "lawmaking worry"), interfere with the autonomy of politics ("the interventionism worry"), or answer political questions ("non-justiciability worry"). Second, though all three worries represent coherent norms in the abstract, in deeply controversial cases like Miller/Cherry, those norms fail to be of independent help. Attempts to distinguish the judicial domain from the domain of politics, the article argues, are themselves rooted in ideologically deeply colored definitions and acts of political stance-taking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Arbitrary control over its own docket is the hallmark of the modern Supreme Court. While the Court's power to choose its cases is a frequent subject of study, its practice of preselecting questions for review has received almost no attention. This is particularly surprising since the Court openly adds or subtracts questions in some of its most consequential and politicizing cases. Yet despite the significance of this practice, its origins are poorly understood. This Essay uncovers the hidden history of the Court's question-selection powers and reveals an important--and possibly intractable--conflict between the Court's legal authority and its practice. Scholars usually explain the Court's agenda control as either a power granted by Congress or a natural component of the judicial power. Tracing the statutory, legislative, and common law histories, this Essay presents a novel challenge to these standard narratives. The Court's custom of targeting specific questions is not grounded in the history of appellate practice and Congress never intended to, and likely never did, give the Supreme Court the power to select its own questions. This history has profound repercussions for the Court's appellate jurisdiction. The question-selection power rests uneasily with both statutory law and Article III's "case or controversy" requirement, risks doing fundamental injustice to litigants, and pulls the Court deeper into politics--all of which put its legitimacy at risk. Abandoning this practice would almost certainly limit the Court's ability to answer hot-button political questions, but it might also help to preserve the Court's legitimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of the article is the determination of the role of legal conclusions of the SC in providing the principle of legality. For implementation of this purpose the following tasks were performed: 1) justification of the thoughts that the legal conclusions of the SC in the modern conditions are characterized by the numerous number of signs of court precedent; 2) proving the constantly increasing role of legal conclusions of the SC in providing of the implementation of the principle of legality; 3) determination of the expanded content of the principle of legality based on the obligation of the subjects of authority to take into account the legal conclusions of the SC in their activity. During the study of the topic of the article, the author analyzed the works of scientists who pay attention to the study of the role and significance of legal conclusions of the Supreme Court in the activities of subjects of power as N. Zozulia, O. Kibenko, M. Sambor, M. Shumylo and others. Some questions connected with the determination of the role of legal conclusions of the Supreme Court in ensuring the unity of judicial practice, were investigated by the author of this article when compiling the "Compendium of Legal Positions of the Supreme Court for lawyers" and developing the content part of the analytical and legal system ZakonOnline (Kibenko, 2022). Nevertheless, in modern legal science there is still a list of unsolved issues in the sphere of the role definition of legal conclusions of the Supreme Court in providing of the principle of legality. Based on the conducted research, it is concluded that it is established by the law the obligation for all courts and subjects of authorities to consider (apply) legal conclusions of the SC allows to confirm that such approach causes the expanded application of the principle of legality, as the norm of law in fact cannot exist separately from the SC case law (its legal understanding) and the subject of authorities cannot have own approach to understand of this or that norm of law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Ottawa Law Review is the property of University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Unlike their employees, municipal defendants in civil-rights suits cannot invoke qualified immunity. Municipal defendants also don't have a right to appeal if a district court refuses to dismiss a municipal claim. These defendants have nevertheless largely succeeded in tagging along when their employees appeal from the denial of qualified immunity. Invoking pendent appellate jurisdiction, most courts of appeals will allow these municipal appeals so long as--in the employees' qualified-immunity appeal--the court concludes that no constitutional violation occurred. This practice--which I call "municipal piggybacking"--is wholly unnecessary. Jurisdiction in municipal appeals turns entirely on the outcome of the employees' appeals, so no one knows at the outset whether appellate jurisdiction exists. The parties nevertheless spend time researching, briefing, and arguing the municipal claim. If the court of appeals ultimately refuses to extend pendent appellate jurisdiction, all that effort is wasted. Municipal piggybacking serves no legitimate purpose. It's merely a tool for defendants to wear down civil-rights plaintiffs. Municipal piggybacking needs to stop. But it's not the only aspect of qualified-immunity appeals that needs reform. A unique set of appellate procedures accompany qualified immunity. Defendants have a right to appeal from the denial of immunity, and courts have steadily expanded the scope and availability of those appeals. These expansions serve little or no legitimate purpose. They instead make civil-rights litigation all the more complex, expensive, and time consuming. Qualified-immunity appeals need to change, whether that means limiting their scope and availability, making them discretionary, or doing away with them entirely. And the Rules Committee might be the best forum for those reforms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a practical guide to the 2020 Florida Appellate Rules of Procedure amendments for appellate practitioners. Other topics include the new technical requirements for appellate drafting and filing like font styles and word limits, the transfer of appellate jurisdiction to the district courts of appeal from circuit courts, and the changes made by the Florida Supreme Court.

The article explains the provisions for forum selection in administrative appeals in Florida. Topics discussed include the meaning of the provision that the selection of appellate forum is a statutory right and not a common law privilege, tendency of parties not to opt for the First District for the review of a Florida Housing Finance Corp. (FHFC) decision in which the latter is a party appellee, and the role of the appellant in the forum selection at the appellate level.

The scope of this article is to identify the law governing the international commercial arbitration by reporting the international and internal regulations. We shall consider the situation of contracting parties selecting the law governing their contract and when the parties have not selected the governing law and decided for arbitration as manner of solving their disputes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the Supreme Court continues to restrict the reach of private class actions, numerous commentators have championed public enforcement actions by state attorneys general (AGs) as a superior alternative to hold corporations accountable for misconduct. While AG actions fill some of the void left by the forced retreat of the private class action, few scholars have seriously considered whether the agency problems that exist in private class actions also occur in AG actions. And, until now, no scholar has recognized the unique agency problems that arise when AGs act together in multistate actions. Multistate actions are made up of two discrete layers of "class action." On the first level, AGs frequently aggregate the claims of state residents to bring actions on their behalf, with AGs acting like lead counsel and state residents resembling class members. On the second layer, when multiple AGs bring action together, another "class action" of a sort emerges, with a few AGs leading a "class" of states and their combined state residents. In other words, multistate action is class action squared. Agency problems are not simply doubled in multistate actions by virtue of being class action squared. Rather, an entirely new host of agency dilemmas arise when the two layers of "class action" interact with each other. Put more simply, "class action squared" problems create temptations for AGs to "borrow" and "steal" in multistate actions in ways they could not if they pursued actions independently. These problems raise the question of whether multistate action is really a viable substitute for the private class action and challenge the notion that multistate action is always better than states going it alone. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Reversed and remanded." Or "vacated and remanded." These familiar words, often found at the end of an appellate decision, emphasize that an appellate court's conclusion that the lower court erred generally does not end the litigation. The power to remand for further proceedings rather than wrap up a case is useful for appellate courts because they may lack the institutional competence to bring the case to a final resolution (as when new factual findings are necessary) or lack an interest in the fact-specific work of applying a newly announced legal standard to the particular circumstances at hand. The modern Supreme Court has carried the power to remand rather far, vacating and remanding in some cases in which it is unclear whether the lower court erred in any respect. Some of the Justices have sought to narrow the circumstances in which the Court can remand, relying heavily on claims about the nature of Article III "appellate jurisdiction" and the "traditional" practices of appellate courts. When they have responded at all, the defenders of a broad conception of the remand power have not effectively countered the critics' claims. There is a risk that the remand power will therefore be narrowed unnecessarily and without a full defense. This Article takes a broad look at the remand power, examining it in its theoretical, constitutional, statutory, historical, and prudential dimensions. Contrary to the critics' contentions, the history is not one in which traditional limitations on appellate jurisdiction have lately been degraded. Rather, the history is more interesting in that it contains two separate appellate traditions: a rigid approach from the common law and a flexible approach from equity. Modern federal appellate procedure is a hybrid of the two, but Congress and the courts have chosen the flexible, equitable approach when it comes to appellate courts' remedial powers. The most important constraints on the power to remand therefore come not from supposed rigidities in the Constitution or traditional practice but instead from prudential considerations. The prudent exercise of an appellate court's remedial discretion depends on the court's role in the judicial system. Debates over the remand power therefore implicate deep conflicts over the Supreme Court's sometimes competing functions of doing justice, developing the law, and supervising a bureaucracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses evidence on whether Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg can be considered as the greatest proceduralist in the U.S. Supreme Court. Topics mentioned include her ability to handle procedural disputes, her explanation on the jurisdiction of a federal court, and her opinion about the procedural requirement.

The article discusses the court case Martinez v. Barr which deals with the jurisdiction of an appeals court to review the denial of the plaintiff's motion to reopen by the U.S. Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).

The author explores the role of independent lawyers in the preservation individual liberty as realized in U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens' dissent in Walters v. National Association of Radiation Survivors. Three of the four opinions in the case dealt with issues of statutory interpretation, due process, and appellate jurisdiction. On the issue of due process, the justice's dissent focused on the arbitrariness of the statute as interpreted by the Court.

The article examines the applicability of the vertical stare decisis concept of the Appellate Jurisdiction Theory in the decisions of three-judge federal district courts in the U.S.

Nearly 90 percent of the work of the federal courts of appeals looks nothing like the opinions law students read in casebooks Over the last fifty years, the so-called “unpublished decision” has overtaken the federal appellate courts in response to a caseload volume “crisis ” These are often short, perfunctory decisions that make no law; they are, one federal judge said, “not safe for human consumption ” The creation of the inferior unpublished decision also has created an inferior track of appellate justice for a class of appellants: indigent litigants The federal appellate courts routinely shunt indigent appeals to a second-tier appellate process in which judicial staff attorneys resolve appeals without oral argument or meaningful judicial oversight For the system’s most vulnerable participants, the promise of an appeal as of right often becomes a rubber stamp: “You lose ” This work examines the product of that second-class appellate justice system by filling two critical gaps in the existing literature First, it compiles comprehensive data on the use of unpublished decisions across the circuits over the last twenty years The data reveal, for the first time, that the courts’ continued— and increasing—reliance on unpublished decisions has no correlation to overall caseload volume Second, it examines the output of the second-tier appellate justice system from the perspective of the litigants themselves Relying on a procedural justice framework, this work develops a taxonomy of un-published decisions and argues for minimum standards for reason-giving in most unpublished decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on judicial law discusses several key legal decisions and developments in the eight Circuit. It touches on various aspects of civil litigation, including appellate jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, expert witness testimony, motion to disqualify judges, forum selection clauses, and sealing of court documents. It provides insights into how the courts have handled these issues and their impact on legal proceedings.

The article discusses the role of discretionary appeals in federal appellate jurisdiction in the U.S. and the proposed form they should take in the reformed system of said jurisdiction. Also cited are some reform proposals like the elimination of limitations on the types of decisions that could be certified under the Constitution, and the system of dual certification for appeals in civil lawsuits.

The article analyzes the jurisdictional issues, particularly appellate jurisdiction, on the lawsuits questioning the conduct of U.S. President Donald Trump under the Constitution's Emoluments Clauses. Topics include the cases filed against Trump with federal courts in Maryland and Washington, D.C. on alleged violations of the clauses due to continuous receipt of income from his firms and the relationship between appellate mandamus and the certification process under the Constitution.

The article presents a speech by U.S. Senator Ted Cruz during the second annual Gregory S. Coleman Memorial Lecture. Topics discussed include transformative power such as The Federalist Society and the Texas Solicitor General's Office; familiarity with appellate litigation and constitutional nuances; and a case representing Municipal District Chair in Austin challenging Section Five of the Voting Rights Act took by lawyer Gregory S. Coleman.

This article examines the history of the office of Bankruptcy Registrar of the High Court of England and Wales. It is argued that the power of the registrars to act judicially grew from their authorisation to act pursuant to delegated powers introduced in 1869 and that this began a major shift in their role from being largely administrative to their current status as fully fledged (and renamed) insolvency and companies court judges. The fluidity of bankruptcy offices in the nineteenth century is also examined, demonstrating that certain bankruptcy officer‐holders moved freely between functions in the course of the development in the office of registrar from what might be called its administrative phase to the judicial phase with the eventual creation of a Bankruptcy Court and more recently the creation of a specialist insolvency and companies list in the new Business and Property Courts. Finally, it is argued that a factor in the foregoing developments and the increasing reputation of the bankruptcy registrars was the extension of their jurisdiction from pure bankruptcy work to include company insolvency, directors' disqualification cases and non‐insolvency company work, a significant increase in their trial work and their acquisition of an appellate jurisdiction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the appellate court per curiam affirmed decision (PCA) as an appellate practice by the five district courts of appeal (DCA) in Florida. Topics covered include the grounds for rendering PCA expressed by Florida's appellate district courts such as lack of substantial contribution to Florida's common law jurisprudence, lack of jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court to review a PCA and limitations of a Florida PCA.

Foreign judges play an important role in deciding constitutional cases in the appellate courts of a range of countries. Comparative constitutional scholars, however, have to date paid limited attention to the phenomenon of "hybrid" constitutional courts staffed by a mix of local and foreign judges. This Article addresses this gap in comparative constitutional scholarship by providing a general framework for understanding the potential advantages and disadvantages of hybrid models of constitutional justice, as well as the factors likely to inform the trade-off between these competing factors. Building on prior work by the authors on "outsider" models of constitutional interpretation, it suggests that the hybrid constitutional model's attractiveness may depend on answers to the following questions: Why are foreign judges appointed to constitutional courts--for what historical and functional reasons? What degree of local democratic support exists for their appointment? Who are the foreign judges, where are they from, what are their backgrounds, and what personal characteristics of wisdom and prudence do they possess? By what means are they appointed and paid, and how are their terms in office structured? How do the foreign judges approach their adjudicatory role? When do foreign judges exercise their role? Exploration of these questions is informed by interviews of judges who have served on three jurisdictions' appellate courts that include foreign judges. Ultimately, the Article suggests that the value of having foreign judges on a national court may well depend on their partial "domestication"-- through some meaningful degree of domestic support for the role of such judges and through the foreign judges' own approach to constitutional appellate decision-making, such that they occupy a truly hybrid position between that of constitutional "outsider" and "insider." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the powers of the California Supreme Court from 1850 to 1879. Topics discussed include the court's final ruling in disputes involving the jurisdictions of courts, Constitutional limitation on the court's appellate power, Legislature's expansion of the court's appellate jurisdiction to cases originating in district courts and application of a common law principle to decide whether a reversal of a case on appeal can hinder further proceedings.

The article discusses the organization of the California Supreme Court. Topics discussed include Mexico's ratification of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo which passed the possession of California to the U.S., the military rule in California, ratification of the state constitution, limitation of the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, original jurisdiction of the district courts in civil cases and direct election of justices at the Constitutional Convention.

Most of the law of federal appellate jurisdiction comes from judicial interpretations of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. That statute gives the courts of appeals jurisdiction over only "final decisions" of the district courts. The federal courts have used this grant of jurisdiction to create most of the rules governing appellate jurisdiction. But those efforts have required giving many different meanings to the term "final decision." And those many different meanings are to blame for much of the confusion, complexity, unpredictability, and inflexibility that plague this area of law. The literature has accordingly advocated reform that would base most of the law on something other than case-by-case interpretations of what it means for a decision to be "final." Before any reform, however, it is crucial to understand the ways in which the federal courts have interpreted the term "final decision.". This article unearths the three contexts in which courts have interpreted § 1291 to create three different kinds of rules: (1) rules about when district court proceedings have ended and parties can take the classic, end-of-proceedings appeal on the merits; (2) rules about when litigants can appeal before the end of those proceedings; and (3) rules limiting or expanding the scope of review in those before-the-end-of-proceedings appeals. Though related, these contexts are distinct, involve unique interests, and raise unique issues. Successful reform must fill all of the roles that interpretations of the term "final decision" have played. In the meantime, federal courts could bring some much-needed candor and transparency to this area of law by acknowledging the three different ways in which they have used this term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the decisions by Indiana appellate courts from October 2016 to September 2017 about administrative law issues. Topics discussed include the procedural issues on petitions for judicial review, the case of "21st Amendment Inc. v. Indiana Alcohol & Tobacco Commission," exhaustion of administrative remedies before seeking court intervention, reasons for an appellate court to set aside an agency's action and limitations of an agency rulemaking authority.

Copyright of Collected Papers of Zagreb Law Faculty / Zbornik Pravnog Fakulteta u Zagrebu is the property of Sveuciliste u Zagrebu, Pravni Fakultet and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The central feature of American judicial federalism is the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over state courts. Conventionally, we tend to view controversy over judicial federalism through the lens of the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian eras, in which this appellate oversight functioned to consolidate the power of national institutions against the periphery and defenders of states' rights promoted the independence of state courts from federal oversight. But the deliberative process that attended the formation of the federal judiciary exhibited a more complex dynamic that presented the framers of the Constitution and of the first judiciary act with a range of possible institutional arrangements. Given the available alternatives, the Supreme Court's appellate oversight was not so much an aggression on states' rights as a concession to those wary of consolidation. Rather than being contested, it in fact formed a ground of consensus as a modest means of ensuring federal supremacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A proper notice of appeal is a necessary first step in most federal appeals. But federal litigants sometimes file their notice of appeal early, before district court proceedings have ended. When those proceedings finally end and no new notice is filed, the law of cumulative finality determines what effect--if any--the premature notice has. Sometimes the notice is effective and the appeal proceeds as normal. Sometimes it's not, and litigants lose their right to appeal. At least, that's how the law of cumulative finality looks from a distance. Up close, the courts of appeals are hopelessly divided on matters of cumulative finality. They disagree on what law governs cumulative finality issues--whether they are governed solely by Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(2) or also by a common-law cumulative finality doctrine that preceded the rule--and under what conditions a premature notice of appeal is saved. Three distinct approaches to cumulative finality have emerged, resulting in a deep circuit split. To make matters worse, decisions within several of the circuits have applied different approaches, resulting in intracircuit divides. This Article offers a fix. Neither the text of the Rules of Appellate Procedure nor their history provide a clear cumulative finality rule. But looking to the practicalities of the issue suggests allowing a subsequent judgment to save any prematurely filed notice of appeal. Doing so imposes few costs while preserving litigants' right to appeal. The current cumulative finality mess illuminates a larger issue with the appellate jurisdiction literature and its attendant reform efforts. The literature has long maligned the unnecessary complexity and uncertainty of the entire federal appellate jurisdiction regime and advocated reform. But most of that literature focuses on only one part of that regime--appeals before a final judgment. Equally important are issues with determining when district court proceedings have ended and parties thus have a right to appeal. Cumulative finality is only one piece in this other aspect of appellate jurisdiction. There are more. Successful reform might require establishing a new, clearer point at which parties have a right to appeal. So this other aspect of appellate jurisdiction needs similar attention if reform is to succeed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on contribution of Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) to the development of human and fundamental rights with events in Caribbean legal and political history with post-colonial legal and judicial dependence. It mentions appellate jurisdiction (AJ) of CCJ is aimed at replacing the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) as the apex court of those Caribbean countries. It also mentions legal cultures and approaches to incorporation of international human rights and laws.

The article discusses the U.S. Supreme Court's (Supreme Court) ruling in the 2017 case Microsoft Corp. v. Baker which deals with appellate jurisdiction, America's final judgment rule, and the Supreme Court's rejection of a maneuver which let plaintiffs appeal adverse class certification orders by volunteering to have their individual claims dismissed with prejudice. Rule 23(f) of America's Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Title 28, Section 1291 of the U.S. Code are assessed.

The present debate concerning whether it is appropriate, desirable and feasible to establish an appellate body in the context of investor-State dispute settlement may be regarded as somewhat novel, yet this is not the first time that the creation of an international court with appellate jurisdiction has been contemplated. This article considers earlier initiatives to create post-award and post-judgment procedures, including appellate jurisdiction, for international adjudicatory bodies. In particular, it considers a number of examples where a form of "supervisory" or "control" jurisdiction has been conferred on the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Court of Justice, and examines particular instances in which the Permanent Court of International Justice has exercised appellate jurisdiction. This article concludes that this historical context should not be ignored as the development of an appeals regime for investor-State arbitration is considered, as it demonstrates that a permanent international adjudicatory body can, sensibly, exercise appellate jurisdiction regarding the decisions and awards of other international tribunals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the authority of the U.S. Congress to strip the U.S. Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction with respect to hearing patent appeals. It mentions importance of patent law, and assesses recent Supreme Court patent law jurisprudence and precedent warrants a consideration of a jurisdiction-stripping statute. It also mentions U.S. Supreme Court make easier for an accused infringer to invalidate a patent.