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This article shares reflections from members of the community of philosophers of education in the United States and Canada who were invited to express their insights in response to the theme ‘Snaps...

In his 2006 essay, “Moral Education’s Modest Agenda,” Robin Barrow argues for a clearly bounded conception of morality; he presents the moral domain as concerned with moral principles, and moral education as the cultivation of moral understanding. Barrow rejects behaviourism, character education, values clarification, developmentalism, and what he calls “the insidious influence of political and moral correctness” as practices and ideas that are irrelevant and inappropriate for moral education. While I share some of Barrow’s concerns about some of these approaches, I believe he over-restricts the scope of legitimately moral concerns and what educators ought to do in the name of moral education. In this paper, I make a case for a broader and bolder agenda for moral education, putting the question of what constitutes a human life (which Barrow takes to be a non-moral question) at the very heart of morality and moral education.

Cultivating critically reflective practitioners is a vital professional competency for social work students. However, few reflective models support undergraduate students to foster nonconce...

Kinship care is increasingly a first option for children in need of protection across all international child welfare jurisdictions, and predominantly grandparents assume this responsibility (Winokur, Holtan, & Valentine, 2009). A New Zealand study of grandparent caregivers found that a number of their marital relationships were disrupted following grandchild placement (Worrall, 2009). Relational crises of this nature have been previously little discussed in kinship literature. The emotional quality of couple connections affects care provision. Drawing on attachment theory, this article argues that the grandparent couple's relationship must be a key focus of practitioners' preplacement assessments and highlights five domains of relational functioning and four reliable measures for assessing these qualities.

INTRODUCTION: Social work practice knowledge was seminal to the evolution of attachment theory. This disciplinary connection is little known to many social work practitioners. This article seeks to remind care practice social workers specifically of this association, as the social work skills upon which early attachment knowledge was premised remain important to contemporary care practice.METHOD: Through a three-part discussion, this article aims to deepen care practice social workers’ understanding of attachment theory and its practical relevance for care practice assessment. The first section outlines the watershed moments of the theory’s development. The second highlights social work’s connection to this development. The third and final section reviews the construct of the internal working model and its value for distinguishing emotional differences in an adult’s relational biography.FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS: A key care practice goal is to facilitate the healthy growth and development of children and young people who have been placed in foster care due to maltreatment. A growing number of attachment researchers have found that the internal working model of a child’s new caregivers, with respect to attachment, is an important element in the revision of the child’s internal working model of relationships (Pace Zavattini, 2011). Thus, care practice social workers need to pay close attention to relational facets in prospective caregivers’ assessments as some literature suggests that practitioners struggle to understand the role attachment orientation plays in the care relationship (Bick Dozier, 2008).CONCLUSIONS: This article highlights and elaborates upon the utility of attachment theory for present-day care practice and argues that a deep understanding of this theory is likely to be instrumental to achieving better relational outcomes in foster care. This knowledge is foundational to conceptualising the different relational expectancies that prospective foster parents might bring to a new relationship.

Purpose – This paper outlines a teaching and learning collaboration between information literacy (IL) professionals and a social work academic at The University of Auckland. The collaboration was developed for the purpose of introducing evidence-based practice (EBP) and related IL skills to a third-year social work cohort preparing for their first practicum. Embedding the research–practice connection in the minds of students at this level of study is essential, as using evidence in practice is considered to be a fundamental professional objective. Despite this perspective, it is not uncommon for research to be viewed as an ancillary, if not discretionary skill in social work, with the research–practice gap well recognised in the social work literature. EBP offers students a clearly defined, systematic research framework imminently suited to the novice learner which emphasises the importance of research for practice. Research skills, in particular IL and the ability to find, evaluate and apply information, are essential to the development of effective EBP. Apart from the practical skills of being able to find evidence, critical thinking and reflective skills are key skills also inherent to IL processes and practice, and mastery of the evidence-based approach is impossible without mastery of these key IL competencies. Taking a solution-focused frame, theoretically underpinned by a constructivist teaching philosophy, we detail specific EBP and IL teaching practices, challenges and the remedies applied. The paper concludes with key lessons learned and future directions for teaching EBP and IL skills to social work students at The University of Auckland. Design/methodology/approach – A solution-focused frame is theoretically underpinned by a constructivist teaching philosophy. Findings – This paper offers insights derived from seven years of teaching EBP and IL skills to social work students and investigates specific teaching challenges and details the remedies applied. Research limitations/implications – As a case study, this article deals with one instance of EBP and IL teaching. Focusing specifically on EBP in the social sciences, this may not be relevant for other disciplines. Practical implications – This paper offers insights into methods for merging EBP and IL skills teaching in the social sciences, providing practical examples of activities which can be used in teaching, underpinned by relevant theory. Social implications – To be effective practitioners, social workers must understand the importance of research to practice, in particular how this can improve their professional knowledge and practice. Forging the research–practice connection aids the development of competent practitioners and enhances the well-being of social work clients. Originality/value – The authors outline constructivist–connectivist learning activities that can be used to advance students’ IL skills, develop research capacity and enhance the importance of the research-practice connection in social work practice. While much research has been done on EBP and IL connections in the medical and nursing literature, there is limited literature discussing EBP and IL integration in social work.

It is both a pleasure and a privilege to have this opportunity to review Clarence Joldersma’s recent book, A Levinasian Ethics for Education’s Commonplaces: Between Calling and Inspiration (hereafter LEEC). Joldersma has participated in and contributed to the scholarship on Emmanuel Levinas and education for the past 15 years or so, and I see this book in part as a consolidation of that work. I must admit that, on first reading, I was puzzled that he had chosen not to engage more explicitly with the work of other philosophers of education whose work is also informed by Levinas. I am thinking, for example, of Sharon Todd, Gert Biesta, Paul Standish, Claudia Eppert, Denise Egea-Kuehne and others (although several are named in the acknowledgments). But when I read the book a second time, I noticed a brief comment in the preface where he says that in the process of working and reworking the manuscript over a period of many years, what emerged—to his surprise—was his own voice. And indeed, as I returned to the body of the text, I started to see the book as a sort of pedagogical creed—an unpacking of Joldersma’s own fundamental beliefs about teaching, learning, curriculum, and the larger projects of schooling and education, as inspired by Levinas’s ethics. We learn, for example, that, for Joldersma, education is not about competition or primarily about passing on disciplinary knowledge, but rather a response to the call to justice—a fundamentally other-centered vision of education oriented toward the poor and marginalized, and to a commitment to human flourishing in our local communities and around the globe. Joldersma’s Levinasian-inspired education is obviously a radical departure from other conceptions of what education ought to be about, such as the pursuit of ‘‘academic excellence, personal development, finding truth, or the American dream’’ (p. 107). When I approach LEEC as a pedagogical creed, it becomes less important whether or not I agree with Joldersma’s interpretations of Levinas on particular points, or whether his interpretations align with or depart from that of other philosophers of education. Rather, reading the book through that lens allows me to

In contrast to the Kantian principle that we are morally accountable only for those actions over which we have control, Bernard Williams, Thomas Nagel, and others have argued that luck plays a significant role in the moral life. Put briefly, moral luck is at play when we are appropriately praised or blamed for our moral actions despite the fact that at least some aspects of what we are being judged for lie beyond our control. In this essay, Ann Chinnery discusses the concept and various types of moral luck, and draws on two news stories from the summer of 2013 (one involving an incident in the United States and the other in the United Kingdom) in order to suggest that a nonideal approach to moral education could go some way toward mitigating the morally limiting effects of “constitutive bad luck.”

Debate is arguably a central aspect of philosophy. There are a number of topics, however, on which the weighing of argument and counter-argument does not reach a final conclusion, but only a temporary settlement before the issue raises itself again. Understanding the historical development of such debates in philosophy of education is crucial to an appreciation of contemporary discussions in the field of education more broadly. They are debates that seem to have been always there and that continue to challenge new developments. Each chapter in Section 3, Revisiting Enduring Educational Debates, situates the debate related to a particular topic, considers its relevance, and highlights how it continues to influence educational theory and practice today.

How social work students incorporate personal and professional selves in the contexts of field education represents a cornerstone of effective and sustainable practice. This paper presents a qualitative component of a study that tracked 15 third-year bachelor of social work students across their first field placement to document their use of self, critical reflections and experiential learning. The project examined students' assessed ‘use of self’ assignments to understand their capacity for and development of critical awareness across this placement. Students were most articulate in being able to identify stressful situations that arose from placement in terms of what they were thinking (mind) and feeling (emotion) and to a much lesser extent to what they were sensing (body). Over time, students demonstrated a growing critical awareness to better identify and respond to their self-reported tensions. The findings provide developmental insights into how students integrate personal and professional selves a...

In this paper I explore the connection between narrative ethics and the increasing emphasis on historical consciousness as a way to cultivate moral responsibility in history education. I use Timothy Findley’s World War I novel, The Wars, as an example of how teachers might help students to see history neither simply as a collection of artefacts from the past, nor as an effort to construct an objective view about what went on in those other times and places, but rather as something that makes ethical demands on us here and now. Theoretically, this paper draws on Adam Zachary Newton’s conception of narrative ethics and Roger Simon’s conception of historical consciousness, both of which rest on the Levinasian themes of irreducible difference, the face, and subjectivity as a position of ethical responsibility to and for the other.

Over the past 20 years, there has been a shift in history education away from a view of history as the pursuit of an objective, universal story about the past toward ‘historical consciousness,’ which seeks to cultivate an understanding of the past as something that makes moral demands on us here and now. According to Roger Simon, historical consciousness calls us to ‘live historically’ – to live in a particular kind of ethical relationship with the past. However, no matter how much educators might believe in the importance of learning to live historically, if students do not see it that way, even the most thoughtfully designed program in history education will never get off the ground. This paper is an attempt to see whether the notion of ‘caring for the past,’ based on Nel Noddings' ethic of care, might help us begin to address the problem of moral motivation in educating for historical consciousness.

Despite growing interest in Emmanuel Levinas’s ethics in educational theory and practice, little has been done with the fact that for over 30 years Levinas served as director of a teacher education school in Paris, and that he taught classes there for more than 40 years. I attempt here to begin to fill that gap by focusing on Levinas’s classroom practices and everyday interactions with students rather than on his philosophical writings. I sketch three pedagogical postures he embodied and discuss them in relation to ongoing philosophical work in teacher education.

This essay reviews the three chapters contained in Section D on Teaching Curriculum of The SAGE Handbook, focusing on the relationship of policy to professional pedagogy in teaching and teacher edu...

According to Kevin Kumashiro (2004), education toward a socially just society requires a commitment to challenge common sense notions or assumptions about the world and about teaching and learning. Recalling Audre Lorde's (1984) classic essay, “The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House,” I focus on three common sense notions and practices within cross-cultural teacher education that often leave marginalized students bearing the burden of cross-cultural work at the expense of their own learning. Specifically, I critique the assumptions that students ought to share their experiences with others, that they should do so willingly, and that they should tell the truth in these exchanges (whether in reflective journals or in-class discussions). I offer no easy solutions; instead I call for re-examination of the ways in which everyday practices in teacher education risk serving as tools to “keep the oppressed occupied with the master's concerns” (p. 113) as an important step toward social justice...

The teaching of foundations courses, and in particular philosophy of education, is frequently under siege in teacher education programs across Canada, as these programs struggle to meet other demands on student teachers. This article results from a panel discussion addressing the context of a variety of undergraduate philosophy of education courses across the country, and the principles and practices instructors take in teaching their discipline. The result of the discussion is a strong argument in favour of teaching philosophy of education as an important means of achieving many of the other aims Faculties of Education and teacher education programs have for their teacher education students, in an atmosphere of reflective thought about the profession and its challenges.

Education has long been charged with the taskof forming and shaping subjectivity andidentity. However, the prevailing view ofeducation as a project of producing rationalautonomous subjects has been challenged bypostmodern and poststructuralist critiques ofsubstantial subjectivity. In a similar vein,Emmanuel Levinas inverts the traditionalconception of subjectivity, claiming that weare constituted as subjects only in respondingto the other. In other words, subjectivity isderivative of an existentially priorresponsibility to and for the other. Hisconception of ethical responsibility is thusalso a radical departure from the prevailingview of what it means to be a responsible moralagent. In this paper, I use jazz improvisationas a metaphor to focus on three interrelatedaspects of ethical responsibility on Levinas'saccount: passivity, heteronomy, andinescapability. I then point toward some waysin which reframing responsibility andsubjectivity along this line might offer newpossibilities for conceiving subjectivity andmoral agency in education.

In this symposium, we highlight the importance of critical engagement with philosophical traditions in philosophy of education. On one hand, it is important to critique the exclusionary nature of canons of knowledge that have shaped both philosophy and education; on the other, we believe it is important to acknowledge that our thinking, as well as the thinking of philosophers of education before us, is undeniably and indelibly marked by these traditions. Framed by Jacques Derrida’s reflections on the “figure of the philosopher” and Michael Naas’s conception of “taking on the tradition,” David Burns invites us to revisit the Stoic conception of character as a counterpoint to current discourses of character education in Canadian schools; David Waddington examines how Thomas Jefferson’s writings influenced John Dewey’s conception of democracy and democratic education; and Ann Chinnery proposes acknowledgement of intellectual indebtedness as an essential scholarly disposition, looking specifically at the “difficult inheritance” of Emmanuel Levinas’s debt to Martin Heidegger.