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In the chapter Sexual concepts from the book Philosophy of Sex and Love the author presents different views and attitudes on how we can understand what is sexual and under what conditions something can be called sexuality; can a mere touch be called sexual or must we have sexual intercourse; is love necessary for the sexual act or can we be aroused and have sexual intercourse without love? Is sexuality connected solely to reproduction? He explains why homosexual intercourse is on the same sexuality scale as heterosexual even though it can‘t produce children. The author also explores the concept of sexuality being socially constructed and not existing per se, and argues that sexuality has a stronger connection to touch as a form of communication between partners that stimulates the enrichment of sensations than to the act of sexual intercourse itself.

In this essay I explore the idea of whether there are sexual duties to others and what the source of such duties might be. I provide reasons for thinking that such duties exist (there might even be, ironically, a Christian sexual duty, flowing from the nature of agape). I also explore whether there are supererogatory sexual actions — sexual actions that go beyond the demands of duty. I begin with a personal example of having had sex with a woman in graduate school out of moral duty —at least what I thought at the time was my moral duty. I end by addressing numerous factors that can exist in such types of cases, showing how intricate and complex our thinking about these issues should be.

The philosophy of sexuality, like the philosophy of science, art or law, is the study of the concepts and propositions surrounding its central protagonist, in this case ‘sex’. Its practitioners focus on conceptual, metaphysical and normative questions. Conceptual philosophy of sex analyses the notions of sexual desire, sexual activity and sexual pleasure. What makes a feeling a sexual sensation? Manipulation of and feelings in the genitals are not necessary, since other body parts yield sexual pleasure. What makes an act sexual? A touch on the arm might be a friendly pat, an assault, or sex; physical properties alone do not distinguish them. What is the conceptual link between sexual pleasure and sexual activity? Neither the intention to produce sexual pleasure nor the actual experience of pleasure seems necessary for an act to be sexual. Other conceptual questions have to do not with what makes an act sexual, but with what makes it the type of sexual act it is. How should ‘rape’ be defined? What the conceptual differences are, if any, between obtaining sex through physical force and obtaining it by offering money is an interesting and important issue. Metaphysical philosophy of sex discusses ontological and epistemological matters: the place of sexuality in human nature; the relationships among sexuality, emotion and cognition; the meaning of sexuality for the person, the species, the cosmos. What is sex all about, anyway? That sexual desire is a hormone-driven instinct implanted by a god or nature acting in the service of the species, and that it has a profound spiritual dimension, are two – not necessarily incompatible – views. Perhaps the significance of sexuality is little different from that of eating, breathing and defecating; maybe, or in addition, sexuality is partially constitutive of moral personality. Normative philosophy of sex explores the perennial questions of sexual ethics. In what circumstances is it morally permissible to engage in sexual activity or experience sexual pleasure? With whom? For what purpose? With which body parts? For how long? The historically central answers come from Thomist natural law, Kantian deontology, and utilitarianism. Normative philosophy of sex also addresses legal, social and political issues. Should society steer people in the direction of heterosexuality, marriage, family? May the law regulate sexual conduct by prohibiting prostitution or homosexuality? Normative philosophy of sex includes nonethical value questions as well. What is good sex? What is its contribution to the good life? The breadth of the philosophy of sex is shown by the variety of topics it investigates: abortion, contraception, acquaintance rape, pornography, sexual harassment, and objectification, to name a few. The philosophy of sex begins with a picture of a privileged pattern of relationship, in which two adult heterosexuals love each other, are faithful to each other within a formal marriage, and look forward to procreation and family. Philosophy of sex, as the Socratic scrutiny of our sexual practices, beliefs and concepts, challenges this privileged pattern by exploring the virtues, and not only the vices, of adultery, prostitution, homosexuality, group sex, bestiality, masturbation, sadomasochism, incest, paedophilia and casual sex with anonymous strangers. Doing so provides the same illumination about sex that is provided when the philosophies of science, art and law probe the privileged pictures of their own domains.

In this essay, the author (actually, one of his personae, the one who sports suspenders) critically and perversely discusses over 50% of the words of Notre Dame professor Vittorio Hosle on the philosophy and humor of Woody Allen. Neither the copyeditor nor the proofreader of the journal (let alone its main editor) are responsible for the facts that the review-essay turned out to be mostly about Woody, and that its wry and derivative humor was a lame attempt to be a parody of Allen's humor. The humor of Vittorio could not be satirized, for the same reason that we are unable to ride unicorns, or to be rude to them. According to Soble, the central philosophical issue that Allen has been dealing with for decades, with time out for an affair with a young woman and a plate of Fettuccine Alfredo, is the Problem of Evil. In effect, Allen solves this perennial riddle, using Julia Roberts as his mouthpiece, by appealing to the opportunity that every movie maker or goer has to carry on wickedly with a young girl and Fettuccine Alfredo. The God who allowed nearly six million souls to die prematurely (before learning, say, how to fiddle), is not to be held accountable, because in His cosmic calculations, He is able to justify the ways of God to man through the value of blissfully wicked affairs and fettuccine, and by confirming the wisdom of what your Bubba has said to you over and over again: "QUIT YOUR KVETCHING!"

In The Reasons of Love, Harry Frankfurt proposes a philosophical account of love according to which there are four necessary conditions for the occurrence of love. We may ask reasonable questions about these four conditions: (1) Is each condition adequately analytically defined? (2) Is each condition plausibly a necessary condition for love, and has Frankfurt defended their necessity with good arguments? (3) Are all four conditions consistent with each other? And (4) if the four conditions are only necessary, and hence tell us only when love is absent, what must be added to Frankfurt’s account which would tell us, just as importantly, when love is present? In this essay I address these questions, although some more than others, especially in trying to understand Frankfurt’s claims about “self-love.” It emerges from this investigation that Frankfurt’s central metaethical thesis, which he has been advancing for three decades—that caring about or loving something logically precedes valuing it, and hence that we cannot have value-mentioning reasons for loving something or someone—starts to fall apart.

This essay historically explores philosophical views about the nature and significance of human sexuality, starting with the Ancient Greeks and ending with late 20th-century Western philosophy. Important figures from the history of philosophy (and theology) discussed include Sappho, Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, St. Jerome, the Pelagians, St. Thomas Aquinas, Michel de Montaigne, Rene Descartes, Thomas Hobbes, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Søren Kierkegaard, Arthur Schopenhauer, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Sigmund Freud, Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Wilhelm Reich, and Herbert Marcuse. Contemporary philosophers whose recent work is discussed include Michel Foucault, Thomas Nagel, Roger Scruton, Karol Wojtyla (Pope John Paul II), Catharine MacKinnon, Richard Posner, and John Finnis. To show the unity of the humanities, the writings of various literary figures are incorporated into this history, including Mark Twain, Arthur Miller, James Thurber, E. B. White, Iris Murdoch, and Philip Roth.

This essay is a case study of the self-destruction that occurs in the work of a social-constructionist historian of science who embraces a radical philosophy of science. It focuses on Thomas Laqueur's Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud in arguing that a history of science committed to the social construction of science and to the central theses of Kuhnian, Duhemian, and Quinean philosophy of science is incoherent through self-reference. Laqueur's text is examined in detail in order to make the main point; a similar phenomenon in the work of the feminist historian of science Evelyn Fox Keller is then briefly discussed.

In the first part (the "Doctrine of Right," the Rechtslehre) of his late, post-critical Metaphysics of Morals (1797), which part is devoted to the Law, Immanuel Kant tells us about a crime that is "deserving of death, with regard to which it still remains doubtful whether legislation is also authorized to impose the death penalty." This crime is "a mother's murder of her child."1 But Kant is not concerned with a Susan Smith, who drowned in an automobile submerged in a lake her properly, legally, conceived children. That it is "doubtful" that the law should be brought to bear against infanticide is reserved by Kant for a special case

Dans cet article, l'A evoque la vie sexuelle de Saint Augustin. L'A fait ici le point sur son homosexualite, son activite sexuelle et sur les ecrits concernant ces questions

I begin by describing the hideous nature of sexuality, that which makes sexual desire and activity morally suspicious, or at least what we have been told about the moral foulness of sex by, in particular, Immanuel Kant, but also by some of his predecessors (e.g., Augustine) and by some contemporary philosophers. A problem arises because acting on sexual desire, given this Kantian account of sex, apparently conflicts with the Categorical Imperative. I then propose a typology of possible solutions to this sex problem and critically discuss recent philosophical ethics of sex that fall into the typology's various categories.

I examine three common beliefs about love: constancy, exclusivity, and the claim that love is a response to the properties of the beloved. Following a discussion of their relative consistency, I argue that neither the constancy nor the exclusivity of love are saved by the contrary belief, that love is not (entirely) a response to the properties of the beloved. Introduction Three propositions about human love are held by many persons and by some philosophers, theologians, and poets: (1) love is constant, (2) love is exclusive, and (3) love is a response to the properties of the beloved. In what follows I begin by stating these beliefs in a reasonably precise way. It turns out that (3) poses problems for the truth of both (1) and (2), and so I examine a number of ways to make them mutually consistent. Doing so is important because these beliefs are often meant to describe accurately the love between, say, two adults in a successful marriage or to provide a picture of an ideal, the best that humans can achieve in their intimately personal, sexual, love relationships. (The love I am concerned with does not always, and need not, result in marriage. Nor is it restricted to heterosexuals.) The question of the compatibility of these beliefs is, then, really a question about the coherence of ordinary thought about love. Note that even though the problems are caused by (3), not much is gained by rejecting it. As I shall argue, neither the constancy nor the exclusivity of love are saved by the contrary belief, that love is not (entirely) a response to the properties of the beloved. 294 Soble: The Coherence of Love

Some exceptional and surprising mistakes of scholarship made in the writings of a number of feminist academics (Ruth Bleier, Ruth Hubbard, Susan Bordo, Sandra Harding, and Rae Langton) are examined in detail. This essay offers the psychological hypothesis that these mistakes were the result of political passion and concludes with some remarks about the ability of the social sciences to study the effect of the politics of the researcher on the quality of his or her research.

Dans le cadre d'une reflexion sur le comportement des hommes et des femmes precedant un rapport sexuel, l'A. examine les conseils prodigues par la politique d'offense sexuelle de l'universite d'Antioche, fondee sur l'idee d'un consentement verbal prealable a la moindre action. Soulevant la question du plaisir et du langage corporel, l'A. montre que la politique d'Antioche repose sur une conception atomiste de l'action contraire au principe de l'autonomie de l'individu

Feminist science critics, in particular Sandra Harding, Carolyn Merchant, and Evelyn Fox Keller, claim that misogynous sexual metaphors played an important role in the rise of modern science. The writings of Francis Bacon have been singled out as an especially egregious instance of the use of misogynous metaphors in scientific philosophy. This paper offers a defense of Bacon.

Evelyn Fox Keller's Reflections on Gender and Science1 was a provocative, interdisciplinary contribution to the feminist critique of science. Keller has con tinued her iconoclastic ways with Secrets of Life, Secrets of Death,2 a collection of essays published in various books and journals after Reflections. She is renowned, in particular, for her intriguing psychoanalytic exploration of the mas culinity of science, which was received with some fanfare, although primarily only among feminists.3 Still, Keller's essay "Feminism and Science" is the token feminist piece in the gigantic, mainstream teaching anthology The Philosophy of Science,4 so her work has been noticed, and will be scrutinized, by a wider audience. Many scholars occupied with the feminist epistemology project tip their hats to Keller for having done ground-breaking work.5 She proposed, for example, that "masculine" and "scientific" have, historically, been yoked to gether, but also that men's (or a masculine) cognitive/emotional style does not have to be the principal or only mode of investigating the world. In light of this latter supposition, we are naturally prompted to wonder how far the feminist revamping of science can be pushed. Would women's (or a feminine) cogni tive/emotional style have even more to contribute to our understanding of the world? In this paper I examine to what extent Keller's work grounds this exciting, but extreme, idea. Keller's attitude toward science can be situated in the humanist tradition that is more suspicious than congratulatory. We get a taste of this antipathy in Bertrand Russell, whose The Scientific Outlook6 voiced sixty years ago some of the concerns that animate Keller in Reflections and Secrets. According to Russell, "We may seek knowledge of an object because we love the object or because we wish to have power over it. The former impulse leads to the kind of knowledge that is contemplative, the latter to the kind that is practical" (p. 261). The original, ancient impulse for knowledge was the love for the world that sought the "ecstacy" (p. 262) of contemplating it, not the love for the material benefits of manipulating it. Where science went wrong was in replacing contemplation with manipulation. "In the development of science the power impulse has increasing ly prevailed over the love impulse" (p. 261), and science became "sadistic" (p. 263). Russell is here anticipating a motif of Keller's, for in speaking about the

Richard D. McAnulty Producing encyclopedias and reference sets on various topics has become a popular,and apparently lucrative, venture. Indeed, there are encyclopedias for almost everyimaginable topic (two of my favorites are the encyclopedia of hair and the onedevoted exclusively to Bob Dylan). There are literally hundreds of encyclopedias,most of which deal with very specific and relatively narrow topics. It should be nosurprise, then, that encyclopedias on sex have joined the fray. After all, sex does sell.Several recent encyclopedias address various aspects of sex and sexuality. Forexample, the same publisher, Greenwood Press, also offers an encyclopedia onprostitution and sex work (Ditmore, 2006). Better known is the four-volume setedited by Robert Francoeur, the

Feminist critics, particularly, Sandra Harding, Carolyn Merchant, and Evelyn Fox Keller, claim that misogynous sexual metaphors played an important role in the rise of modern science. The writings of Francis Bacon have been singled out as an especially egregious instance of the use of misogynous (“rape”) metaphors in scientific philosophy to promote the scientific method and to justify technological innovation. This chapter presents a defense of Bacon, arguing that the feminist reading of Bacon is based on misquotations, passages taken out of context, projection, and scholarly uncharitability.

Richard HULL: Editorial Foreword. Carol CARAWAY: Preface. Alan SOBLE: Introduction. ONE Jerome A. SHAFFER: Sexual Desire. TWO Donald LEVY: The Definition of Love in Plato's Symposium. THREE Hugh T. WILDER: The Language of Sex and the Sex of Language. FOUR Sexual Paradigms Twenty Years Later. FIVE Ann GARRY: Why Are Love and Sex Philosophically Interesting? SIX Sandra HARDING: Why Love and Sex Are Really Interesting. SEVEN Michael RUSE: Are There Gay Genes? Sociobiology and Homosexuality. EIGHT Lee RICE and Steven BARBONE: Hatching Your Genes Before They're Counted. NINE Robert PIELKE: Are Androgyny and Sexuality Compatible? TEN Eric HOFFMAN: Love as a Kind of Friendship. ELEVEN Donald LEVY: Three Kinds of Love. TWELVE Richard D. MOHR: Gay Civil Rights: The Arguments. THIRTEEN Linda LeMoncheck: What Is Wrong with Treating Women as Sex Objects? FOURTEEN Richard C. RICHARDS: Objections to Sex Objectification. FIFTEEN John P. SULLIVAN: Women as Sex Objects. SIXTEEN Ann GARRY: Sex (and Other) Objects. SEVENTEEN John MCMURTRY: Sex, Love, and Friendship. EIGHTEEN Jo-Ann PILARDI: Why Should We Exclude Exclusivity? NINETEEN Alan SOBLE: A Lakoma. TWENTY Deborah ROSEN and John CHRISTMAN: Toward a New Model of Sexuality. TWENTY-ONE Mary Ann CARROLL: Sexual and Other Activities and the Ideal Life. TWENTY-TWO Alan SOBLE: Sexual Activity. TWENTY-THREE Roger PADEN: Abortion and Sexual Morality. TWENTY-FOUR Alan SOBLE: More on Abortion and Sexual Morality. TWENTY-FIVE Russell VANNOY: Can Sex Express Love? TWENTY-SIX Edward JOHNSON: Lovesexpressed. TWENTY-SEVEN Steven BARBONE and Lee RICE: Spinoza and Human Sexuality. TWENTY-EIGHT Leonard J. BERKOWITZ: Sex: Plain and Symbol. TWENTY-NINE Claudia CARD: The Symbolic Significance of Sex. THIRTY Charles W. JOHNSON: Body Language. THIRTY-ONE M.C. DILLON: Sex, Time, and Love: Erotic Temporality. THIRTY-TWO Diane P. MICHELFELDER: Eros and Human Finitude. THIRTY-THREE Neera KAPUR BADHWAR: Friends as Ends in Themselves. THIRTY-FOUR Alan Gerald SOBLE: Irreplaceability. THIRTY-FIVE Russell VANNOY: The Structure of Sexual Perversity. THIRTY-SIX Carol CARAWAY: Romantic Love: Neither Sexist Nor Heterosexist. THIRTY-SEVEN Dana E. BUSHNELL: Love Without Sex. THIRTY-EIGHT Alan SOBLE: The Unity of Romantic Love. THIRTY-NINE Carol CARAWAY: Romantic Love: A Patchwork. FORTY Stephen M. FISHMAN: Marital Friendship: Toward a Reconception of Romance. FORTY-ONE Hilde LINDEMANN NELSON and James LINDEMANN NELSON: An Unromantic Reply to Marital Friendship. FORTY-TWO Christine PIERCE: AIDS and Bowers v. Hardwick. FORTY-THREE David J. MAYO: An Obligation to Warn of HIV Infection? FORTY-FOUR Alan SOBLE: Love at Second Sight. FORTY-FIVE Gene FENDT: Is Works of Love a Work of Love? FORTY-SIX Steven M. EMMANUEL: Biography in the Interpretation of Kierkegaard. FORTY-SEVEN T.F. MORRIS: Kierkegaard on Despair in Works of Love. FORTY-EIGHT Anthony J. GRAYBOSCH: Which One Is the Real One? FORTY-NINE Richard C. RICHARDS: Love Is the Real One. FIFTY Timo AIRAKSINEN: The Style of Sade: Sex, Text, and Cruelty. FIFTY-ONE Dorothea OLKOWSKI: Repetition and Revulsion in the Marquis de Sade. FIFTY-TWO Steven G. SMITH: The Attraction of Gender. FIFTY-THREE Nancy E. SNOW: Are the Attractions of Gender Really Attractions? FIFTY-FOUR Natalie DANDEKAR: Eros, Romantic Illusion, and Political Opportunism (Symposium 178-180). FIFTY-FIVE Carol S. GOULD: Romantic and Philosophical Views of Eros in Plato's Symposium. FIFTY-SIX Joseph KUPFER: Romantic Love. FIFTY-SEVEN Solving Stendhal's Problem Art Stawinski. FIFTY-EIGHT Imagination, and Other, Matters. FIFTY-NINE Justin LEIBER: Pornography, Art, and the Origins of Consciousness. SIXTY Sylvia WALSH: Desire and Love in Kierkegaard's Either/Or. Contributors. Index.

A principle of paternalism must be able to answer three questions. Who are the persons who are the proper object of paternalism? Which actions should we prevent persons from doing or induce them to perform? What should our goals be when acting paternalistically toward these persons? A satisfactory principle will also be reasonably precise in distinguishing appropriate from inappropriate instances of paternalism, and it will be comprehensive, speaking to most (if not all) potential cases, including suicide. My purpose is not to reach a conclusion about the acceptability of paternalistic restrictions on suicide. Rather, because such a conclusion will follow from the way in which a principle of paternalism is formulated, I want to examine several liberal attempts at formulation and the theoretical background underlying these attempts.