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Traditional models of skill learning posit that skilled action unfolds in an automatic manner and that control will prove deleterious to movement and performance proficiency. These perspectives assume that automated processes are characterised by low levels of control and vice versa. By contrast, a number of authors have recently put forward hybrid theories of skilled action which have sought to capture the close integration between fine-grained automatic motor routines and intentional states. Drawing heavily on the work of Bebko et al. (2005) and Christensen et al. (2016), we argue that controlled and automated processes must operate in parallel if skilled performers are to address the wide range of challenges that they are faced with in training and competition. More specifically, we show how skilled performers use controlled processes to update and improve motor execution in training contexts and to stabilise performance under pressurised conditions.

This chapter considers whether optimal/peak performance is as automatic or ‘mindless’ as many accounts of expertise suggest. It starts by exploring the phenomenon known as ‘flow’ which is typically presented as evidence that peak performance is mindless or automatic in nature. It then reviews recent literature in this area which reveals that the mind remains online during skilled action and especially during ‘clutch’ performances or when athletes are seeking to ‘make it happen’. It proceeds to discuss how ‘mindedness’ and bodily awareness are integral features of peak performance. It then uses this argument to uncover the potential perils associated with ‘non-mindedness’ or automated performance. In particular, the chapter discusses how excessive automaticity prevents athletes from exercising attentional control and results in a number of undesirable outcomes including slips, lapses, and in extreme cases, ‘choking’ under pressure.

What is the role of habitual movement in expert action? This chapter begins by reviewing traditional conceptualizations of habit according to which our well-learned movements are mechanical-like tendencies to respond to stimuli in a preordained manner. It then draws on a range of theoretical perspectives which emphasize the generative nature of habits. It proceeds to discuss a variety of the ‘crises’ which confront the performing body (e.g. injury, ageing, normalization of bodily processes) and suggest that habits must be inherently flexible if experts are to successfully address these latter challenges. In doing so, it draws on the work of theorists such as Bourdieu, Carlisle, and Dewey. The chapter concludes by discussing some of the pedagogical strategies such as discursive practice that coaches and practitioners may use to extend habitual movement capacities and address habitual crises. It argues that experts acquire flexible habits which allows them to act back upon the body and to initiate change.

A considerable volume of research has explored spectators’ attraction to the aesthetic aspects of sport. However, considerably less attention has been devoted to an evaluation of the aesthetic dimension of sport from the performer’s perspective. This chapter hypothesizes that such evaluation can benefit athletic skill. It substantiates and elucidates some of the types of aesthetic experiences athletes may undergo and considers their potential use in sports. The chapter argues that athletes sometimes evaluate their actions by determining whether they have certain aesthetic quality, such as whether a movement embodies power or feels somehow just beautifully right. In bringing some of these ideas together it considers how an athlete’s aesthetic awareness of their own movements might be conducive to better practice and performance. This thesis is propaedeutic to future empirical work investigating the role of aesthetic self-evaluation in athletic performance.

What role might intuition and deliberation play during the performance of well-learned skills? Dreyfus and Dreyfus’ (1986) influential phenomenological analysis of skill-acquisition proposes that expert performance is guided by non-cognitive responses which are fast, effortless, and intuitive in nature. Although Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) recognize that, on occasions (e.g. when performance goes awry for some reason), a form of ‘detached deliberative rationality’ may be used by experts to improve their performance, they see no role for calculative problem solving or deliberation (i.e. drawing on rules or mental representations) when performance is going well. The current chapter counters this argument by drawing on empirical evidence and phenomenological description to argue that skilled performers use cognitive control (an executive function) across a range of sporting situations (i.e. in training, pre-performance routines, on-line skill execution) in order to maintain and enhance performance proficiency.

This penultimate chapter considers how athletes might develop the ability to exert attentional control. It outlines some approaches that might help athletes to switch their focus or re-distribute patterns of attention when they realize they have adopted task-irrelevant thoughts. It evaluates the use of mindfulness, quiet-eye training, pressurized training, among other approaches, as means of training attentional control. The chapter concludes by outlining a series of methodological approaches that might be employed by researchers wishing to test some of the predictions put forth by our model of skilled action and our proposal that skilled maintenance is underpinned by the flexible deployment of attentional resources.

After identifying some of the weaknesses associated with linear, or serial, models of skill learning—with a focus on their failure to fully account for the ongoing relevance of motor control and attention to action—this chapter synthesizes the evidence presented over the course of this book to construct a model of skilled action that captures the complex relationship between automaticity and attentional focus. This model explains how these two processes operate in a synergistic fashion to help experts overcome the challenges they face in seeking to not only maintain but to continue to improve performance proficiency over long timescales, to update and improve motor execution in training contexts, and to stabilize performance under pressurized conditions. The chapter concludes by briefly discussing the role metacognition plays in allowing expert performers to identify and apply situationally appropriate modes of control.

In this chapter, the phenomenon of continuous improvement is introduced and it is suggested that conscious processes play a crucial role in the maintenance and improvement of performance proficiency among skilled performers. This thesis is intriguing because it runs counter to a body of research warning us of the perils of thinking too much, or even at all, about highly practised movement. By contrast, it argues that continuous improvement is mediated by a performer’s ability to reflect and consciously guide their action during practice and performance. It critically evaluates some of the dominant paradigms in the skill acquisition literature, including information processing approaches and theories of embodiment, and explains why the book’s stance is intellectualist and pragmatic in nature. Lastly, it provides an overview of the remaining chapters in the book.

Prominent theories of skill acquisition posit that the performing body is absent during ‘habitualized’ or well-learned action. This chapter challenges this position by arguing that the body is never forgotten during skilled movement. Instead, it possesses what might be termed an enduring presence. Drawing on Colombetti’s (2011) taxonomy of the bodily self, the chapter shows how skilled performers may experience either a reflective or pre-reflective mode of bodily awareness depending on what they attend to during online skill execution. It proposes that while the body is always lived through as the subject of experience, performers will often have little choice but to take the body as the intentional object of their awareness. The chapter concludes by arguing that it is the dynamic interplay of various forms of bodily awareness that facilitates optimal performance and allows skilled performers to confront the challenges (e.g. injury, performance slumps) that are a ubiquitous feature of competitive environments.

The final chapter synthesizes the arguments presented over the course of the book by suggesting that skill execution continues to be governed by conscious processes even after performers have attained a high level of expertise. It argues that skill-focused attention is necessary if experts are to eschew proceduralization and react flexibly to ‘crises’ and fine-grained changes in situational demands. In doing so, it discusses the role played by conscious control, reflection, and bodily awareness in maintaining performance proficiency. It suggests that skill maintenance and continuous improvement are underpinned by the use of both automated procedures (acknowledging that these are inherently active and flexible) and metacognitive knowledge. The chapter concludes by briefly considering how skill-focused attention needs to be applied in both training and performance contexts in order to facilitate continuous improvement.

How do great athletes defy the power law of practice, according to which improvements in skill eventually plateau? To solve this puzzle, this book presents a theory of ‘continuous improvement’ which emphasizes the role that conscious processes play in maintaining and advancing skilled performers’ movement capacities. It argues that continuous improvement requires the use of processes such as abstract thought and bodily awareness in order to strategically alter and improve habitual movements in response to contextual demands. The book also elucidates a number of strategies that might be used to improve an athlete’s attentional control and help them switch their focus when they realize they have adopted task-irrelevant thoughts. Finally, it presents a range of methodological approaches that might be used by researchers to better understand the attentional flexibility that characterizes skilled action across training and performance contexts.

Objectives The present paper elucidates some cognitive mechanisms of expertise in sport that have emerged from recent studies of three topics in psychology: motor imagery; flow and “clutch” states; and the “quiet eye” phenomenon. Design A selective narrative review was conducted of research on the three preceding topics. Special consideration was given to recent studies by European researchers on these topics. Method Following a brief overview of theoretical approaches to sport expertise, the paper examines certain cognitive mechanisms of elite athletic performance that have emerged from recent studies of motor imagery; flow and “clutch” states; and the “quiet eye” phenomenon. In the final section, conclusions are drawn about theoretical progress in understanding the cognitive mechanisms of expertise in sport. Results The mechanisms underlying sport expertise reflect both task-specific and universal cognitive processes (e.g., mental representations). Conclusion Considerable progress has been made in identifying the cognitive mechanisms underlying expertise in sport but additional research is required to address certain unresolved issues in this field.

Cognitive sport psychology is concerned with the scientific investigation of “cognitive” processes in sport performers. The classical paradigm in cognitive psychology was shaped significantly by a symposium held on 11 September 1956 at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The concept of the mind as a representational information-processing system revolutionized cognitive psychology for one major reason: it challenged the prevailing behaviourist view that, as mental processes were unobservable, they could not be studied scientifically. Arising from the limitations of the information-processing paradigm, a range of embodiment approaches to the study of cognition emerged in psychology in the early 1990s. Research in cognitive sport psychology is influenced by two main theoretical paradigms – the classical or information-processing approach and a range of embodiment approaches. Evidence to support embodiment theories in psychology has emerged from numerous sources, especially in the field of perception.

Eye tracking technology records the location, duration and sequence of people’s visual fixations when they inspect a given scene. In this way, it elucidates what people pay attention to when they l...

Motor imagery (MI) involves consciously performing an action in our minds without engaging in overt physical movement. Although inhibition is crucial to MI, few studies have explored the nature of ...

Introduction Cognitive training is an important training modality which allows the user to rehearse a procedure without physically carrying it out. This has led to recent interests to incorporate cognitive training within surgical education but research is currently limited. The use of cognitive training in surgery is not clear-cut and so this study aimed to determine whether, relative to a control condition, the use of cognitive training improves technical surgical skills on a ureteroscopy simulator, and if so whether one cognitive training method is superior. Methods This prospective, comparative study recruited 59 medical students and randomized them to one of three groups: control- simulation training only (n = 20), flashcards cognitive training group (n = 20) or mental imagery cognitive training group (n = 19). All participants completed three tasks at baseline on the URO Mentor simulator followed by the cognitive intervention if randomized to receive it. Participants then returned to perform an assessment task on the simulator. Outcome measures from the URO Mentor performance report was used for analysis and a quantitative survey was given to all participants to assess usefulness of training received. Results This study showed cognitive training to have minimal effects on technical skills of participants. The mental imagery group had fewer laser misfires in the assessment task when compared to both control and flashcards group (p = 0.017, p = 0.036, respectively). The flashcards group rated their preparation to be most useful when compared to control (p = 0.0125). Other parameters analyzed between the groups did not reach statistical significance. Cognitive training was found to be feasible and cost effective when carried out in addition to simulation training. Conclusion This study has shown that the role of cognitive training within acquisition of surgical skills is minimal and that no form of cognitive training was superior to another. Further research needs to be done to evaluate other ways of performing cognitive training.

Resumen Introduccion La formacion cognitiva es una modalidad de formacion importante que permite al usuario ensayar un procedimiento sin realizarlo fisicamente. Esto ha llevado a intereses recientes a incorporar la formacion cognitiva en la educacion quirurgica, pero la investigacion actualmente es limitada. El uso de la formacion cognitiva en cirugia no es claro, por lo que este estudio tuvo como objetivo determinar si, en relacion con una condicion de control, el uso de la formacion cognitiva mejora las habilidades quirurgicas tecnicas en un simulador de ureteroscopia y, si es asi, si un metodo de formacion cognitiva es superior. Metodos Este estudio prospectivo y comparativo recluto a 59 estudiantes de medicina y los asigno al azar a uno de los 3 grupos: formacion de simulacion de control solamente (n = 20), grupo de formacion cognitiva de tarjetas educativas (n = 20) o grupo de formacion cognitiva de imagenes mentales (n = 19). Todos los participantes completaron 3 tareas al inicio en el simulador URO Mentor, seguidas de la intervencion cognitiva si se asignaron al azar para recibirla. Los participantes regresaron para realizar una tarea de evaluacion en el simulador. Las medidas de resultado del informe de ejecucion URO Mentor se usaron para el analisis y se realizo una encuesta cuantitativa a todos los participantes para evaluar la utilidad de la formacion recibida. Resultados Este estudio mostro que la formacion cognitiva tiene efectos minimos en las habilidades tecnicas de los participantes. El grupo de imagenes mentales tuvo menos fallos de laser en la tarea de evaluacion en comparacion tanto con el grupo control como con el de tarjetas educativas (p = 0,017, p = 0,036, respectivamente). El grupo de tarjetas educativas califico su preparacion para ser mas util en comparacion con el control (p = 0,0125). Otros parametros analizados entre los grupos no alcanzaron significacion estadistica. Se descubrio que la formacion cognitiva era factible y rentable cuando se llevaba a cabo ademas de la formacion de simulacion. Conclusion Este estudio ha demostrado que el papel de la formacion cognitiva en la adquisicion de habilidades quirurgicas es minimo y que ninguna forma de entrenamiento cognitivo fue superior a otra. Se necesita investigar mas para evaluar otras formas de realizar entrenamiento cognitivo.

The purpose of this study was to test the feasibility of a theory-based self-regulation intervention to increase older adolescents' leisure time physical activity (LTPA) behavior. Forty-nine adolescents (M = 15.78 years; SD = 0.52; 31% female) from two schools agreed to participate. Participants were randomly assigned to the experimental or control arm at the school level. The experimental group (n = 24) underwent a brief self-regulation intervention for six weeks. The control group (n = 25) continued with standard classes. Intervention fidelity data was collected to assess feasibility. Outcome measures included self-reported LTPA behavior and self-regulation technique use. Intervention sessions were delivered as intended, participant attendance was high and compliance with intervention content was acceptable. The experimental group reported higher levels of LTPA behavior eight weeks post-intervention and increased use of self-regulation techniques. A brief theory-based self-regulation intervention delivered in a school-setting appears feasible and may increase LTPA behavior and self-regulation in adolescents.

Recent years have witnessed an upsurge of research interest in motor imagery (MI; sometimes known as mental practice) or the mental simulation of actions without any concomitant bodily movement. While numerous experimental studies have demonstrated the efficacy of MI in improving skilled performance in fields such as music, sport and medical surgery, few to date have investigated the extent to which MI and motor execution share similar cognitive mechanisms. Therefore, to address this gap, the present studies explored the relationship between the executed and imagined movements of expert pianists. Study 1 explored the effects of movement complexity and force on the time required for nine pianists to actually perform and imagine performing a musical composition. Results revealed that although the durations of participants’ imagined performances were longer than those of executed ones, stage-duration variations during execution were mirrored in the stage-duration variations during MI. In Study 2, seven pianists’ pupil-size measurements (obtained using Tobii eye-tracking glasses) were used to explore changes in cognitive effort between executed and imagined piano performance. Results showed that pupil-size measurements during executed and imagined piano playing were similar. The significance of the findings is discussed and some potential new directions for research are identified.

Empirical evidence demonstrates that performing artists are confronted by a variety of ‘bodily crises’ (e.g., injury, attrition of habits induced by ageing) over the course of their careers (Wainwright, Williams, & Turner, 2005). Such crises may present a serious threat to the embodied subject. Unfortunately, many prominent theories of skill acquisition (e.g., Fitts & Posner, 1967) appear to evacuate the body from performance by suggesting that any form of conscious processing (i.e., paying conscious attention to one's action during motor skill execution) will disrupt habitual behaviour. As a result, few researchers have considered how performers might tackle bodily anomalies. In the current paper, we seek to address this issue by discussing a variety of the ‘crises’ that confront the performing body. We start by discussing a number of disciplinary practices that may contribute to these crises. Next, we argue that habitual movements must be open to ‘acts of creativity’ in order to maintain a productive relationship between the performing body and the environment. Then we consider what this ‘creative action’ might involve and discuss a number of approaches (e.g., mindfulness, somaesthetic awareness) that could maintain and improve one's movement proficiency. Here, our argument draws on Dewey's (1922) pragmatist philosophy and his belief that ‘intelligent habit’ was required to help people to improve their movement functioning. Finally, we consider the implications of our argument for current conceptualisations of ‘habitual’ movement and recommend that researchers explore the adaptive and flexible capacity of the performing body.

We used a novel meta regression analysis approach to examine the effectiveness of 24psychological skills training and behavioral interventions in sport assessed using single-case 25experimental designs (SCEDs). One hundred and twenty-one papers met the inclusion criteria 26applied to eight database searches and key sport psychology journals. Seventy-one studies 27reported sufficient detail for effect sizes to be calculated for the effects of psychological skills 28training on psychological, behavioral, and performance variables. The unconditional mean 29effect size for weighted (∆ = 2.40) and unweighted (∆ = 2.83 ) models suggested large 30improvements in psychological, behavioral, and performance outcomes associated with 31implementing cognitive-behavioral psychological skills training and behavioral interventions 32with a SCED. However, meta-regression analysis revealed important heterogeneities and 33sources of bias within this literature. First, studies using a group-based approach reported 34lower effect sizes compared to studies using single-case approaches. Second, the single-case 35studies, (over 90 per cent the effect sizes), revealed upwardly biased effect sizes arising from: 36(i) positive publication bias such that studies using lower numbers of baseline observations 37reported larger effects, while studies using larger numbers of baseline observations reported 38smaller – but still substantial – effects; (ii) not adopting a multiple baseline design; and (iii) 39not establishing procedural reliability. We recommend that future researchers using SCED’s 40should consider these methodological issues. 41Keywords: meta regression analysis, psychological skills training, single-case experimental 42designs, procedural reliability, applied sport psychology

Objectives Motor imagery (MI) is a dynamic mental state during which the representation of a given motor movement is rehearsed in working memory without overt motor output. Mental practice (MP; also known as motor imagery practice) is the systematic application of MI for the cognitive rehearsal of a task in the absence of overt physical movements. Although MP is known to enhance skilled performance, debate still exists about the magnitude and moderators of these imagery effects. Against this background, and amid concerns about the “reproducibility crisis” in psychology, it seems timely to revisit, update and extend a key meta-analysis of MP effects published over two decades ago – namely, that of Driskell, Copper, and Moran (1994). To this end, the present paper reports a methodological replication of the Driskell et al’s (1994) meta-analysis of MP effects. Design & method Included are 37 studies on MP effects published between 1995 and 2018. Nine factors were selected to examine the extent to which they moderate the effectiveness of mental practice, providing a window into the conditions under which mental practice is most effectively implemented. Practice Type (Mental or Physical), Expertise, Duration of practice (both program and session), Task Type, and Control Type were retained as factors of interest from the original Driskell et al. (1994) meta-analysis. In order to further explore the nuance of mental practice implementation, we additionally examined the Imagery Type, the Performance Measure used, Activity Type (team versus individual activities) and the Setting of the intervention. Results Following publication bias analyses, our results confirm that overall, MP has a small but significant positive effect on performance (r = 0.131). Moderators of this beneficial effect were MP duration, type of task and type of imagery used. Conclusions We conclude that MP has an enduring positive influence on performance.

Motor imagery (MI; mental simulation of actions) shares certain mental representations and processes with executed movement (ME). This neurocognitive overlap between MI and ME may explain why the systematic use of MI improves skilled performance in numerous domains. Unfortunately, the attentional mechanisms underlying MI remain unresolved. Therefore, the present studies investigated the role of attentional effort (as measured by pupil dilation) in MI. We evaluated the effects of movement complexity and speed on expert pianists' pupil dilation as they physically executed and used MI to perform easy/complex and slow/fast music phrases. Results revealed that easy movements required similar levels of attentional effort during MI and ME. However, during complex movements performed at a fast speed, the correspondence between execution and imagery of movement was disrupted.

What exactly is “concentration”, and how is it related to the broader psychological construct of attention? what theories and metaphors best help us to understand attentional processes? why do skilled performers “lose” their concentration? what are the building blocks of effective concentration? how is attention related to situational awareness and visual-perceptual skills? The chapter presents answers for these questions using the principles and findings of cognitive psychology – a discipline that studies how the mind works in acquiring, storing and using knowledge. In psychology, the term “attention” refers to a cognitive system that facilitates the selection of some stimuli for further processing while inhibiting that of other stimuli. In sport and performance psychology, considerable research has been conducted on how experts and novices use their perceptual system to guide their attention. In psychology, “pupillometry” is the objective measurement of mental effort though task-evoked changes in the diameter of the pupil of the eye during cognitive processing.

We are constantly bombarded by information. Therefore, during every waking moment of our lives, we face decisions about which stimuli to prioritize and which ones to ignore. To complicate matters, the information that clamors for our attention includes not only events that occur in the world around us but also experiences that originate in the subjective domain of our own thoughts and feelings. The end result is that our minds can consciously attend to only a fraction of the rich kaleidoscope of information and experiences available to us from our senses, thoughts, memories, and imagination. Attentional processes such as “concentration,” or the ability to focus on the task at hand while ignoring distractions, are crucial for success in sport and other domains of skilled performance. To illustrate, Venus Williams, one of the greatest tennis players of all time, proclaimed that “for the players it is complete and pure focus. You don’t see anything or hear anything except the ball and what’s going on in your head.” For psychological scientists, concentration resembles a mental spotlight (like the head-mounted torch that miners and divers wear in dark environments) that illuminates targets located either in the external world around us or in the internal world of our subjective experiences. A major advantage of this spotlight metaphor is that it shows us that concentration is never “lost”—although it can be diverted to targets (whether in the external world or inside our heads) that are irrelevant to the task at hand. Research on attentional processes in sport and performance has been conducted in cognitive psychology (the study of how the mind works), cognitive sport psychology (the study of mental processes in athletes), and cognitive neuroscience (the study of how brain systems give rise to mental processes). From this research, advances have been made both in measuring attentional processes and in understanding their significance in sport and performance settings. For example, pupillometry, or the study of changes in pupil diameter as a function of cognitive processing, has been used as an objective index of attentional effort among skilled performers such as musicians and equestrian athletes. Next, research suggests that a heightened state of concentration (i.e., total absorption in the task at hand) is crucial to the genesis of “flow” states (i.e., rare and elusive moments when everything seems to come together for the performer) and optimal performance in athletes. More recently, studies have shown that brief mindfulness intervention programs, where people are trained to attend non-judgmentally to their own thoughts, feelings, and sensations, offer promise in the quest to enhance attentional skills in elite athletes. By contrast, anxiety has been shown to divert skilled performers’ attention to task-irrelevant information—sometimes triggering “choking” behavior or the sudden and significant deterioration of skilled performance. Finally, concentration strategies such as “trigger words” (i.e., the use of short, vivid, and positively phrased verbal reminders such as “this ball now”) are known to improve athletes’ ability to focus on a specific target or to execute skilled actions successfully.

A number of influential theories of skill acquisition posit that the performing body is an absent presence during “habitualized” action. The current article counters this claim by drawing on a wide range of empirical and phenomenological evidence to argue that the body is never forgotten during skilled movement. We draw on Colombetti’s (2011) taxonomy of the bodily self to show how skilled performers may experience either a reflective or prereflective mode of bodily awareness depending on the foci of attention adopted during online skill execution. We argue that it is the dynamic interplay of these latter forms of bodily awareness that facilitates optimal performance and allows skilled performers to confront the challenges (e.g., injury, performance slumps) that are a ubiquitous feature of competitive environments.

Classical theories of skill acquisition propose that automatization (i.e., performance requires progressively less attention as experience is acquired) is a defining characteristic of expertise in a variety of domains (e.g., Fitts & Posner, 1967 ). Automaticity is believed to enhance smooth and efficient skill execution by allowing performers to focus on strategic elements of performance rather than on the mechanical details that govern task implementation ( Williams & Ford, 2008 ). By contrast, conscious processing (i.e., paying conscious attention to one's action during motor execution) has been found to disrupt skilled movement and performance proficiency (e.g., Beilock & Carr, 2001 ). On the basis of this evidence, researchers have tended to extol the virtues of automaticity. However, few researchers have considered the wide range of empirical evidence which indicates that highly automated behaviors can, on occasion, lead to a series of errors that may prove deleterious to skilled performance. Therefore, the purpose of the current paper is to highlight the perils, rather than the virtues, of automaticity. We draw on Reason's (1990) classification scheme of everyday errors to show how an overreliance on automated procedures may lead to 3 specific performance errors (i.e., mistakes, slips, and lapses) in a variety of skill domains (e.g., sport, dance, music). We conclude by arguing that skilled performance requires the dynamic interplay of automatic processing and conscious processing in order to avoid performance errors and to meet the contextually contingent demands that characterize competitive environments in a range of skill domains.