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The America First agenda in the United States poses a major threat to Canada America First is marked by an enthusiasm for protectionism; a retreat from global engagement that echoes the isolationism of the 1930s; a rejection of global governance; an indifference towards a global leadership role for the United States; an embrace of illiberal and authoritarian leaders and a concomitant disdain for America's traditional friends and allies in the West. The America First policy agenda enjoys the support of tens of millions of Americans. If the Democratic Party loses control of the White House and one or both houses of Congress, the consequences for the interests of Canadians will be profoundly negative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the ideational dimension and political performance of American grand strategy since '9/11' and explores to what extent the strategic assumptions, ideological dispositions, and security practices of the Bush Doctrine have endured since the 2001 terrorist attacks. It advances a constructivist understanding of American grand strategy as a nexus of national identity discourses and security practices. The article will first explore the significance of American exceptionalism in the ideational dimension of the Bush Doctrine and its practical impact in the pursuit of US national security. The article will then focus on the Obama Doctrine, arguing that its embrace of cooperative engagement and multilateralism represented a limited strategic course correction within the paradigm of liberal hegemony. Finally, the article will contrast grand strategy discourses under Bush and Donald Trump, exploring their shared foundations in Jacksonian nationalism and unilateralism that demonstrate the continued relevance of Bush's strategic vision of US primacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The election of President Donald J. Trump in 2016 introduced a new foreign policy, one that holds certain aspects of traditional schools of thought in international relations but is unique in that it does not prescribe to any one theory or academic framework. It does, however, contain foundational pillars that are essential to understand the cause and effect of President Trump's foreign policy. Through careful review of President Trump's prepared foreign policy speeches and interviews with Trump administration officials, this article argues that a return to nation-state sovereignty and burden sharing are the most important pillars of President Trump's foreign policy, known as America First or "Trumpism". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay contributes to a materialist theory of media populism by criticizing America First, an influential U.S. American reactionary live-stream hosted by Nicholas J. Fuentes, and its Groyper fans. Fuentes has expanded his online presence despite the deplatforming, or administrative suspension, of his social media accounts on account of his antisemitic, antiblack, and sexist hate speech. To understand the ideological ramifications of deplatforming populist influencers, I read clips from America First into the economic and infrastructural context of U.S. far-right subcultures. I argue that media studies must attend to bourgeois digital platform management as a technology which reproduces the undemocratic conditions of racial capitalism. The deplatforming of Fuentes facilitates the ascent of reactionary populism by reinforcing possessive individualism, or a white masculine fantasy of unmediated access to the public. "The people" of populism functions as media whose lost presence naturalizes sovereign violence against marginalized people. Media populism illustrates the need for to move beyond the dichotomy of "mainstream" versus "fringe" platforms to consider the material affinity of bourgeois digital publics and white nationalist provocation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With its emphasis on anti-immigration rhetoric and actions, protectionism, as well as populism, Donald Trump has transformed the Republican Party into a party that closely resembles populist radical right-wing parties in Europe. In this article, we first illustrate how the Republican Party has transformed into a radical right-wing party. Second, we examine the degree to which the Trump voter has the same or similar characteristics as the prototypical radical right-wing voter. To do so, we compare some key features of voters for the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Trump voters. Through original survey research, we find that the two voter types are alike. Both AfD and Trump voters espouse anti-immigrant sentiment, reject globalization, and position themselves on the right on a left-right ideological scale. This implies that, both from a supply and demand side perspective, the Trump Republican Party has become a prototypical radical right-wing party. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article considers the political implications of temporal orientations, building on Reinhart Koselleck's conceptual histories of "progress" and "utopia". A computational analysis of survey data from the 2016 US election provides a snapshot of the breakdown of the American Dream for some respondents, and its continued relevance for others. Rather than progress from past to future, data shows negative perceptions of the past or present associated with negative expectations for the future, a link especially pronounced among white respondents and those who subscribe to "America first" beliefs. At the same time, to the extent that racial privilege is inversely related to expectations of future progress, the findings suggest that utopian narratives of progress can help smooth over injustice or inequality with view to a better future. Expectations of progress are thus tightly woven into perceptions of injustice or marginalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

India–US relations have witnessed diverse trends ranging from estrangement to engagement followed by strategic partnership. They have signed various agreements, such as DPA, CND, LEMOA, COMCASA and BECA, to institutionalize their strategic partnership. However, real-time challenges have continuously shaped the trajectory of strategic alignment as their national interests occasionally converged and often diverged. Their notions of world order sharply contrast. New Delhi stands for a multi-polar world order, whereas Washington advocates uni-polar world order. The US–Pakistan alliance partnership has further proved an impediment to the Indo–US strategic partnership. Hence, much claimed natural partnership has not been able to make much headway as their national interests diverge on core issues such as trade, immigration, joint and co-production, and world order. The mainstream literature advocates that these are the teething problems of evolving strategic partnerships, but the in-depth analysis indicates that issues confronting their relationship are structural and deep-rooted. Realism, neorealism and social constructivism prove appropriate tools to grasp the dynamic of Indo–US natural and strategic partnerships by locating them in the global, Asian and regional power structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

President Donald Trump's admiration of President Andrew Jackson evokes a discussion of parallels between their ideologies, including a reluctance to repudiate white supremacy and a disregard for the rule of law. These attitudes are reflected both in Jackson's authorship of the Indian Removal Act (1830) and his refusal to acknowledge a judgment by the US Supreme Court in favor of the Cherokee Nation that might have averted the Trail of Tears. Jackson's advocacy of American exceptionalism (“America first” to Trump) also provokes an analysis of what later was cast in popular discourse as Manifest Destiny. United States history--its “race law” in particular--is described here through the admiring eyes of Adolph Hitler, who likened Germany's expansion before and during World War II to United States “westward movement” during the nineteenth century.

The discursive domain of (in)security is integral to nationalist populism, as documented in the political rhetoric of Donald Trump. This article combines insights from political psychology on blame attribution with scholarship in International Relations on security narratives to show how the reframing of national identity through a populist security imaginary elevated internal 'enemies of the people' to an ontological status of equal, or even superior standing to that of external threats to national security. Portraying internal and external Others as equally existential threats endangering the 'real' United States informed both foreign policy choices and mobilised voters through an affective persuasion of audiences, actively dividing society for political gain. Populist appeals to resentment, fear, and anxiety constituted a shared affective space between Trump and his followers that provided a source of mutual ontological reassurance and the legitimation of America First measures from immigration restrictions to trade protectionism and a Jacksonian foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The article reviews through chronological analysis key issues in US-Canadian relations in the context of new trade agreement USMCA replacing NAFTA during Trump's presidency. It identifies a new model of relations between the closest North American partners in the context of a new paradigm which is called “America First”. This model leads to a crisis the US-Canadian relations, which is aggravated by the increased partisan rivalry in light of the upcoming US presidential elections, the impeachment process initiated in the House of Representatives.The article comes to the following conclusions. The evolutionary development of the free trade agreement (NAFTA), its rejection and acceptance of the USMCA preferential agreement is a gradual and consistent process of protecting North American countries from global market, which started during the presidency of George W. Bush and continued by the subsequent American presidents. This is also connected with the trade war between the United States and China, that was repeatedly emphasized both in the US Administration and in the Congress during D. Trump's presidency. The United States-Canadian relations have worsened significantly, although the countries' leaders do not recognize it publicly during the agreement's preparation and its ratification, for almost three years. The USMCA agreement is not a final version, subject to further ratification. It took more than a year for the parties to find compromise solutions on the USMCA with the protocols' preparation to the agreement and its submission to the national parliaments. Moreover, in the agreed version, the USMCA agreement meets primarily the interests of the United States. The US pressure on Canada was unprecedented. As a result, we should expect the continued growth of political and trade contradictions between the United States and Canada, as well as the revision and addition of new additional agreements in the USMCA agreement.

Did "America First" construct America irrelevant? Answering this question has been the subject of much debate in the popular press, the policy community, and scholarly circles. That asked, it is worth remembering that scholars and policymakers have long argued that one of the most enduring and important aspects of the US role in the world is American structural power. Perhaps nowhere has the Trump administration's approach to world affairs been more notable in perhaps diminishing US structural power than in withdrawing from multilateral forums. On an individual level of analysis, however, Trump's ever-changing, whiplash style of leadership made allies and adversaries less certain about American actions, intentions, and the direction of future policy trajectories. These issues point to the possibility that such impacts were more about Trump being Trump and less about a decline in American structural power. Only time will tell whether President Biden is able to rebuild from that structural wreckage. With these ideas in mind, the forum editors asked scholars representing diverse voices and perspectives to provide varying analyses of America First, specifically in light of the emergence of multiple global challenges from the COVID-19 pandemic to racial reckoning through the climate crisis and more. As you will see, each author brings a decidedly different lens to the questions we pose below and also generates divergent analyses of the present and the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What are the coping strategies of small states at a time when their great power ally questions its security guarantees? Faced with such a scenario, one strand of the literature proposes that small states will seek to establish a reputation of a "good ally" in the eyes of their security patron, thus reducing the likelihood of abandonment. Others, however, maintain that in times of heightened geopolitical uncertainty, small states will attempt to "hedge their bets" by reducing their reliance upon a capricious great power and pursue strategic realignment. The article tests these theoretical assumptions against NATO's easternmost members: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and their navigation of the "America First" world. The analysis lends evidence that the Baltics have not sought a strategic reorientation away from Washington. Instead, to guard against the possibility of their patron's defection, they have strived to gain a loyal and trustworthy partner's reputation by increasing their defence spending and joining the US on a foreign battlefield. The study concludes that these efforts have been primarily geared towards an audience of one: a NATO-sceptic US President. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to highlight the main legacies of Donald Trump's four-year tenure in the White House. Firstly, political polarization appears to have reached unprecedented levels in America. From this point of view, last November's elections were largely a referendum on the incumbent president. Secondly, the digital revolution has disrupted the information ecosystem, contributing to the spread of conspiracy theories in public discourse. Thirdly, this context has favoured the emergence of the unchecked power of digital companies, such as Twitter and Facebook. Both Trump's unscrupulous use of social media, and the subsequent closure of his accounts have highlighted Silicon Valley's control over political communication. Finally, the essay intends to show the legacy of «America First»: the issues signalled by populist nationalism did not disappear with Trump's electoral defeat, and are destined to condition the international policies of the Biden administration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Desde el triunfo de Fidel Castro en Cuba en 1959, las relaciones de Estados Unios con la isla caribeña fueron caracterizadas durante más de medio siglo por una alta hostilidad y conflictividad. Eso cambió durante el segundo mandato de Barak Obama con una serie de medidas que parecieron señalar el despegue de una nueva época de cooperación entre ambos países. Esa estrategia de descongelamiento de las relaciones bilaterales terminó, sin embargo, con la victoria electoral de Donald Trump y su estrategia favorita América first, que instrumentalizó de manera extrema la política externa para fines de la política interna. Para satisfacer a sus adherentes, entre ellos los cubanoamericanos en el Estado de Florida, Trump revertió paso por paso una gran parte de la política de apertura de su antecesor con efectos económicos negativos tanto para los cubanos como, aunque menos, para empresas y ciudadanos estadounidenses y empeoró sustancialmente la imagen de Estados Unidos y de su gobierno tanto en la región como en Europa. Un cambio generacional en la comunidad cubana en Miami, protestas de la Unión Europea y de ciertos sectores económicos en Estados Unidos despiertan por otra parte dudas si la política rígida de sanciones de la administración Trump sobreviva realmente a las próximas elecciones en Estados Unidos en 2020. Como conceptos analíticos nos sirven el neorealismo, el socialconstructivismo y el concepto intermestic polictics.

Si los neoconservadores se significaron por su obstinada y radical oposición a la política exterior de Barack Obama, su crítica al desempeño presidencial de Donald Trump no puede decirse que sea de menor entidad. Los neoconservadores consideran que la irrupción política del magnate supone una amenaza para la democracia americana, implicando, asimismo, una deriva de importante calado en el seno del Partido Republicano. A partir de un análisis comparativo entre las ideas fundamentales del ‘trumpismo’ y del neoconservadurismo, este artículo se centrará en estudiar cómo, según la visión neoconservadora, la ‘America First’ foreign policy, al claudicar de las responsabilidades globales de los Estados Unidos, pone en peligro el orden mundial liberal y, en última instancia, la seguridad americana y la seguridad internacional. Finalmente, se prestará atención a la existencia de ciertas coincidencias entre Trump y los neoconservadores y se valorará la posibilidad de una relativa influencia neoconservadora en determinados ámbitos de la política exterior de los Estados Unidos.

Beyond the rhetoric and the very deep contradictions that seem to characterize the Trump administration, events seem to suggest that US continental politics will be characterized by the attempt to abandon or, at least, supersede some of the pillars of US foreign policy in Latin America since the post-Cold War. Security threats remain essentially the same, as is the tendency to establish privileged relationships with key partners in the region. What seems to have changed is trust in multilateral institutions and agreements, in the promotion of democracy, and, more generally, in that combination of hard and soft power which, since the end of the 1980s, was considered by US policy makers as the main way to preserve the ‘liberal hegemony’. These things have been abandoned in favor not of a withdrawal from the continental scenario, but of a definitively unilateral and aggressive approach. It is difficult to predict what the effects of all this will be on the Latin American countries. The Trump administration’s choices could even open paths unthinkable until now.

Copyright of Canadian Foreign Policy Journal (CFPJ) is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Canadian Foreign Policy Journal (CFPJ) is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Digital economic and overall social transformation does not shape the future in an economicsociological/socio-economic direction and with content that contributes as an important factor for raising the level of social integration and cohesion that is social capital. In reality, the economic-sociological/socio-economic problem of the 'old' working class, a working class that is not optimally involved in the structures of digital technology, economy and society, is imposed as a key problem. The most provocative expression of the significance of this class, in particular the American white working class, that 'old' white working class, is its impact on the outcome of the presidential election in the US in November 2016. The decisive factor for Trump's victory was the acquisition of an economically-sociologically/socially-economically disadvantaged or even depressed American white working class concentrated in several major states in the US West and the Midwest, which carry a large number of electors in the electoral college. Therefore, the primary goal of potential democratic presidential candidates is to take, that is, to restore this American white working class as its electorate. this end, ideological and political variants of the concepts of democratic socialism (exclusively Bernie Sanders) and democratic capitalism (practically all other Democratic presidential candidates) are being created. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Strategic Universe Journal / Univers Strategic is the property of Dimitrie Cantemir Christian University, Institute for Security Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This study intends to analyse the rise of Donald Trump to the presidency of the U.S. as a symptom of the economic aftershocks to the 2008 financial crisis at the global and domestic levels. In response to the financial crisis and structural shifts in the global economy, Trump is pursuing protectionist measures which are being legitimized domestically by applying exclusionary policies based on a logic of "us vs. them." By focusing on Trump's public speeches, U.S. National Security Strategy and budgetary documents, this study will explore how Trump's intention of "America First" resonates in the political economy and foreign policy plans of the U.S. It claims that the Trump administration, which faces a legitimacy crisis at home and abroad, will continue to be deeply affected by its policy decisions considering, first, protectionism versus openness in foreign affairs and second, equality versus efficiency in domestic politics. The Trump administration may also hasten the demise of the global system by its isolationist policies which encourage polarization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the end of World War II, the United States has played a leading role in shaping the global economic system. While US influence has waned with the reconstruction of Europe and the rise of China, it has remained the leading power in the international system. The election of Donald Trump, however, represents a significant shift in US trade policy. In its first days the Trump administration withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and has since taken specific steps to renegotiate trade agreements and protect US industries. Politicizing the importance to reduce bilateral US trade deficits and to bring manufacturing jobs back home, the Trump administration has also utilized trade remedies in addition to the seldom-used safeguards to advance its "America First" economic agenda. Although trade remedy actions--the imposition of antidumping and countervailing duty based on the US Trade Act of 1974--have been critical instruments for US trade, prioritizing trade deficit reduction in US trade policy has the potential to erode the underlying international system and exacerbate rather than resolve the tensions that have spurred nationalistic economic movements. Against this backdrop, in this article we explore the implications of an abrogation of US global economic leadership for the international trading system and US influence more broadly. We also consider the implications for East Asia and the global economy as a whole as China, the European Union, and Japan take on larger leadership roles within the global trading system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With Donald Trump as President of United States, multilateralism in the world economy is facing an unprecedented challenge. The international economic institutions that have evolved since the fifties are increasingly under the risk of being undermined. With the growing assertion of the emerging and developing economies in the international fora, United States is increasingly sceptical of its ability to maneuvre such institutions to suit its own purpose. This is particularly true with respect to WTO, based on “one country one vote” system. The tariff rate hikes initiated by the leader country in the recent past pose a serious challenge to the multilateral trading system. The paper tries to undertake a critical overview of the US pre-occupation of targeting economies on the basis of the bilateral merchandise trade surpluses of countries, through the trade legislations like Omnibus Act and Trade Facilitation Act. These legislations not only ignore the growing share of the United States in the growing invisibles trade in the world economy, but also read too much into the bilateral trade surpluses of economies with United States and the intervention done by them in the foreign exchange market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a relatively short period of time, the Trump administration has been fairly active in the field of space. The reconstitution of the National Space Council, under the direction of Vice President Pence, the President's signing of Space Policy Directive 1, that calls for the return of humans to the Moon, and the announcement of a National Space Strategy that calls for an 'America first' approach in space, have been the highlights of this process. A key component of the administration's approach has been the promotion of commercial (private) space activities through an effort of regulatory reform intended to facilitate free enterprise and individual initiative in space. Overall, it is evident that the Trump administration views a consolidated US leadership in space as instrumental to 'Make America Great Again'. However, due to the lack of cohesion in the management of the US space program, the controversial interpretation of international principles and the US-centred view of space endorsed by the administration, doubts remain as to whether the space policy of the Trump administration will foster US leadership in space or lead to its progressive isolation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]