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This handbook brings international scholarship on transnational human rights obligations into a comprehensive and wide-ranging volume.

Fragile States are defined as states incapable of fully implementing their international obligations in a part of the territory falling under their jurisdiction. The fragile State''s compliance with its international law obligations is then reduced due to objective factors, which also has a major impact on international human rights law (IHRL). However, doctrine has ignored that fragile states can and sometimes do implement their positive obligations in areas beyond their effective control by virtue of the evolving interpretation of IHRL, based on effectiveness. The article argues that each of the dominant conformity theories can only partially explain the factors that influence compliance with IHRL by fragile States : instead of limiting conformity to a monocausal model, rational choices and internal socialization processes should be taken into account to enhance compliance of fragile States. The two main schools of doctrine, rational and constructivist theories, provide complementary explanations to the questions of why and how fragile States can comply with their positive obligations under the IHRL. Rational theories explain that the respect, by fragile States, of their positive obligations in IHRL has direct advantages, especially in terms of monitoring the human rights situation, the well-being of the population of the region and international cooperation. Rational interests do not, however, explain why public bodies act in such a way as to promote the protection of human rights in the area beyond the effective control of the State, especially if their national behavior is not reported in international human rights mechanisms. In these cases, constructivism can provide a complementary explanation : repeated models of norms play an essential role in the creation of a common identity, in particular the belief of national actors in an ideal and active State., Les États fragiles sont définis comme les États inaptes à pleinement implémenter leurs obligations internationales dans une partie du territoire tombant sous leur juridiction. La conformité de l’État fragile envers ses obligations de droit international est alors réduite en raison de facteurs objectifs, ce qui a également un impact majeur sur le droit international des droits de l''homme (DIDH). Néanmoins, la doctrine a ignoré que les États fragiles peuvent implémenter et parfois effectivement implémentent leurs obligations positives dans des régions hors de leur contrôle effectif en vertu de l''interprétation évolutive du DIDH, basée sur l''effectivité. L''article soutient que chacune des théories de conformité dominantes ne peut expliquer que partiellement les facteurs qui influent sur le respect du DIDH par des États fragiles : au lieu de limiter la conformité à un modèle monocausal, les choix rationnels et les processus de socialisation interne devraient être pris en compte pour renforcer la conformité des États fragiles. Les deux principales écoles doctrinales, les théories rationnelle et constructiviste, fournissent des explications complémentaires aux questions pourquoi et comment les États fragiles peuvent se conformer à leurs obligations positives en vertu du DIDH. Les théories rationnelles expliquent que le respect par les États fragiles de leurs obligations positives en DIDH comporte des avantages directs, notamment en termes de suivi de la situation des droits de l'homme, de bien-être de la population de la région et de coopération internationale. Les intérêts rationnels n’expliquent cependant pas pourquoi les organismes publics agissent de manière à favoriser la protection des droits de l’homme dans la zone hors du contrôle effectif de l’État, surtout si leurs comportements nationaux ne sont pas signalés dans les mécanismes internationaux des droits de l’homme. Dans ces cas, le constructivisme peut fournir une explication complémentaire : des modèles répétés de respect des normes jouent un rôle essentiel dans la création d’une identité commune, en particulier la croyance des acteurs nationaux en un État idéal et actif., Los Estados frágiles se definen como Estados incapaces de implementar plenamente sus obligaciones internacionales en una parte del territorio que se encuentra bajo su jurisdicción. El cumplimiento, por parte del Estado frágil, de sus obligaciones de derecho internacional se reduce debido a factores objetivos, lo que también tiene un impacto importante en el derecho internacional de los derechos humanos (DIDH). Sin embargo, la doctrina ha ignorado que los Estados frágiles pueden implementar, e implementar a veces, sus obligaciones positivas en áreas que escapan su control efectivo en virtud de la interpretación en evolución del DIDH, basada en la eficacia. El artículo sostiene que cada una de las teorías de la conformidad dominantes solo puede explicar parcialmente los factores que influyen en el cumplimiento del DIDH por parte de los estados frágiles : en lugar de limitar la conformidad a un modelo monocausal, se deben tomar en cuenta las elecciones racionales y procesos de socialización interna para mejorar el cumplimiento de los Estados. Las dos principales escuelas de doctrina, las teorías racional y constructivista, brindan explicaciones complementarias a las preguntas de por qué y cómo los Estados frágiles pueden cumplir con sus obligaciones positivas conformemente al DIDH. Las teorías racionales explican que el respeto, por los Estados frágiles, de sus obligaciones positivas en DIDH tiene ventajas directas, especialmente en términos de monitoreo de la situación de los derechos humanos, el bienestar de la población de la región y la cooperación internacional. Los intereses racionales, sin embargo, no explican por qué los organismos públicos actúan de tal manera que promueven la protección de los derechos humanos en el ámbito fuera del control efectivo del Estado, especialmente si su comportamiento nacional no se reporta en los mecanismos internacionales de derechos humanos. En estos casos, el constructivismo puede proporcionar una explicación complementaria : los modelos repetidos de normas juegan un papel vital en la creación de una identidad común, en particular la creencia de los actores nacionales en un estado ideal y activo., Berkes Antal. Compliance of Territorially Fragile States with International Human Rights Law. In: Revue Québécoise de droit international, Hors-série juin 2021 – State Compliance with International Human Rights Law: State-of-the-art, Improvement and Challenges. pp. 11-37.

Can international human rights law be applied and enforced in a part of a State's territory outside its effective control? This study provides a step by step analysis to show how it can. International human rights law can normalise an imperfect, defective situation through pragmatic interpretation; it imposes obligations both on the territorial State on account of its sovereign title and residual effectiveness on the one hand, and on any subject of international law exercising territorial control over the area on account of its effective control on the other. By considering effectiveness beyond formal normative sources and titles of the subjects implicated in the territorial situation, international human rights law is interpreted and applied in a manner which renders human rights practical and effective. The book provides a comprehensive analysis of State practice regarding various subjects implicated in the territorial situation, applicable legal sources and major geographic areas.

With the fall of the dualist Monarchy, the so-called Hungarian optants in the annexed territories chose the Hungarian nationality instead of the nationality of the three Little Entente states and transferred their place of residence to Hungary. As most of their land was expropriated without due compensation, they started to contest the land reforms before a series of national and international fora. The regional dispute initiated by the Hungarian optants against the Little Entente governments became part of a global controversy between the protection of private property (individual interests) and the sovereign states’ agrarian policies (community interests). The League of Nations provided a framework to debate about the conflict both at the level of international law and politics. This chapter claims that to face the delicate choice between socio-economic community interests and individuals’ property interests, all procedures of the League had to maintain a careful balance between the two.

The League of Nations set up The Hague codification conference that focused, among three specific agendas, on the responsibility of states for damage caused in their territory to the person or property of foreigners. Scholarship has dominantly ignored or considered the work of the League of Nations in the law of state responsibility as a failure, starting the story of the codification with the International Law Commission. This article proposes to rethink the dominant view and claims that the League of Nations’ codification process not only initiated, but substantially contributed to the codification of the law of state responsibility, leading to lasting methods, concepts, principles and norms that have been integrated in the contemporary canon of the rules of state responsibility.

Beyond the host State, the home State too has international obligations to regulate the activities of its corporate nationals when they conduct economic activities overseas. These obligations are “extraterritorial” in the sense that they are triggered by acts and omissions of the State authorities performed or producing effects outside their own territory. The paper focuses on the home State’s responsibility for violations of its obligations under international human rights law with regard to the activities of corporate nationals abroad. The paper demonstrates that recent State practice reveals progressive evolution of positive international law towards the duty of home States to protect from the harmful conduct of their corporate nationals acting abroad.

This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in Journal of Conflict & Security Law following peer review. The version of record Antal Berkes, The Standard of ‘Due Diligence’ as a Result of Interchange between the Law of Armed Conflict and General International Law, Journal of Conflict and Security Law, Volume 23, Issue 3, Winter 2018, Pages 433–460 is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/jcsl/kry022

The EU is bound by human rights obligations toward individuals outside the territory of its Member States who are affected by its trade and investment policies. Internal rules of the EU, namely the Founding Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and various external norms, that is international law sources, impose human rights obligations on the EU. Those human rights obligations are increasingly interpreted by treaty monitoring bodies as requiring extraterritorial due diligence duties from States parties, in the sense that the creation of substantial and foreseeable effects outside the State’s territory establishes the jurisdiction of the State party. This jurisdiction leads to positive obligations, namely the duty to exert due diligence on trade and investment policies. The EU is expected to assess the risks of human rights violations by its trade and investment partners in and outside its Member States and take all reasonable efforts to avoid foreseeable human rights violations. Although those human rights are likely to continue to be unenforceable before the Court of Justice, the consistent reference to due diligence obligations by treaty monitoring bodies, the European Ombudsman and the European Data Protection Supervisor should encourage EU institutions to comply with their due diligence obligations.

For several years the government has refused to recognize to the guerrilla group FARC-EP as a belligerent group, or, at least, as part of an armed conflict, forcing its treatment to a terrorist group. Nevertheless, bearing in mind that the criteria to analyze the configuration of a non-international armed conflict are objective, the applicable law to study the status of the FARC-EP is the humanitarian international law. In this sense, one of these objective requisites is the territorial control. In the frame of this control, the guerrilla group has managed to dominate the population and manipulate both the internal and external safety of several areas of the country, replacing this way the functions of the State. The clearest example of this phenomenon happened during the peace negotiations with the Pastrana’s government in the demilitarised zone of Caguán. In this sense, it might be possible to considerer this area as a “independent republic”. In the history of Colombia, beyond that the use of this term dates of 1960, it has been used in ambiguous form and the areas to which it has referred seldom were not fulfilling with the requirements of the international law. In this regards, these grey zones are characterized for being areas where the State has strong limitations to exercise its jurisdiction and to impose its authority and where, at the same time, private groups dominate, delimit its territory and impose its will, committing, in most cases, violations of the human rights and of the humanitarian international law. Aunque por varios años el Gobierno se ha negado a reconocer al grupo guerrillero FARC-EP como grupo beligerante, o, al menos, como parte de un conflicto armado, forzando así su trato a un grupo terrorista; teniendo en cuenta que los criterios para analizar la configuración de un conflicto armado de carácter no internacional son objetivos, el derecho aplicable para analizar el estatus de las FARC-EP es el derecho internacional humanitario. En este sentido, uno de estos requisitos es el control territorial, y, en este marco, las FARC-EP han logrado dominar a la población y manipular la seguridad tanto interna como externa de varias áreas del país, reemplazando así las funciones del Estado. El ejemplo más claro de esta sustitución del Estado se dio durante las negociaciones de paz con el gobierno de Pastrana en la zona despejada del Caguán. Así, podría, en principio, considerarse a dicha región como una “república independiente”. Más allá de que la utilización de este término data de 1960, ha sido usado en forma ambigua y las áreas a las cuales ha hecho referencia pocas veces cumplían con los requisitos del derecho internacional. En este sentido, estas áreas grises se caracterizan por ser zonas donde el Estado tiene fuertes limitaciones para ejercer su jurisdicción e imponer su autoridad y que, al mismo tiempo, están dominadas por grupos privados que delimitan su territorio e imponen su voluntad, cometiendo, en la mayoría de los casos, violaciones a los derechos humanos y al derecho internacional humanitario.

Status-neutrality is a specific case of impartiality, where international organizations take a neutral position on the status of a self-proclaimed separatist entity. The reasons for choosing a status-neutral policy are the States’ discretionary power to decide on State recognition, the member States’ lacking consensus about the final status of the territorial entity and the international organizations’ mandate to achieve practical solutions in the dispute settlement. The normative content of the term, namely the obligations with regard to impartiality are the negative duty not to recognize the statehood of the territorial entity or to make pronouncements on its current or future status, and, positively, the obligations to achieve pragmatic solutions, to assist the implementation of standards in the given region and to seek for the consent of both parties. However, even if international organizations comply with the normative content of status-neutrality, they face various accusations of partiality. As the precedents mainly related to Kosovo show, direct contacts with self-proclaimed authorities, the aid and assistance provided for the entity and the silence of the international organizations with regards to unilateral acts of the self-proclaimed authorities are a priori conform to international law. Nevertheless, the impartial conduct of international organizations cannot prevent the factual consequences they have on the stabilization of self-proclaimed separatist entities.