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Advance directives entail a refusal expressed by a still-healthy patient. Three consequences stem from that fact: (a) advance refusal is unspecific, since it is impossible to predict what the patient's conditions and the risk-benefit ratio may be in the foreseeable future; (b) those decisions cannot be as well informed as those formulated while the disease is in progress; (c) while both current consent and refusal can be revoked as the disease unfolds, until the treatment starts out, advance directives become effective when the patient becomes incapable or unconscious; such decisions can therefore not be revoked at any stage of the disease. Therefore, advance directives are binding for doctors only at the stage of advance treatment planning, i.e., only if they refer to an illness already in progress.

This paper takes a novel approach to the active bioethical debate over whether advance medical directives have moral authority in dementia cases. Many have assumed that advance directives would lack moral authority if dementia truly produced a complete discontinuity in personal identity, such that the predementia individual is a separate individual from the postdementia individual. I argue that even if dementia were to undermine personal identity, the continuity of the body and the predementia individual's rights over that body can support the moral authority of advance directives. I propose that the predementia individual retains posthumous rights over her body that she acquired through historical embodiment in that body, and further argue that claims grounded in historical embodiment can sometimes override or exclude moral claims grounded in current embodiment. I close by considering how advance directives grounded in historical embodiment might be employed in practice and what they would and would not justify., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2019. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

Some authors have questioned the moral authority of advance directives (ADs) in cases in which it is not clear if the author of the AD is identical to the person to whom it later applies. This article focuses on the question of whether the latest results of neuroimaging studies have moral significance with regard to the moral authority of ADs in patients with disorders of consciousness (DOCs). Some neuroimaging findings could provide novel insights into the question of whether patients with DOCs exhibit sufficient psychological continuity to be ascribed diachronic personal identity. If those studies were to indicate that psychological continuity is present, they could justify the moral authority of ADs in patients with DOCs. This holds at least if respect for self-determination is considered as the foundation for the moral authority of ADs. The non-identity thesis in DOCs could no longer be applied, in line with clinical and social practice.

Purpose of Review: The aim of this review is to examine literature relating to the withdrawal of life-sustaining therapy (WLST)., Recent Findings: Discussions regarding end-of-life issues in adults and children are not occurring comprehensively. Discussions relating to the WLST in the pediatric population varies by institution and may vary by race, age, health insurance, diagnosis, and severity of illness. Completing advance directives prior to placement of life-sustaining treatments is not consistent practice. With the WLST, differences in perspectives exist between medical specialties, within one specialty at different levels of training, and in physicians' ethical and psychological responses to the WLST. The timing of WLST appears to be influenced by ICU strain and communication issues. Study outcomes differ regarding the functionally favorable survival of patients who have had WLST. Universal guidelines for the WLST may not address individual patient circumstances., Summary: Discussions of end-of-life issues early in the course of a patient's health care will contribute to the healthcare team's understanding and respect of the patient's wishes. This article addresses the withdrawal of left ventricular assist devices; attending physicians and physicians in training perspectives of WLST; do physicians distinguish between withholding and WLST; the timing of WLST; guidelines for the process of WLST; and pediatrics and end-of-life decisions.

Background: Many hospitalized adults do not have the capacity to make their own health care decisions and thus require a surrogate decision-maker. While the ethical standard suggests that decisions should focus on a patient's preferences, our study explores the principles that surrogates consider most important when making decisions for older hospitalized patients., Objectives: We sought to determine how frequently surrogate decision-makers prioritized patient preferences in decision-making and what factors may predict their doing so., Design and Participants: We performed a secondary data analysis of a study conducted at three local hospitals that surveyed surrogate decision-makers for hospitalized patients 65 years of age and older., Main Measures: Surrogates rated the importance of 16 decision-making principles and selected the one that was most important. We divided the surrogates into two groups: those who prioritized patient preferences and those who prioritized patient well-being. We analyzed the two groups for differences in knowledge of patient preferences, presence of advance directives, and psychological outcomes., Key Results: A total of 362 surrogates rated an average of six principles as being extremely important in decision-making; 77.8% of surrogates selected a patient well-being principle as the most important, whereas only 21.1% selected a patient preferences principle. Advance directives were more common to the patient preferences group than the patient well-being group (61.3% vs. 44.9%; 95% CI: 1.01-3.18; p = 0.04), whereas having conversations with the patient about their health care preferences was not a significant predictor of surrogate group identity (81.3% vs. 67.4%; 95% CI: 0.39-1.14; p = 0.14). We found no differences between the two groups regarding surrogate anxiety, depression, or decisional conflict., Conclusions: While surrogates considered many factors, they focused more often on patient well-being than on patient preferences, in contravention of our current ethical framework. Surrogates more commonly prioritized patient preferences if they had advance directives available to them.

Dementia patients may express wishes that do not conform to or contradict earlier expressed preferences. Our understanding of the difference between their prior preferences and current wishes has important consequences for the way we deal with advance directives. Some bioethicists and gerontologists have argued that dementia patients change because they undergo a 'response shift'. In this paper we question this assumption. We will show that proponents of the response shift use the term imprecisely and that response shift is not the right model to explain what happens to dementia patients. We propose a different explanation for the changed wishes of dementia patients and conclude that advance directives of dementia patients cannot be simply put aside., (Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://www.bmj.com/company/products-services/rights-and-licensing/)

Dementia is highly prevalent and incurable. The participation of dementia patients in clinical research is indispensable if we want to find an effective treatment for dementia. However, one of the primary challenges in dementia research is the patients' gradual loss of the capacity to consent. Patients with dementia are characterized by the fact that, at an earlier stage of their life, they were able to give their consent to participation in research. Therefore, the phase when patients are still competent to decide offers a valuable opportunity to authorize research, by using an advance research directive (ARD). Yet, the use of ARDs as an authorization for research participation remains controversial. In this paper we discuss the role of autonomous decision-making and the protection of incompetent research subjects. We will show why ARDs are a morally defensible basis for the inclusion of this population in biomedical research and that the use of ARDs is compatible with the protection of incompetent research subjects.

Some of the concerns that have been raised in connection to the use of advance directives are of the epistemic variety. Such concerns highlight the possibility that adhering to an advance directive may conflict with what the author of the directive actually wants (or would want) at the time of treatment. However, at least one objection to the employment of advance directives is metaphysical in nature. The objection to be discussed here, first formulated by Rebecca Dresser and labeled by Allen Buchanan as the slavery argument and David DeGrazia the someone else problem, aims to undermine the legitimacy of certain uses of advance directives by concluding that such uses rest upon an incorrect assumption about the identity over time of those ostensibly governed by the directives. There have been numerous attempts to respond to this objection. This paper aims to assess two strategies that have been pursued to cope with the problem.

People with dementia who are no longer competent have limited control over how their lives end. But an advance directive to withhold food and water by mouth could be used to ensure that one does not live for years in severe dementia. Such directives are arguably already legal.

Objective: To identify the processes, surgeons use to establish patient buy-in to postoperative treatments., Background: Surgeons generally believe they confirm the patient's commitment to an operation and all ensuing postoperative care, before surgery. How surgeons get buy-in and whether patients participate in this agreement is unknown., Methods: We used purposive sampling to identify 3 surgeons from different subspecialties who routinely perform high-risk operations at each of 3 distinct medical centers (Toronto, Ontario; Boston, Massachusetts; Madison, Wisconsin). We recorded preoperative conversations with 3 to 7 patients facing high-risk surgery with each surgeon (n = 48) and used content analysis to analyze each preoperative conversation inductively., Results: Surgeons conveyed the gravity of high-risk operations to patients by emphasizing the operation is "big surgery" and that a decision to proceed invoked a serious commitment for both the surgeon and the patient. Surgeons were frank about the potential for serious complications and the need for intensive care. They rarely discussed the use of prolonged life-supporting treatment, and patients' questions were primarily confined to logistic or technical concerns. Surgeons regularly proceeded through the conversation in a manner that suggested they believed buy-in was achieved, but this agreement was rarely forged explicitly., Conclusions: Surgeons who perform high-risk operations communicate the risks of surgery and express their commitment to the patient's survival. However, they rarely discuss prolonged life-supporting treatments explicitly and patients do not discuss their preferences. It is not possible to determine patients' desires for prolonged postoperative life support on the basis of these preoperative conversations alone.

The attitude of humility in the context of surgical intensive care medicine incorporates a serving attitude towards the patient and the recognition of limitations in intensive care medicine. Limitations are set in the indications for intensive care medicine, in that which is medically possible and reasonable as well as ethically by the will of the patient which is binding for physicians. Furthermore, there are limitations due to available resources, due to the personal knowledge and abilities of the physician and the intensive care treatment team and due to the equipment in the intensive care ward. It is absolutely necessary to recognize and avoid futile care because this involves the use of resources which will be lost for the care of other patients who would profit from intensive care. The formal difficulties in the definition and determination of futile care are discussed.

Medical social workers have needs for training in ethics that is specific to dilemmas that arise while providing service to patients who are very ill, mentally compromised, or in a terminal condition. A social work department developed a continuing education training to educate social workers in bioethics related to determining decisional capacity and understanding standards of ethical decision making. Case studies are used to illustrate ethical conflicts and the role of social workers in resolving them. The benefits of case study training are discussed.

The question, how and when an individual decision for and end of medical treatment or abdication of therapy should be made remains difficult. Ethical considerations have to be taken into account with respect to a humane and dignified decease. The goal of our manuscript there for is to achieve more certainty with respect to juridical and legal preconditions and frameworks. The conditions in Switzerland support general practitioners and family doctors to fulfill patients' requests, wishes and wills in an outpatient setting. An awareness and sensitization for a dignified and humane care at the end of life - despite social changes and an increased importance of health economics - as well increasing support of outpatient palliative care become more and more important. Existing legal certainty and security of practitioners, therefore, will be outlined in the following.

Advance directives containing a request for euthanasia in cases of severely debilitating dementia are of no use. In such an advanced stage of the disease, the doctor would have to administer lethal medication to a patient who does not realise what is happening to him/her. The Dutch Euthanasia Act is ambivalent about this possibility.

The personal identity problem expresses the worry that due to disrupted psychological continuity, one person's advance directive could be used to determine the care of a different person. Even ethicists, who strongly question the possibility of the scenario depicted by the proponents of the personal identity problem, often consider it to be a very potent objection to the use of advance directives. Aiming to question this assumption, I, in this paper, discuss the personal identity problem's relevance to the moral force of advance directives. By putting the personal identity argument in relation to two different normative frameworks, I aim to show that whether or not the personal identity problem is relevant to the moral force of advance directives, and further, in what way it is relevant, depends entirely on what normative reasons we have for respecting advance directives in the first place.

The number of people suffering with dementia is increasing in the general population and the trend is projected to continue as people live longer, especially in countries with developed economies. The most common cause of dementia (among the many other causes) is Alzheimer's dementia, which is considered a terminal illness. The disease could eventually lead to death, or death could occur as a consequence of co-morbid physical complications. The problem of end of life (EOL) care for patients suffering from dementia though spoken of and written about, does not get the attention and system support as for example patients suffering from cancer receive. Many reasons have been advanced for the current state of affairs where EOL issues for patients suffering from dementia are concerned. This article attempts to revisit the issues, and the reasons, that may contribute to this. Some guidelines on palliative management in cases of patients suffering from severe dementia exist; the evidence base for these guidelines though is relatively weak. The ethical and legal issues that may influence or impact on the decision to initiate the palliative care pathway in the management of EOL issues for dementia patients in the terminal or end stage of the illness is highlighted. Initiatives by the department of health in England and Wales, and other bodies with interest in dementia issues and palliative care in the United Kingdom to ensure good and acceptable EOL pathways for patients with dementia are mentioned.

Since 1 September 2009, advance directives are regulated by law in Germany. This article discusses ethical challenges of advance directives in patients with mental disorders. Besides concrete information on the preferred medical treatment in concrete clinical situations, the mental capacity of the patient at the time of issuing the directive is essential. The "Decisional Competence Assessment Tool for Psychiatric Advance Directives" and empirical studies from the USA on advance directives in patients with mental disorders and the assessment by the treating psychiatrists of these patient directives are discussed. Ethical conclusions are drawn for handling advance directives in psychiatric practice.

Philosophers have mostly advocated that advance directives should bear the same authority, with regard to refusal of life-extending treatment, as a patient's contemporaneous consent or refusal. Such authors typically support this position through a theory of persistent personal identity. I agree that the loss of mental competence does not render someone a moral stranger to their prior goal but argue that equating advance direction with consent is to ignore the capacity of nonpersons to attribute and withhold moral value. A distinction should be drawn between advance directives that seek to pursue deeply held goals and those that express contempt for the mentally incompetent.

A cornerstone of American medical ethics is the right to say, "Keep your hands off of me," to decline medical treatment. A central problem is how to decide about individuals who have become incapacitated and can no longer request or refuse potentially life-sustaining treatment. An advance directive is a formal attempt to protect people's right to autonomy when they are no longer autonomous. As such, it assumes that previously expressed wishes are precise and immutable, but many families make decisions together, and individuals may negotiate, compromise, and modify their genuine preferences, especially when novel threats arise, and the stakes are high. The current article describes a case in which two daughters overruled a patient's explicit preference to refuse life-sustaining treatment, leading to burdensome illness before death. In the end, the mother seemed to understand her children's needs and seemed willing, at least in retrospect, to have met those needs. After the death of this individual, we continued to talk with the daughters and videotaped an interview in which they shared their perspectives on the case. The daughters consented to be videotaped and to share the video with the medical community (available in online version of article). Their forceful devotion to their mother and their search in retrospect for what could have been done differently has completely changed our understanding of events. We believe that the daughters' behavior is not the indefensible breach of respect for person that it seemed to be. Their mother's true wishes might well have included a desire to help her children during her own dying. Family members' preferences are likely to be important considerations for many people, although the possibility of coercion has to be acknowledged as well. Accommodating this level of decision-making complexity is highly problematic for our understanding of advance directives., (© 2011, Copyright the Authors Journal compilation © 2011, The American Geriatrics Society.)

After falling from a roof, an older man lost neurological function below his face. In two days, the patient regained consciousness, but it was unclear whether he could communicate his preferences, whether due to injuries or difficulties with language. His family believed he could communicate with them, and that he was capable of making treatment decisions. The staff did not think to contact the hospital's largely inactive ethics consultation service for assistance, and instead looked to the patient's living will for guidance, even though the patient was not terminally ill, and his lack of capacity had not been determined.

A commentary on a case of a man who is left a "high quad" (ventilator dependant as well as quadriplegic) after an accident discusses the following: The right of patients who sustain catastrophic injuries to choose to discontinue life-sustaining treatment, The role of capacity assessment in treatment decisions and in ethics consultations, The role of advance directives (ADs) for such patients if they lack capacity, Whether a do-not-resuscitate or do-not-attempt-resuscitation order should be seen as "a medical order" or an advance directive, Some hints about what might be intended when a patient refers to the criterion of having a "meaningful life."