Search

the height of their development and popularization, the Odyssey and the Iliad were part of a rich tradition of oral epic poetry. And while the transmission of Homer's epics was facilitated by a Panhellenic framework, these works themselves became catalysts for the consolidation and unification of Greek culture; they shaped a shared Greek identity and a common value system. Particularly significant in this regard is the episode from Book IX of the Odyssey, namely the scene of the Odysseus-Polyphemos encounter. The island of the Cyclopes, as I argue in this article, represents a structural inversion of a civilized and orderly human community; the image of Polyphemos embodies "wildness" and delineates (or redefines) the boundaries of discourse on civilization, culture, and community. This motif anticipates, thus, the debate on nomos ("law") and physis ("nature") that engaged the intellectual elite of Athens, known as the sophists, around the turn of the 5th and 4th centuries BCE. This article traces the reception of the Polyphemos motif within this sophistic discourse of that period. Euripides' satyr play Cyclops, filled with allusions to the sophists who were keenly interested in the Homeric motif of the island of the one-eyed monsters, serves as the focal point for this analysis. Furthermore, I will show that Euripides uses the dramaturgical framework inspired by Homer's epic to confront two worldviews: on the one hand, respect for tradition and values associated with ancient poetry (the attitude represented by Odysseus), and on the other, the rationalism, radicalism, and tradition-directed criticism that characterized Euripides' contemporary political thinkers and philosophers (represented by Polyphemos). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I focus on the relationships between language, definition and being in Antisthenes. I start from Plato's Sophist 251b–c, in which the reference to the ὀψιμαθεῖς stands out, and I conclude that it is not possible to identify these characters with Antisthenes. The conception of ὀψιμαθεῖς provides for the exclusive legitimacy of identical judgments, exploiting in an eristic sense an evident Eleatic legacy. But this position, rather than concordances, reveals serious opposition to what is surely known to us of the logical and linguistic doctrines of Antisthenes. The most explicit testimony about the relationship between language and being in Antisthenes is handed down by Porphyry, who attributes to Antisthenes the equation λέγειν = λέγειν τι = λέγειν τὸ ὄν. My analysis intends to show that this equation is assumed by Antisthenes through a Socratic mediation and has a double objective: to ensure an objective reference of language, as opposed to Gorgias' self-referential conception of language, and to nullify the antilogy, which is typical of sophistic argumentation. To it Antisthenes contrasts the ἐπίσκεψις τῶν ὀνομάτων, which is a development of Socratic ἐξετάζειν, and whose aim is to reach, at the end of the examination, no longer just a ὁμολογία, but a definition valid once and for all. Antisthenes is aware that there is a distinction between essence and quality, and with this, he moves a first important step beyond the univocal conception of being proper to Parmenides. The doxography will sum up Antisthenes' position by describing him as the first philosopher to advance a definition of logos, i. e., definition. He bases his theory of definition on the identification of that attribute which is ἴδιον καὶ οἰκεῖον of the proposed object. Antisthenes coined the phrase τὸ τί ἦν to designate what the predicate is meant to say in a definition, i. e., the proper quality. This expression does not seem to identify the general notion of a predicate as such, but rather to indicate the determination or qualification necessary to actually define the object in question. In the final part of my article, I examine some testimonies that show how, with his theory of definition, Antisthenes is, and was considered already in antiquity, the precursor of the Stoic theory of definition, whose objective is, according to Chrysippus' formula, to provide the explanation of what is proper (ἰδίου ἀπόδοσις). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Antilogies, or pairs of symmetrically opposed speeches or arguments, were generally ignored by Plato, Isocrates, Aristotle, Cicero, and Diogenes Laertius, and, later, by Eduard Norden, Hermann Diels, and most modern scholars of antiquity. As a consequence, until the end of the twentieth century CE, antilogies have been ignored or, at best, treated as a minor literary device to be mentioned only with reference to individual writings. Nevertheless, during the second half of the fifth century, antilogies were a crucially important form of argument and persuasion in 'sophistic' thought, philosophy, historiography, comedy and tragedy, and other fields. In order to redress the historical neglect of the art of antilogy, this essay provides an inventory (doubtless incomplete) of some 30 antilogies composed by playwrights such as Sophocles, Euripides, and Aristophanes, historians such as Herodotus and Thucydides, and, most importantly, 'sophists' such as Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus and Antiphon (in addition to a few other writers of the same period). Building on this inventory, the second part of the essay seeks to establish identifying features of antilogy and assess its cultural significance in the Athenian context (in the second half of the fifth century BCE). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Socrates' burial is dismissed as philosophically irrelevant in Phaedo 115c-e although it had previously been discussed by Plato's older contemporaries. In Antisthenes' Kyrsas dialogue describes a visit to Socrates' tomb by a lover of Socrates who receives protreptic advice in a dream sequence while sleeping over Socrates' grave. The dialogue is a metaphysical explanation of how Socrates' spiritual message was continued after death. Plato underplays this metaphorical imagery by lampooning Antisthenes philosophy and his work (Phd. 81b-82e) and subsequently precludes him from an active role in the Phaedo. A similar case is the exclusion of Euclides of Megara. Fragments of a lost Socratic dialogue depict Apollodorus citing an unnamed Megarian in order to justify care for the remains of the dead. Similar mistaken notions explain Kyrsas' belief when he lusts after Socrates even though he was dead. In spite of these disputes, the philosophers (Euclides, Antisthenes and Plato) each attempted to present Socrates' moral influence as a force that continued after his death and burial. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The manuscripts of De officiis all record something strange at 1.148: Cicero says that the philosophers Socrates and Aristippus had exceptional licence to flout social custom and convention owing to their 'great and divine good qualities' (magna et divina bona). There are no worries about Socrates, but the example of Aristippus seems preposterous. This paper makes the following argument: (1) elsewhere Cicero defines divina bona in such a way to exclude hedonists; this should rule out crediting Aristippus with magna et divina bona alongside Socrates; (2) all scholarly efforts to account for the presence of Aristippus at 1.148 fail to convince; (3) the name Aristippus at 1.148 should, therefore, be remedied; (4) there are excellent philosophical reasons to think that Antisthenes, a follower of Socrates who is credited with setting in motion the Cynic philosophical tradition, is the name that Cicero wrote or should have written in the original. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Antisthenes and Ortega analyzed the relationship between language, reality and truth. Our aim here is first to prove certain provocative ideas of Antisthenes, if we fit them onto the ontological plane, find their correlate in Ortega's thought, and second to show that there is a partial match between the antisthenic thesis that it is impossible to define things and the Ortegian affirmation that the man has no nature. In the third place, to point out the amazing resemblance between the antisthenic conception of the "proper name" of things and the "authentic names" that Ortega postulates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

See below the translation from German of the section dedicated to cynicism present in Lessons on the History of Philosophy by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831). In the section in question, the German philosopher approach not only the history of the Cynic school, but also its principles, its influences and the importance that this movement had for later philosophical thought -- especially for Stoicism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why, when Plato wants to justify his definition of the sophist as an "image maker"(Sophist, 236c), he quotes two authentic verses of Parmenides (fr. 7.1-2) that undoubtedly allude to the path taken by the "mortals who know nothing" (fr. 6.4)? Does he want to suggest that these "mortals", who are actually "opinions (doxaí) makers" are ancestors of the sophists, who are "image makers"? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Socratic Memorabilia (1759) reconstruct the figure of Socrates with great interest for a historiography inaugurated by Plato and encouraged by Xenophon. The problematic nature of a life without written work and the philosophical instrumentalization of his exemplary death are exploited by Hamann to appropriate the Socratic êthos (cultivated from the daímon rather than from the logos), which allows defining an aesthetic Socrates who articulates his vital attitude under two premises. On the one hand, beliefs and other material concretions take part in the epistemological understanding of the world and, on the other, it is through radical and critical skepticism towards institutions that it is best to find in Socrates the protoenlightened one that the most orthodox Enlightenment seeks. If Hamann's Socrates is aesthetic, it is because of his understanding of the aesthetic as a human perceptual structure, prior to the constitution of subjectivity that would dominate senses and passions, according to traditional Aesthetics. Given that the aesthetic dimension appears as the gift of God that brings together the divine and the human in the sentient body, Hamann thus approaches a Christian Socrates, but also a 'teacher of existence' like the character left by Antisthenes and who must complement the Platonic one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The development of the studies on the Socratic philosophies have enabled a return to the analysis of intertextual passages within the platonic corpus. This work explores the dream passage in Theaetetus, 201c ff. and its links with Antisthenic philosophy. Firstly, it analyses its features in the context of the Socratic dialogue. Then, it presents some key points on the dream passage, and finaly, it sets out an interpretation of the Antisthenic philosophy that reveals relevant contacts with the Platonic approach. In this vein, we offer an hypothesis about the general sense of the dialogue and its way of comprehend the phenomenon of knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I examine Antisthenes's conception of truth in order to better understand the relation between ontology and language in his thought. I intend to show that it presents a sharp contrast to Plato's account of the problem of truth, which relies on an affirmative conception of ontology that involves both the concepts of correspondence and of predicative attribution. While for both philosophers the problem of truth is central, Antisthenes develops a peculiar perspective that subverts Plato's attempt to sort, through dialectics, the interferences that permeate language, in order to gain access to an essential instance that warrants a truthful discourse. For Antisthenes, truth cannot be understood in terms of correspondence, since, properly speaking, there are only true propositions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ancient art of knowing oneself could have several forms -- either philosopher knows man through words, or (later in Peripatetic philosophy) recognizes human character on the basis of appearance and bodily manifestations. In ancient Greek, this art was referred to as φυσιογνωμονία, which is usually translated as the science or art of judging a man by his features. The authorship of the work on this art is attributed to Pseudo-Aristotle. In our paper, we will try to answer the question whether we can also find certain theoretical possibilities, which this term binds to itself, namely the possibility to judge the character from the appearance, in Socratic philosophy. We will focus mainly on Socratic authors as Antisthenes, Xenophon, Plato or Phaedo of Elis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Annali dell'Universita degli Studi di Napoli L'Orientale is the property of Brill Academic Publishers and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Ideas y Valores is the property of Universidad Nacional de Colombia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía is the property of Centro de Investigaciones Filosoficas and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The main purpose of this paper is: a) to explain who can be actually considered an anti-hero character in Socratic philosophy, and b) to show the philosophical significance of these negative literary protagonists and how they determine the Socratic paideia. In trying to define the anti-hero we will build upon the concept of Joseph Campbell called The Hero’s Journey. At the same time, we will assume that the best example of a hero in Socratic literature – except Socrates himself – is Odysseus.

Considering the importance of cunning in the characterization of σοφός in the Ancient Greek tradition, from the literature of the archaic period to the Socratic circle, it is striking that in Plato there is no such thing as a cunning σοφός. Apart from the Lesser Hippias, which offers an ambiguous assessment of Odysseus πολυτροπία, the σοφός is almost never defined by its intelligence --this is not a distinctive feature of the σοφός or φιλόσοφος-- but rather by the knowledge of certain things. The lack of treatment has led to most interpreters to neglect the subject. In order to remedy this situation, in this article I offer an interpretation that diagnoses the absence of an attribute such as cunning in the conceptualization of σοφός in Plato, but not as the result of simple condemnation or censorship as argued, for example, by Detienne and Vernant 1978 and suggested by Montiglio 2011. In this paper I propose that Plato would manifest a lack of interest regarding these attributes. From the analysis of the Platonic corpus I seek to demonstrate that, although attributes of intelligence are considered advantageous and desirable qualities, they have only instrumental value with respect to the attainment of truth and good. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies on the Socratic philosophies have grown in number in recent years, calling attention to their significance for the understanding of the intellectual climate at the beginning of the fourth century bc. Figures such as Antisthenes, Aristippus, Aeschines, and the Megarics were as influential as Plato and Xenophon, but their views were very different, so that it is difficult to determine what the theoretical features are that make them part of this group. In this paper, the problem of the common ground of the Socratic philosophies is investigated through the exploration of their anthropological perspectives. Through this analysis it will be possible to arrive at conclusions about their common concerns and to illuminate the role of the Socratic philosophies in the shaping of Western anthropological thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several scholars have suggested that Isocrates' speeches Against the Sophists and Encomium of Helen attack some of Socrates' followers, mainly Plato, Antisthenes and Euclid. Nonetheless, most of these authors do not see the overall nature of Isocrates' criticism of the Socratics, which not only includes the figures mentioned above, but it is aimed at the group as a whole. This article seeks to defend that hypothesis. In order to do so, I will reconstruct, firstly, Isocrates' attack on the first group criticized in Against the Sophists and on the intellectuals from the prologue of Encomium of Helen. I will defend that both groups must be identified and that Isocrates attributes a set of shared doctrines and practices to all of them, among which he highlights an eristic methodology of argumentation and an intellectualist ethical position. Secondly, I will argue that these elements were practiced and defended by many of first-generation Socratics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main purpose of this paper is: a) to explain who can be actually considered an anti-hero character in Socratic philosophy, and b) to show the philosophical significance of these negative literary protagonists and how they determine the Socratic paideia. In trying to define the anti-hero we will build upon the concept of Joseph Campbell called The Hero's Journey. At the same time, we will assume that the best example of a hero in Socratic literature -- except Socrates himself -- is Odysseus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Literature / Literatura is the property of Vilnius University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Antisthenes (444 - 365 BC.), a predecessor of the Cynic philosophical school, brings an original conception of temperance as a defence against the negative consequences of the excessive pursuit of delight. Antisthenes places an emphasis on experience; he refuses Plato's attempts to define theories of ideas. He examines the power of the word and pursues moral objectives. His "naturalistic economy of rational choice" prepares the ground for the Cynics' shift to nature. The theory of "austerity" is discussed in relation to behavioural economy and the theory of rational choice. The main premise is Antisthenes' nominalist logic and his well-known ability to persuade, which presupposes a dialogue of free people, as well as love, friendship and cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article we intend to analyze the ontology of different Socratic lines of thought, through an approach of Zones of dialogic tension. Antisthenes and the megarics Euclid and Stilpo develop ontologically negative conceptions that reject the affirmation of ontological principles capable of sustaining reality and its linguistic expression. This theoretical stance not only offers an alternative to the platonicaristotelic approach towards ontology, but affects, by means of interaction and reciprocal influence, the constitution of those affirmative variants in classical Greek thought. Thereby, the inclusion of Socratic lines of thought allows us to question the heideggerian diagnosis of ancient Greek philosophy, inscribed solely in the paradigm of "metaphysics of presence". The recovery of the Socratic philosophers, usually obscured by the figures of Plato and Xenophon, offers an opportunity to redimension the period of classical antiquity through the study of its diverse ontological conceptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to present recent Socratic studies as offered in the collected papers edited by Ugo Zilioli titled From the Socratics to the Socratic Schools: Classical Ethics, Metaphysics and Epistemology (2015) in the context of Slovak researches in this field. The paper has twofold ambition: to be informative about contemporary Socratic studies as well as to be protreptic for further reading and the exploration of the Socratic tradition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the Symposium, there are two revelations: one is that of the woman of Mantinea, the other that of Alcibiades. The former (201d 1–212e 3) proposes a Socrates reshaped by Plato, but what Socrates does the latter (216a 6–217a 3) express? Can the praise for Socrates contained in the latter also be considered a tribute by Plato to his teacher? The opinions are divided. I looked at two scholars: Michel Narcy (2008) and Bruno Centrone (20142 ), whose judgments, as they are set out and argued, are irreconcilable. The contrast may be determined by a certain ambiguity in Plato’s attitude towards Alcibiades. Part One – In order to clarify this ambiguity and to overcome the contrast between the two scholars I have tried to show how in the praise of Alcibiades there overlap different portraits of Socrates that refer to the tradition, to different experiences of various Socratics and of Plato himself in Apologia, and how this differs from the others and from himself by proposing a whole new portrait of Socrates as a representative of an Eros megas daimōn, revealed by the woman of Mantinea, in contrast to an Eros megas theos. Part Two – As instead regards the accusation of hybris, the hypothesis is this: for Plato his colleagues, and especially Antisthenes and Xenophon, offering an image of Socrates founded exclusively on his way of life and not also on the erotic aspects alluding to the supersensible world, seem to end up arousing laughter and looking like “fools” (nēpioi), like Alcibiades, who at the end of his speech, after making the audience laugh, is unmasked by Socrates for his clumsy attempt to impart a “life lesson” to Agathon, which he did not need at all, paying at his own expenses for his ignorance of the revelation through arriving late at the party.

A. Brancacci (1990) ha interpretado y reconstruido la filosofía de Antístenes de Atenas en clave semántica, negando el nominalismo antisténico y acentuando el carácter vincular que el método antisténico de investigación filosófica establece entre la habilidad retórica y el saber moral. La interpretación de Brancacci se ha tornado canónica; sin embargo, los pasajes antisténicos referidos al análisis de los nombres parecen más bien el ejemplo de una filosofía nominalista (en el sentido que la expresión ‘nominalista’ cobrara en las disputas del siglo XII sobre el estatuto de los términos universales) que un modelo exclusivamente destinado al análisis semántico de conceptos.A. Brancacci (1990) has interpreted and rebuilt the philosophy of Antisthenes semantically, denying antisthenic nominalism and pointing out the binding status of the antisthenic method of philosophical research, which links rhetorical skill and moral knowledge. Brancacci’s interpretation has become canonical, but the antisthenic passages, which refer to the analysis of names, seem more an example of nominalist philosophy (according to the meaning that ‘nominalism’ acquired in the twelfth century disputes about status of universals) rather than an exclusively pattern for the semantic analysis of concepts.

The so-called Socratic protreptikos is usually seen as a kind of transitory genre departing from the epideictic oratory of the Sophists and leading into the early dialogues of Plato. The aim of this article is to examine various examples of Socratic protreptikoi and to further define whether we can speak of a type of genre in formation and of the transitory nature of this genre. The author also wishes to draw the reader’s attention to a few problems of methodology which are related to our understanding of the protreptik corpus which dates from the fourth century BC to the time of the birth of Our Lord. The article also examines the differences between the explicitly named protreptikoi (Cleitophon, Euthydemos) and those generally known under the name of Socratic protreptikoi

This article analyses the three epideictic orations of Isocrates which are in themselves a precious testimony of the quality of intellectual life at the close of the fourth century before Christ. To this period belong also the Socratics who are generally seen as an important link between Socrates and Plato. The author of this article proposes a more productive approach to the study of Antisthenes, Euclid of Megara and other so-called Socratics, revealing them not as independent thinkers but rather as adherents of the sophistic school and also as teachers, thereby, including them among those who took part in the educative activity of their time

Apollodorus' prelude to Pl. Symp. is a complex rejection of earlier accounts of Socrates' participation in a symposium. This can be examined contextually as a literary mannerism, or sub-textually as a rejection of previous literary versions of this topos. Neither approach contradicts the other, but scholars have found difficulties in finding any earlier author who could have been rejected. Recently, it has been argued that Xen. Symp. preceded Pl. Symp. acting as a catalyst for Plato's work. However, if neither was the first on a sympotic theme in a Socratic dialogue, we need not presume that Apollodorus referred to Xenophon, but rather that both responded to an earlier author. Scholars suggest various candidates although none has been proven. However, one source has not attracted attention: two anecdotes recorded in PFlor 113 where Antisthenes depicts both Socrates and himself as critical of symposia in general. The conclusions of my paper are that the contents of these anecdotes can be seen as the raw kernel out of which both Xenophon and Plato could have responded.

In Laws 3.680b-c the Athenian Stranger's positive evaluation of the Cyclopean 'way of life' (Od. 9.112-15) is deeply indebted to Antisthenes' interpretatio Homerica of the Cyclopes as 'just' insofar they do not have the need of written law. Antisthenes' equation of 'need of law' with 'need of written law' is then contextualized within the unresolved tension, in the legislative project of the Laws, between oral dissemination ('proems' to the laws) and the potentially coercive power of the written text. Finally, Megillus' inept reply to the Homeric quotation by the Athenian Stranger allows us to gain a more nuanced view of the 'readerly' dynamics enacted by the internal audience of the Laws. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reconstructs the work of John Moles , eminent classicist with a wide range of interests, as a historian of ancient philosophy. The article focuses on Moles ' studies of Dio Chrysostom, Cynicism, and Aristotle's Poetics. In particular, the article presents Moles ' ever original interpretations, based on an exceptional knowledge of the ancient sources and modern scholarship. The article highlights the fundamental characteristics of Moles ' approach to the history of ancient philosophy, which is grounded in a firm historical basis and in detailed, acute, and always rigorously demonstrative analyses of texts. Moles ' contribution to the history of ancient philosophy is marked by strong ethical motivations and a commitment to trace in classical texts not just mere data, but rather values and ideas to be preserved and reflected upon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The speeches by Ajax and Odysseus, whose authorship is ascribed to the Socratic philosopher Antisthenes, give us the chance to trace some possible connections between philosophy, sophistic and poetry. In the bases of these connections we can find an important element present in Antisthenes’ conception of language: the notion of χρῆσις τῶν ὀνομάτων (use of names). We are going to examine how some scenes from the epic tradition, together with some rhetorical strategies, are seen through a conception of language in which the meaning of a word depends on the social and historical conditions in which that term is used. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present paper offers a new interpretation of the relation between cynic philosophy and pythagoreism. It tries to shed light on the Antisthenian concept of philosophy as a peculiar blend of socratic and pythagorean attitudes and concepts. Its first part deals with Diodoros of Aspendus and his characteristics as a cynic. In the second part, some of the fundamental aspects of cynic philosophy going back to mythical Heracles and his pythagorean lore are traced. The investigations end with the conclusion that there is no contradiction between the cynic philosophy and pythagorean way of life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper offers a reconstruction of Antisthenes' understanding of practical wisdom, based on the comparison of doxographic reports on Antisthenes with Xenophon's portrait of the philosopher. The comparison shows that Antisthenes links wisdom with perseverance and self-control - with an asceticism that results in excellent decisions. The therapeutic function of wisdom consists in eliminating all deceptive assumptions about what it means to live a good life. However, wisdom alone is not enough for anyone to live a happy life. Wisdom requires Socratic education, i.e. instructions concerning our attitudes to others as well as ourselves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

P. Erlangen 4 is papyrus fragment of an ancient Greek, "Socratic" dialogue discussing cures for the (desire) of the beautiful--and, by implication, the meaning of moral beauty itself. Previous discussions have made general comparisons with the works of Plato, Xenophon and Aeschines. Prior to its philosophical analysis, I will re-examine the fragment, suggesting new reconstructions of the text, accompanied by an English translation. Although the precise authorship still remains a mystery, I will attempt to show that its philosophical language, argument and dramatic background are closer to the remains of Antisthenes than other Socratic writers and in particular to one of his Alcibiades compositions. The possibility will then be considered that it originated in one of his works or with one of his immediate followers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A. BRANCACCI (1990) has interpreted and rebuilt the philosophy of Antisthenes semantically, denying antisthenic nominalism and pointing out the binding status of the antisthenic method of philosophical research, which links rhetorical skill and moral knowledge. BRANCACCI'S interpretation has become canonical, but the antisthenic passages, which refer to the analysis of names, seem more an example of nominalist philosophy (according to the meaning that 'nominalism' acquired in the twelfth century disputes about status of universals) rather than an exclusively pattern for the semantic analysis of concepts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper deals with the Socratic ethics as developed by Antisthenes and conceived by the doxografical tradition as the basis of Diogenes' Cynicism. The author tries to show that Antisthenes' thought as a whole is connected with paideia (education). Thus Antisthenes' interpretations of Homer as well as his logical paradoxes have ethical aiming. There is a close connection between Antisthenes' logic and his ethics of the care of the self. Socratic thought in Antisthenes' fragments is neither skeptical nor dialectical. Contrary to both "intellectualistic" tendencies Antisthenes puts stress on the wise continually practicing ethics. By using of logical paradoxes (mainly ouk estin antilegein) Antisthenes probably hoped to demonstrate the anti-Platonic priority of ethics over metaphysics and logic. From this point of view Antisthenes can be seen as the predecessor of practical Cynical bios (way of life). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on Antisthenes' concept of paideia, which, undoubtedly, must have been inspired by Socratic tradition. The decisive fragment - "the beginning of education is the research in names" - points to a connection between logic and ethics as it is witnessed in Xenophon's and Plato's dialogues. However, there are several differences as well. The author compares Antisthenes' paideia with the rhetorical ideal of Isocrates. Then he displays several variations of the Socratic model inside the Socratic circle. Antisthenes shows no interest in the metaphysical development of his Teacher's thought and offers a positive ethical ideal to be followed. This is the point where Cynics and Stoics carried on the Socratic tradition, the former putting stress on ethics and the letter completing it with logical studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]