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This article reviews the recent effort of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute (ASP) to measure the performance of the International Criminal Court (ICC) through the identification of goals and performance indicators. Upon an analysis of the various performance indicators reports prepared by the ICC and pertinent scholarly contributions, it offers a critical review of the ASP’s endeavour. While appreciating the usefulness of the large amount of information collected by the ICC in the said reports, it argues that the turn to managerialism brought about by the ASP’s endeavour, while laudable in many respects, may constitute an encroachment on the exercise of the judicial function if not properly handled through a closer coordination with the goals set in the ICC Statute. It may, in fact, amount to ‘micromanagement’ with the consequence of diverting the ASP’s attention from the more pressing task of developing—20 years after the signing of the Rome Statute—an innovative vision of the ICC’s role for the next (20) years.

The security of System Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems is one of the most pressing subjects in industrial systems, particularly for those installations actively using the public network in order to provide new features and services. In this paper, we present an innovative approach to the design of filtering systems based on the state analysis of the system being monitored. The aim is to detect attacks composed of a set of “SCADA” commands that, while licit when considered in isolation on a single-packet basis, can disrupt the correct behavior of the system when executed in particular operating states. The proposed firewall detects these complex attacks thanks to an internal representation of the controlled SCADA system. Furthermore, we detail the design of the architecture of the firewall for systems that use the ModBus and DNP3 protocols, and the implementation of a prototype, providing experimental comparative results that confirm the validity of the proposed approach.

The situation in Iraq, in the period between the end of the Coalition Provisional Authority's (CPA) occupation of Iraq and the constitution of the Interim Government presided over by Prime Minister Allawi in June 2004 and the general elections held at the end of January 2005, was subject to Security Council Resolution 1546 as well as, of course, to the applicable provisions of international law. Resolution 1546, inter alia, endorses the formation of the Interim Government, recognises the Interim Government as sovereign and authorises, on the basis of the invitation by the Interim Government the continued presence in Iraq of the Multinational Force, an approximately 140,000 troop American led-army, and regulates its relationships with the other actors in the Iraqi crisis such as the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). When the rather grim reality of the situation in Iraq as presented in the media is compared with the project and ambitions characterising Resolution 1546, questions arise. How did Resolution 1546 impact on the reality in Iraq? What is the exact legal status of the Multinational Force after Resolution 1546? What are the legal relationships between the Multinational Force and the other actors in the Iraqi crisis? The article questions, inter alia, the domestic legitimacy of the Interim Iraqi Government and the validity of the invitation it issued to the Multinational Force. It further argues that, if the invitation is not valid under general international law as being issued by a government that has been externally appointed, the Multinational Force should still be regarded as an occupation force.

This article is concerned with the remedy of ‘review’ provided for in the Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, in Articles 26 and 25 respectively, which allows a convicted individual or the prosecution to seek the reopening of a case on the basis of a new fact. The main purpose of this article is to provide a comprehensive overview of how this remedy has been applied by the chambers of the ICTY and the ICTR. It focuses first on the relevant provisions set out in the Statutes and in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the two tribunals, and then reviews a range of international and national provisions. The latter examination clarifies the concept of review adopted, and reveals the interplay between international and national provisions. It also shows that the remedy of review can be seen as one application of the general principle of law that a convicted individual must have the right to seek the reopening of his or her case on the basis of a new fact, which may show his or her innocence, even after a considerable lapse of time. This article then examines the decisions rendered so far by the ICTY and the ICTR. It considers the factual context of each case and discusses how the applicable law has been interpreted and refined by the judges of the ICTY and ICTR appeals chambers. In conclusion, some suggestions are advanced as to how the pertinent Rules of Procedure and Evidence could be made clearer and perhaps fairer, in the light of the experience gained from the practice of the two tribunals and the provisions of the Statute of the International Criminal Court.

An issue has recently arisen in international criminal law concerning the gravity of the offences listed in the Statutes of the International Tribunals: Should offences be ranked according to their seriousness and, hence, as entailing heavier or lighter punishment? Should the same act when charged as a crime against humanity or genocide be punished more severely than when charged as a war crime?

A relatively new trend in Critical Infrastructures (e.g., power plants, nuclear plants, energy grids, etc.) is the massive migration from the classic model of isolated systems, to a system-of-systems model, where these infrastructures are intensifying their interconnections through Information and Communications Technology (ICT) means. The ICT core of these industrial installations is known as Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition Systems (SCADA). Traditional ICT security countermeasures (e.g., classic firewalls, anti-viruses and IDSs) fail in providing a complete protection to these systems since their needs are different from those of traditional ICT. This paper presents an innovative approach to Intrusion Detection in SCADA systems based on the concept of Critical State Analysis and State Proximity. The theoretical framework is supported by tests conducted with an Intrusion Detection System prototype implementing the proposed detection approach.

The security of SCADA systems is one of the most pressing subjects in industrial systems, especially for those installation actively using the public network in order to provide new features and services. In this paper we present an innovative approach to the design of Filtering Systems based on the state analysis of the system being monitored. The aim is to detect attacks composed of a set of “SCADA” commands that, while licit when considered in isolation on a single-packet basis, can disrupt the correct behavior of the system when executed in particular operating states. The proposed firewall detects these complex attacks thanks to an internal representation of the controlled SCADA system. Furthermore, we detail the design of the architecture of the IDS for systems using the ModBus and DNP3 protocols, and the implementation of a prototype, providing experimental comparative results that confirm the validity of the proposed approach.

Industrial Systems are nowadays exposed to new kinds of malicious threats. The cause of this is related to the large number of new vulnerabilities and architectural weaknesses introduced by the extensive use of ICT and Networking Technologies for the operation and monitoring of such complex systems. Several scientific works, have showed how Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition Systems (SCADA), i.e. the systems which control industrial installations, are exposed to cyber attacks. These, due to the intrinsic nature of SCADA systems, cannot be avoided by using traditional ICT security measures. In this paper, we present a first prototype of survivable SCADA architecture, conceived in order to be resilient and robust to cyber SCADA attacks.