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We propose the river pollution claims problem to distribute a limited pollution budget among agents located along a river. A key distinction with the standard claims problem is that agents are ordered and they are given priority based on their location in this order instead of their identity. We propose two new axioms that are relevant in the context of river pollution and use these to characterize two priority rules. Our characterization results show that Consistency plays an important role since it makes sure that any asymmetric treatment will be transferred across problems.

We present a general model of bidding behavior in wildlife corridor auctions. Given (i) some spatial configuration of landowners in a landscape, (ii) the landowners’ opportunity costs, and (iii) the value of establishing the corridor, our model predicts individual landowners’ bids, overall participation rates in the auction, as well as the expected net benefits to the conservation agency. We find that market efficiency of the auction increases in the number of potential corridors. We use simulations to compare a benchmark auction with two policy scenarios in a hypothetical landscape. In one scenario, members of a winning corridor receive an agglomeration bonus. In the other scenario, we buy out a pivotal landowner (one that is part of many potential corridors) prior to the auction. Given equal budgets for the agglomeration bonus and the buyout policy, an agglomeration bonus is less efficient than a buyout for conservation agencies facing low budgets, and vice versa. A risk-averse conservation agency is however always better off using a buyout policy.

We analyse the threats of global environmental change, as they relate to food security. First, we review three discourses: (i) ‘sustainable intensification’, or the increase of food supplies without compromising food producing inputs, such as soils and water; (ii) the ‘nexus’ that seeks to understand links across food, energy, environment and water systems; and (iii) ‘resilience thinking’ that focuses on how to ensure the critical capacities of food, energy and water systems are maintained in the presence of uncertainties and threats. Second, we build on these discourses to present the causal, risks and options assessment for decision-making process to improve decision-making in the presence of risks. The process provides a structured, but flexible, approach that moves from problem diagnosis to better risk-based decision-making and outcomes by responding to causal risks within and across food, energy, environment and water systems.

We analyse the threats of global environmental change, as they relate to food security. First, we review three discourses: (i) 'sustainable intensification', or the increase of food supplies without compromising food producing inputs, such as soils and water; (ii) the 'nexus' that seeks to understand links across food, energy, environment and water systems; and (iii) 'resilience thinking' that focuses on how to ensure the critical capacities of food, energy and water systems are maintained in the presence of uncertainties and threats. Second, we build on these discourses to present the causal, risks and options assessment for decision-making process to improve decision-making in the presence of risks. The process provides a structured, but flexible, approach that moves from problem diagnosis to better risk-based decision-making and outcomes by responding to causal risks within and across food, energy, environment and water systems.

The success of river restoration was estimated using the ecosystem services approach. In eight pairs of restored–unrestored reaches and floodplains across Europe, we quantified provisioning (agricultural products, wood, reed for thatching, infiltrated drinking water), regulating (flooding and drainage, nutrient retention, carbon sequestration) and cultural (recreational hunting and fishing, kayaking, biodiversity conservation, appreciation of scenic landscapes) services for separate habitats within each reach, and summed these to annual economic value normalized per reach area. We used locally available data and literature, did surveys among inhabitants and visitors, and used a range of economic methods (market value, shadow price, replacement cost, avoided damage, willingness-to-pay survey, choice experiment) to provide final monetary service estimates. Total ecosystem service value was significantly increased in the restored reaches (difference 1400 ± 600 € ha−1 year−1; 2500 − 1100, p = 0.03, paired t test). Removal of one extreme case did not affect this outcome. We analysed the relation between services delivered and with floodplain and catchment characteristics after reducing these 23 variables to four principal components explaining 80% of the variance. Cultural and regulating services correlated positively with human population density, cattle density and agricultural N surplus in the catchment, but not with the fraction of arable land or forest, floodplain slope, mean river discharge or GDP. Our interpretation is that landscape appreciation and flood risk alleviation are a function of human population density, but not wealth, in areas where dairy farming is the prime form of agriculture.

We augment the standard cartel formation game from non-cooperative coalition theory, often applied in the context of international environmental agreements on climate change, with the possibility that singletons support coalition formation without becoming coalition members themselves. Rather, their support takes the form of a monetary transfer to the coalition, which increases the members’ payoffs, and thereby provides an incentive for other singletons to join the coalition. We show that, under mild conditions on the costs and benefits of contributing to the public good (i.e. abatement of CO2 emissions), supporters exist in equilibrium. The existence of supporters increases the size of stable coalitions, increases abatement of CO2 emissions, and increases payoffs to each of four types of agents: members, joiners, free-riders, and supporters.

Introduction: We assess a very general economic model of transboundary river water allocation and show how it has been used in the literature and how it can be applied ...

Violence and coercion are key to understanding economic and social interactions in any society. This premise was used by North et al. (2009) to distinguish three `patterns of social organization' that societies have used to solve the problem of violence. We model one of these, the `limited access order', that is still dominant today. This order is characterized by an elite coalition that uses coercion to extract economic rents, while restricting violence and containing bandits. Since violence is key, we choose to apply insights from the economic literature on conflict and appropriation. Our model puts structure on the main elements of the limited access order. It allows us to assess some of its characteristics, by identifying conditions under which a sizeable elite emerges that is capable of limiting the activities of bandits and thereby provides order and stability. Our results show large variations in elite size, appropriation, production levels, and welfare across limited access societies due to only minor variations in exogenous model parameters, such as productivity, the cost of conflict, and the decisiveness of conflict. A striking result is that, within the limited access order, unproductive societies are faced with a high tax rate and a large elite, while productive societies are faced with a low tax rate and a small elite. The difference in additional productivity between these societies is offset by increased appropriation by bandits in absence of a strong elite, resulting in welfare being maximized for moderate levels of productivity.

We augment the standard cartel formation game from non-cooperative coalition theory, often applied in the context of international environmental agreements on climate change, with the possibility that singletons support coalition formation without becoming coalition members themselves. Rather, their support takes the form of a monetary transfer to the coalition, which increases the members' payoffs, and thereby provides an incentive for other singletons to join the coalition. We show that, under mild conditions on the costs and benefits of contributing to the public good (i.e. abatement of CO2 emissions), supporters exist in equilibrium. The existence of supporters increases the size of stable coalitions, increases abatement of CO2 emissions, and increases payoffs to each of four types of agents: members, joiners, free-riders, and supporters. Importantly, this result does not require commitment.