Search

When the Eleventh hour rang on November 11th, 1918, the United States Expeditionary Force, now the United States Army was no longer a mere constabulary organization. In fact, it had grown from just over 200,000 total soldiers to a staggering 4.2-million-man army. However, the growth of the army was not easy, through political and organizational in-fighting the army grew painfully. The inability of the United States government, especially its commander-in-chief, to implement reform measures ensured, and ultimately sealed the fate of thousands of American dead Doughboys in France. Additionally, the Army War College, General Staff, and War Department deliberately curtailed the progression of the army by virtually dismissing foreign reports of the war and discounting them as facts. The overall consolidation of facts points to several lackluster and implausible steps both in the military and political departments of the United States as to why the army had such growing difficulties. There was no reason for the most booming economy in the world to have the 17th smallest army to back up a weak and impulsive foreign policy. Within this project I address the raising, fielding, and overall effectiveness of the American Expeditionary Force from conception to victory. The paper embraces a top-down view from the political and military, both encompassing its leaders, President Woodrow Wilson, and his staff, as well as General John Pershing with his General Staff. While these men are magnanimous in the world of historical fact, the Doughboy’s story is also told to get a better understanding of what these extraordinary men did for their country.

Following the Cold War, the Services sought to redefine themselves in the face of a future operating environment devoid of a singular threat. As this era unfolded the term expeditionary came to the forefront of each service culture and has increasingly dominated discussions over the past decade. The core competencies, capabilities, and conditions that should underpin expeditionary operations are not common across the services and are not codified by DoD policy, joint doctrine, or joint training standards. Today, the expeditionary moniker is used universally, albeit with varying definitions and associated training tasks, conditions, and standards developed by each service. The essential element of being joint is the ability to speak a common language and this is not the case with expeditionary operations. This creates interoperability and capability gaps that could be exploited and generates expectations and assumptions in the planning process that may not exist otherwise. This paper will demonstrate that only by establishing and implementing joint expeditionary doctrine and training standards will the joint force be effective in the current operating environment and meet the challenges of the future operating environment. Analyzing the American military expeditionary tradition shapes modern thoughts on the subject. Analyzing the way each service used the last decade to transform can help determine what the joint force needs to be successful in the future operating environment., The original document contains color images.

Following five unsuccessful German offenses in early 1918, the Germans found themselves in a solely defensive situation, conducting defensive battles, or Abwehrschlachten. This monograph analyzes German operational thinking and operational art in the defensive campaign that began after the Germans' last unsuccessful offensive in July 1918 and lasted until the armistice in November 1918. The paper relies on two approaches. First, it analyzes data from primary sources to identify changes in the strategic context from a German perspective using a model from Collin S. Gray. Second, it analyzes German military actions during the Abwehrschlachten using a framework of operational elements derived from a previous case study by David T. Zabecki on the German offensive operations. The analysis results in a confirmation of previous findings about the level of German operational thinking at that time. It also reveals the limitations the Germans faced in their attempts to apply their thinking through military action. Those limitations predominately emerged from significant changes in the operational environment in 1918. Current consensus, in line with Clausewitz's thoughts on the defense, is that the defense, which is tied to a negative aim, is a temporary form of warfare. Military leaders always strive to transit to the offensive form of warfighting, which is tied to a positive aim. The monograph recommends the development of a framework for operational art in the defense., The original document contains color images.

This paper examines the development of the American Army corps structure during World War I. The corps formation developed in World War I by General John J. Pershing was the culmination of 56 years of lessons learned from the Civil War through the beginning of World War I. The success of the American Expeditionary force (AEF) in World War I was, in large part, the result of the development and combat effectiveness of the corps formation. The corps formation allowed commanders flexibility, concentrated firepower, sustainability, and increased command and control. The American corps formation in World War I led the AEF to victory in the Saint Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne campaigns. The American corps formation provided resources and capabilities that helped provide the needed edge to defeat the Central Powers and help end World War I., The original document contains color images.

On the opening day of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive of World War I, the newly-created United States 79th Division was directed to advance 9 kilometers through German-controlled terrain. However, the advance through the first 4 kilometers, which included the German strong point of Montfaucon, took 2 days. The slowed advance of the 79th Division is credited with slowing the progress of the entire American Expeditionary Forces' First Army, thus allowing time for the Germans to react to the surprise American offensive. Thus, the central research question of this thesis is as follows: What were the factors that caused the delay of the 79th Division in their capture of Montfaucon? Little research has been completed on this subject, and most historians pinpoint the sole cause as inexperience on the part of the 79th Division. Therefore, an analysis will be conducted which takes into account the training received by the 79th Division in the United States, the training received by the division in France, and other factors that influenced the outcome of the battle.

Recent historiography has almost universally denounced the tactical prowess of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF). However, a detailed analysis of the performance of the 42nd Division's 165th Infantry Regiment tells a surprisingly different story. Despite the challenges of the WWI battlefield, the 165th Infantry Regiment compiled a remarkable record of tactical effectiveness in its 180 days of combat. During its six campaigns, the regiment repeatedly held the line and seized objectives against veteran German units in a variety of situations and under various conditions. At the regimental level, a de facto adoption of trench warfare doctrine enabled the unit to synchronize the combined arms and avoid the doctrinal dysfunction that plagued the majority of the AEF. At the tactical level, the Irish platoons and companies rapidly became adept at using Indian-style or infiltration tactics to advance, seize terrain, and destroy German positions. In addition, superb leadership throughout the regiment and stellar unit cohesion played significant roles in the unit's superior tactical proficiency. In sum, these four factors enabled the 165th to achieve a level of tactical effectiveness second to none among the non-regular regiments of the AEF and equal to the best units within the German Army. A bibliography of 38 books, 11 journal articles, 18 government documents, and 9 other sources is included. Appendixes provide a table showing the organization of the 42nd Division, a chronology and casualties of the campaigns, and maps of the following 1918 campaigns: the Irish defensive sector at Luneville, France, 21 Feb-21 Mar; the 165th's defensive sector at Ancerville, France, 31 Mar-21 Jun; the Irish defensive sector at St. Hilaire, France, 15-20 Jul; the 165th's attack across the Ourcq River, near Seringes-et-Nesles, France, 25 Jul-6 Aug; the 165th's axis of advance during the St. Mihiel offensive, 12-16 Sep; and the Irish sector at St. Georges, France, 12-19 Oct. (4 figur7

Geroge Loukides WWI unit photograph. Loukides was with the American Expeditionary Forces, assigned to the 326th Battalion of the 82nd Division. In his diary, he writes about the fierce fighting, of crossing a river while “German machine guns mow down our ranks,” of shrapnel “whistling over us like rain,” and how “the river was dyed with the blood of my company and Company G.

Inscriptions au crayon feutre dans le bas de l'affiche

L'A.E.F. siginifie American Expeditionary Force

The First Army, AEF captured the St. Mihiel Salient in the early part of September and then had been moved west to attack the strategic objective of the German railroad communications through Mezieres and Sedan. The initial attack of the First Army, 26 September, was stopped on 28 September, after it had penetrated the enemy position to a depth of from three to seven miles between the Meuse River on the east and the Argonne Forest on the west. From 28 September until 4 October, the First Army reorgazined for further attacks. Maps are unavailable online due to fragility of paper.

On the opening day of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive of World War I, the newly-created United States 79th Division was templated to advance nine kilometers through German-controlled terrain. However, the advance through the first four kilometers, which included the German strong point of Montfaucon, took two days. The slowed advance of the 79th Division is credited with slowing the progress of the entire American Expeditionary Forces' First Army, thus allowing time for Germans to react to the surprise American offensive. Thus, the central research question is: What were the factors that caused the delay of the 79th Division in their capture of Montfaucon? Little research has been completed on this subject, and most historians pinpoint the sole cause as inexperience on the part of the 79th Division. Therefore, an analysis will be conducted which takes into account the training received by the 79th Division in the United States, the training received in France, and other factors that influenced the outcome of the battle.

This paper examines the development of the American Army corps structure during World War I. The corps formation developed in World War I by General John J. Pershing was the culmination of 56 years of lessons learned from the Civil War through the beginning of World War I. The success of the American Expeditionary force (AEF) in World War I was, in large part, the result of the development and combat effectiveness of the corps formation. The corps formation allowed commanders flexibility, concentrated firepower, sustainability, and increased command and control. The American corps formation in World War I led the AEF to victory in the Saint Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne campaigns. The American corps formation provided resources and capabilities that helped provide the needed edge to defeat the Central Powers and help end World War I.

How did munitions supply and distribution affect the execution of operational art by the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) during World War I? The AEF had many logistical challenges during World War I. The majority of academic research focused on the lack of preparedness on a national level and the subsequent logistical issues caused by the difficulties in the mobilization of the industrial base. This study focuses on how the operational planners and leaders dealt with the supply of munitions and how that supply affected the operational art demonstrated by the AEF. The campaigns at St. Mihiel and Meuse Argonne are examples of operational art by the AEF. The significant amount of munitions needed for these operations required operational art to integrate the operational plan. Both of these operations deal with the difficult task of getting munitions from the theater supply system to the point of tactical employment. This task is critical to operational art in the areas of culmination, operational reach, phasing and tempo.

This study assesses the ability of the United States Army's Signal Corps to respond organizationally technologically, and doctrinally to the changing tactical communication requirements dictated by the character of warfare existing in Europe both at America's entrance into declared war, and its subsequent campaign participations. The study focuses initially on an overview of the Signal Corps from the years of its birth to America's entrance into World War I. Further investigative material is presented to establish the position that the American prewar attitude of non-involvement contributed to a position of general military unpreparedness, to include major impacts on the Signal Corps and its ability to respond to critical communication needs. Examination of the Signal Corps during mobilization highlights the difficulties of creating, and then sustaining a technical force. The acquisition and training of personnel is the remarkable story of the struggle to meet the manpower requirements of the American Expeditionary Forces in France. A critical analysis of the employment of tactical communications in the Second Battle of the Marne and the Meuse-Argonne Offensive then provides the primary research focus for determining the communications equipment and personnel available to an infantry division in the American Expeditionary Forces; and to trace the changes in general doctrine, tactics and equipment as a result of its battle experience. Research reveals that the Signal Corps responded adequately to the requirements of providing a force capable of exercising the Army’s signaling arm. However, being tested under the strain of combat extended the support capabilities of the tactical signal organizations to their breaking point. The ingenuity of the signal soldier ensured reliable, flexible and timely communications support, but at a great cost of manpower and material.

Recent historiography has almost universally denounced the tactical prowess of the American Expeditionary Force. However, a detailed analysis of the performance of the 42nd Division’s 165th Infantry Regiment tells a surprisingly different story. Despite the challenges of the First World War battlefield, the 165th Infantry Regiment compiled a remarkable record of tactical effectiveness in its 180 days of combat. During its six campaigns, the regiment repeatedly held the line and seized objectives against veteran German units in a variety of situations and under various conditions. At the regimental level, a de facto adoption of trench warfare doctrine enabled the unit to synchronize the combined arms and avoid the doctrinal dysfunction the plagued the majority of the AEF. At the tactical level, the Irish platoons and companies rapidly became adept at using Indian-style or infiltration tactics to advance, seize terrain, and destroy German positions. In addition, superb leadership throughout the regiment and stellar unit cohesion played significant roles in the unit’s superior tactical proficiency. In sum, these four factors enabled the 165th to achieve a level of tactical effectiveness second to none among the non-regular regiments of the AEF and equal to the best units within the German Army.

Reports presented to and approved by General Pershing, with supplementary reports showing progress of the work.

A description of the U.S. Army divisions that participated in World War I including information on where the division was originated, the brigades and battalions contained in the division, a short history of the combat overseas, and a chronology of combat service.

This paper examines records, reports, policies and plans, and personal opinion on the development of replacement of personnel, as experienced during and post-war.