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In this article we highlight a number of the ongoing challenges faced by people living with HIV in the UK today (2021). Based on in-depth interviews with 23 respondents drawn from a range of ages, backgrounds and walks of life, we offer an insight into deeply personal experiences of what it means to have HIV. We demonstrate the degree to which, 40 years on from the formal emergence of the HIV pandemic, stigma and related structural violence remain both extremely present and extraordinarily debilitating. In essence, social responses to HIV remain mired in a past age.

This article considers the degree to which achieving equity in Global North–South research partnerships is possible under current UK funding models. While there has been significant discussion with respect to the decolonisation of research, it will be argued that there is some distance between the language of equity articulated currently by UK funding bodies, and the realities of working as a project partner in the Global South. The article draws on the prior and ongoing experiences of a multidisciplinary team of researchers brought together by a UK-funded research project. In the interests of moving towards more equitable systems of knowledge production and dissemination, it explores the power asymmetries that can be inherent in Global North–South research partnerships, and the extent to which issues of coloniality continue to shape aspects of research agenda setting, project framing, impact, academic publishing and the division of labour within partnerships.

This paper makes the case for a closer study as to how Africa and African people are portrayed within popular culture in the Global North, adding to the discussion surrounding the importance of ‘low politics’ in producing and reproducing global hierarchies. It focuses on representations of African traditional healers in Anglo-American popular culture as a way of highlighting deeply entrenched outsider ‘understandings’ of the continent. The colonial trope of the ‘African witchdoctor’ has remained a fixture in the collective Anglo-American cultural imagination since the days of H. Rider Haggard. Evidence demonstrates that these colonial stereotypes have remained remarkably durable, having seen little change in over one hundred and fifty years. Following Cynthia Enloe (1996), this paper argues that, in the interests of gaining a deeper appreciation of the power structures shaping African ‘development’, the realm of the ‘imaginary’ and the ‘made up’ where popular culture is concerned, demands greater scrutiny.

Understanding the resilience of water supplies to climate change is becoming an urgent priority to ensure health targets are met. Addressing systemic issues and building the resilience of community-managed supplies, which serve millions of people in rural LMIC settings, will be critical to improve access to safe drinking water. The How Tough is WASH (HTIW) framework to assess resilience was applied to community-managed water supplies in Ethiopia and Nepal to assess the effectiveness of this framework in field conditions. The resilience of these water supplies was measured along six domains—the environment, infrastructure, management, institutional support, community governance and supply chains—that can affect how they respond to climate change effects. We found that the HTIW framework provided an objective measure of resilience and could be used to rank water supplies in order of priority for action. We also found that systemic issues could be identified. The tools and methods used in the framework were easy to deploy by field research teams. The water supplies studied in Ethiopia and Nepal had low to moderate resilience to climate change. Service management and institutional support were weak in both countries. The data from Ethiopia and Nepal suggests that many water supplies in rural and small-town communities are unlikely to be resilient to future climate change without increased investment and support. The use of simple frameworks such as HTIW will be important in supporting decisions around such investments by identifying priority communities and actions.

Many global North–South collaborations seek to address different aspects of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for Africa. The role of the North in these collaborations is crucial from a funding point of view. However, the realisation of the SDG objectives for Africa will depend largely on strategies that are guided by the successes and challenges of previous and existing collaborative efforts. Globally, Africa has the highest disease burden with the leading causes of morbidity and mortality being malaria, tuberculosis, HIV and AIDS and more recently, cardiovascular diseases, diabetes and cancer. Neglected tropical diseases are also causing long-term detrimental health effects, resulting in huge social and economic losses. Ironically, the continent is endowed with a huge biodiversity resource that has the potential to provide novel and potent drug candidates but remains largely unexplored partly due to financial and infrastructural challenges. Developing the scientific research capabilities of African institutions towards drug discovery through global networks is, therefore, an important component of improving health systems on the continent. This chapter examines experiences from three North–South collaborations—the Royal Society’s Leverhulme Trust Africa Award (LTAA), Newton Advanced Fellowships (NAF) and Cambridge-Africa Partnership for Research Excellence (CAPREx)—and proposes the adoption of structures that extend the current focus on skill transfer to include the building and maintenance of sustainable infrastructure. It is believed that these thoughts and suggestions could promote sustainable collaborative research to provide good health and well-being (SDG3), quality education (SDG4), relevant infrastructure (SDG9) and reduced inequalities (SDG10) in Africa.

This article makes a case for a reconceptualisation of aid and development programme design. Specifically, it questions the role of the international “development expert” in the design and implementation process. We argue that by employing “design thinking” as a guiding principle, the way in which aid programmes are envisaged and delivered can be radically overhauled, resulting in dramatically improved outcomes for the users of aid. We argue that practical improvements in delivery are achievable through locally rooted, “user-driven” development solutions that originate from the beneficiaries themselves. Design thinking as applied here goes significantly further than other programme design and implementation methodologies that champion locally owned, needs-driven assistance. Furthermore, we make a case for this approach addressing wider problems within the sector, namely the perception, in some quarters, that aid is intrinsically “neo-imperialist” in design and ideologically driven.

Traditional healing remains an important aspect of many people’s engagement with healthcare and, in this, responses to the treatment of HIV/AIDS are no different. However, given the gravity of the global HIV/AIDS pandemic, there has been much debate as to the value of traditional healing in this respect. Accordingly, this paper explores the extent to which meaningful accommodation between the biomedical and traditional sectors is possible (and/or even desirable). It does this through a consideration of Native American and South African experiences, looking at how the respective groups, in which medical pluralism is common, have addressed the issue of HIV/AIDS. The paper points to the importance of developing “culturally appropriate” forms of treatment that emphasise complementary rather than adversarial engagement between the traditional and biomedical systems and how policymakers can best facilitate this.

This article makes the case for a development paradigm shaped and determined by the people affected directly by aid and assistance programs: in essence, it is a call for beneficiary-led aid (BLA). Over the past two decades, input from beneficiaries has become increasingly important in the design of development programs. At the same time, the donor model remains one that is top-down, agenda driven, and expert led. Similarly, the use of information and communications technology (ICT) by donors in the interests of facilitating closer engagement with beneficiaries has been ongoing for over a decade. However, while the ICT4D (ICT for development) model has generated a great deal of enthusiasm within the donor community, the approach has yet to generate a discernible paradigm shift where the provision of aid and assistance is concerned. Taking inspiration from initiatives both within and outwith the field of development, we explore the extent to which ICT can indeed offer a route through which to revolutionize the meaning of “participation” in an aid context, for beneficiaries, donors, and development experts alike.

Where hiv/aids is concerned, the twin goals of ‘zero new infections’ and an ‘aids-free generation’ are now, due to advances in treatment (and treatment as prevention), a realistic possibility. However, these goals can only be achieved through the scaling-up of treatment to the point of universal access. It is inevitable that the success of any scaling-up will be predicated on cost, particularly of hiv/aids medicines. This article argues that recent changes in the global intellectual property landscape—effected by way of bilaterally- and plurilaterally-negotiated trade agreements initiated by developed countries—jeopardise the target of universal access. Enhanced protection of international intellectual property rights increasingly poses a threat to the development of, and international trade in, generic medicines. Unless developing countries move to reinvigorate moribund multilateral institutions, particularly the wto, they will lose control of the intellectual property agenda, and thus the abili...

This article analyses, from a policymaking perspective, the continued recourse to South Africa's thriving traditional healthcare sector, which operates in tandem with the country's relatively well-...

The WTO-sanctioned waiver for the extension of the Lome system of preferences to the African, Caribbean Pacific (ACP) countries expired in December 2007. This deadline coincided with the scheduled conclusion of the EU–ACP Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations, initiated in 2002. The origins of the EU–ACP relationship stretch back to the early days of the European Community, and were formalised in 1975 with the signing of the Georgetown Agreement. However, there has been a notable ‘cooling’ of the relationship since the signing of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement in 2000. For many, the new EPA framework is perceived as a diktat rather than a true partnership agreement. This article reviews the culmination of six years of talks between the two sides and the EU's apparent ‘rationalisation’ of a decades-old partnership.

The Cotonou Partnership Agreement, signed in Benin in 2000 between the European Union (EU) and its African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) partners, constitutes the basis for much of the EU's interaction with developing countries. The Agreement stresses the need to prioritize poverty alleviation and sustainable development as part of the overall development process. While an all-embracing approach to tackling problems of poverty and the environment ostensibly fulfils a number of social and political requirements where the EU's moral obligation towards the South is currently concerned, Cotonou's flagship provisions invite closer scrutiny. This paper considers the EU's attempt to marry poverty alleviation and sustainable development within its pro-poor strategy and assesses the likely efficacy of this approach in achieving Cotonou's stated aims.

One of the features of the African HIV/AIDS pandemic has been the re-emphasis of Africa's place in the global imagination as the ‘sick continent’, the ‘diseased continent’ and the ‘dark continent’. Much of the early discourse on HIV/AIDS in Africa – intentionally or not – helped to cement a longstanding outsider idea of Africa as a place where health and general well-being are determined by culturally (and to a degree racially) dictated modes of sexual behaviour that fall well outside of the ‘ordinary’. Early HIV/AIDS discourse have much in common with colonial-era narratives on African ‘venereal disease’ pandemics like syphilis in the late nineteenth/early twentieth century – noteworthy, in both instances, was the view that African people needed saving from themselves. By analysing historical responses to these two pandemics, we demonstrate an arguably unbroken outsider perception of African sexuality, based largely on colonial-era tropes, that portrays African people as over-sexed, uncontrolled in their appetites, promiscuous, impervious to risk and thus agents of their own misfortune.

HIV/AIDS has spread across much of Africa with chilling speed. In this respect, gender inequality is the proverbial elephant in the room. As with so many issues calling complex cultural norms into question, the very linkage of HIV/AIDS with the realities of African gender relations is emotive and disquieting; analysis is fraught with difficulty on a number of levels. At the same time, it is a fact that heterosexual transmission is, epidemiologically, at the heart of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and African women appear to be disproportionately vulnerable to infection. It is therefore critical to consider very seriously the association between gender inequality and HIV/AIDS. There is no doubt that gender-based violence and HIV/AIDS in much of sub-Saharan Africa can be said to be almost symbiotic; the two strands tend to be mutually reinforcing. However, while Kofi Annan, then Secretary-General of the United Nations, described AIDS in Africa as having ‘a woman’s face’ (Annan 2002), debates about gender hierarchies, sexual and physical violence, cultural norms and human rights all sit rather uncomfortably beneath this particular rubric. Gender-based analysis of HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly studies conducted by ‘outside’ NGOs and agencies, has provoked a backlash from African leaders like Thabo Mbeki (2004), who equate perceived criticisms of African norms and values by bodies like the New York-based NGO Human Rights Watch (1995, 1997, 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004) with cultural imperialism.

In the absence of an HIV/AIDS vaccine, and against a complex sociopolitical and economic backdrop, endeavours to formulate a successful strategy to stay the HIV/AIDS pandemic in sub-Saharan Africa have varied considerably. At one end of the spectrum lie responses based on faith — either traditional Christian or Islamic values of sexual morality or in similarly traditional African medicine (Chapter 5), all of which can be at odds with the Western biomedical approach. Largely successful efforts by Western governments to counter the spread of HIV/AIDS amongst homosexual populations in the US and Europe have tended to focus on the disease as a medical issue. Efforts have concentrated on interventions that reduce the chance of exposure by those most at risk of contracting HIV/ AIDS. Campaigns centring on the use of condoms and ‘safer-sex’ have been hallmarks of such drives. However, as the rampant spread of HIV/ AIDS during the past three decades attests, the safer-sex approach has been notably less successful in sub-Saharan Africa, prompting calls for a re-examination of the safer-sex model’s suitability for the region. In particular, Christian faith-based organizations (FBOs) have long pressed for an alternative approach based on a focus on behavioural change, in effect a ‘social vaccine’.

For the past 30 years, healthcare practitioners around the world, both traditional and biomedical, have had to come to terms with the day-to-day realities of treating HIV and AIDS. In many African countries, a significant proportion of the responsibility has fallen to practitioners of traditional medicine; there is an often-quoted figure that suggests that up to 80 percent of the sub-Saharan population consults traditional healers and makes use of traditional medicine for their primary healthcare needs (see for example WHO 2002, 2008b). The international media spotlight has fallen on the tendency of African traditional practitioners to classify HIV/AIDS sufferers as ‘bewitched’ or contaminated with ‘pollutants’. Behind the headlines lie a number of representations of illness and affliction that are distinctly African, and frequently at odds with ‘orthodox’ ‘Western’ ideas of disease. Where the language of ‘pollution’ is concerned, there are distinct parallels between African perspectives on contamination of the body and worldwide concerns about contamination of the environment. However, in a purely medical sense, the ‘pollution’ designation runs contrary to prevailing ‘Western’ perspectives on the diagnosis of disease. It is crucial that more attention be paid by governments, donor agencies and NGOs to working with, and through, traditional African cosmologies. This chapter outlines some of the main elements common to many African cultures’ understanding of illness and its causality, and highlights the difficulties that this paradigm represents for ‘orthodox’ disease prevention and treatment programmes. In addition, it considers the attempts by African governments to reconcile the tensions caused by competing worldviews on disease with respect to HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention.

The international community was slow to respond to HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa. For much of the 1980s and 1990s, funding remained limited. However, pressure to respond to the crisis led to the formation of three key donor programmes: The World Bank’s Multi-Country HIV/AIDS Program for Africa (MAP), established in 2001 The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (henceforth ‘Global Fund’), operational since 2002 The US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) authorized in 2003.

Why has Africa suffered so disproportionately from HIV/AIDS? This is the question at the heart of this study. One possible explanation relates to the origins of HIV, the virus that causes AIDS. The bald statistics bear repeating: by late 2008, an estimated 33.4 million people were infected with HIV/AIDS worldwide. Sufferers in sub-Saharan Africa made up two-thirds of this total (UNAIDS 2009a). That HIV originated in Africa is, conspiracy theories aside, undisputed. This being the case, it is hardly surprising that HIV/AIDS managed to gain a strong foothold on the continent. After all, HIV was not identified positively until 1983 and even then remained little understood for some years. A simple answer, therefore, to the question of ‘why Africa?’ is that Africa represents ‘ground zero’ (Iliffe 2006).

The question of universal access to life-saving drugs like antiretrovirals is inevitably emotive. ARVs are the only proven means of staving off AIDS. That so many in Africa do not have access to ARVs is clearly problematic, both morally and medically. The need for a comprehensive biomedical framework for African states has never been more urgent. An obvious starting point for consideration is cost. Here, the HIV/AIDS story comes with a ready made villain in the shape of the multinational pharmaceutical giants, perceived by some critics to be making billions of dollars in profits whilst people across sub-Saharan Africa die. Campaigners pressing for universal access to ARVs point to the influence of ‘Big Pharma’ in driving and shaping both American and WTO policies on the protection of intellectual property rights with respect to the patenting of their products. The extension of these rights across the globe has cemented the major drug companies’ control over the international pharmaceutical market and, with it, their ability to control prices and access. The rules regulating the governance of international trade are thus pivotal to the future of HIV/AIDS treatment, particularly in poorer countries where price concerns can mean the difference between life and death.

There is a scene in the film Blood Diamond (2006) in which Leonardo DiCaprio’s character, Danny Archer, attempts to explain the roots of the ‘African Crisis’ to a newly-arrived American journalist played by Jennifer Connelly. Archer sums up the situation with a pithy acronym, ‘TIA’ — ‘this is Africa’. The implication is that Africa is somehow both unknowable and inexplicable; a continent in which the normal ‘rules’ do not apply. It is due to the pernicious spread of this view across much of the developed world that a degree of ennui has crept into people’s perceptions of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa. HIV/AIDS is often treated as though it is without precedent, that it is unique in terms of African development; a disease lying outside the realms of historical context. There has also been an increased tendency on the part of policymakers to identify what makes Africa, and Africans, ‘different’ where HIV/AIDS is concerned. This chapter will address these trends, locate the disease within the broader ‘African Crisis’ and place HIV/AIDS within an appropriate historical context.

HIV/AIDS ‘dissidents’ have been compared with Holocaust deniers, to the point where there have been calls for them to be prosecuted in the manner of David Irving, the British historian jailed in Austria in 2006 for maintaining, amongst other problematic points, that there were no gas chambers at Auschwitz (Smyth 2006). The terms AIDS ‘dissident’ or ‘sceptic’ cover a broad spectrum of opinion. Dissidents are by no means unified. Different individuals and groups have made various claims about the nature of HIV, the link between HIV and AIDS, and the efficacy of antiretroviral treatments. Some have questioned whether AIDS as a disease exists at all. The majority of dissidents base their theories on what are perceived to be ‘holes’ in the science underpinning HIV/AIDS ‘orthodoxy’. For analysts and policymakers, the question at the heart of the debate is one of censorship. Should dissidents, in the interests of freedom of speech and scientific inquiry, be permitted a platform for their views? After all, in the best traditions of liberalism, and in the spirit of John Stuart Mill (1998), any theory, if ‘true’, should be able to withstand scrutiny.

I must declare an interest before proceeding: I have hugely admired Roger Southall and his work since the early 1990s (he taught me as an undergraduate at Rhodes University). Together with colleagu...

Building on the special provisions for LDCs provided by the Cotonou Agreement, in February 2001 the EU approved the implementation of the ‘Everything But Arms’ (EBA) initiative. The initiative proposed ‘granting duty-free access to imports of all products from LDCs, except arms and munitions, without any quantitative restrictions (with the exception of bananas, sugar and rice for a limited period)’ (European Commission 2006a). Furthermore, the terms of the agreement were non-reciprocal, allowing LDCs to continue to collect levy tariffs on EU exports. The announcement, coming as it did in the build-up to the WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, generated an enormous amount of positive publicity for the EU, publicity the EU did its best to fan. The then European Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy stated in a press conference that It’s a worldwide first. At the end of the day, we will have 100% access, with no exclusions, except of course for arms. We have delivered on our fine words. This sends a signal to the rest of the world that we are serious about getting the most disadvantaged to share in the fruits of trade liberalization. (European Commission 2001b) The EBA initiative is important for a number of reasons.

Sustainable development has purportedly been a guiding strategy for all EU policymakers since the signing of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) in 1992, affecting both domestic and foreign policy requirements, including those concerning the Polity’s relations with developing countries (Article 130u): ‘The Commission undertakes in its proposals, and the member states undertake in implementing these proposals, to take full account of their environmental impact and of the principle of sustainable growth.’

Empirical evidence suggests that increased flows of trade generate wealth (O’Brien and Williams 2007, pp. 148–52). Given that trade issues form a core aspect of the Cotonou Agreement, it is important to evaluate the extent to which EU policies facilitate increases in trade flows between the Polity and the ACP and the extent to which these activities are sustainable in the long term. As highlighted, the rationale behind the Cotonou Treaty (Article 1) is poverty alleviation and the facilitation of the ACP countries into the global economy whilst simultaneously promoting environmentally sound outcomes. In this regard, trade policy clearly has an important role to play. The Cotonou Agreement remains in its early stages and a true assessment of its impact on sustainability is difficult to gauge before the implementation of the economic partnership agreements (EPAs) in 2008.

Before considering the sustainability of EU-ACP relations, it is important to place this relationship against the backdrop of North-South relations in general and the evolution of the ‘Washington Consensus’ in particular. Relationships such as that linking the EU and ACP do not develop in isolation and must be analysed as part of a wider process. For this reason, it is necessary to investigate the forces governing the interaction between richer and poorer states and consider how these came to be established. It is only once this broader picture has been painted that relations such as those governing the interaction between the EU and the ACP can be adequately understood. Chapter 2 highlights the perceptions colouring the EU’s approach to sustainable development; similarly, this chapter outlines the context and evolution of the Polity’s vision of a development strategy for the ACP countries within the broader international context. Together, Chapters 2 and 3 allow for a clearer interpretation of the EU’s priorities vis-a-vis its ACP partners.

While energy provision (Chapter 7) is crucial in terms of raising living standards, improving access to education and affording new business ventures, such opportunities cannot be fully exploited when people are continuously exposed to environment-based threats to their general health and well-being. Poor sanitation and a lack of access to clean, safe drinking water can result in exposure to cholera, diarrhoea and malaria, all of which result in millions of preventable deaths each year, the main victims being children under the age of five (Steele et al. 2002, p. 11). Worldwide, estimates suggest that up to 1 billion people are exposed to unsafe drinking water on a continual basis. This represents 18 per cent of the global population. Similarly, approximately 2.4 billion people are without adequate forms of sanitation (African Ministerial Conference on Water 2003, p. 4). Estimates suggest that preventable incidents of disease could be cut by as much as 75 per cent through the provision of safe drinking water and improved sanitation (European Commission 2004a). As can be seen in Table 8.1, access to water and sanitation services (WSS) varies dramatically, and it is rural dwellers who are the least likely to be able to access these services. Furthermore, global estimates suggest that severe water shortages will be a hallmark of the next two decades, with availability being expected to drop by as much as a third (UNESCO 2004). Security of supply is thus equally as important as cleanliness and safety.

Globally, nearly 70 per cent of people living in extreme poverty live in rural areas (European Commission 2000a, p. 5). If the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of halving poverty by 2015 is to be achieved, then special attention needs to be devoted to rural economies, and specifically to agricultural policies. While the majority of the poor in the Caribbean1 and Pacific2 ACP countries also live in rural areas, the severity of the problem is most pronounced in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). In global terms, poverty is on the decline, with the number of people living in absolute poverty being set to fall from 1.27 billion in 1990 to 0.75 billion by 2015 (Broca et al. 2003, p. 216). However, these global averages belie regional imbalances. East Asia and South Asia have made significant progress over and above their 1990 MDG baseline figures and appear set to continue in this vein. The situation in Africa, on the other hand, is set to worsen. Since 1990, levels of poverty in SSA have increased and, it has been argued, are likely to increase even beyond 2015. If these projections are correct, then by 2015 nearly half of all those living in absolute poverty will be resident in Africa (Broca et al. 2003, p. 216).

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs — see Table 7.1), whilst explicitly aimed at poverty alleviation, all contain an environmental component. The eradication of hunger has obvious links to soil fertility and the need for functioning ecosystems. Less obvious are the environmental links to the MDGs of reducing child mortality, combating disease, improving maternal health and promoting universal primary education. Chapters 7 and 8 stress the importance of environmental factors in determining development outcomes, and how these best be acknowledged and addressed. The following statistics should be considered (Steele et al. 2002, pp. 10–14): 1. Up to 30 percent of all disease in Sub-Saharan African can be attributed to environmental factors. 2. Waterborne diseases kill nearly 3 million people a year, the majority of whom are young children. 3. Indoor air pollution and the effects of carrying heavy loads of water and firewood affect the health of women in developing countries and can lead to complications during pregnancy. 4. The time devoted to gathering water and firewood by young girls frequently results in them forgoing such educational opportunities as are available to them.

This chapter outlines the scope of EU-ACP relations post-2000. It identifies potential areas of conflict and disagreement between the two blocs and considers the possible scenarios for both sides if ongoing trade negotiations fail to reach consensus. Attention is focused on one of Cotonou’s principal features: the proposed establishment of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and the ACP countries.

The evolution of EU-ACP cooperation between 1957 and 2000 is significant in that it contextualises the European Commission’s current attempts at promoting development amongst its ACP partners. Cooperation between the EU and the countries that came to form the African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) bloc in 1975 is almost as old as the Polity itself. French influence in the early days of the EU ensured the development of a ‘special relationship’ between the newly formed European Economic Community and countries tied to Europe through colonialism. The special nature of this relationship came to be entrenched with the signing of the Georgetown Agreement in 1975, the formation of the ACP bloc and the negotiation of the Lome Convention. The Lome Convention and its later incarnations were to govern EU-ACP cooperation for 25 years and formed the heart of the EU’s development agenda. The unique bond between the EU and the ACP was epitomised by the Lome trading regime which established non-reciprocal, privileged access to EU markets for ACP exports. However, by the 1990s it was clear that Lome had run its course. The EU made it clear that the agreement would not be extended beyond 2000. A new partnership agreement, signed in Cotonou, Benin, in 2000, set out the blueprint for future EU-ACP relations.