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Increased population mobility has confronted the Western welfare states with various flows of immigrants varying from labour migrants to destitute refugees. A special category of migrants is formed by the immigrants from former colonies settling in their former mother countries. Welfare states have tried to keep control over immigration by implementing an increasingly refined set of laws regulating entry, residence and work of foreigners. The Netherlands have been no exception to this general trend. Moreover, immigration was a sensitive political issue in the Netherlands because the country was generally considered to be densely populated. In this context, the post-colonial migration from Suriname became an important theme in Dutch politics in the 1970s. The number of immigrants from Suriname was in fact small, but had increased from 13,000 in 1966 to 51,000 in 1972. The Surinamese immigration was a special case because the migration laws did not apply to Dutch citizens, and the Surinamese had been Dutch citizens since 1954. In 1973 Joop den Uyl, the leader of the Dutch labour party, became prime minister, and curbing the flow of Surinamese immigrants through independence was one of his top priorities. However, the results of his policy measures were contradictory. They caused a panic in Suriname and led to an unprecedented flow of immigrants. In 1975 the number of Surinamese in the Netherlands had already increased to 110,000. Den Uyl’s policy proved to be based on a total misunderstanding of the nature and dynamics of this migration flow.

When studying exit strategies and their (military) implications, historical parallels come to mind. Because they are full of analogies with present-day expeditionary missions, for the purpose of this book probably the most thought-provoking and informative exits are those related to the process of decolonisation. Then, as now, the fundamental question was how to manage the political and military disengagement, while safeguarding Western political and economic influence. The four cases discussed here (Indonesia 1945-1949; Malaya 1945-1960; New Guinea 1945-1962 and Vietnam 1969-1973) suggest that exits in order to retain infl uence are intricately paradoxical by nature. They can only be understood properly by acknowledging that such exits are shaped by the complex and often contradictory dynamics of the interaction of civilian and military actors of the sides involved and the domestic and international environments, rather than by a preconceived end-state. Adaptation and constant reconsideration are a prerequisite for success or avoiding failure.

De ‘Task Force Uruzgan’ (TFU) werd in 2006 uitgezonden uit politieke overwegingen, zonder dat daaraan een militaire strategie of een operatieplan ten grondslag lag. Daarom voorzag de TFU daar zelf in. Dat verlies aan vermogen tot strategievorming is historisch verklaarbaar en is een internationaal verschijnsel. Het is echter ongunstig geweest voor de effectiviteit van de operatie van de TFU. Nederland kan het vermogen tot strategievorming terugkrijgen door enkele eenvoudige maatregelen. Hierbij gaat het onder meer om de noodzaak een militaire strategie op te nemen in het Toetsingskader en de Artikel 100-brief; de oprichting van een Nationale Strategische Raad waar de politiek-militaire leiding de strategie kan ontwerpen; de zorg voor goede inlichtingen en het opleiden van strategen. Bij dat laatste is een rol weggelegd voor de master ‘Military Strategic Studies’ van de FMW.

Doing the wrong things for the right reason captures the intention of what the authors aim at. They point at the very awkward situation wherein soldiers on mission try to respect the indigenous population so much, that they almost neglect or look away from their own moral anchors. Respecting the other stems from lessons learned from operations and is implemented in mission-oriented training, but when soldiers respectfully look away from injustice, cultural competences result in moral disengagement. Chai boys or dancing boys may be a phenomenon in some mission areas, but to intervening soldiers they do pose a moral problem. Lessons in moral competences should bebalanced with ethics training in order not to end up in trained incapacity.

Analysis of the concept responsibility, which is at present not only voiced on an individual level, but also on an organisational level and on a political level. An action will be seen as responsible when the response that is given to call of the other, whether on an individual level, an organisational or a political level, can be considered adequate by the people involved in and effected by this action. This implies that the needs and interests that are at stake are taken into account and carefully weighed. Referring to Arendt's analysis of the concepts 'thinking', 'judging' and 'acting' and Levinas' analysis of the 'face-to-face relation with the other', the author discusses the preconditions for an action to be seen as responsible in this way

"The missions of armed forces are required to be effective. Thus missions are oriented to objectives that help prevent, contain or solve problems. A soldier, for example, who skillfully neutralizes his or her target is not effective when the problem is not prevented, contained or solved. Political, legal and moral awareness is important to the soldier, because doing things right is not the same as doing right or rightful things. The soldier wishes to avoid unlawful orders, but also tries to avoid casualties among non-combatants. Normally responsibility lies with higher authorities, but the fact remains that the soldier is the one who pulls the trigger. It is not simply a matter of veering between two evils, because a mission that is without moral grounds should not have been initiated in the first place and when pursued against better knowing it will probably lose effectiveness in the end. It is impossible to make compromises here. But it is also not possible to foresee all the consequences of military action, and unanticipated consequences can easily backfire. Dilemmas are bound to occur when the soldier is caught up in blurred conflict situations. This volume tries to add to our understanding of the problem of creating and maintaining a balance between effectiveness and moral responsibility."

In 1810 the French Conscription Law introduced in the Northern Netherlands. Increasing numbers of Dutch citizens were forced to leave their community and to serve under the French aigles. They thereby became part of a bigger whole, the nation and the state interest.

The 1922 Army Reform Bill reduced the Dutch army to a militia. During the period between the two World Wars Dutch army leadership sought to rebuild an army that in several repects (organization, armement, doctrine) could be compared to the armies of great powers like France and Germany. The army leadership pursued this course of action although budget constraints and political opposition stood in the way. This must be attributed to the military culture in army leadership circles in the period.

In juli 2007 kondigde de minister van Defensie aan dat hij, vanwege de kosten van de inzet in Uruzgan, wilde snijden in een aantal belangrijke wapensystemen. De helft van de opbrengst zou worden gebruikt om het exploitatietekort te verminderen. Bij gelijkblijvende ambities leiden dergelijke ingrepen tot een paradox. De vraag of Nederland of zijn krijgsmachtdelen een betaalbare kopie van grote mogendheden moet zijn, is echter niet nieuw. De auteur bespreekt de ontwikkeling van deze vraag sinds 1918. In zijn ogen gaat het over de vraag hoe ambities, middelen en de relatie tot een voorbeeld van een dergelijke mogendheid met elkaar in evenwicht kunnen worden gebracht.

In the literature regarding immigration and immigrants in the various West European states, the label post-colonial migration and/or post-colonial immigrants is regularly used. The use of such a general label suggests that there is a fundamental similarity between this kind of migrations setting it apart from other migrations as for instance from Turkey to Germany. As is often the case with such general labels, this is partly true and at the same time partly misleading. It is therefore worthwhile to take a closer look at the characteristics of migration from former colonies to present day welfare states.