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Improving our understanding of how disengagement and deradicalisation from terrorism and violent extremism occurs has critical real-world implications. A systematic review of the recent literature in this area was conducted in order to develop a more refined and empirically-derived model of the processes involved. After screening more than 83,000 documents, we found 29 research reports which met the minimum quality thresholds. Thematic analysis identified key factors associated with disengagement and deradicalisation processes. Assessing the interactions of these factors produced the Phoenix Model of Disengagement and Deradicalisation which is described in this paper. Also examined are some of the potential policy and practice implications of the Phoenix Model, as are avenues for future research in this area.

Climate change is a potential major driver of future terrorism. It is already recognised by many (if not most) nations as a strategic security threat, though the potential role it can play in igniting, facilitating, or exacerbating terrorist conflict has been relatively unexplored. There are, however, growing signs that climate change—either through direct or indirect impacts—should be considered as a significant macro-level driver of terrorism.

The “specificity problem” is one of the longest running unanswered questions in research on terrorism. This problem focuses on the fundamental question as to why do only a few people radicalize when many appear to have been exposed to at least some of the same causes of radicalization? The current study seeks to help answer that question through comparative research with two sample populations in Northern Ireland. In-depth interviews were carried out with 17 former paramilitary members and 12 paramilitary sympathizers. The interviews explored factors which distinguished those who became actively involved with paramilitary groups versus those who did not. The results discussed here found that geographic proximity to intercommunity violence flashpoints/interfaces was strongly associated with increased paramilitary involvement. Thematic analysis found this effect was mediated by two additional factors: (1) levels of exposure to violence and (2) levels of community isolation. The findings are discussed in relation to the wider literature on radicalization.

This article introduces readers to the Framework for Research Ethics in Terrorism Studies (FRETS). FRETS has been developed to assist IRB/HREC chairs and reviewers in completing reviews of terrorism studies ethics proposals, in as objective a manner as possible. The framework consists of a series of yes/no questions for chairs and reviewers to answer before completing their reviews. These questions are divided into six different sections: participant’s right’s, safety and vulnerability; informed consent; confidentiality and anonymity; researcher’s right’s, safety and vulnerability; data storage and security-sensitive materials; and the ethical review process. This framework was developed as a result of critical analysis of the literature in terrorism research and analogous fields.

This paper presents a systematic review of organised crime data collection and analysis methods. It did this by reviewing all papers published in Trends in Organized Crime and Global Crime between 2004 and 2018 (N = 463). The review identified a number of key weaknesses. First, organised crime research is dominated by secondary data analysis of open-access documents, and documents are seldom subjected to the same principles guiding primary data collection methods. Second, data analysis lacked balance with a distinct lack of inferential statistical analysis. Third, there was a significant absence of victim or offender voices with an overreliance on data from state bodies and the media. The paper concludes that organised crime, as field of research, appears unbalanced by reliance upon a small number of methods and sources. Rebalancing the field requires more organised crime researchers to speak to offenders and victims, employ greater use of statistical analysis and tighten our methodologies.

This paper provides a systematic overview of the emergence of organized crime in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland since the late 1960s. It draws on two major studies of organized crime in the South (Hourigan 2011) and paramilitary activity in the North (Morrison 2014) to explore how conflict within and between organized criminal and paramilitary groups, shapes the distinctive dynamic of organized crime on the island of Ireland. The paper opens with an overview of the development of the drugs trade in the Republic of Ireland. The distinctive cultural characteristics of Irish organized crime groups are considered and the role played by paramilitary groups in criminal networks, North and South, is reviewed. As part of this analysis, the dynamic of inter-gang feuds and the spectrum of conflicts between organized criminal and paramilitary groups are analyzed. The competitive and mutually beneficial links between these organizations, North and South are explored as well as the tendency of paramilitaries to engage in vigilantism against criminals (mostly drugs dealers) as a means of building political capital within local communities.

Prisons and madrassas have both been repeatedly flagged in UK government policy as high risk settings for jihadist radicalisation. Some theoretical models of the radicalisation process have also drawn attention to these spaces. This review found that there have been cases of radicalisation or attempted radicalisation in both prison settings and madrassas in the UK. However, such cases are isolated. While other countries may have different experiences, the research evidence suggests that successful radicalisation is rare in both settings in the UK. The evidence instead stresses the importance of other factors in the radicalisation process, and suggests that physical settings overall appear to be a poor predictor for radicalisation risk. Despite this, it is clear that both types of settings continue to be widely regarded both by the media and within government circles as prominent centres of radicalisation, with the result that policy attention continues to be specifically directed to these settings.

Understanding terrorist innovation has emerged as a critical research question. Terrorist innovation challenges status quo assumptions about the nature of terrorist threats and emphasises a need for counterterrorism policy and practice to attempt to not simply react to changes in terrorist tactics and strategies but also to try to anticipate them. This study focused on a detailed examination of the 1972 Munich Olympics attack and draws on the wide range of open source accounts available, including from terrorists directly involved but also from among the authorities and victims. Using an analytical framework proposed by Rasmussen and Hafez (Terrorist innovations in weapons of mass effect: preconditions, causes and predictive indicators, The Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Washington, DC, 2010), several key drivers are identified and described, both internal to the group and external to its environment. The study concludes that the innovation shown by Black September was predictable and that Munich represented a profound security failure as much as it did successful terrorist innovation.

The 1916 Rising was, in military terms, a shambolic failure. Despite the fact that Britain was locked in a gruelling struggle with Germany, the Rising was still utterly crushed within a week. How then, in the aftermath of victory against Germany, did Britain fail to win the subsequent struggle with the IRA between 1919 and 1921? This article assesses some of the key factors which played out in the conflict, drawing particular attention to the IRA’s focus on the RIC and the consequences of this and then, later, how distorted perceptions of the proximity of success ultimately undermined British commitment. One of the most remarkable features of the conflict was the widespread belief among many on the British side (and more than a few in the Republican camp) that the IRA was on the verge of total defeat when the truce was agreed in 1921. The IRA had suffered heavy casualties and were running low on weapons and ammunition. Yet, somehow the movement prevailed. This article aims to shed light on how and why that happened.

Identifying the 'causes' or 'root causes' of terrorism, and then removing or reducing these causes in order to diminish the scourge of terrorism, has been a popular idea among many politicians and scholars. Critics argue that 'root causes' are too remote from the alleged outcome, acts of terrorism, to be of any analytical or practical use. While recognizing that the causes of terrorism are an important subject, it is worth highlighting at an early stage some of the key problems faced by efforts to better understand these causes. There are several conceptual distinctions which may be of help to get a better grip on how causal explanations can inform our understanding of the emergence of terrorism. It can be useful to differentiate between two different types of causes behind terrorism: preconditions and precipitants. Most research on micro causes is based on individual cases of people who actually became radicalized and engaged in terrorist activities.

In a context where widespread failings in the nature of terrorism research are well recognised—yet where the quantity of work is still enormous—is it possible to fairly assess whether the field is progressing or if it has become mired in mediocre research? Citation analysis is widely used to reveal the evolution and extent of progress in fields of study and to provide valuable insight into major trends and achievements. This study identifies and analyses the current 100 most cited journal articles in terrorism studies. A search was performed using Google Scholar for peer-reviewed journal articles on subjects related to terrorism and counter-terrorism. The most cited articles were published across sixty-two journals, which reflected the interdisciplinary nature of terrorism studies. Compared to other articles, the most cited articles were more likely to be the result of collaborative research and were also more likely to provide new data. Sixty-three of the top 100 articles have been published since 2001. ...

Our understanding of how people become involved in terrorism and violent extremism has transformed since the turn of the century. That transformation occurred at the same time that ‘radicalisation’ took over as the dominant framework for considering questions around terrorist psychology, motivation and recruitment. Today, radicalisation is typically seen to refer to a complex and dynamic process which results in individuals coming to embrace a violent ideology in support of a political or religious cause. The concept of radicalisation has become an almost universal element in contemporary efforts to understand and combat terrorism. This chapter outlines the rise and development of theoretical models and research on radicalisation. It highlights some of the major research breakthroughs but also focuses on where very significant gaps remain in our understanding. The chapter cautions that we need to be careful in terms of how we think about the broader role of radicalisation. A subtle – and dangerously unquestioned - assumption has spread that ‘radicalisation’ as a phenomenon is the major root cause of terrorism. When different radicalisation models are used to design or justify a variety of counter-terrorism policies and programmes, care is needed to look beyond the headline banner of radicalisation and pay attention to the factors identified within those models as key drivers.

(2012). Chapter 4 - Understanding terrorist target selection. Routledge Online Studies on the Olympic and Paralympic Games: Vol. 1, Terrorism and the Olympics, pp. 49-71.

This paper aims to provide an overview of the psychology of individuals who join and engage in terrorism, and in particular of individuals who engage in jihadi-motivated terrorism such as that carried out by al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Based on the most reliable available evidence, this paper gives an account of the psychology and motivations of such individuals and the processes that facilitate and develop violent radicalization.

The central argument of this paper is that suicide has had a long and explicit role in politics and in conflict. Turning to historical examples for insight offers many advantages to current efforts to understand and respond to suicide terrorism. In particular, it facilitates greater objectivity and a calmer consideration of the actors and circumstances than can often be the case with contemporary events. Explanations of suicide in terms of madness, brainwashing, coercion, and fanaticism ring hollow with many of the historical cases, and other explanations, causes, and processes take on greater significance. By considering a number of case examples, this article shows how improved historical awareness can provide badly needed objective insight and help reveal strategic trends and issues. The article illustrates how historical cases offer valuable material and insight which is often extremely difficult to acquire on contemporary protagonists. Lessons and issues for research and policy are highlight...

Police investigations of terrorist incidents are rarely straightforward. This paper reports the findings of research that looked at low-level paramilitary attacks in Northern Ireland which have taken place during the ceasefire era. Of 500 incidents studied, 28 were followed by the arrest of suspects. The study examines what factors were important for linking later arrests with other features of the incident. These results are discussed in terms of the wider implications for the successful investigation of paramilitary offences and in terms of the specific implications for investigative policing within Northern Ireland.

Children are all too often the victims of terrorist conflicts and, as the Beslan school siege tragically illustrated, this victimisation can be extreme, deliberate and intentional. While all victims of terrorism attract a special interest, child victims unquestionably attract the most. Following this, how terrorist groups and governments initiate and react to violence which kills and maims children can play a major role in how conflicts are perceived and in how campaigns unfold. A failure to appreciate the critical issues surrounding the victimisation of children risks undermining perceived legitimacy, eroding wider support and increasing the backing opponents enjoy. Drawing on a variety of case studies, this article provides a review of how the victimisation of children has impacted in recent terrorist conflicts. Implications for policy and practice are highlighted. Vengeance for the blood of a small child Satan has not yet created Haim Nahman Bialik, Al ha-Shehitah (1903)

The author examined the relation between anonymity and aggression in violent interpersonal assaults that occurred in Northern Ireland. Of the 500 violent attacks that the author studied, 206 were carried out by offenders who wore disguises to mask their identities. The findings revealed that significant positive relationships existed between the use of disguises and several measures of aggression. Disguised offenders inflicted more serious physical injuries, attacked more people at the scene, engaged in more acts of vandalism, and were more likely to threaten victims after the attacks. The author discussed these results within the framework of deindividuation theory.

While considerable concerns have been raised about crime and deviancy on the Internet, relatively little research has looked closely at the subject. This paper describes a study on criminal and deviant behaviour that occurred on a World Wide Web site. The Cyber Magpie website was established to determine whether people who visited for the purposes of gaining access to legal material would also attempt to access illegal and/or pornographic material. Over an 88-day period 803 visitors entered the site. By using a tracking facility, it was found that those sections offering illegal and/or deviant material were accessed by a majority of visitors. These findings are discussed in terms of deindividuation theory and with regard to the implications for understanding deviant behaviour in cyberspace.

It is much easier to condemn terrorism than it is to comprehend it, yet outrage and horror can never be the sole foundation on which to build an accurate understanding of even the worst terrorist atrocities. Terrorism is not a simple phenomenon with easy explanations and direct solutions. Yet the effort devoted to gaining an objective understanding of terrorists and terrorism has often been extremely deficient. Such deficiency may not have often led to the collapse of the system combating the terrorists but it has certainly prolonged and exacerbated many conflicts that could have been resolved with greater speed and at less cost and suffering. This article highlights a framework through which useful insights into terrorist atrocities can be gained for those interested in combating and preventing similar acts in the future. As a demonstration, this article focuses its analysis on one of the worst terrorist incidents to occur in the conflict in Northern Ireland: the 1993 Shankill Bombing. In so doing, the a...

Our understanding of the risk assessment of terrorist and extremist prisoners is in its infancy, yet this is clearly a critical issue. How can one tell if a prisoner is still dangerous or not? What are valid measures to assess risk and what type of evidence is worth examining? In considering risk assessment of terrorists and extremists in prison settings there are a range of essential issues to consider. Crucially, not all terrorist and extremist prisoners are the same and factors which apply clearly to one individual will not apply equally strongly to others. As a result, effective risk assessment processes need to be nuanced. This chapter highlights the range of issues which are likely to be of most use when considering risk assessment in the context of a terrorist prisoner, and also identifies what sources of information can provide the necessary insight to inform this assessment.

In a review in 1988, Schmid and Jongman identified a number of key problems in research on terrorism. These included serious concerns with the methodologies being used by researchers to gather data and with the level of analysis that was undertaken once data was available. Following on from this work, this article draws on a review of research published between 1995 and 2000. It was found that the problems identified in 1988 remain as serious as ever. Research is ultimately aimed at arriving at a level of knowledge and understanding where one can explain why certain events have happened and be able to accurately predict the emergence and outcome of similar events in the future. Terrorism research, however, has failed to arrive at that level of knowledge. This article outlines some of the causes of these continuing problems and highlights ways in which the situation can be improved.

Hostage-taking events remain one of the most common forms of international terrorism. Such events are particularly significant due to their very high media profile and the unique challenges and potentials they present to governments. Yet despite such importance, remarkably little systematic analysis of terrorist hostage-taking has taken place. This paper reviews a body of research which has attempted to model such events using mathematical principles. The guidelines which have emerged from this research are tested against three recent high-profile hostage situations. The overall finding is that the mathematical models are currently too limited to be heavily relied upon in field situations. Nevertheless, it is equally very clear that the potential exists to develop more robust models which could prove highly useful in the real world.

Paramilitary vigilantism in Northern Ireland has increased dramatically in the wake of the 1994 cease-fires, and is increasingly threatening to destabilise the peace process. Yet despite the long history of vigilantism in Northern Ireland and the unprecedented attention the activity is now attracting, virtually no empirical research has been carried out on the topic. This article reports findings from a study made of 213 IRA and 132 loyalist vigilante incidents which occurred between 1994 and 1996. The aim of the study was to provide hitherto unavailable demographic information on the vigilantism. Results also show that there are clear differences between IRA and loyalist vigilantism and that the nature of vigilantism is changing over time. The main conclusion is that there is a worrying lack of even basic knowledge about the vigilantism at a time when its importance is increasing dramatically. The findings are discussed in relation to the current situation in Northern Ireland.

Starting from Mao's well‐known metaphor of ‘water and fish’, this article examines the nature of power as it applies to terrorist groups. Terrorists are under constant pressure actively to increase their influence and control over their constituent communities. Our understandings of how terrorist groups can do this has generally suffered from being too limited and overly simplistic. Focusing on Northern Ireland, this article explores how terrorist groups can first identify and then access various sources of power which can be used to strengthen the group's position and authority. The article argues that there are identifiable strategies which can be exploited by current and future terrorists in virtually any setting. It is in the interest of those combating terrorism to study these principles closely if they wish to limit the power and durability of terrorist opponents.

This article looks at fund raising schemes used by Loylist groups including robberies, tax fraud, smuggling, drinking clubs, drug dealing and counterfeiting. The veracity and nature of the drug dealing aspect is the main focus of this paper which also considers the rise and fall of the splinter group, the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF), in this context.

Paramilitary vigilantism has been a feature of conflict in Northern Ireland since the earliest days of the Troubles. In that time, the vigilante campaigns have left over 115 people dead and more than 4,000 injured. Yet despite this toll, remarkably little research has been carried out on the subject. Now, in the sixth year since the 1994 ceasefires, paramilitary vigilantism has gradually emerged as one of the most critical issues in the Northern Ireland peace process. This article focuses on the impact the vigilantism has on its victims and on the wider communities. In doing so, it also addresses why the governments have hesitated to take strong action against the activity. The article attempts a multi‐layered analysis of the impact of an emotive, controversial and increasingly critical subject.

Loyalist paramilitaries have been carrying out vigilante attacks since the earliest years of the Troubles. In four of the past six years, they have actually carried out more vigilante attacks than republican paramilitaries. Yet despite this history, virtually nothing has been written about this aspect of paramilitarism in Northern Ireland. This article explores the origins and growth of loyalist vigilantism. The impact of pivotal events such as the 1985 Anglo‐Irish Agreement and the 1994 cease‐fires are discussed. The vigilantism clearly fulfils a number of important functions for the loyalists but it also carries heavy costs. The article examines how the political parties associated with the paramilitaries have struggled to accommodate the vigilante campaigns while attempting to build wider political appeal. The article concludes that despite the political costs, current developments in Northern Ireland appear to favour an intensification rather than a diminution of loyalist vigilantism.

The 40‐month period which has followed the introduction of the IRA's 1994 cease‐fire has witnessed the most intensive vigilante campaign ever carried out by the movement. A commitment to vigilantism has profoundly affected the evolution of both the policy and structure of Sinn Fein and the IRA. However, vigilantism bears costs for the two organizations and several serious attempts have been made by senior figures to end the practice. This article sets out to understand and describe the dynamics of militant republicanism's fluctuating commitment to vigilante violence, and in particular to understand the complex issues vigilantism has raised within Sinn Fein and the IRA in the past three decades. The article concludes that the two organizations are now irretrievably committed to vigilantism, and short of major RUC reform, they will be unable to end what has become a politically‐damaging policy.