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The Department of Defense (DOD) has expanded the Global Ministry of Defense Advisors (MODA) program more slowly than planned. It had 2 advisors in the field in Kosovo and Montenegro for most of fiscal year 2014, short of its goal of deploying 12 advisors by the end of fiscal year 2014. DOD deployed advisors to 2 additional countries just before the end of fiscal year 2014 (see figure). According to DOD officials, reasons it has taken longer than expected to expand globally include delays in the country approval process and with advisor recruitment and training. DOD has met most but not all legislative requirements for the MODA program. As required by the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012, DOD obtained concurrence on its proposed deployments from the Department of State (State). DOD's most recent annual report to Congress included 4 of the 6 required elements, but did not include information on the cost or duration of each Global MODA deployment, which could help Congress assess the value of the program in relation to other capacity-building efforts (see figure). Additionally, DOD has not provided information on the program's performance, such as linking actual performance to goals. Although DOD is not required by law to include this information, GAO has previously reported that such information can be useful to decision makers. Finally, DOD has not updated the policy for the program as required in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014., The original document contains color images. Report to Congressional Committees.

Why GAO Did This Study. The activities of Iranian government elements, such as a 2011 attempt to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador in the United States, could pose a threat to U.S. national security. Congress enacted the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012, requiring State to assess the threats posed to the United States by Iran's presence and activity in the Western Hemisphere and to develop a strategy to address those threats. This report examines (1) State's collaboration with other key U.S. agencies and foreign partners to address Iranian activities in the Western Hemisphere, (2) the extent to which the strategy addresses elements identified in the act, and (3) the extent to which the strategy includes desirable characteristics of national strategies. GAO analyzed agency documents and interviewed agency officials in Washington, D.C. Argentina; Brazil; Colombia; and Mexico. GAO chose these countries based on factors such as past instances of Iran-linked terrorist attacks and their bilateral relationships with the United States. What GAO Recommends. GAO recommends that the Secretary of State provide the relevant congressional committees with additional information that would fully address the elements in the act. In the absence of such information, State should explain why it was not included in the strategy., Report to Congressional Requesters.

Events in northwest Africa such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb s seizure of territory in Mali in 2012 and Boko Haram s near-daily attacks in Nigeria have underscored concerns that the region is vulnerable to the spread of violent extremism. TSCTP, a U.S. multiagency counterterrorism effort begun in 2005, led by State, and primarily coordinated with USAID and DOD, focuses on strengthening partner countries counterterrorism capabilities and inhibiting the spread of terrorist ideology through diplomacy, development, and security assistance. This report examines (1) the status of TSCTP-related funding and U.S. agencies ability to track such funding; (2) the extent to which U.S. agency implementation of TSCTP is consistent with key practices of interagency collaboration; and (3) whether U.S. agencies considered partner country needs, absorptive capacities, and other donor efforts when selecting TSCTP activities. GAO reviewed agency documents, met with key officials in Washington, D.C., and conducted fieldwork at the U.S. Africa Command in Germany and in Algeria, Mauritania, and Niger. GAO recommends that the Secretary of State and the Administrator of USAID ensure that TSCTP program managers take steps to routinely collect and assess information on the status of funds for TSCTP. GAO also recommends that the Secretary of State take steps to better integrate the Department of Justice into TSCTP coordination efforts. State and USAID both concurred with GAO s recommendations., Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate.

The U.S. Civil-Military Strategic Framework for Afghanistan is intended to articulate the strategic vision guiding U.S. government efforts to achieve U.S. national goals and to facilitate U.S. civilian and military cooperation and partnership in Afghanistan. The Department of State (State) notes that this framework serves as strategic guidance for all U.S. civilian and military personnel serving in Afghanistan. In March 2012, the framework replaced the Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan, which was first signed in August 2009 by the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan and the Commanding General, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan. The framework was subsequently updated, in October 2012 and, most recently, in August 2013.1 The August 2013 version of the framework likely the final update, according to State officials shows, among other things, a heightened focus on transition in Afghanistan. 2 Section 1220 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (NDAA) mandates GAO to report on any substantial updates to the campaign plan for Afghanistan, which the strategic framework has replaced. The framework defines transition to mean a shift, through the end of 2014, in security responsibility for Afghanistan to Afghan security institutions and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) as well as a shift in U.S. policy toward a more traditional diplomatic and development model. After January 1, 2015, when the last U.S. combat troops are expected to have withdrawn from Afghanistan, the United States plans to continue to support the government of Afghanistan in its efforts to achieve longer-term goals for governance and development. According to State officials, the 2013 revision of the framework was intended to reflect changes in U.S. goals and priorities, better align them with Afghan goals and priorities, and reflect changing circumstances on the ground.

DOD officials are seeking to approach strategic communication as a process that leaders, planners, and operators should follow to integrate foreign audience perceptions into policy making, planning, and operations at every level. However, descriptions of strategic communication in several key documents including the Quadrennial Defense Review and the National Framework for Strategic Communication characterize it differently. For example, the Quadrennial Defense Review describes strategic communication as the coordination of activities such as information operations2 and public affairs, among other things. According to DOD officials, these varying descriptions of strategic communication have created confusion within the department. To address this confusion, DOD is drafting an instruction to clarify the steps of the strategic communication process, which DOD officials expect to be completed in late spring or early summer 2012.

The collection of biometrics data, including fingerprints and iris patterns, enables U.S. counterinsurgency operations to identify enemy combatants and link individuals to events such as improvised explosive device detonations. GAO was asked to examine the extent to which (1) DOD's biometrics training supports warfighter use of biometrics, (2) DOD is effectively collecting and transmitting biometrics data, and (3) DOD has developed a process to collect and disseminate biometrics lessons learned. To address these objectives, GAO focused on the Army and to a lesser extent on the Marine Corps and U.S. Special Operations Command, since the Army collected about 86 percent of the biometrics enrollments in Afghanistan. GAO visited training sites in the United States, observed biometrics collection and transmission operations at locations in Afghanistan, reviewed relevant policies and guidance, and interviewed knowledgeable officials., Report to Congressional Requesters.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD[I]) has the authority to oversee DOD's ISR enterprise; however, the broad scope and complex funding arrangements of DOD's ISR enterprise make it difficult to manage and oversee. The scope of the ISR enterprise and capabilities include many different kinds of activities conducted by multiple agencies. As a result, ISR activities may be funded through any of several sources, including the Military Intelligence Program, the National Intelligence Program, overseas contingency operations funding, and military service funds. To manage DOD's large ISR enterprise, the USD(I) serves as DOD's senior intelligence official, responsible for providing strategic, budget, and policy oversight over DOD's ISR enterprise. However, the USD(I) does not have full visibility into several budget sources that fund DOD's ISR enterprise, such as national intelligence capabilities, dual use assets, urgent operational needs, and military personnel expenses related to ISR. The USD(I)'s inability to gain full visibility and clarity into all of DOD's ISR financial resources hinders efforts to develop an investment strategy for ISR and to achieve efficiencies. DOD has developed general guidance in directives and other documents emphasizing the need to identify efficiencies and eliminate duplication or redundancies in its capabilities, which provides a foundation for further action. In August 2010, the Secretary of Defense directed that the department begin a series of efficiency initiatives to reduce duplication, overhead, and excess. However, the scope of the review pertaining to ISR was limited to analysis activities and excluded activities associated with collecting ISR data--one of the largest areas of growth in ISR spending.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of Defense (DOD) award direct assistance to Afghanistan, using bilateral agreements and multilateral trust funds that provide funds through the Afghan national budget. GAO assessed (1) the extent to which the United States, through USAID and DOD, has increased direct assistance, (2) USAID and DOD steps to ensure accountability for bilateral direct assistance, and (3) USAID and DOD steps to ensure accountability for direct assistance via multilateral trust funds for Afghanistan. GAO reviewed USAID, DOD, and multilateral documents and met with U.S. officials and staffs of multilateral trust funds in Washington, D.C., and Afghanistan., Report to Congressional Addresses.

In 2005 through 2008, the key agencies distributed the majority of the obligated and committed resources to countries in the Sahel region, supporting a range of diplomacy, development assistance, and military activities. In 2005 through 2007, the agencies distributed about 74 percent of approximately $230 million obligated to the four countries in the Sahel region, about 3 percent to the countries in the Maghreb region, and about 8 percent to the countries in the sub-Saharan region; the remaining 15 percent of the obligations was distributed through regional assistance, such as military exercises in multiple countries. As of June 2008, the agencies expected to distribute about half of approximately $123 million committed for TSCTP for 2008 to the Sahel countries and to distribute the remaining commitments among the Maghreb and Sub-Saharan countries and through regional assistance. The agencies have supported a wide range of activities related to diplomacy, development, and military assistance. For example, State has hosted educational and cultural exchange programs intended to isolate and marginalize violent extremists; USAID supported efforts to improve education and health; and DOD has provided counterterrorism training in marksmanship and border patrol as well as distributed equipment such as vehicles to the militaries of TSCTP partner countries. Several challenges have hampered the key agencies implementation of TSCTP activities, in some cases limiting their ability to collaborate in working to strengthen countries counterterrorism capacity and inhibit the spread of extremist ideology. " No comprehensive, integrated strategy has been developed to guide the programs implementation. The documents used in planning TSCTP activities lack key elements that we have found to be needed in strategies for large interagency programs, such as a clear definition of the program's goals and objectives and milestones linked to these objectives.

Since 2001, Congress has appropriated about $640 billion for the global war on terrorism, the majority of it for operations in Iraq. In January 2007, the President announced "The New Way Forward" to stem violence in Iraq and enable the Iraqi government to foster national reconciliation. This new strategy established goals and objectives to be achieved over 12 to 18 months, or by July 2008. GAO discusses progress in meeting the following key goals of "The New Way Forward": (1) improve security conditions; (2) develop capable Iraqi security forces; and (3) help the Iraqi government enact key legislation, spend capital budgets, and provide essential services. GAO also discusses U.S. strategies for Iraq. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from U.S. agencies, the United Nations, and the Iraqi government. GAO also had staff stationed in Baghdad. Since May 2003, GAO has issued over 130 Iraq-related audits which have provided baseline information for this assessment. GAO prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority. GAO recommends that the Departments of Defense and State, in conjunction with relevant U.S. agencies, develop an updated strategy for Iraq that defines U.S. goals and objectives after July 2008, and addresses the long-term goal of achieving an Iraq that can govern, defend, and sustain itself., Report to Congressional Committees.