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RATIONALE, AIMS AND OBJECTIVES Six years ago, the Supreme Court judgement in Montgomery v Lanarkshire changed medical law. It introduced a new patient-based standard of care for the communication of treatment risks and alternatives, rejecting the doctor-based standard that had long governed all aspects of medical negligence. This is the first systematic review to analyse the literature on Montgomery. Our aim is to appraise and synthesize the literature on Montgomery's impact on medicine and the law and to identify areas for further academic enquiry and implications for professional guidance and training. METHODS Searches were run in Medline, Embase, PsycINFO, Web of Science, Scopus, Westlaw UK, HeinOnline, and LexisNexis. Two reviewers screened papers. Extracted data was analysed and discussed by an interdisciplinary team. PRISMA guidelines were followed. RESULTS Of the 1134 papers identified, 100 met the inclusion criteria. These papers revealed significant disagreement on four core sets of issues, focusing on Montgomery's impact on: (1) legal and professional duties; (2) medical practice; (3) the patient experience; and (4) litigation. The first set addresses whether the case actually changed doctors' legal and professional duties, the relationship between GMC guidance and medical law, and the boundaries of Montgomery. The second explores whether the decision has incentivized defensive medicine, its resource implications, and doctors' knowledge of it. The third concerns whether and how the decision has promoted patient autonomy and involvement in their own care. The fourth focuses on whether the case has caused an increase in litigation. CONCLUSIONS Despite the abundance of legal and medical literature on Montgomery, many issues remain unresolved. Empirical research is required for many of the questions. Doctrinal analysis informed by medical knowledge is also required to assess whether Montgomery may have unrecognized ramifications-for example, whether it will require the disclosure of risks associated with diagnostic uncertainty, where doctors advise patients without performing procedures.

COVID-19 is a highly contagious infection with no proven treatment. Approximately 2.5% of patients need mechanical ventilation while their body fights the infection.1 Once COVID-19 patients reach the point of critical illness where ventilation is necessary, they tend to deteriorate quickly. During the pandemic, patients with other conditions may also present at the hospital needing emergency ventilation. But ventilation of a COVID-19 patient can last for 2–3 weeks. Accordingly, if all ventilators are in use, there will not be time for patients to ‘queue up’ to wait for those who arrived earlier to recover. Those who need a ventilator will die if they do not receive access to one quickly. Many nations now face the prospect that they failed to prepare appropriately for this foreseen risk of pandemic (another issue worthy of legal analysis) and that their populations will need far more ventilators than the health service can supply. For many weeks, the UK has been anticipating a surge of COVID-19 infections that could leave patients queuing in hospitals for ICU care. Luckily, social distancing has ‘flattened the curve’ and this problem might not arise. There is still a degree of risk, however, and other countries will not be so lucky. At some point, during this pandemic or the next, all countries will need to answer hard questions about whether and when scarce ICU resources (such as ventilators, beds and staff) should be either withheld or withdrawn from certain groups of patients solely for the purpose of providing them to others. Attempts to answer these questions can be found in a wide range of ICU triage protocols and ethical guidance documents, many of which embrace the foundational principle of ‘save the most lives’. Unfortunately, this worthwhile goal has generated many suggestions that could violate the law. This article identifies …

At some point during this pandemic or next, all countries will need to answer hard questions about whether and when scarce ICU resources (such as ventilators, beds and staff) should be either withheld or withdrawn from certain groups of patients solely for the purpose of providing them to others. Attempts to answer these hard questions can be found in ICU triage protocols and ethical guidance documents, many of which embrace the foundational principle of ‘save the most lives’. Unfortunately, this worthwhile goal has generated many suggestions that could violate the law. This article identifies 10 ways in which the withholding or withdrawal of a clinically indicated ventilator might violate a patient’s rights, along with recommendations on how to avoid doing so. While our analysis is based on UK law, its lessons are relevant for other countries with similar legal systems. If the issues we identify are not addressed, doctors may act unlawfully. Worse, patients may die unlawfully.

The interaction of black and white students in a new open enrollment desegregated middle school which meets most of the criteria Allport (1954) specified as important in fostering positive intergroup relations was studied. Seating patterns in the cafeteria were observed during the school's first year of operation. Analysis of these patterns using indices based on Campbell et al.'s (1966) formula for analyzing racial aggregation suggested: (a) race is an extremely important grouping criterion even for students who have chosen a desegregated school; (b) however, sex is generally an even more important grouping criterion; (c) girls show more racial aggregation than boys; and (d) racial aggregation decreased over time in the seventh grade but increased in the eighth grade, which had a predominantly white accelerated academic track and a predominantly black regular track.