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In recent years, conflicting findings have been reported in the scientific literature about the influence of dopaminergic, serotonergic and oxytocinergic gene variants on moral behavior. Here, we utilized a moral judgment paradigm to test the potential effects on moral choices of three polymorphisms of the Oxytocin receptor (OXTR): rs53576, rs2268498 and rs1042770. We analyzed the influence of each single polymorphism and of genetic profiles obtained by different combinations of their genotypes in a sample of male insurance brokers (n = 129), as compared to control males (n = 109). Insurance brokers resulted significantly more oriented to maximize outcomes than control males, thus they expressed more than controls the utilitarian attitude phenotype. When analyzed individually, none of the selected variants influenced the responses to moral dilemmas. In contrast, a composite genetic profile that potentially increases OXTR activity was associated with higher moral acceptability in brokers. We hypothesize that this genetic profile promotes outcome-maximizing behavior in brokers by focusing their attention on what represents a greater good, that is, saving the highest number of people, even though at the cost of sacrificing one individual. Our data suggest that investigations in a sample that most expresses the phenotype of interest, combined with the analysis of composite genetic profiles rather than individual variants, represent a promising strategy to find out weak genetic influences on complex phenotypes, such as moral behavior.

Cancer research has led to more cancer patients being cured, and many more enabled to live with their cancer. As such, some cancers are now considered a chronic disease, where patients and their families face the challenge to take an active role in their own care and in some cases in their treatment. To this direction the iManageCancer project aims to provide a cancer specific self-management platform designed according to the needs of patient groups while focusing, in parallel, on the wellbeing of the cancer patient. In this paper, we present the use-case requirements collected using a survey, a workshop and the analysis of three white papers and then we explain the corresponding system architecture. We describe in detail the main technological components of the designed platform, show the current status of development and we discuss further directions of research.

Moral behavior has been a key topic of debate for philosophy and psychology for a long time. In recent years, thanks to the development of novel methodologies in cognitive sciences, the question of how we make moral choices has expanded to the study of neurobiological correlates that subtend the mental processes involved in moral behavior. For instance, in vivo brain imaging studies have shown that distinct patterns of brain neural activity, associated with emotional response and cognitive processes, are involved in moral judgment. Moreover, while it is well-known that responses to the same moral dilemmas differ across individuals, to what extent this variability may be rooted in genetics still remains to be understood. As dopamine is a key modulator of neural processes underlying executive functions, we questioned whether genetic polymorphisms associated with decision-making and dopaminergic neurotransmission modulation would contribute to the observed variability in moral judgment. To this aim, we genotyped five genetic variants of the dopaminergic pathway [rs1800955 in the dopamine receptor D4 (DRD4) gene, DRD4 48 bp variable number of tandem repeat (VNTR), solute carrier family 6 member 3 (SLC6A3) 40 bp VNTR, rs4680 in the catechol-O-methyl transferase (COMT) gene, and rs1800497 in the ankyrin repeat and kinase domain containing 1 (ANKK1) gene] in 200 subjects, who were requested to answer 56 moral dilemmas. As these variants are all located in genes belonging to the dopaminergic pathway, they were combined in multilocus genetic profiles for the association analysis. While no individual variant showed any significant effects on moral dilemma responses, the multilocus genetic profile analysis revealed a significant gender-specific influence on human moral acceptability. Specifically, those genotype combinations that improve dopaminergic signaling selectively increased moral acceptability in females, by making their responses to moral dilemmas more similar to those provided by males. As females usually give more emotionally-based answers and engage the “emotional brain” more than males, our results, though preliminary and therefore in need of replication in independent samples, suggest that this increase in dopamine availability enhances the cognitive and reduces the emotional components of moral decision-making in females, thus favoring a more rationally-driven decision process.

At the present time, the growing interest in the topic of moral judgment highlights the widespread need for a standardized set of experimental stimuli. We provide normative data for a sample of 120 undergraduate students using a new set of 60 moral dilemmas that might be employed in future studies according to specific research needs. Thirtydilemmas were structured tobe similar tothe Footbridge dilemma (“instrumental” dilemmas, in whichthedeathofonepersonisameanstosavemorepeople),andthirtydilemmasweredesignedtobesimilartotheTrolleydilemma(“incidental” dilemmas, in which the death of one person is a foreseen but unintended consequence of the action aimed at saving more people). Besides type of dilemma, risk-involvement was also manipulated: the main character’s life was at risk in half of the instrumental dilemmas and in half of the incidental dilemmas. We provide normative values for the following variables: (i) rates of participants’ responses (yes/no) to the proposed resolution; (ii) decision times; (iii) ratings of moral acceptability; and (iv) ratings of emotional valence (pleasantness/unpleasantness) and arousal (activation/calm) experienced during decision making. For most of the dependent variables investigated, we observed significant main effects of type of dilemma and risk-involvement in both subject and item analyses. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

International audience; Objective: The aim of this study was to investigate explicit moral and socio-conventional knowledge in Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) patients. Method: A group of 28 TBI patients was tested on a new set of moral and socio-conventional items. Responses of TBI patients were compared with those of 28 matched controls. Participants had to report how hard would be to perform specific moral or socio-conventional transgressions, using a 10-point Likert scale. We analyzed our data through mixed-effects models, to jointly assess by-participants and byitems variance. The factors considered were Type of Item (Moral vs. Socio-conventional) and Group (TBI vs. Controls). Results: Results revealed a significant interaction between Type of Item and Group (chi(2)[1] = 25.5, p < .001). Simple-effects analyses showed that TBI, as Controls, were able to differentiate moral and socio-conventional transgressions (chi(2)[1] = 72.3, p < .001), as they deemed the former as more difficult to enact. TBI patients, however, evaluated moral transgressions as easier to fulfill (chi(2)[1] = 12.2, p = .001). Conclusions: TBI patients can clearly differentiate moral and socio-conventional transgressions, suggesting that the explicit knowledge of these two dimensions is spared. TBI patients, however, considered moral transgressions as easier to fulfill with respect to Controls. This finding may suggest a tendency in TBI patients to underestimate the weight of moral transgressions.

In recent years, a great deal of research has relied on hypothetical sacrificial dilemmas to investigate decision-making processes involved in pro-social utilitarian choices. Recent evidence, however, has suggested that moral sacrificial choices may actually reflect reduced harm aversion and antisocial dispositions rather than an utilitarian inclination. Here, we used moral dilemmas to confront healthy volunteers with controversial action choices. We measured impulsiveness and venturesomeness personality traits, which have been shown to influence harm aversion, to test their role in utilitarian action and evaluation of moral acceptability. The results of the present study show that, in males, venturesomeness drives engagement in actions and increases moral acceptability. In contrast, in females no effects of venturesomeness were observed on moral action and evaluation. Rather, in females empathetic concern and personal distress, elicited by the vicarious experience of the other's emotional states, exerted an inhibitory effect on action. Taken together, these findings indicate that the "harm aversion hypothesis" may contribute to explain utilitarian choices in males but not in females. In both genders, no association was observed between impulsiveness and moral action.

Contrary to Greene's dual-process theory of moral judgment (Greene 2013), this commentary suggests that the network view of the brain proposed by Pessoa, in which emotion and cognition may be used as labels in the context of certain behaviors, but will not map clearly into compartmentalized pieces of the brain, could represent a better explanation of the rationale behind people's moral behavior.

Traditional studies on moral judgement used resolutions of moral dilemmas that were framed in terms of acceptability of the consequentialist action promoting a greater good, thus overlooking the deontological implications (choices cannot be justified by their consequences). Recently, some authors have suggested a parallelism between automatic, unreflective emotional responses and deontological moral judgements. In this study, we developed a novel experimental paradigm in which participants were required to choose between two resolutions of a moral dilemma (consequentialist and deontological). To assess whether emotions are engaged in each of the two resolutions, we asked participants to evaluate their emotional experience through the ratings of valence and arousal. Results showed that emotion is involved not only in deontological but also in consequentialist resolutions. Moreover, response times pointed out a different interplay between emotion and cognition in determining a conflict in the dilemma's resolution. In particular, when people were faced with trolley-like dilemmas we found that decisions leading to deontological resolutions were slower than decisions leading to consequentialist resolutions. We propose that this finding reflects the special (but not accepted) permission provided by the doctrine of the double effect for incidentally causing death for the sake of a good end. © 2013 © 2013 Taylor & Francis.

BackgroundPeople have fought for their civil rights, primarily the right to live in dignity. At present, the development of technology in medicine and healthcare led to an apparent paradox: many people are fighting for the right to die. This study was aimed at testing whether different moral principles are associated with different attitudes towards end-of-life decisions for patients with a severe brain damage.MethodologyWe focused on the ethical decisions about withdrawing life-sustaining treatments in patients with severe brain damage. 202 undergraduate students at the University of Padova were given one description drawn from four profiles describing different pathological states: the permanent vegetative state, the minimally conscious state, the locked-in syndrome, and the terminal illness. Participants were asked to evaluate how dead or how alive the patient was, and how appropriate it was to satisfy the patient's desire.Principal findingsWe found that the moral principles in which people believe affect not only people's judgments concerning the appropriateness of the withdrawal of life support, but also the perception of the death status of patients with severe brain injury. In particular, we found that the supporters of the Free Choice (FC) principle perceived the death status of the patients with different pathologies differently: the more people believe in the FC, the more they perceived patients as dead in pathologies where conscious awareness is severely impaired. By contrast, participants who agree with the Sanctity of Life (SL) principle did not show differences across pathologies.ConclusionsThese results may shed light on the complex aspects of moral consensus for supporting or rejecting end-of-life decisions.

In this paper, we claim that the problem of conditionals should be dealt with by carefully distinguishing between thinking conditional propositions and conditional thinking, i.e. thinking on the basis of some supposition. This distinction deserves further investigation, if we are to make sense of some old and new experimental data concerning the understanding and the assertion of conditional sentences. Here we will argue that some of these data seem to refute the mental models theory of conditional reasoning, setting the ground for a different approach to the cognitive study of conditionals.