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The 2014–2016 West Africa Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) Epidemic devastated Guinea’s health system and constituted a public health emergency of international concern. Following the crisis, Guinea invested in the establishment of basic health system reforms and crucial legal instruments for strengthening national health security in line with the WHO’s recommendations for ensuring better preparedness for (and, therefore, a response to) health emergencies. The investments included the scaling up of Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response; Joint External Evaluation of International Health Regulation capacities; National Action Plan for Health Security; Simulation Exercises; One Health platforms; creation of decentralised structures such as regional and prefectural Emergency Operation Centres; Risk assessment and hazard identification; Expanding human resources capacity; Early Warning Alert System and community preparedness. These investments were tested in the subsequent 2021 EVD outbreak and other epidemics. In this case, there was a timely declaration and response to the 2021 EVD epidemic, a lower-case burden and mortality rate, a shorter duration of the epidemic and a significant reduction in the cost of the response. Similarly, there was timely detection, response and containment of other epidemics including Lassa fever and Marburg virus disease. Findings suggest the utility of the preparedness activities for the early detection and efficient containment of outbreaks, which, therefore, underlines the need for all countries at risk of infectious disease epidemics to invest in similar reforms. Doing so promises to be not only cost-effective but also lifesaving.

Summary Background A record number of people survived Ebola virus infection in the 2013–16 outbreak in west Africa, and the number of survivors has increased after subsequent outbreaks. A range of post-Ebola sequelae have been reported in survivors, but little is known about subsequent mortality. We aimed to investigate subsequent mortality among people discharged from Ebola treatment units. Methods From Dec 8, 2015, Surveillance Active en ceinture, the Guinean national survivors' monitoring programme, attempted to contact and follow-up all survivors of Ebola virus disease who were discharged from Ebola treatment units. Survivors were followed up until Sept 30, 2016, and deaths up to this timepoint were recorded. Verbal autopsies were done to gain information about survivors of Ebola virus disease who subsequently died from their closest family members. We calculated the age-standardised mortality ratio compared with the general Guinean population, and assessed risk factors for mortality using survival analysis and a Cox proportional hazards regression model. Findings Of the 1270 survivors of Ebola virus disease who were discharged from Ebola treatment units in Guinea, information was retrieved for 1130 (89%). Compared with the general Guinean population, survivors of Ebola virus disease had a more than five-times increased risk of mortality up to Dec 31, 2015 (age-standardised mortality ratio 5·2 [95% CI 4·0–6·8]), a mean of 1 year of follow-up after discharge. Thereafter (ie, from Jan 1–Sept 30, 2016), mortality did not differ between survivors of Ebola virus disease and the general population. (0·6 [95% CI 0·2–1·4]). Overall, 59 deaths were reported, and the cause of death was tentatively attributed to renal failure in 37 cases, mostly on the basis of reported anuria. Longer stays (ie, equal to or longer than the median stay) in Ebola treatment units were associated with an increased risk of late death compared with shorter stays (adjusted hazard ratio 2·62 [95% CI 1·43–4·79]). Interpretation Mortality was high in people who recovered from Ebola virus disease and were discharged from Ebola treatment units in Guinea. The finding that survivors who were hospitalised for longer during primary infection had an increased risk of death, could help to guide current and future survivors' programmes and in the prioritisation of funds in resource-constrained settings. The role of renal failure in late deaths after recovery from Ebola virus disease should be investigated. Funding WHO, International Medical Corps, and the Guinean Red Cross.

Rift Valley fever (RVF) is a mosquito‐borne viral zoonosis causing abortions and high mortality among animals, whereas in humans, the disease is usually mild or asymptomatic. In September 2016, the Republic of Niger declared the first RVF outbreak in the northern region of Tahoua near the Malian border. This study describes the outbreak and reports the results of serological and molecular investigations of the human and animal samples collected. Serum samples from both human and animal suspected cases have been confirmed at the Centre de Recherche Médicale et Sanitaire (CERMES) and the Laboratoire Centrale d'Elevage (LABOCEL) public health and animal reference laboratories, respectively. Techniques for biological confirmation were real time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT‐PCR) and enzyme linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA). Phylogenetic trees were established after genetic sequencing of the small and medium segments of the RVF virus (RVFV) genome. Out of the 399 human samples collected, 17 (4.3%) were confirmed positive for RVFV. Overall, 33 (8.3%) deaths occurred out of which five (29%) were among the 17 confirmed cases. Regarding animals, 45 samples were tested, three of which were RT‐PCR positive and 24 were IgG positive. The phylogenetic analyses showed that the Niger strains clustered with Senegal 2013 and Mauritania 2015 RVFV strains. This first outbreak of RVF was very challenging for public and animal health laboratories in Niger. Besides resulting in human deaths, important loss of cattle has been reported. Therefore, vigilance has to be strengthened emphasising vector control strategies and active surveillance among animals.

ObjectivesWe conducted a review of intra-action review (IAR) reports of the national response to the COVID-19 pandemic in Africa. We highlight best practices and challenges and offer perspectives for the future.DesignA thematic analysis across 10 preparedness and response domains, namely, governance, leadership, and coordination; planning and monitoring; risk communication and community engagement; surveillance, rapid response, and case investigation; infection prevention and control; case management; screening and monitoring at points of entry; national laboratory system; logistics and supply chain management; and maintaining essential health services during the COVID-19 pandemic.SettingAll countries in the WHO African Region were eligible for inclusion in the study. National IAR reports submitted by March 2021 were analysed.ResultsWe retrieved IAR reports from 18 African countries. The COVID-19 pandemic response in African countries has relied on many existing response systems such as laboratory systems, surveillance systems for previous outbreaks of highly infectious diseases and a logistics management information system. These best practices were backed by strong political will. The key challenges included low public confidence in governments, inadequate adherence to infection prevention and control measures, shortages of personal protective equipment, inadequate laboratory capacity, inadequate contact tracing, poor supply chain and logistics management systems, and lack of training of key personnel at national and subnational levels.ConclusionThese findings suggest that African countries’ response to the COVID-19 pandemic was prompt and may have contributed to the lower cases and deaths in the region compared with countries in other regions. The IARs demonstrate that many technical areas still require immediate improvement to guide decisions in subsequent waves or future outbreaks.

The 2014–2016 Ebola virus (EBOV) disease outbreak affected over 29000 people and left behind the biggest cohort (over 17000 individuals) of Ebola survivors in history. Although the persistence of EBOV in body fluids of survivors was reported before the recent outbreak, new evidence revealed that the virus can be detected up to 18 months in the semen, which represents the biggest risk of Ebola resurgence in affected communities. In this study, we review the knowledge on the Ebola flare-ups that occurred after the peak of the 2014–2016 Ebola epidemic in West Africa.

Background By the end of the 2013–2016 West African Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreaks, a total of 3814 cases (probable and confirmed) and 2544 deaths were reported in Guinea. Clearly, surveillance activities aiming at stopping human-to-human transmission have been the breakthrough of EVD outbreak management, but their application has been at times easier said than done. This article presents five confirmed or probable EVD cases that arose in Conakry towards the end of the Guinea epidemic, which demonstrate flaws in surveillance and follow-up. Case presentation For case 1, safe burial requirements were not followed. For cases 1 and 2, negative Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) results were interpreted as no infection. For the first case, the sample may have not been taken properly while for the second the disease was possibly at its early stage. Case 3 was stopped at a border health checkpoint and despite her high temperature she was allowed to continue the bus journey. For case 4, an oral swab sample was supposedly taken after death but could not be found for retrospective testing. Despite characteristic symptomatology, case 5 was not identified as a suspect case for as long as 3 weeks. Conclusion In epidemic contexts, health systems must be able to track all samples of suspect cases and deaths, regardless of their laboratory results. Social mobilization in communities and training in health care facilities must be strengthened at the tail of an outbreak, to avoid the natural slackening of disease surveillance, in particular for long-lasting and deadly epidemics.

Funding Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale, Reacting, the French Ebola Task Force, Institut de Recherche pour le Développement, and Montpellier University Of Excellence-University of Montpellier.; International audience; BACKGROUND : The prevalence of Ebola virus infection among people who have been in contact with patients with Ebola virus disease remains unclear, but is essential to understand the dynamics of transmission. This study aimed to identify risk factors for seropositivity and to estimate the prevalence of Ebola virus infection in unvaccinated contact persons.METHODS : In this retrospective, cross-sectional observational study, we recruited individuals between May 12, 2016, and Sept 8, 2017, who had been in physical contact with a patient with Ebola virus disease, from four medical centres in Guinea (Conakry, Macenta, N'zérékoré, and Forécariah). Contact persons had to be 7 years or older and not diagnosed with Ebola virus disease. Participants were selected through the Postebogui survivors' cohort. We collected self-reported information on exposure and occurrence of symptoms after exposure using a questionnaire, and tested antibody response against glycoprotein, nucleoprotein, and 40-kDa viral protein of Zaire Ebola virus by taking a blood sample. The prevalence of Ebola virus infection was estimated with a latent class model.FINDINGS : 1721 contact persons were interviewed and given blood tests, 331 of whom reported a history of vaccination so were excluded, resulting in a study population of 1390. Symptoms were reported by 216 (16%) contact persons. The median age of participants was 26 years (range 7-88) and 682 (49%) were male. Seropositivity was identified in 18 (8·33%, 95% CI 5·01-12·80) of 216 paucisymptomatic contact persons and 39 (3·32%, 5·01-12·80) of 1174 (2-4) asymptomatic individuals (p=0·0021). Seropositivity increased with participation in burial rituals (adjusted odds ratio [aOR] 2·30, 95% CI 1·21-4·17; p=0·0079) and exposure to blood or vomit (aOR 2·15, 1·23-3·91; p=0·0090). Frequency of Ebola virus infection varied from 3·06% (95% CI 1·84-5·05) in asymptomatic contact persons who did not participate in burial rituals to 5·98% (2·81-8·18) in those who did, and from 7·17% (3·94-9·09) in paucisymptomatic contact persons who did not participate in burial rituals to 17·16% (12·42-22·31) among those who did.INTERPRETATION : This study provides a new assessment of the prevalence of Ebola virus infection among contact persons according to exposure, provides evidence for the occurrence of paucisymptomatic cases, and reinforces the importance of closely monitoring at-risk contact persons.

Publisher's version (útgefin grein), [No abstract available], The authors have not declared a specific grant for this research from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.

The International Health Regulations (IHR, 2005) are an essential vehicle for addressing global health security. Here, we report the IHR capacities in the WHO African from independent joint external evaluation (JEE). The JEE is a voluntary component of the IHR monitoring and evaluation framework. It evaluates IHR capacities in 19 technical areas in four broad themes: ‘Prevent’ (7 technical areas, 15 indicators); ‘Detect’ (4 technical areas, 13 indicators); ‘Respond’ (5 technical areas, 14 indicators), points of entry (PoE) and other IHR hazards (chemical and radiation) (3 technical areas, 6 indicators). The IHR capacity scores are graded from level 1 (no capacity) to level 5 (sustainable capacity). From February 2016 to March 2019, 40 of 47 WHO African region countries (81% coverage) evaluated their IHR capacities using the JEE tool. No country had the required IHR capacities. Under the theme ‘Prevent’, no country scored level 5 for 12 of 15 indicators. Over 80% of them scored level 1 or 2 for most indicators. For ‘Detect’, none scored level 5 for 12 of 13 indicators. However, many scored level 3 or 4 for several indicators. For ‘Respond’, none scored level 5 for 13 of 14 indicators, and less than 10% had a national multihazard public health emergency preparedness and response plan. For PoE and other IHR hazards, most countries scored level 1 or 2 and none scored level 5. Countries in the WHO African region are commended for embracing the JEE to assess their IHR capacities. However, major gaps have been identified. Urgent collective action is needed now to protect the WHO African region from health security threats.