Search

Every state relies on fines and fees to defray the costs of community supervision, and many rely on a combination of monetary sanctions and government aid to operate these programs. Texas is one such state that designs their system to provide approximately two-thirds of funding necessary for supervision operations while the rest is meant to be obtained via local supervisee fees. This study questions the accuracy of the 65/35 split in counties involved in the Community Corrections Fines and Fees (CCFF) Study and examines how programs’ offender fees and state appropriated funding have changed over time. Gathering data from local fiscal reports, three programs covering six counties are studied. Our findings indicate that fees are over-relied upon in every jurisdiction examined, with increasing contributions each year while supervisee counts fall. Further, these individuals also supply money to other funds used for supervision and/or criminal justice not accounted for in the core programming (i.e., local supplemental programs, general fund contributions). Though few, the CCFF programs examined appear representative of state-wide trends and data suggests the fluctuations in fee reliance may largely result from targeted funding changes to competitive program grants. In all, Texas and specific program appropriations and fees are all increasing, but the state appears to be failing to keep up with local needs. This has large potential for collateral consequences to system and supervisee alike.

Monetary sanctions exist in every part of the criminal legal system, including community corrections. Fines, fees, restitution, surcharges, and other court costs are included as monetary sanctions. Prior research has highlighted the types of monetary sanctions, their correctional goals, and the effects of monetary sanctions on individuals paying them. For fees, Texas relies on them for partial support of their probation departments’ operations. In this study, we focus on two probation jurisdictions in Texas to explore officers’ attitudes and beliefs around monetary sanctions. Specifically, we use survey data to examine officers’ belief in fairness around fees assessment and their views on the collection and enforcement of fees. The findings find overall support among the officers for fees within probation. Sixty-one percent of the surveyed officers believed asking clients to pay fees was fair. Officers also had more punitive attitudes around collections and thought that consequences were appropriate responses to late or nonpayment of fees. This study provides insight into how officers view monetary sanctions and how these views might shape enforcement.