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This paper studies the role of expectations and monetary policy in the economy's response to climate actions. We show that in a stochastic environment, without the standard assumption of the perfect rationality of agents, there is more uncertainty regarding the path and the economic impact of a climate policy, with a potential threat to the ability of central banks to maintain price stability. Market beliefs and behavioral agents increase the trade-offs inherent to the chosen mitigation tool, with a carbon tax entailing more emissions uncertainty than in a rational expectations model and a cap-and-trade scheme implying a more pronounced pressure on allowance prices and inflation. The impact on price stability is worsened by delays in the implementation of stringent climate policies, the lack of confidence in the ability of central banks to keep inflation under control, and the adoption of monetary rules tied to expectations rather than current macroeconomic conditions. Central banks can implement successful stabilization policies that reduce the uncertainty surrounding the impact of climate actions and support the greening process while remaining within their mandate. • This work investigates how expectations can shape a green transition. • Without fully rational agents impacts of climate policy are more uncertain. • Carbon taxes and cap-and-trade's drawbacks are enlarged by non-fully-rational agents. • Delayed action and low credibility in central banks cause major inflationary pressure. • A reactive monetary policy can reduce uncertainty on climate policies' impacts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The objective of the paper is to study how the tax burden arising from an exogenous stream of public expenditures and transfers should be distributed between labor and capital in a scale‐less endogenous growth model, where the engine of growth are successful innovations. Our laboratory is a prototypical quality ladder model with a labor/leisure choice where research and development productivity is decreasing in the size of the economy. Our contribution is to show that even when labor supply has no effects on growth in the long run, it will still be optimal to tax capital for reasonable parametrizations of the model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• We present a behavioural New Keynesian model with different beliefs. • Economic fluctuations may be driven by heterogeneous expectations. • Credit cycles and inequalities in the distribution of wealth emerge endogenously. • With limits on the amount of borrowing the model generates severe crises. • Monetary policy can reduce the frequency of severe recessions. In a behavioral variant of a New Keynesian model, in which individuals use simple heuristic rules to forecast future inflation and output, if there are limits on the amount of debt that economic agents are allowed to bear, we observe occasionally severe downturns. Differences in beliefs combined with borrowing constraints tend to dampen expansions, but give rise to a chain reaction that exacerbates the recessions. The model is an example of endogenous credit cycles with expansions, severe recessions, and persistent inequality in the distribution of wealth. Monetary policy can both stabilize the economy and cause increased average output. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Limiting global warming to well below 2 °C may pose threats to macroeconomic and financial stability. In an estimated Euro Area New Keynesian model with financial frictions and climate policy, we study the possible perils of a low-carbon transition and evaluate the role of monetary policy and financial regulation. We show that, even for very ambitious climate targets, transition costs are moderate along a timely and gradual mitigation pathway. Inflation volatility strongly increases for disorderly climate policy, demanding a strong monetary response by central banks. In reaction to an adverse financial shock originating in the fossil sector, a green quantitative easing policy can provide an effective stimulus to the economy, but its stabilizing properties do not significantly differ from those of market neutral asset purchase programs. A financial regulation, encouraging the decarbonization of the banks' balance sheets via ad hoc capital requirements, can significantly reduce the severity of a financial crisis, but prolongs the recovery phase. Our results suggest that the involvement of central banks in climate actions must be carefully designed to be in compliance with their mandate and to avoid unintended trade-offs. • We develop a New Keynesian model with climate policy and financial frictions. • We study the role of financial regulation and monetary policy in a green transition. • The risk of macro-financial instability is limited for a gradual mitigation pathway. • Green quantitative easing programs stabilize the economy after a financial shock. • Differentiated capital requirements can mitigate the severity of a financial crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Since the second half of 2011, after a period of prolonged low growth, Italy has found itself at the center of a severe economic crisis. Concerns about the sustainability of its debt burden, along with gloomy growth prospects, have pushed up the cost of government borrowing, exacerbating current economic conditions. At the moment Italy is facing two mounting economic challenges: (i) achieve a rapid fiscal consolidation to restore financial market confidence; (ii) implement structural reforms to strengthen medium-term growth prospects. Using the European Commission''s model QUEST III with R&D, adapted to Italy, we quantify the potential effects of a set of interventions inspired to the reform packages currently being undertaken or under discussion and consider different levels of policy effort. Results show that reforms are likely to bring about sizable gains in output, consumption, employment and net foreign assets position and that most of these gains derive from labor market reforms. However, the fiscal austerity plan is likely to severely mitigate the positive effects of the interventions, especially during the earlier phases of the reform process. Most of these losses accrue to liquidity-constraint households who would experience a drop in consumption. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: In the context of the current policy debate on the reform of European fiscal rules, there is wide consensus on the need to place more attention on debt–GDP ratios. Proposals have been made to alleviate fiscal pressure on Member States with relatively low public debts. The present paper gives support to this view. Economies with high public debt–GDP ratios are shown to experience larger price deviations after a fiscal expansion. These results are derived in a model, calibrated to euro area quarterly data, with capital accumulation, flexible prices and wealth effects in the presence of an independent monetary authority. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This paper shows that in a general equilibrium model with interest-rate feedback rules of the Taylor-type population dynamics give rise to multiple steady states. Under an active monetary policy, real determinacy occurs only around the steady state with zero net financial wealth, where aggregate consumption is equally distributed among agents of different generations. By contrast, in a neighborhood of the steady state displaying a positive stock of financial wealth and intergenerational inequality, real determinacy requires monetary policy to be passive. Changes in the demographic profile of the economy are shown to have relevant implications for the aggregate accumulation of wealth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We extend the protection for sale model of Grossman and Helpman (1994) by introducing a general model of monopolistic competition with variable markups and incomplete pass-through. We show that the structure of protection emerging in the political equilibrium not only depends on the weight attached by the government to consumer welfare when making its policy decision, but also on the degree of market power of firms and on the terms-of-trade variations due to the degree of pass-through. Our results highlight the importance of preferences in shaping the structure of protection and are consistent with the occurring of protectionism also in unorganized industries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]