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Sharon Street’s influential Darwinian Dilemma argues that moral realism is incompatible with moral knowledge. In this paper I argue that Street’s argument cannot give us reason to reject moral realism. This is because the debunker’s own arguments imply that our evidence for the claim that we have moral knowledge underdetermines its truth. Furthermore, the final part of the Street’s argument, where she infers that moral realism must be false because we have moral knowledge, commits her to the view that underdetermining evidence cannot justify belief. This implies that the debunker is not justified in believing that we have moral knowledge. As a result, Street’s debunking argument does not give us reason to reject realism (or accept anti-realism), even if we grant that they successfully establish the incompatibility of moral realism with our having moral knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes the work of film director Andrei Tarkovsky through an appeal to modern scientific versions of the interpretation of his films. The problematic of the study is related to the fact that despite the significant corpus of works devoted to A. Tarkovsky, not all of them realize the possible potential of a philosophical examination of his legacy. They often traditionally either join the pathetic admiration for his films or pay primary attention to their biographical and production aspects. The article attempts to turn to some modern theoretical studies, the authors of which offer versions of philosophical reflection of A. Tarkovsky’s works. It seems that this will allow us to identify possible relevant approaches to the analysis of A. Tarkovsky’s films. In this regard, the article describes some aspects of the explanations of A. Tarkovsky’s films, firstly, in the theological plane, which reveals their potential in the realization of a number of theological motives and religious practices, primarily prayer and contemplation. The article also describes possible psychoanalytic meanings of his work. In addition, the article reveals the anti-realistic aspects of the cinema of A. Tarkovsky, in whose films phantasmagoric elements become a way of expanding the boundaries of reality and constructing a special aesthetic environment.

A Buddhist system of two truths provides a descriptive framework with criteria for what counts as real in contrast to what does not. This paper looks at the relationship between these two truths in the works of two seventh-century Indian philosophers, Dharmakīrti and Candrakīrti, and draws implications for comparison and contrast with modern scientific understandings of the world. It highlights important features of Dharmakīrti's epistemology that aim to circumvent cultural conventions in a way that resonates with scientific representations of knowledge. It also contrasts this approach with one inspired by Candrakīrti in order to argue for the place of ethics and persons in a hybrid Buddhist–scientific picture of the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This paper begins by contrasting two familiar approaches to truth and justification: realist and anti-realist, in order to indicate, firstly, two important, but diametrically opposed, intuitions they each capture about these notions, and secondly, the epistemological problems they each give rise to: radical scepticism and relativism respectively. It then introduces a third, fallibilistpragmatist account, which captures each of the important insights of the other two accounts while avoiding their problems. The paper concludes by showcasing how the fallibilist-pragmatist approach differs from both relativism and radical scepticism, and in doing so fares better than they do in navigating the issue of academic freedom and "cancel culture" on college campuses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fitch's knowability paradox shows that for each unknown truth there is also an unknowable truth, a result which has been thought both odd in itself and at odds with views which impose epistemic constraints on truth and/or meaningfulness. Here a solution is considered which has received little attention in the debate but which carries prima facie plausibility. The decidability solution is to accept that Fitch sentences are unknowably true but deny the significance of this on the grounds that Fitch sentences are nevertheless decidable. The decidability solution is particularly attractive for those whose primary concern is an epistemic constraint on meaningfulness ('verificationists'). For those whose main concern is truth ('anti‐realists'), the situation is more complex: Melia takes the solution to exonerate anti‐realism completely; Williamson sees it as completely irrelevant. The truth lies between these two extremes: there is one broad anti‐realist commitment to which the solution does not apply, but there is also one, the "fundamental tenet" of anti‐realism according to Dummett, to which it does. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Husserl’s theory of fulfilment conceives of empty acts, such as symbolic thought, and fulfilling acts, such as sensory perceptions, in a strict parallel. This parallelism is the basis for Husserl’s semantics, epistemology, and conception of truth. It also entails that any true proposition can be known in principle, which Church and Fitch have shown to explode into the claim that every proposition is actually known. I assess this logical challenge and discuss a recent response by James Kinkaid. While Kinkaid’s proposal saves one direction of the parallel for semantics, it gives up the parallelism for truth. I spell out a different response which meshes naturally with Husserl’s account of meaning. If the parallelism is restricted to a class of basic propositions, the truth of non-basic propositions can be defined inductively, without leading to the paradox. I then discuss objections that have been raised against a similar proposal by Dummett. The result is that exegetically plausible and popular interpretations of Husserl’s correlationism are indeed challenged by Church and Fitch. But when taking into account the ‘logical adumbration’ of propositional blindspots, truth and possible fulfilment can be connected without paradox. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper begins by applying a version of Timothy Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument to normative properties. This argument suggests that there must be at least some unknowable normative facts in normative Sorites sequences, or otherwise we get a contradiction given certain plausible assumptions concerning safety requirements on knowledge and our doxastic dispositions. This paper then focuses on the question of how the defenders of different forms of metaethical anti-realism (namely, error theorists, subjectivists, relativists, contextualists, expressivists, response dependence theorists, and constructivists) could respond to the explanatory challenge created by the previous argument. It argues that, with two exceptions, the metaethical anti-realists need not challenge the argument itself, but rather they can find ways to explain how the unknowable normative facts can obtain. These explanations are based on the idea that our own attitudes on which the normative facts are grounded need not be transparent to us either. Reaching this conclusion also illuminates how metaethical anti-realists can make sense of instances of normative vagueness more generally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What makes ethical accounts natural law ethical is, I argue, commonly misrepresented in teaching within much of the philosophical academy. Yet those immersed in the field of natural law and ethics rarely give definitions/brief characterisations of what makes ethical accounts natural law ethical. I suggest theoretical reasons for the lack. I argue that bringing natural law into ethics is best understood as leading to theoretically unitary accounts, not simply collections of positions detachable from each other: an overlooked and significant point when defending natural law ethical accounts. My arguments throughout rely on the metaethical/normative ethical distinction, which is relatively little used in the natural law literature. I argue that the distinction helps clarify what is distinctive of natural law ethical accounts in general, especially to the secular contemporary philosophical academy, where appreciation of natural law ethical accounts is commonly appreciably lower than in philosophical contexts with a religious ethos. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides a concise overview and summary of the positions on facts, events, and realism in the philosophy of history as developed in my work. This summary is then used to clarify and resolve confusions on these points found in various essays contained in the volume The Poverty of Anti-Realism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this text I analyze Frank Ankersmit's, Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen's, and Paul Roth's responses to my claim that anti-realism in the philosophy of history entails that the past did not happen. I conclude that Ankersmit has failed to understand the argument I presented, Kuukkanen de facto agrees with my view, while Roth has addressed my earlier criticism of the view that the past can be changed and not the argument that is currently under discussion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this criticism of Mitrović argument about realism it is pointed out 1): that Mitrović is unaware of how the medieval debate between realists and nominalists about the existence of universals complicates his position, 2) similarly, he is unaware of how the debate on the so-called 'essentially contested concepts' (W.B. Gallie) complicates his position, 3) when taking up the issue of holism and individualism he mistakenly assumes that what has been said about it in the context of the social sciences can also be applied to the writing of history, 4) the debate on the legal person or corporation since Innocent IV further complicates the issue. Finally, I explain why and how one can be a realist in philosophy of history, though on the basis of arguments entirely different from those proposed by Mitrović. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This comment discusses Branko Mitrović's view of historical anti-realism and realism. It identifies several interpretative errors and philosophical infelicities in Mitrović's account, in particular regarding colligation, and realism itself. It is suggested that the debate between the realist and the anti-realist pertains to the statuses attributed to scientific and historical claims. Provided that anti-realism is not general skepticism about them, the burden of proof to show that such notions as 'real,' 'fact,' and 'counterpart' contribute to the philosophical discussion about the statuses of the claims rests on the shoulders of the realist. Furthermore, the realist should establish that the historian's colligations can be uniquely correct and yet independent of the historian. This comment also is a plea for a more measured and rigorous philosophy of historiography. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Authors who advocate historical anti-realism have often insisted that they do not claim that no past events happened or that the past did not happen. In this paper, I show that in spite of such protestations, the core arguments presented by Leon Goldstein, Paul Roth, Frank Ankersmit, and Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen preclude the possibility that the past or past events happened. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years there has been a noticeable yet largely unacknowledged ‘pragmatic turn’ in the scientific realism debate, inspired in part by van Fraassen’s work on ‘epistemic stances’. Features of this new approach include: an ascent to the meta-level (the focus is not so much on whether scientific realism is true, but on the prior questions of the nature of the positions in this debate, how to decide whether to be a scientific realist, etc.); a reinterpretation of scientific realism and anti-realism as (or as closely associated with) stances or frameworks, rather than theories or beliefs; a move away from the previously dominant empirical-explanatory (i.e. quasi-scientific or naturalistic) conception of scientific realism, anti-realism, and their justification; and a stress on the pragmatic and values-based elements in the debate. The traditional scientific realism debate is concerned with determining which position is true, or most epistemically justified. The new approach by contrast is concerned with determining which position best serves certain values, e.g. is most useful, fruitful, or otherwise prudentially preferable. In this paper we try to bring together the various strands in this new orientation, summarise its key features, contrast it with superficially similar but opposing views, and explore the similarities and differences among some of its adherents. Given we are advocates of the turn, we also offer a defence of the value and fruitfulness of this reconceptualization of the debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present research aims to explain symbolic realism in literary texts by reviewing and critically examining symbolic realism, while explaining three important aspects of symbolic realism epistemology. For this purpose, the possibility of connecting realism with anti-realism and presentationism in symbolic realism and the semantic system of symbolic realism was investigated in three parts of the situational context of symbolic realism. Symbolic realism is known as both an artistic technique and a style. Since the term "symbolic realism" is not properly recognized in literary and artistic circles of Iran, the necessity of this research was felt. As a result, symbolic realism grew in contexts where the connection between language and reality became more prominent and, on the other hand, symbols were used simultaneously with the departure from photographic realism. Another thing is that the possibility of interaction between realism and anti-realism was investigated, the result is that in the studied periods, we can witness the influence of realism from anti-realism and presentationism in the use of symbolic realism, although these links can be traced, but symbolic realism itself maintains an independent structure. It passes through the dry and monotonous approach of pure realism and achieves a broad and multi-meaning system. In the third part, while confirming and explaining the polysemous system of symbolic realism, its difference with other polysemous systems was determined and the position of the symbol in symbolic realism was analyzed. It goes further and an independent semantic pattern can be drawn for it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The first pathway toward a new conceptualist answer to the existence of universals begins with Descartes. The article is guided by a Cartesian method of starting anew in metaphysics and our knowledge of mind-dependent universals. Relevant examples and learning experiments defend and validate the pragmatic utility of conceptualism. It is past time for analytic ontology to set aside its assumptions, reevaluate its methodology and simplify itself. I raise novel objections through metaphor and analogy against standard and Platonic realism. Independent universals of realism are speculative and are neither necessary nor sufficient. This rejection of metaphysical realism defends the validity of scientific empiricist realism. Historical arguments such as William James' empirical conceptualism and J.S. Mill's criticisms strengthen this position. Nominalist methods are also considered. My theory is confirmed and useful for a preliminary epistemic-ontology which evaluates concepts and universals of mineral species. This appendix is consistent with Descartes' theory of attributes and provides a new important approach to this field of study. The article, long dormant, is made possible by the work of Rene Descartes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The discussion of the ethical ontology of states and the relationship between the legal system and the moral system and their influence on each other is one of the most important topics in contemporary legal philosophy and the trend of public law. The moral paradigm of states, which are divided into two spectrums of neutral and perfectionist states, is different. Neutral states, meanwhile, often fall into the category of moral non-realists due to their individualistic structure and belief in the contractual legitimacy of power and their acceptance of moral relativism. Proponents of anti-realism believe that moral values and requirements are not outside the minds and perceptions of individuals, and that the standard of morality is determined by individuals. In this theory, it is emphasized that ethics has no spatial ends and is relative. Therefore, this paper tries topresent the views in the field of moral anti-realism with an analytical and descriptive method, describing the theoretical foundations of neutral states and the intellectual foundations of the school of antirealism - in cases such as relativism, subjectivism, and non, emotionalism and non-driven is from ought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While increasing numbers of philosophers have argued for eliminating the retributivist elements of criminal justice systems, their arguments often fall short due to internal inconsistency. Some of the best known of these arguments — such as those provided by Derk Pereboom and Gregg Caruso — rely on the claim that there are moral grounds for rejecting retributivism. In defending this claim, these philosophers typically provide arguments seeking to undermine the type of agent responsibility that they believe is needed to justify retributivism. This is usually followed by an assertion that since the excessive suffering caused by retributivist punishment cannot be justified, it is therefore immoral to preserve remnants of it in our criminal justice systems. This paper — which opposes the moral case against retributivism provided by Pereboom and Caruso, and favors non-moral reasons that recommend rejecting a retributivist approach — is divided into three parts. In part one, I discuss why Pereboom and Caruso are correct in thinking that free will skepticism undercuts the moral justification for retributivism. Part two sets out to explain why their moral case against retributivism fails insofar as it runs afoul of the folk intuitions that are called upon to defend Pereboom’s account of free will skepticism. In part three, I provide a non-moral case against the retributivism that is founded on considerations of self-interest and empathy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I address a family of objections I label the So What? objection to robust non-naturalist realism (or, just non-naturalism). This objection concludes that non-naturalism fails to identify the moral properties in virtue of failing to explain why non-natural properties would have all the features we expect moral properties to have and can be extended to provide the conclusion that the non-naturalist is therefore immoral. I argue that So What? is question-begging because it disallows non-naturalists their central theoretical claim: there are ethical properties iff they are fundamental properties (and, in virtue of that, non-natural). I then diagnose the error anti-non-naturalists make explicitly: those who object to non-naturalism along the lines of So What? either fail to understand precisely what the theory claims or fail to understand non-naturalist motivations for going in for that theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I propose to open a discussion on a realist philosophy of curation. To do so, I plot premises that will move towards such a philosophy. While I am neither introducing a new ontology nor contributing to metaphysics, I deal with metaphysical and ontological issues as these engage in the philosophy of curation and the philosophy of museums. In particular, I start with a museological or curatorial realism towards a discussion on meeting curation with the broadness of reality. There are three core premises. First, while reality is ontologically mind-independent, it is anti-realist for reality to be curation-dependent. Second, curation has to be folded (contrary to Deleuze's use of dynamic folding qua 'an origami cosmos') to address the anti-realist connotations of curation. To do this, I methodologically introduce the fold and state two-fold, three-fold, fourfold, and fifth-fold semantics of curation. While curatorial realism can be argued in a fourfold curation, the third premise is that the realist aspect lies in the fifth-folding of curation to match the extensivity of reality. This paper will attempt to introduce the philosophy of museums and the philosophy of curation with a bent on the realism/anti-realism debate. It will expose the inherit anti-realism of curation, and survey the need for objects in metaphysics and within contemporary forms of realism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Putnam coined what is now known as the no miracles argument "[t]he positive argument for realism". In its opposition, he put an argument that by his own standards counts as negative. But are there no positive arguments against scientific realism? I believe that there is such an argument that has figured in the back of much of the realism-debate, but, to my knowledge, has nowhere been stated and defended explicitly. This is an argument from the success of quantum physics to the unlikely appropriateness of scientific realism as a philosophical stance towards science. I will here state this argument and offer a detailed defence of its premises. The purpose of this is to both exhibit in detail how far the intuition that quantum physics threatens realism can be driven, in the light also of more recent developments, as well as to exhibit possible vulnerabilities, i.e., to show where potential detractors might attack. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The literature on authenticity in adaptation studies seems to be focused almost entirely on adaptations of either historical and (auto-)biographical literary texts or non-fiction narratives. The usual case studies are often generically limited to heritage and historical films, period dramas, documentaries, and biopics, to the exclusion of non-/anti-realist genres. However, there is more to adaptation than empirically and/or historically verifiable source texts, which warrants an examination of authenticity in adaptations of fantastical, science-fictional, and gothic fictions away from the fixation on historicity and veracity. This paper proposes an aesthetic (metadiscursive and experiential) outlook on authenticity in genre adaptations, namely George Miller's adaptation of A. S. Byatt's 'The Djinn in the Nightingale's Eye', Three Thousand Years of Longing (2022); Denis Villeneuve's adaptation of Ted Chiang's 'Story of Your Life', Arrival (2016); and the different adaptations of Mary Shelley's Frankenstein. Metadiscursively, authenticity depends on the self-consciousness of artistic representation, the extent to which the source text and its cinematic adaptation acknowledge their status as fictional narratives and their representational, medium-specific limits and potentials. Experientially, authenticity is judged by the degree of audience immersion in the storyworld, the feeling (generated by diegetic techniques) that what they are watching is experientially plausible despite the implausibility of the genre itself. Without lapsing in excessive realism and verbatim fidelity, an authentic adaptation is heedful of the paradoxes surrounding authenticity itself in any fictional narrative, attentive to their aesthetic and thematic treatment in the source text, aware of the representational affordances of the literary and cinematic media, and capable of offering the audience an immersive experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the early 20th century, two new disciplines emerged in the tradition of analytic philosophy: meta-ethics and political epistemology. Nevertheless, debates on such questions go back to the ancient Greeks and, in particular, to the debates between Plato and Protagoras. This article elucidates the controversy between Plato and the influential sophist Protagoras from the perspective of contemporary meta-ethics and political epistemology. It argues that the main motivation of Plato's philosophical endeavors is to overcome Protagoras's skeptical claims that no moral facts and no moral knowledge applicable to political issues exist. The paper defends the thesis that there exists a deep disagreement between Protagoras and Plato on the existence of moral facts and moral knowledge. A deep disagreement is a disagreement that cannot be resolved through the use of reasons and arguments. Applying the foundationalist approach Robert J. Fogelin proposes in his seminal paper "The Logic of Deep Disagreements", this article argues that the deep disagreement between Protagoras and Plato exists because their political thought is based on "underlying principles" that clash. While Plato's political philosophy rests on his religious and theological convictions, the political thought of Protagoras is based on his skepticism, relativism, and agnosticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dasgupta poses a serious challenge to realism about natural properties. He argues that there is no acceptable explanation of why natural properties deserve the value realists assign to them and are consequently absent of value. In response, this paper defines and defends an alternative non-explanatory account of normativity compatible with realism. Unlike Lewis and Sider, who believe it is sufficient to defend realism solely on realist terms, I engage with the challenge on unfriendly grounds by revealing a tu quoque. Dasgupta and anti-realists face a similar challenge to that directed against realism: one that not only undermines the objection to realism by legitimising non-explanatory normativity but leaves them facing a significant dilemma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction. The problems of reference, truth, and realism are extremely important for contemporary philosophical discourse. Interesting interpretations of these problems have been given by such thinkers as Paul Ricoeur and Hilary Putnam. Instead of being originally representatives of different philosophical traditions, Ricoeur and Putnam came to similar conclusions on a number of the above issues, which allows us to speak of the possible prospect of a fruitful philosophical synthesis of the two authors' positions. The aim of this paper is to justify the theoretical possibility of such a synthesis, namely to show how the different elements of Putnam's theory can be improved by using Ricoeur's approach, which is outlined in his concept of metaphorical truth. Despite the obvious proximity of the two authors, there are currently no works where Ricoeur's conception of metaphorical truth was compared with Putnam's philosophy.Methodology and sources. To meet this challenge, we have resorted to an examination of the author's primary sources, which reveal the methodology of both philosophers. Special relevance of the article is connected with the unusual perspective of considering the problems that are important for the philosophy of late 20th-early 21st century. These are problems that related to the comprehension of our thinking, the role of language in creating a picture of the world and the resulting possibility of building a special kind of ontology.Results and discussion. The study revealed many overlaps in the authors' consideration of the concept of truth, the problem of realism, and the theory of reference, as well as in the way that both philosophers define the relationship between language and reality. The most similarities were found in the relationship between Ricoeur's concept of metaphorical truth and Putnam's philosophy of inner realism.Conclusion. Thus, we can conclude that the philosophical approaches of both thinkers share a great deal of intuition about the direction in which research of truth and referential theory and the problem of realism that is one of the most fundamental problems of philosophy throughout its history can be developed.

Scientific realism and anti-realism, in various forms, frame many philosophical discussions about what constitutes a successful scientific theory. This paper explores this within an Islamic framework by examining the Sunnī theological tradition's various divine action models (DAMs) for their possible impact upon the theological reception of scientific realism and anti-realism, concluding that the tradition would be committed to an agnostic stance on the question. This enables the tradition to remain relevant to a broad spectrum of future scientific developments and changing intellectual currents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper aims to examine Michael Devitt's arguments in favor of metaphysical realism, where he argued that the issue of realism is devoid of the issues of semantics and epistemology. He has tried to compress his argument by focusing on the metaphysical or ontological questions of realism, but he states that epistemological concerns can be taken only when epistemology is naturalised. Devitt, therefore, has considered naturalised epistemology as a method to give potency to his Realism. Realism, as defined by him, is having majorly two major characteristics, the independent dimension and the existence dimension, that is, the view of the reality in which the reality exists independent of the human mind. These independence and existence dimensions are not mutually exclusive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are many ways for truths to be true. How should we understand that idea? One is that there are different kinds of truth: the ways are different truth-like properties. Another understanding is that a truth can be made true in different ways, by different kinds of entities. The former understanding supports alethic pluralism. But the latter can be understood as a kind of monism: truth is the existential property of having some truthmaker or other. On this view, the differences reside in how a truth is made true, but not in its being true. I’ll discuss how these two understandings differ and what the potential advantages of the latter idea might be. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Peter of Spain's doctrinal content developed in Summulae logicales has been interpreted in various ways by the modern scholarship. As a result, when describing his ontological commitment, a number of different, often opposing, labels were ascribed, ranging from doctrinal neutrality to realism or anti-realism. Starting from the varieties of interpretations, we propose an assessment of Peter of Spain's ontological commitment regarding the universal, by arguing for the existence in his Summaries of two intertwined tendencies, one realist, another antirealist. The former tendency will be argued in accordance with his theory of predicables, signification, supposition and appellation; the latter one, will be tracked in a series of distinctions: via logicae vs via naturae, praesentia vs existentia, res vs dispositio. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since Plato philosophers have struggled to understand the nature of ethics. It seems different from understanding the world around us, which we do by means of our senses and our sciences. Like mathematics ethics seems different. My brief dialogue seeks to unravel its mystery, and may tell you all you need to know about it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on Persian-Chinese Buddhist monk and scholar Jizang's theory of truth, which involves deducing universal affirmation from universal negation. It challenges interpretations that attribute Jizang's reasoning to a monistic worldview or the acceptance of true contradictions; arguing instead for an anti-realist understanding of truth based on the denial of mind-independent reality; and rejection of the correspondence theory of truth in Chinese Buddhism.

It is argued that the emergence of controversial views in discussions of theoretical medicine and bioethics is best explained by the assumption of moral realism within those discursive practices. Neither of the main alternatives of realism in contemporary meta-ethics — moral expressivism and anti-realism — can account for the rise of controversies in the bioethical debate. This argument draws from the contemporary expressivist or anti-representationalist pragmatism as advanced by Richard Rorty and Huw Price, as well as the pragmatist scientific realism and fallibilism of the founder of pragmatism, Charles S. Peirce. In accordance with the fallibilist view, it is proposed that presenting controversial positions may serve epistemic purposes within bioethical debates, providing opportunities for inquiry by pointing towards problems to be solved and arguments and evidence for and against to be put forward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thompson's contribution to this critique has two primary targets: (i) the mindfulness movement, which is inspired by, and strongly endorses, neuroessentialism or the view that the best and most definitive way to explain human psychology is by reference to the brain and its activity; and (ii) the evolutionary psychology paradigm used to legitimize a naturalized version of Buddhism favored by many North Americans, as found, inter alia, in Robert Wright's best-selling I Why Buddhism is True i (Wright, [110]). In light of these remarks, Thompson's answer to the third question in the foregoing can seem rather disingenuous if the only difference between the approach of evolutionary psychology favored by champions of "naturalistic Buddhism" and his enactivism is that the latter allows for a back and forth circulation of ideas between Buddhism and science. Regardless of Thompson's critical stance on the viability of evolutionary psychology as a scientific enterprise, it is a further question whether evolutionary psychology is an appropriate framework for relating Buddhism to science. Introductory psychology texts as a view of sociobiology/evolutionary psychology's role in psychology. [Extracted from the article]

I distinguish Local Constructivism (humans play a constitutive role in constructing some of the objects we have epistemic access to) from Global Constructivism (humans play a constitutive role in constructing all of the objects we have epistemic access to). I explicate and clarify Local Constructivism and show how the metaphysical concerns which motivate endorsing Local Constructivism about some objects (e.g. social objects, modal objects) differ from the epistemic and semantic concerns which motive endorsing Global Constructivism. I, then, examine the criticisms Realists typically present against Constructivism. I argue that, although these criticisms undermine Global Constructivism, Local Constructivism is immune to them. If one has anti-Realist inclinations, but wishes to avoid the morass anti-Realism usually falls into (aka: anti-Realist Boogeyman), one should endorse Local, rather than Global, Constructivism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to alethic pluralism, sentences belonging to different domains of discourse can be true by having different alethic (i.e., truth‐constituting) properties. Against this pluralistic view, Jamin Asay has recently argued that pluralists' appeal to multiple alethic properties is ill‐motivated because the main advantages of pluralism can already be obtained within the framework of standard truthmaker theory. In response to this objection, this paper argues that Asay's claim does not hold with respect to one of the central advantages of pluralism, namely, the ability to offer a proper understanding of the realism/anti‐realism debate. This is because, first, when simply construed, truthmaker theory can only provide an inadequate understanding of the debate, and second, when construed in certain ways that allow it to avoid inadequacy, it becomes committed to multiple alethic properties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In her book Casas del Vedado (1983), Cuban author María Elena Llana explores themes and compositional strategies of non-realistic literary traditions that have remained in force in Latin America to date. In this paper I analyze one of her stories, "Claudina", with the aim of obtaining an understanding of her specific poetics in the general framework of supernatural fiction in our continent, as well as the symbolic meaning of the supernatural used by the author in this short story. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we advance a realist response to Sharon Street's debunking argument, which appeals to evolutionary theory to argue that natural selection and moral realism are incompatible. Our aims are three. First, we describe the debate on this topic by distinguishing between a modal argument, a parsimony argument, and Street's Darwinian Dilemma. Secondly, we focus on her reasoning, one of the most relevant arguments in the recent metaethical debate against moral realism. To mount a defense of that, we will point at three fundamental characteristics of moral realism: its cognitive character, the nature of its representative language, and the relationship between evaluative judgements and their truthmakers (facts). Finally, we will argue, contra Street, that moral realism is not scientifically inferior to moral antirealism, thus, the former is not debunked. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to reconstruct the meaning of existence in the Pāli discourses of the Buddha by considering how the notion is used in the most systematic contexts in which it appears, and how it could be best interpreted. The discourses are concerned with how existence is used to support and consolidate a certain attitude of ownership, appropriation, and entitlement over contents of experience, in virtue of which one can claim that this or that is 'mine'. The problem with this move is that it seems to require a degree of stability that is at odds with the fundamental uncertainty (anicca) of all conditioned realities. Existence is used to somehow cover up uncertainty, and thus allow for a semblance of genuine ownership and possession, while in fact possession and ownership are just deluded views doomed to be contradicted by the structural uncertainty of actual experience. This reading entails that the early discourses do share with later traditions an anti-realist inspiration, which is worth exploring in its own right. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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