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The existence of a significant relationship between the concept of the balance of power and international law would be regarded as improbable by most modern international lawyers. They would think of the balance as a wholly obsolete conception and, in any case, as a part of international policy, or worse, part of cynical Realpolitik rather than of law. Earlier generations of jurists, however, did see international equilibrium either as an integral part of the system of rules of the law of nations or at least as a necessary precondition to the existence of such a law. Such a view of the interrelationship was never unanimous; indeed, there were in the past many legal observers who saw the balance of power as an obstacle to the development of an international legal order based on something more moral than force alone. This article is devoted to a study of the relationships between those two concepts as seen by the publicists who created the corpus of international law, principally during the period from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 to the outbreak of World War I in 1914. It is not a study of the balance of power at large—a topic to which volumes might be dedicated—but only of that idea’s relationship with law.

Even though most of the modern wars fought since the French Revolution have been wars of nationalism, including the American Civil War and the German War of 1866, hardly one of them has dispensed with the services of the foreigner, the one who is foreign by birth, descent or citizenship. In fact, nationalism itself, whether of the quiet and dignified kind 1 or the aggressive and noisy sort, has been unable to do without the services of the foreigner whether as ideologist and agitator,2 as the composer of national music,3 as worker or soldier. Foreigners have served the multi-national states of the 19th century (Austria-Hungary, the Papal States) as well as the national states and such embryonic states as Greece or the Latin American republics. They have helped to defend the status quo, in Europe and elsewhere, and they have helped to upset it. Without them the Boer War would not have lasted as long as it did. They have been soldiers of revolution and of counter-revolution, and occasionally the same man has served both. The French revolutionaries offered the supreme command to Duke Ferdinand of Brunswick, a man whose great military reputation was attested

Twice within 25 years, in 1919 and again in 1944–5, the idea of the balance of power hasbeen pronounced dead, and twice it has arisen from its seeming demise soon after such funereal exercises. Foremost among the obituaries were those of American statesmen, like Woodrow Wilson and Cordell Hull. When the latter returned from conferences in Moscow in the autumn of 1943, he stated, as if he were the true heir of Wilsonism, that “as the provisionsof the fournations declarations are carried into effect, there will no longer be need for spheres of influence, for balance of power, or any other of the special arrangements through which, in the unhappy past, the nations strove to safeguard their security.”

TOTAL LOSSES OF SOME BELLIGERENTS. Rather more often than losses of a tactical nature, may strategical or medical interpretations be adduced from the statistics, such as several of the belligerents have given out, concerning their total losses up to certain dates. The United States armed forces, through various agencies, made announcements about their casualties from the outbreak of the war to dates preceding the statements by two or three weeks, covering all theaters of war and not specific actions, but sometimes definite as to theaters. An early analysis of casualties according to area includes the following, arranged in importance according to their "costliness": North African, Philippine, European, South Pacific, Southwest Pacific, North American, Middle Eastern, Central Pacific, Asiatic, and Latin American (for the period up to January 31, 1944).1 American casualties through March 15, 1944, not long before the landing in Normandy, are given as follows, with a total of 173,239

T HE PROGRESS, SPATIAL and otherwise from limited and local state systems, in Italy, Europe, the Western hemisphere, to a world-wide system and world politics, Weltpolitik, has been accompanied by a progress in Weltangst, to use a term of German existential philosophy.' Much of grosse Politik, so-called, is conditioned, if not driven by grandes peurs, several of which, if one were to undertake a genealogy of fears and anxieties, would prove far from new ("Yellow Peril," etc.), and so are domestic politics.2 Both are anxiety-affected-in the extreme: anxiety-driven-fields. Some of the participation of the citizen in world politics takes place through a primary, unanalyzed anxiety, through what is sometimes called "an unhealthy interest," some through a rational, "healthy" interest in a problem presenting itself, newly or recurrent. Only to a limited extent would we be justified in calling the existence or the play on such anxieties characteristic of totalitarian regimes; not all leaders of democracies give or even promise "freedom from fear." The basic difference in this respect is rather this: that totalitarian regimes establish monopolies for the supreme anxifer, the fear maker, while in democracies anxiety-producers have to compete with one another as well as rationalizers of fears. One of the forms which anxiety about world politics assumes by preference, sometimes on slight, at other times on more massive, objective or subjective, provocation, is the encirclement complex, the concern about Einkreisung, kapitalistickeskoe okruzhenie, the fear of, the anxiety about one's own nation being ringed in system

The private fortunes of great men form a subject usually neglected by their biographers. The more idolizing the biographer, the less apt he is to consider it, as if such a hero's fortune were a partie honteuse in his life. In Bismarck's case, the forms and size of his fortune and the ways he acquired it, matters about which he himself was never reticent, were the object of hostile contemporary pamphleteering and much gossip then and later among friends and foes, high and low, princes and underlings.