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When managers get to trade in options received as compensation, their trading prices reveal several aspects of subjective option pricing and risk preferences. Two subjective pricing models are fitted to show that executive stock option prices incorporate a subjective discount. It depends positively on implied volatility and negatively on option moneyness. Further, risk preferences are estimated using the semiparametric model of Ait-Sahalia and Lo (2000). The results suggest that relative risk aversion is just above 1 for a certain stock price range. This level of risk aversion is low but reasonable, and it may be explained by the typical manager being wealthy and having low marginal utility. Related to risk aversion, it is found that marginal rate of substitution increases considerably in states with low stock prices.

Employing stochastic programming, we provide a general framework for option pricing based on marginal bid/ask price valuation. It is applied to numerical analysis of options with European and American style exercise using a double binary tree. Incentive options are valued considering hedging restrictions and other market frictions, such as transaction and short position costs, and different borrowing and lending rates. The framework also includes correlated labor income. The possibility of partial sales is analyzed using ask price functions. Without friction costs and labor income, our model is the discrete-time equivalent of Ingersoll (J Bus 79:453–487, 2006). When labor income and/or market frictions are present, or a fraction of options is sold, the option values are materially different compared to Ingersoll (J Bus 79:453–487, 2006).