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President Donald Trump’s Africa policy is often characterized as one of indifference towards the continent. The news of four American soldiers killed in combat with ISIS on the border of Mali and Niger, however, demonstrated the reality of the situation, which is that American troops are increasing their involvement in counterterrorism on the continent. This paper uses the Niger incident as its starting point to examine the Trump administration’s military policy in Africa against Al Qaeda and ISIS affiliated groups. Trump’s rhetoric and stated policy about Africa contrasts with the reality on the ground, where the US considers the war on terrorism there to be strategically important. The presence of the US Army and its actions in Somalia, Libya, Niger and in Nigeria demonstrate that Trump has carried over some of the active military policies of George W. Bush and Barack Obama. Trump, however, has changed the US strategy from an emphasis on foreign aid and peacekeeping to a focus on the use of significant military force and firepower to defeat Al Qaeda and ISIS terrorist groups. The wars in Africa fit into Trump’s worldwide war on terrorism aimed at destroying Al Qaeda and ISIS, and in which the administration is prepared to accept significant American casualties.

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This article addresses the question whether the French military intervention in Mali in 2013 (Operation Serval) and the follow-up Operation Barkhane are evidence of a new French military strategy in Africa. The first part briefly sets out the chronology of events that led to the French intervention. The decisionmaking process in Paris that led to the decision to intervene and the sequence of events following the intervention is then examined, in order to show that this raised important questions about the viability of the key principles - partnership, 'Africanization' and 'Europeanization' - that informed and underpinned France's Africa policy from the late 1990s. It is argued that Operation Serval and the follow-on operation, Barkhane, need to be understood, first, in the context of the importance attached to Africa as a privileged arena for the projection of French power overseas. Second, they must be understood in the geopolitical context of the neo-liberal post-Cold War international order, within which France, as a major western power and permanent member of the UNSC, feels it has a responsibility to undertake certain actions. Third, they should also be understood against the background of the failure to reform the institutional architecture of Africa policymaking, in particular the roles of the Ministry of Defence and the 'Africa cell' at the Elysée Palace, which have traditionally played a pivotal role in Africa policy. Finally, the article argues that a new Africa strategy did emerge under President Hollande, albeit in an unplanned and incremental manner, but that the resulting policy is some distance from representing a renovated, or 'normalized', Africa policy based on a new partnership with Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Teenage pregnancy remains an important and complex issue around the world, with reports indicating that Africa has higher rates than other continents. Studies have indicated that social and economic determinants are associated with these higher rates. Therefore this study aims to identify the social and economic influencers of teenage pregnancy which would help develop a best-practice approach to reduce its incidence in Africa. Methods: Data sets from the World Bank Organisation between 2008 and 2010 specific to 51 Africa countries were obtained to conduct this study, based on availability. Independent t-test, Spearman's correlation and regression analysis were performed. The eight social and economic variables used in this study are: GDP per capita, GINI index, Female Literacy rate, Health expenditure, Unemployed female rate, Gender equality, Contraceptive prevalence and urban population rate. Results: Independent t-test revealed that in countries where teenage pregnancy rate is high, Literacy rate, contraceptive prevalence rate and Healthcare expenditure rate was low. Spearman correlation indicated that female literacy rate, Healthcare expenditure, GDP per capita and Contraceptive prevalence had a significant inverse relationship with teenage pregnancy rate. Logistic regression indicates that Female Literacy rate is the best predictor of teenage pregnancy in Africa. Conclusion: Result suggest that a practical approach to reduce teenage pregnancy rate in Africa is to implement strategies and policies aimed at improving female literacy rate, Health care expenditure and the GDP per capita of a country. Additionally, an increase in female literacy rate would concurrently increase Contraceptive prevalence rate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines convergence between the United Kingdom and France in West Africa since 1997–1998. This readiness to work together on African issues is in stark contrast to the history of rivalry between the two nations on the continent that dates back at least to the Fashoda incident of 1898. The article shows how security concerns in West Africa were a key driver of Anglo-French convergence and then goes on to examine how far the United Kingdom and France have been able to move beyond their traditional, largely unilateral, policies within their spheres of influence in West Africa and adopt a new, more cooperative approach. The article uses three case studies—convergence within the United Nations Security Council and the European Union and engagement with Economic Community of West African States—to provide examples of different areas of convergence. It then goes on to ask how far we can generalize from these case studies about what enables convergence and cooperation and what hinders them. Finally, the question of regime efficacy, in terms of the outcomes of convergence, is addressed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]