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The International Health Regulations Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (IHRMEF) includes four components regularly conducted by States Parties to measure the current status of International Health Regulations (IHR) 2005 core capacities and provide recommendations for strengthening these capacities. However, the four components are conducted independently of one another and have no systematic referral to each other before, during or after each process, despite being largely conducted by the same team, country and support organisations. This analysis sets out to identify ways in which IHRMEF components could work more synergistically to effectively measure the status of IHR core capacities, taking into account the country’s priority risks. We developed a methodology to allow these independent components to communicate with each other, including expert consultation, a qualitative crosswalk analysis and a country-level quantitative analysis. The demonstrated results act as a proof of concept and illustrate a methodology to provide benefits across all four components before, during and after implementation.

Abstract Background All countries are required to implement International Health Regulations (IHR) through development and implementation of multi-year National Action Plans for Health Security (NAPHS). IHR implementation requires annual operational planning which involves several tools such as NAPHS, State Party Annual Report (SPAR), Joint External Evaluation (JEE) and WHO IHR Benchmarks tool. Sierra Leone has successfully improved IHR capacities across the years through successful annual operational planning using the above tools. We conducted a study to document and share the country’s unique approach to implementation of NAPHS. Methods This was an observational study where the process of implementing and monitoring NAPHS in Sierra Leone was observed at the national level from 2018 to 2021. Data was obtained through review and analysis of NAPHS annual operational plans, quarterly review reports and annual IHR assessment reports. Available data was supplemented by information from key informants. Qualitative data was captured as notes and analysed for various themes while quantitative data was analyzed mainly for means and proportions. Results The overall national IHR Joint External Evaluation self-assessment score for human health improved from 44% in 2018 to 51% in 2019 and 57% in 2020. The score for the animal sector improved from 32% in 2018 to 43% in 2019 and 52% in 2020. A new JEE tool with new indicators was used in 2021 and the score for both human and animal sectors declined slightly to 51%. Key enablers of success included strong political commitment, whole-of-government approach, annual assessments using JEE tool, annual operational planning using WHO IHR Benchmarks tool and real time online monitoring of progress. Key challenges included disruption created by COVID-19 response, poor health infrastructure, low funding and inadequate health workforce. Conclusion IHR annual operational planning and implementation using evidence-based data and tools can facilitate strengthening of IHR capacity and should be encouraged.

Following the West Africa Ebola virus disease outbreak (2013–2016), the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) is one of the three voluntary components recommended by the WHO for evaluating the International Health Regulations (2005) capacities in countries. Here, we share experience implementing JEEs in all 47 countries in the WHO African region. In February 2016, the United Republic of Tanzania (Mainland) was the first country globally to conduct a JEE. By April 2022, JEEs had been conducted in all 47 countries plus in the island of Zanzibar. A total of 360 subject matter experts (SMEs) from 88 organisations were deployed 607 times. Despite availability of guidelines, the process had to be contextualised while avoiding jeopardising the quality and integrity of the findings. Key challenges were: inadequate understanding of the process by in-country counterparts; competing country priorities; limited time for validating subnational capacities; insufficient availability of SMEs for biosafety and biosecurity, antimicrobial resistance, points of entry, chemical events and radio-nuclear emergencies; and inadequate financing to fill gaps identified. Key points learnt were: importance of country leadership and ownership; conducting orientation workshops before the self-assessment; availability of an external JEE expert to support the self-assessment; the skills, attitudes and leadership competencies of the team lead; identifying national experts as SMEs for future JEEs to promote capacity building and experience sharing; the centrality of involving One Health stakeholders from the beginning to the end of the process; and the need for dedicated staff for planning, coordination, implementation and timely report writing. Moving forward, it is essential to draw from this learning to plan future JEEs. Finally, predictable financing is needed immediately to fill gaps identified.

Abstract Background Supervision of healthcare workers improves performance if done in a supportive and objective manner. Regular supervision is a support function of Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) strategy and allows systematic monitoring of IDSR implementation. Starting 2015, WHO and other development partners supported the Ministry of Health and Sanitation (MoHS) to revitalize IDSR in Sierra Leone and to monitor progress through supportive supervision assessments. We report on the findings of these assessments. Methods This was a cross-sectional study where six longitudinal assessments were conducted in randomly selected health facilities. Health facilities assessed were 71 in February 2016, 99 in July 2016, 101 in May 2017, 126 in August 2018, 139 in February 2019 and 156 in August 2021. An electronic checklist based on selected core functions of IDSR was developed and uploaded onto tablets using the Open Data Kit (ODK) platform. Supervision teams interviewed health care workers, reviewed documents and made observations in health facilities. Supervision books were used to record feedback and corrective actions. Data from the supervisory visits was downloaded from ODK platform, cleaned and analysed. Categorical data was summarized using frequencies and proportions while means and medians were used for continuous variables. Z test was used to test for differences in proportions. Results Completeness of IDSR reporting improved from 84.5% in 2016 to 96% in 2021 (11.5% points; 95% CI 3.6, 21.9; P-value 0.003). Timeliness of IDSR reports improved from 80.3 to 92% (11.7% points; 95% CI 2.4, 22.9; P-value 0.01). There was significant improvement in health worker knowledge of IDSR concepts and tools, in availability of IDSR standard case definition posters and reporting tools and in data analysis practices. Availability of vaccines and temperature monitoring tools in health facilities also improved significantly but some indicators dropped such as availability of IDSR technical guidelines and malaria testing kits and drugs. Conclusion Supervision using electronic tool contributed to health systems strengthening through longitudinal tracking of core IDSR indicators and other program indicators such as essential malaria commodities and availability and status of routine vaccines. Supervision using electronic tools should be extended to other programs.

ABSTRACT: Introduction: On November 20, 2019, the Sierra Leone International Health Regulations (IHR) National Focal Point was notified of an exported case of Lassa fever in The Netherlands, by a Dutch doctor who previously practiced in a rural hospital in Sierra Leone. This report describes the extent of the outbreak, possible sources of infection, and the outbreak response measures taken. Methods: Response measures implemented to control the outbreak included coordination across multiple countries and cities, outbreak investigation, active case finding, contact tracing and monitoring, laboratory investigation, and isolation and treatment of cases. Results: We report a hospital-associated outbreak that resulted in 3 confirmed cases (health workers) and 2 probable cases (patients). The case fatality rate was 60%, whereas the secondary attack rate was 14%. Two cases involved exportations to The Netherlands. Failure to detect the index case and poor adherence to infection prevention and control (IPC) protocols contributed to disease spread. Pregnancy status and nonspecific signs and symptoms of the index case contributed to failure in early case detection. Conclusions: Rapid activation of national and subnational incident management systems resulted in rapid outbreak control. We recommend regular training for clinicians on surveillance and IPC protocols and strengthening in-country Lassa virus diagnostic capacity.

The 10th and largest Ebola virus disease epidemic in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was declared in North Kivu Province in August 2018 and ended in June 2020. We describe and evaluate an Early Warning, Alert and Response System (EWARS) implemented in the Beni health zone of DRC during August 5, 2018–June 30, 2020. During this period, 194,768 alerts were received, of which 30,728 (15.8%) were validated as suspected cases. From these, 801 confirmed and 3 probable cases were detected. EWARS showed an overall good performance: sensitivity and specificity >80%, nearly all (97%) of alerts investigated within 2 hours of notification, and good demographic representativeness. The average cost of the system was US $438/case detected and US $1.8/alert received. The system was stable, despite occasional disruptions caused by political insecurity. Our results demonstrate that EWARS was a cost-effective component of the Ebola surveillance strategy in this setting.

Background In November 2019, an outbreak of Lassa Fever occurred among health workers in a non-endemic district in Sierra Leone. The outbreak resulted in five cases, including two that were exported to the Netherlands. The outbreak tested multiple technical capacities in the International Health Regulations (2005) in a real-life setting. As such, an after action review (AAR) was undertaken as recommended by World Health Organization. We report on the findings of the AAR including best practices and lessons learnt. Methods A two stage review process was employed. The first stage involved national pillar level reviews for each technical pillar and one review of the district level response. The second stage brought together all pillars, including participants from the national and sub-national level as well as health sector partners. National guidelines were used as references during the deliberations. A standardized template was used to report on the key findings on what happened, what was supposed to happen, what went well and lessons learnt. Results This was a hospital associated outbreak that likely occurred due to a breach in infection prevention and control (IPC) practices resulting in three health workers being infected during a surgical operation. There was a delay in detecting the outbreak on time due to low index of suspicion among clinicians. Once detected, the outbreak response contained the outbreak within one incubation period. Areas that worked well included coordination, contact tracing, active case search and ring IPC. Notable gaps included delays in accessing local emergency funding and late distribution of IPC and laboratory supplies. Conclusions The incident management system worked optimally to contain this outbreak. The core technical gaps identified in surveillance, IPC and delay in deployment of resources should be addressed through systemic changes that can mitigate future outbreaks. Author summary The International Health Regulations (IHR) Monitoring and Evaluation Framework was developed by the World Health Organization to provide strategies to monitor and assess how countries are building their core public health capacities under IHR (2005). The framework has four components: annual reporting on IHR capacities (mandatory), Joint External Evaluation, simulation exercises and After Action Review (AAR). In November 2019, an outbreak of Lassa Fever occurred among health workers in a non-endemic district in Sierra Leone. The outbreak resulted in five cases, including two deaths and two exported cases to the Netherlands. The outbreak tested multiple technical capacities in the IHR (2005) in a real-life setting. We therefore conducted an AAR to assess how well the country responded to the outbreak. This hospital associated outbreak likely occurred due to a breach in infection prevention and control (IPC) practices. The response launched after detection of the outbreak successfully contained the outbreak within one incubation period. Areas that worked well included coordination, contact tracing, active case search and ring IPC. Areas that needed improvement were clinicians’ knowledge on Lassa Fever, delays in accessing local emergency funding and late distribution of IPC and laboratory supplies.

Introduction: Few data on the COVID-19 epidemiological characteristics among the pediatric population in Africa exists. This paper examines the age and sex distribution of the morbidity and mortality rate in children with COVID-19 and compares it to the adult population in 15 Sub-Saharan African countries. Methods: A merge line listing dataset shared by countries within the Regional Office for Africa was analyzed. Patients diagnosed within 1 March and 1 September 2020 with a confirmed positive RT-PCR test for SARS-CoV-2 were analyzed. Children's data were stratified into three age groups: 0-4 years, 5-11 years, and 12-17 years, while adults were combined. The cumulative incidence of cases, its medians, and 95% confidence intervals were calculated. Results: 9% of the total confirmed cases and 2.4% of the reported deaths were pediatric cases. The 12-17 age group in all 15 countries showed the highest cumulative incidence proportion in children. Adults had a higher case incidence per 100,000 people than children. Conclusion: The cases and deaths within the children's population were smaller than the adult population. These differences may reflect biases in COVID-19 testing protocols and reporting implemented by countries, highlighting the need for more extensive investigation and focus on the effects of COVID-19 in children.

# Background The Democratic Republic of Congo declared their tenth outbreak of Ebola in North Kivu in 2018, which was the second-largest in the world and took place in an active conflict zone. Transmission of Ebola occurs by direct contact with infected bodily fluids and can occur within facilities when infection prevention and control (IPC) precautions are not strictly practised. # Methods To develop infection prevention and control (IPC) standards in health facilities, 45 medical students were trained and placed in 101 health facilities to mentor healthcare workers and support IPC practices between February and October 2019. A mixed-methods retrospective evaluation of quality improvement in North Kivu was conducted in October and November 2019 to capture key lessons from such a pilot IPC project. Five focus groups (N=49) and 42 key-informant interviews were conducted in addition to a secondary analysis of surveillance and programmatic data collected during the intervention. # Results The intervention contributed 1.83 times (95% confidence interval, CI=1.10-3.06) to increased the likelihood of health facilities achieving an IPC score of 80% or above compared with facilities that did not receive the intervention. Overall, we found the odds of Ebola cases declining three times more likely in Butembo and Katwa (odds ratio, OR=3.00, 95% CI=1.87-5.62) relative to ten health zones in the region that were not reached by the intervention. # Conclusions The results are difficult to attribute to any one type of intervention, given the number of other interventions implemented concurrently during the outbreak response. Further evaluations should be conducted to assess the cost-effectiveness of using medical students in conflict resolution and IPC, and to assess the suitability of scaling these approaches to other settings and diseases.

Introduction Estimating COVID-19 cumulative incidence in Africa remains problematic due to challenges in contact tracing, routine surveillance systems and laboratory testing capacities and strategies. We undertook a meta-analysis of population-based seroprevalence studies to estimate SARS-CoV-2 seroprevalence in Africa to inform evidence-based decision making on public health and social measures (PHSM) and vaccine strategy.Methods We searched for seroprevalence studies conducted in Africa published 1 January 2020–30 December 2021 in Medline, Embase, Web of Science and Europe PMC (preprints), grey literature, media releases and early results from WHO Unity studies. All studies were screened, extracted, assessed for risk of bias and evaluated for alignment with the WHO Unity seroprevalence protocol. We conducted descriptive analyses of seroprevalence and meta-analysed seroprevalence differences by demographic groups, place and time. We estimated the extent of undetected infections by comparing seroprevalence and cumulative incidence of confirmed cases reported to WHO.PROSPERO: CRD42020183634.Results We identified 56 full texts or early results, reporting 153 distinct seroprevalence studies in Africa. Of these, 97 (63%) were low/moderate risk of bias studies. SARS-CoV-2 seroprevalence rose from 3.0% (95% CI 1.0% to 9.2%) in April–June 2020 to 65.1% (95% CI 56.3% to 73.0%) in July–September 2021. The ratios of seroprevalence from infection to cumulative incidence of confirmed cases was large (overall: 100:1, ranging from 18:1 to 954:1) and steady over time. Seroprevalence was highly heterogeneous both within countries—urban versus rural (lower seroprevalence for rural geographic areas), children versus adults (children aged 0–9 years had the lowest seroprevalence)—and between countries and African subregions.Conclusion We report high seroprevalence in Africa suggesting greater population exposure to SARS-CoV-2 and potential protection against COVID-19 severe disease than indicated by surveillance data. As seroprevalence was heterogeneous, targeted PHSM and vaccination strategies need to be tailored to local epidemiological situations.

Objectives We conducted a review of intra-action review (IAR) reports of the national response to the COVID-19 pandemic in Africa. We highlight best practices and challenges and offer perspectives for the future.Design A thematic analysis across 10 preparedness and response domains, namely, governance, leadership, and coordination; planning and monitoring; risk communication and community engagement; surveillance, rapid response, and case investigation; infection prevention and control; case management; screening and monitoring at points of entry; national laboratory system; logistics and supply chain management; and maintaining essential health services during the COVID-19 pandemic.Setting All countries in the WHO African Region were eligible for inclusion in the study. National IAR reports submitted by March 2021 were analysed.Results We retrieved IAR reports from 18 African countries. The COVID-19 pandemic response in African countries has relied on many existing response systems such as laboratory systems, surveillance systems for previous outbreaks of highly infectious diseases and a logistics management information system. These best practices were backed by strong political will. The key challenges included low public confidence in governments, inadequate adherence to infection prevention and control measures, shortages of personal protective equipment, inadequate laboratory capacity, inadequate contact tracing, poor supply chain and logistics management systems, and lack of training of key personnel at national and subnational levels.Conclusion These findings suggest that African countries’ response to the COVID-19 pandemic was prompt and may have contributed to the lower cases and deaths in the region compared with countries in other regions. The IARs demonstrate that many technical areas still require immediate improvement to guide decisions in subsequent waves or future outbreaks.

Abstract Background Public health agencies require valid, timely and complete health information for early detection of outbreaks. Towards the end of the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak in 2015, the Ministry of Health and Sanitation (MoHS), Sierra Leone revitalized the Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response System (IDSR). Data quality assessments were conducted to monitor accuracy of IDSR data. Methods Starting 2016, data quality assessments (DQA) were conducted in randomly selected health facilities. Structured electronic checklist was used to interview district health management teams (DHMT) and health facility staff. We used malaria data, to assess data accuracy, as malaria was endemic in Sierra Leone. Verification factors (VF) calculated as the ratio of confirmed malaria cases recorded in health facility registers to the number of malaria cases in the national health information database, were used to assess data accuracy. Allowing a 5% margin of error, VF 105 was underreporting. Differences in the proportion of accurate reports at baseline and subsequent assessments were compared using Z-test for two proportions. Results Between 2016 and 2018, four DQA were conducted in 444 health facilities where 1729 IDSR reports were reviewed. Registers and IDSR technical guidelines were available in health facilities and health care workers were conversant with reporting requirements. Overall data accuracy improved from over- reporting of 4.7% (VF 95.3%) in 2016 to under-reporting of 0.2% (VF 100.2%) in 2018. Compared to 2016, proportion of accurate IDSR reports increased by 14.8% (95% CI 7.2, 22.3%) in May 2017 and 19.5% (95% CI 12.5–26.5%) by 2018. Over reporting was more common in private clinics and not- for profit facilities while under-reporting was more common in lower level government health facilities. Leading reasons for data discrepancies included counting errors in 358 (80.6%) health facilities and missing source documents in 47 (10.6%) health facilities. Conclusion This is the first attempt to institutionalize routine monitoring of IDSR data quality in Sierra Leone. Regular data quality assessments may have contributed to improved data accuracy over time. Data compilation errors accounted for most discrepancies and should be minimized to improve accuracy of IDSR data.

The need for resilient health systems is recognized as important for the attainment of health outcomes, given the current shocks to health services. Resilience has been defined as the capacity to "prepare and effectively respond to crises; maintain core functions; and, informed by lessons learnt, reorganize if conditions require it". There is however a recognized dichotomy between its conceptualization in literature, and its application in practice. We propose two mutually reinforcing categories of resilience, representing resilience targeted at potentially known shocks, and the inherent health system resilience, needed to respond to unpredictable shock events. We determined capacities for each of these categories, and explored this methodological proposition by computing country-specific scores against each capacity, for the 47 Member States of the WHO African Region. We assessed face validity of the computed index, to ensure derived values were representative of the different elements of resilience, and were predictive of health outcomes, and computed bias-corrected non-parametric confidence intervals of the emergency preparedness and response (EPR) and inherent system resilience (ISR) sub-indices, as well as the overall resilience index, using 1000 bootstrap replicates. We also explored the internal consistency and scale reliability of the index, by calculating Cronbach alphas for the various proposed capacities and their corresponding attributes. We computed overall resilience to be 48.4 out of a possible 100 in the 47 assessed countries, with generally lower levels of ISR. For ISR, the capacities were weakest for transformation capacity, followed by mobilization of resources, awareness of own capacities, self-regulation and finally diversity of services respectively. This paper aims to contribute to the growing body of empirical evidence on health systems and service resilience, which is of great importance to the functionality and performance of health systems, particularly in the context of COVID-19. It provides a methodological reflection for monitoring health system resilience, revealing areas of improvement in the provision of essential health services during shock events, and builds a case for the need for mechanisms, at country level, that address both specific and non-specific shocks to the health system, ultimately for the attainment of improved health outcomes.

The COVID-19 pandemic is a devastating reminder that mitigating the threat of emerging zoonotic outbreaks relies on our collective capacity to work across human health, animal health and environment sectors. Despite the critical need for shared approaches, collaborative benchmarks in the International Health Regulations (IHR) Monitoring and Evaluation Framework and more specifically the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) often reveal low levels of performance in collaborative technical areas (TAs), thus identifying a real need to work on the human–animal–environment interface to improve health security. The National Bridging Workshops (NBWs) proposed jointly by the World Organisation of Animal Health and World Health Organization (WHO) provide opportunity for national human health, animal health, environment and other relevant sectors in countries to explore the efficiency and gaps in their coordination for the management of zoonotic diseases. The results, gathered in a prioritised roadmap, support the operationalisation of the recommendations made during JEE for TAs where a multisectoral One Health approach is beneficial. For those collaborative TAs (12 out of 19 in the JEE), more than two-thirds of the recommendations can be implemented through one or multiple activities jointly agreed during NBW. Interestingly, when associated with the WHO Benchmark Tool for IHR, it appears that NBW activities are often associated with lower level of performance than anticipated during the JEE missions, revealing that countries often overestimate their capacities at the human–animal–environment interface. Deeper, more focused and more widely shared discussions between professionals highlight the need for concrete foundations of multisectoral coordination to meet goals for One Health and improved global health security through IHR.

Abstract Background The Ministry of Health and Sanitation (MOHS) in Sierra Leone partially rolled out the implementation of Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) in 2003. After the Ebola virus disease outbreak in 2014–2015, there was need to strengthen IDSR to ensure prompt detection and response to epidemic-prone diseases. We describe the processes, successes and challenges of revitalizing public health surveillance in a country recovering from a protracted Ebola virus disease outbreak. Methods The revitalization process began with adaptation of the revised IDSR guidelines and development of customized guidelines to suit the health care systems in Sierra Leone. Public health experts defined data flow, system operations, case definitions, frequency and channels of reporting and dissemination. Next, phased training of IDSR focal persons in each health facility and the distribution of data collection and reporting tools was done. Monitoring activities included periodic supportive supervision and data quality assessments. Rapid response teams were formed to investigate and respond to disease outbreak alerts in all districts. Results Submission of reports through the IDSR system began in mid-2015 and by the 35th epidemiologic week, all district health teams were submitting reports. The key performance indicators measuring the functionality of the IDSR system in 2016 and 2017 were achieved (WHO Africa Region target ≥80%); the annual average proportion of timely weekly health facility reports submitted to the next level was 93% in 2016 and 97% in 2017; the proportion of suspected outbreaks and public health events detected through the IDSR system was 96% (n = 87) in 2016 and 100% (n = 85) in 2017. Conclusion With proper planning, phased implementation and adequate investment of resources, it is possible to establish a functional IDSR system in a country recovering from a public health crisis. A functional IDSR system requires well trained workforce, provision of the necessary tools and guidelines, information, communication and technology infrastructure to support data transmission, provision of timely feedback as well as logistical support.

On 5 March 2020, South Africa recorded its first case of imported COVID-19. Since then, cases in South Africa have increased exponentially with significant community transmission. A multisectoral approach to containing and mitigating the spread of SARS-CoV-2 was instituted, led by the South African National Department of Health. A National COVID-19 Command Council was established to take government-wide decisions. An adapted World Health Organiszion (WHO) COVID-19 strategy for containing and mitigating the spread of the virus was implemented by the National Department of Health. The strategy included the creation of national and provincial incident management teams (IMTs), which comprised of a variety of work streams, namely, governance and leadership; medical supplies; port and environmental health; epidemiology and response; facility readiness and case management; emergency medical services; information systems; risk communication and community engagement; occupational health and safety and human resources. The following were the most salient lessons learnt between March and September 2020: strengthened command and control were achieved through both centralised and decentralised IMTs; swift evidenced-based decision-making from the highest political levels for instituting lockdowns to buy time to prepare the health system; the stringent lockdown enabled the health sector to increase its healthcare capacity. Despite these successes, the stringent lockdown measures resulted in economic hardship particularly for the most vulnerable sections of the population.

INTRODUCTION: The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) declared its 10th outbreak of ebola virus disease (EVD) in 42 years on August 1st 2018. The rapid rise and spread of the EVD outbreak threatened health security in neighboring countries and global health security. The United Nations developed an EVD preparedness and readiness (EVD-PR) plan to assist the nine neighboring countries to advance their critical preparedness measures. In Uganda, EVD-PR was implemented between 2018 and 2019. The World Health Organization commissioned an independent evaluation to assess the impact of the investment in EVD-PR in Uganda. Objectives: i) to document the program achievements; ii) to determine if the capacities developed represented good value for the funds and resources invested; iii) to assess if more cost-effective or sustainable alternative approaches were available; iv) to explore if the investments were aligned with country public health priorities; and v) to document the factors that contributed to the program success or failure. METHODS: during the EVD preparedness phase, Uganda´s government conducted a risk assessment and divided the districts into three categories, based on the potential risk of EVD. Category I included districts that shared a border with the DRC provinces where EVD was ongoing or any other district with a direct transport route to the DRC. Category II were districts that shared a border with the DRC but not bordering the DRC provinces affected by the EVD outbreak. Category III was the remaining districts in Uganda. EVD-PR was implemented at the national level and in 22 category I districts. We interviewed key informants involved in program design, planning and implementation or monitoring at the national level and in five purposively selected category I districts. RESULTS: ebola virus disease preparedness and readiness was a success and this was attributed mainly to donor support, the ministry of health´s technical capacity, good coordination, government support and community involvement. The resources invested in EVD-PR represented good value for the funds and the activities were well aligned to the public health priorities for Uganda. CONCLUSION: ebola virus disease preparedness and readiness program in Uganda developed capacities that played an essential role in preventing cross border spread of EVD from the affected provinces in the DRC and enabled rapid containment of the two importation events. These capacities are now being used to detect and respond to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Process mapping is a systems thinking approach used to understand, analyse and optimise processes within complex systems. We aim to demonstrate how this methodology can be applied during disease outbreaks to strengthen response and health systems. Process mapping exercises were conducted during three unique emerging disease outbreak contexts with different: mode of transmission, size, and health system infrastructure. System functioning improved considerably in each country. In Sierra Leone, laboratory testing was accelerated from 6 days to within 24 hours. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, time to suspected case notification reduced from 7 to 3 days. In Nigeria, key data reached the national level in 48 hours instead of 5 days. Our research shows that despite the chaos and complexities associated with emerging pathogen outbreaks, the implementation of a process mapping exercise can address immediate response priorities while simultaneously strengthening components of a health system.

The spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) has been unprecedented in its speed and effects. Interruption of its transmission to prevent widespread community transmission is critical because its effects go beyond the number of COVID-19 cases and deaths and affect the health system capacity to provide other essential services. Highlighting the implications of such a situation, the predictions presented here are derived using a Markov chain model, with the transition states and country specific probabilities derived based on currently available knowledge. A risk of exposure, and vulnerability index are used to make the probabilities country specific. The results predict a high risk of exposure in states of small size, together with Algeria, South Africa and Cameroon. Nigeria will have the largest number of infections, followed by Algeria and South Africa. Mauritania would have the fewest cases, followed by Seychelles and Eritrea. Per capita, Mauritius, Seychelles and Equatorial Guinea would have the highest proportion of their population affected, while Niger, Mauritania and Chad would have the lowest. Of the World Health Organization's 1 billion population in Africa, 22% (16%–26%) will be infected in the first year, with 37 (29 – 44) million symptomatic cases and 150 078 (82 735–189 579) deaths. There will be an estimated 4.6 (3.6–5.5) million COVID-19 hospitalisations, of which 139 521 (81 876–167 044) would be severe cases requiring oxygen, and 89 043 (52 253–106 599) critical cases requiring breathing support. The needed mitigation measures would significantly strain health system capacities, particularly for secondary and tertiary services, while many cases may pass undetected in primary care facilities due to weak diagnostic capacity and non-specific symptoms. The effect of avoiding widespread and sustained community transmission of SARS-CoV-2 is significant, and most likely outweighs any costs of preventing such a scenario. Effective containment measures should be promoted in all countries to best manage the COVID-19 pandemic.

The International Health Regulations (IHR, 2005) are an essential vehicle for addressing global health security. Here, we report the IHR capacities in the WHO African from independent joint external evaluation (JEE). The JEE is a voluntary component of the IHR monitoring and evaluation framework. It evaluates IHR capacities in 19 technical areas in four broad themes: ‘Prevent’ (7 technical areas, 15 indicators); ‘Detect’ (4 technical areas, 13 indicators); ‘Respond’ (5 technical areas, 14 indicators), points of entry (PoE) and other IHR hazards (chemical and radiation) (3 technical areas, 6 indicators). The IHR capacity scores are graded from level 1 (no capacity) to level 5 (sustainable capacity). From February 2016 to March 2019, 40 of 47 WHO African region countries (81% coverage) evaluated their IHR capacities using the JEE tool. No country had the required IHR capacities. Under the theme ‘Prevent’, no country scored level 5 for 12 of 15 indicators. Over 80% of them scored level 1 or 2 for most indicators. For ‘Detect’, none scored level 5 for 12 of 13 indicators. However, many scored level 3 or 4 for several indicators. For ‘Respond’, none scored level 5 for 13 of 14 indicators, and less than 10% had a national multihazard public health emergency preparedness and response plan. For PoE and other IHR hazards, most countries scored level 1 or 2 and none scored level 5. Countries in the WHO African region are commended for embracing the JEE to assess their IHR capacities. However, major gaps have been identified. Urgent collective action is needed now to protect the WHO African region from health security threats.

Objectives To assess the impact of refresher training of healthcare workers (HCWs) in infection prevention and control (IPC), ensuring consistent adequate supplies and availability of IPC kits and carrying out weekly monitoring of IPC performance in healthcare facilities (HCFs)Design This was a before and after comparison studySettings This study was conducted from June to July 2018 during an Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak in Equateur Province in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).Participants 48 HCFsInterventions HCWs capacity building in basic IPC, IPC kit donation and IPC mentoring.Primary outcome measures IPC scoreResults 48 HCFs were evaluated and 878 HCWs were trained, of whom 437 were women and 441 were men. The mean IPC score at baseline was modestly higher in hospitals (8%) compared with medical centres (4%) and health centres (4%), respectively. The mean IPC score at follow-up significantly increased to 50% in hospitals, 39% in medical centres and 36% in health centres (p value

INTRODUCTION: Severe malaria is a life-threatening medical emergency and requires prompt and effective treatment to prevent death. There is paucity of published information on current practices of severe malaria case management in sub-Saharan Africa; we evaluated the management practices for severe malaria in Ugandan health facilities METHODS AND FINDINGS: We did a cross sectional survey, using multi-stage sampling methods, of health facilities in 11 districts in the eastern and mid-western parts of Uganda. The study instruments were adapted from the WHO hospital care assessment tools. Between June and August 2009, 105 health facilities were surveyed and 181 health workers and 868 patients/caretakers interviewed. None of the inpatient facilities had all seven components of a basic care package for the management of severe malaria consistently available during the 3 months prior to the survey. Referral practices were appropriate for

BACKGROUND:Artemisinin combination therapies (ACTs) are currently the preferred option for treating uncomplicated malaria. Dihydroartemisinin-piperaquine (DHA-PQP) is a promising fixed-dose ACT with limited information on its safety and efficacy in African children. METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS:The non-inferiority of DHA-PQP versus artemether-lumefantrine (AL) in children 6-59 months old with uncomplicated P. falciparum malaria was tested in five African countries (Burkina Faso, Kenya, Mozambique, Uganda and Zambia). Patients were randomised (2:1) to receive either DHA-PQP or AL. Non-inferiority was assessed using a margin of -5% for the lower limit of the one-sided 97.5% confidence interval on the treatment difference (DHA-PQP vs. AL) of the day 28 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) corrected cure rate. Efficacy analysis was performed in several populations, and two of them are presented here: intention-to-treat (ITT) and enlarged per-protocol (ePP). 1553 children were randomised, 1039 receiving DHA-PQP and 514 AL. The PCR-corrected day 28 cure rate was 90.4% (ITT) and 94.7% (ePP) in the DHA-PQP group, and 90.0% (ITT) and 95.3% (ePP) in the AL group. The lower limits of the one-sided 97.5% CI of the difference between the two treatments were -2.80% and -2.96%, in the ITT and ePP populations, respectively. In the ITT population, the Kaplan-Meier estimate of the proportion of new infections up to Day 42 was 13.55% (95% CI: 11.35%-15.76%) for DHA-PQP vs 24.00% (95% CI: 20.11%-27.88%) for AL (p

Uganda recently adopted artemether-lumefantrine (AL) as the recommended first-line treatment for uncomplicated malaria. However, AL has several limitations, including a twice-daily dosing regimen, recommendation for administration with fatty food, and a high risk of reinfection soon after therapy in high transmission areas. Dihydroartemisinin-piperaquine (DP) is a new alternative artemisinin-based combination therapy that is dosed once daily and has a long post-treatment prophylactic effect. We compared the efficacy and safety of AL with DP in Kanungu, an area of moderate malaria transmission.Patients aged 6 months to 10 years with uncomplicated falciparum malaria were randomized to therapy and followed for 42 days. Genotyping was used to distinguish recrudescence from new infection. Of 414 patients enrolled, 408 completed follow-up. Compared to patients treated with artemether-lumefantrine, patients treated with dihydroartemisinin-piperaquine had a significantly lower risk of recurrent parasitaemia (33.2% vs. 12.2%; risk difference = 20.9%, 95% CI 13.0-28.8%) but no statistically significant difference in the risk of treatment failure due to recrudescence (5.8% vs. 2.0%; risk difference = 3.8%, 95% CI -0.2-7.8%). Patients treated with dihydroartemisinin-piperaquine also had a lower risk of developing gametocytaemia after therapy (4.2% vs. 10.6%, p = 0.01). Both drugs were safe and well tolerated.DP is highly efficacious, and operationally preferable to AL because of a less intensive dosing schedule and requirements. Dihydroartemisinin-piperaquine should be considered for a role in the antimalarial treatment policy of Uganda.Controlled-Trials.com ISRCTN75606663.

BACKGROUND: Drug resistance in Plasmodium falciparum poses a major threat to malaria control. Combination antimalarial therapy including artemisinins has been advocated recently to improve efficacy and limit the spread of resistance, but artemisinins are expensive and relatively untested in highly endemic areas. We compared artemisinin-based and other combination therapies in four districts in Uganda with varying transmission intensity. METHODS AND FINDINGS: We enrolled 2,160 patients aged 6 mo or greater with uncomplicated falciparum malaria. Patients were randomized to receive chloroquine (CQ) + sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine (SP); amodiaquine (AQ) + SP; or AQ + artesunate (AS). Primary endpoints were the 28-d risks of parasitological failure either unadjusted or adjusted by genotyping to distinguish recrudescence from new infections. A total of 2,081 patients completed follow-up, of which 1,749 (84%) were under the age of 5 y. The risk of recrudescence after treatment with CQ + SP was high, ranging from 22% to 46% at the four sites. This risk was significantly lower (p < 0.01) after AQ + SP or AQ + AS (7%-18% and 4%-12%, respectively). Compared to AQ + SP, AQ + AS was associated with a lower risk of recrudescence but a higher risk of new infection. The overall risk of repeat therapy due to any recurrent infection (recrudescence or new infection) was similar at two sites and significantly higher for AQ + AS at the two highest transmission sites (risk differences = 15% and 16%, p < 0.003). CONCLUSION: AQ + AS was the most efficacious regimen for preventing recrudescence, but this benefit was outweighed by an increased risk of new infection. Considering all recurrent infections, the efficacy of AQ + SP was at least as efficacious at all sites and superior to AQ + AS at the highest transmission sites. The high endemicity of malaria in Africa may impact on the efficacy of artemisinin-based combination therapy. The registration number for this trial is ISRCTN67520427 (http://www.controlled-trials.com/isrctn/trial/|/0/67520427.html).