1. Anticipated Communication in the Ultimatum Game
- Author
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Mario Capizzani, Luigi Mittone, Andrew Musau, and Antonino Vaccaro
- Subjects
ultimatum game ,anticipated communication ,experiment ,Technology ,Social Sciences - Abstract
Anticipated verbal feedback in a dictator game has been shown to induce altruistic behavior. However, in the ultimatum game which, apart from generosity, entails a strategic component since a proposer may (rightly) fear that the responder will reject a low offer, it remains an open question whether anticipated verbal communication can be effective in increasing offers. We implement a between-subjects experimental design in the ultimatum game with strategy method manipulating the form of anticipated verbal communication (no communication, one-sided communication from proposers and two-sided communication) and find that offers are significantly higher in the presence of anticipated two-sided communication. However, anticipated one-sided communication from proposers has no effect on offers, suggesting, as found in previous studies, that it is the anticipation of feedback that is relevant.
- Published
- 2017
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