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Insight problems are likely to trigger an initial, incorrect mental representation, which needs to be restructured in order to find the solution. Despite the widespread theoretical assumption that this restructuring process happens suddenly, leading to the typical “Aha!” experience, the evidence is inconclusive. Among the reasons for this lack of clarity is that many measures of insight rely solely on the solvers’ subjective experience of the solution process. In our previous paper, we used matchstick arithmetic problems to demonstrate that it is possible to objectively trace problem-solving processes by combining eye movements with new analytical and statistical approaches. Specifically, we divided the problem-solving process into ten (relative) temporal phases to better capture possible small changes in problem representation. Here, we go a step further to demonstrate that classical statistical procedures, such as ANOVA, cannot capture sudden representational change processes, which are typical for insight problems. Only nonlinear statistical models, such as generalized additive (mixed) models (GAMs) and change points analysis, correctly identified the abrupt representational change. Additionally, we demonstrate that explicit hints reorient participants’ focus in a qualitatively different manner, changing the dynamics of restructuring in insight problem solving. While insight problems may indeed require a sudden restructuring of the initial mental representation, more sophisticated analytical and statistical approaches are necessary to uncover their true nature.

Sometimes, the solution to a difficult problem simply pops into mind. Such a moment of sudden comprehension is known as “insight”. This fundamental cognitive process is crucial for problem solving, creativity and innovation, yet its true nature remains elusive, despite one century of psychological research. Typically, insight is investigated by using spatial puzzles or verbal riddles. Broadening the traditional approach, we propose to tackle this question by presenting magic tricks to participants and asking them to find out the secret method used by the magician. Combining this approach with cueing in an fMRI experiment, we were able to break down the insight process into two underlying components: cognitive conflict and restructuring. During cognitive conflict, problem solvers identify incongruent information that does not match their current mental representation. In a second step this information is restructured, thereby allowing them to correctly determine how the magic trick was done. We manipulated the occurrence of cognitive conflict by presenting two types of cues that lead participants to either maintain their perceptual belief (congruent cue) or to change their perceptual belief (incongruent cue) for the mechanism behind the magic trick. We found that partially overlapping but distinct networks of brain activity were recruited for cognitive conflict and restructuring. Posterior, predominantly visual brain activity during cognitive conflict reflected processes related to prediction error, attention to the relevant cue-specific sensory domain, and the default brain state. Restructuring on the other hand, showed a highly distributed pattern of brain activity in regions of the default mode, executive control networks, and salience networks. The angular gyrus and middle temporal gyrus were active in both cognitive conflict and restructuring, suggesting that these regions are important throughout the insight problem solving process. We believe this type of approach towards understanding insight will give lead to a better understanding of this complex process and the specific role that different brain regions play in creative thought.

During creative problem solving, initial solution attempts often fail because of self-imposed constraints that prevent us from thinking out of the box. In order to solve a problem successfully, the problem representation has to be restructured by combining elements of available knowledge in novel and creative ways. It has been suggested that sleep supports the reorganization of memory representations, ultimately aiding problem solving. In this study, we systematically tested the effect of sleep and time on problem solving, using classical insight tasks and magic tricks. Solving these tasks explicitly requires a restructuring of the problem representation and may be accompanied by a subjective feeling of insight. In two sessions, 77 participants had to solve classical insight problems and magic tricks. The two sessions either occurred consecutively or were spaced 3 h apart, with the time in between spent either sleeping or awake. We found that sleep affected neither general solution rates nor the number of solutions accompanied by sudden subjective insight. Our study thus adds to accumulating evidence that sleep does not provide an environment that facilitates the qualitative restructuring of memory representations and enables problem solving.

Magic tricks violate the expected causal relationships that form an implicit belief system about what is possible in the world around us. Observing a magic effect seemingly invalidates our implicit assumptions about what action causes which outcome. We aimed at identifying the neural correlates of such expectation violations by contrasting 24 video clips of magic tricks with 24 control clips in which the expected action-outcome relationship is upheld. Using fMRI, we measured the brain activity of 25 normal volunteers while they watched the clips in the scanner. Additionally, we measured the professional magician who had performed the magic tricks under the assumption that, in contrast to naïve observers, the magician himself would not perceive his own magic tricks as an expectation violation. As the main effect of magic – control clips in the normal sample, we found higher activity for magic in the head of the caudate nucleus bilaterally, the left inferior frontal gyrus and the left anterior insula. As expected, the magician’s brain activity substantially differed from these results, with mainly parietal areas (supramarginal gyrus bilaterally) activated, supporting our hypothesis that he did not experience any expectation violation. These findings are in accordance with previous research that has implicated the head of the caudate nucleus in processing changes in the contingency between action and outcome, even in the absence of reward or feedback.

Magic tricks usually remain a mystery to the observer. For the sake of science, we offered participants the opportunity to discover the magician’s secret method by repeatedly presenting the same trick and asking them to find out how the trick worked. In the context of insightful problem solving, the present work investigated the emotions that participants experience upon solving a magic trick. We assumed that these emotions form the typical Aha! experience that accompanies insightful solutions to difficult problems. We aimed to show that Aha! experiences can be triggered by magic tricks and to systematically explore the phenomenology of the Aha! experience by breaking it down into five previously postulated dimensions. 34 video clips of different magic tricks were presented up to three times to 50 participants who had to find out how the trick was accomplished, and to indicate whether they had experienced an Aha! during the solving process. Participants then performed a comprehensive quantitative and qualitative assessment of their Aha! experiences which was repeated after 14 days to control for its reliability. 41% of all suggested solutions were accompanied by an Aha! experience. The quantitative assessment remained stable across time in all five dimensions. Happiness was rated as the most important dimension. This primacy of positive emotions was also reflected in participants’ qualitative self-reports which contained more emotional than cognitive aspects. Implementing magic tricks as problem solving task, we could show that strong Aha! experiences can be triggered if a trick is solved. We could at least partially capture the phenomenology of Aha! by identifying one prevailing aspect (positive emotions), a new aspect (release of tension upon gaining insight into a magic trick) and one less important aspect (impasse).

Insight problems are difficult because the initially activated knowledge hinders successful solving. The crucial information needed for a solution is often so far removed that gaining access to it through restructuring leads to the subjective experience of "Aha!". Although this assumption is shared by most insight theories, there is little empirical evidence for the connection between the necessity of restructuring an incorrect problem representation and the Aha! experience. Here, we demonstrate a rare case where previous knowledge facilitates the solving of insight problems but reduces the accompanying Aha! experience. Chess players were more successful than non-chess players at solving the mutilated checkerboard insight problem, which requires retrieval of chess-related information about the color of the squares. Their success came at a price, since they reported a diminished Aha! experience compared to controls. Chess players' problem-solving ability was confined to that particular problem, since they struggled to a similar degree to non-chess players to solve another insight problem (the eight-coin problem), which does not require chess-related information for a solution. Here, chess players and non-chess players experienced the same degree of insight.

The Aha! experience is not a unitary construct, and several different dimensions have been proposed as its con-stituents. However, a systematic analysis of how much each purported dimension predicts the overall Aha! experience isneeded. Presented with a large set of difficult problems (magic tricks), participants were asked to rate their solving experiencewith regard to suddenness in the emergence of the solution, certainty about the solution, surprise, pleasantness, relief, and drive.The strongest correlations with an overall Aha! rating on correct solutions were found for the dimensions of pleasantness, re-lief and certainty. Suddenness and drive were correlated to a lesser extent. No significant correlation was found for surprise.These results question the wisdom of the established approach of using a multi-component operational definition for the Aha!experience that encompasses suddenness, certainty and surprise. The positive affect that comes with discovery seems betterexpressed as pleasantness or relief than surprise.

Having a sudden insight is often associated with inherent confidence, enough for Archimedes to run naked through the streets shouting "Eureka!". Recent evidence demonstrates that public displays of enthusiasm, such as the ancient polymath's, are actually supported by a higher likelihood of being correct.

Navigating in a novel environment can serve as an appliedinsight problem solving task, since many people gain asudden, clear understanding (Aha-moment) of the spatialrelations after being lost. With a unique design, wetransformed the city center of a medieval German city into avirtual maze. The aim of the study was to test whether aspatial decision making task simulating real navigation wouldbe feasible for investigating insight problem solving.Participants learned two pathways which they subsequentlyhad to restructure to find their way to the navigation targets.We found evidence for the restructuring of participants’ priorknowledge during the solution attempts. 73% of all problemsolvers reported an Aha-moment and there was an error dropat the critical intersection by those who had insight. The slopeof the learning curve was established as a measurement ofinsightful experiences.

Insightful problem solving is a vital part of human thinking, yet very difficult to grasp. Traditionally, insight has been investigated by using a set of established "insight tasks," assuming that insight has taken place if these problems are solved. Instead of assuming that insight takes place during every solution of the 9 Dot, 8 Coin, and Matchstick Arithmetic Problems, this study explored the likelihood that solutions evoked the "Aha! experience," which is often regarded as the defining characteristic of insight. It was predicted that the rates of self-reported Aha! experiences might vary based on the necessary degree of constraint relaxation. The main assumption was that the likelihood of experiencing an Aha! would decrease with increasing numbers of constraints that must be relaxed, because several steps are needed to achieve a representational change and solve the problem, and thus, the main feature of suddenness of a solution might be lacking. The results supported this prediction, and demonstrated that in many cases participants do solve these classical insight problems without any Aha! experience. These results show the importance of obtaining insight ratings from participants to determine whether any given problem is solved with insight or not.

The 8-coin insight problem requires the problem solver to move 2 coins so that each coin touches exactly 3 others. Ormerod, MacGregor, and Chronicle (2002) explained differences in task performance across different versions of the 8-coin problem using the availability of particular moves in a 2-dimensional search space. We explored 2 further explanations by developing 6 new versions of the 8-coin problem in order to investigate the influence of grouping and self-imposed constraints on solutions. The results identified 2 sources of problem difficulty: first, the necessity to overcome the constraint that a solution can be found in 2-dimensional space and, second, the necessity to decompose perceptual groupings. A detailed move analysis suggested that the selection of moves was driven by the established representation rather than the application of the appropriate heuristics. Both results support the assumptions of representational change theory (Ohlsson, 1992).