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The judiciary is constitutionally vested with power to dispense justice to the citizens without fear, favor, ill-will or affection. This sacred function can only be effectively discharge if the judiciary exercises independence without any iota of interference from any person, body or organ. If that is the case it calls for the judiciary to defend its independence whenever interference is done or is likely to be done to it. This role, at any rate, is not intended to be discharged by individual judges. The appropriate organ to discharge this function is the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) which is mandated to ensure self-regulation of the judiciary. Judiciary is therefore expected to be at the frontline to always defend and promote the independence of the judiciary. This article, therefore, seeks to unveil whether or not the JSC of Tanzania is capable of protecting independence of our judiciary to enable the judges to perform their duty without reprisals or intimidations from any quarter. The author is of the view that a lot has to be done in terms of structure and mandates to realize rebirth of vibrant and independent JSC.

The concept of fair trial and the right to cross-examine by an accused person are fundamental in the broad spectrum of administration of justice in any jurisdiction. Both may well be said to form part of the concept of rule of law. The right to a fair trial is guaranteed in the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977 and in other laws just like the right to cross-examination of witnesses. The importance of affording parties a fair trial has been echoed by the international community in different international legal instruments. It is upon the courts, therefore to conduct trials fairly. One of the critical areas to ensuring fair trial is with respect to the manner the right of cross-examination is provided to the accused and exercised by the same. While admitting that the right to a fair trial takes on board the whole trial process from the beginning to the end, this article concentrates on the right to cross-examination. It is submitted here that the right to a fair trial is sometimes vitiated during the process of cross-examination when a party to a case (an accused or defendant as the case may be) exercises the right without being at least informed of the essence of doing the same. In such a situation it is as tantamount as the right has never been given to the accused. In short, as a matter of practice, the right to cross-examination is given haphazardly to, not only to children who are accused but also to unrepresented adult persons.