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We explore how decision makers perceive and assess the level of risk in interdependent settings. In a series of five experiments, we examine how individuals set expectations for their own project investments when their success is contingent on the success of multiple, independent partners. We find that individuals are subjectively more confident and optimistic in an interdependent venture when its chances of success are presented as separate probabilities for each component and that this optimism is exacerbated by a greater number of critical partners, leading to (1) the inflation of project valuations, (2) the addition of excessive partners to a project, and (3) overinvestment of effort in the development of one's own component within an interdependent venture. We examine these dynamics in settings of risky choice (with exogenously given probabilities) and in an economic coordination game (with the ambiguity of agency and strategic risk). We conduct our study with a wide range of participant samples ranging from undergraduates to senior executives. Collectively, our findings hold important implications for the ways in which individuals, organizations, and policymakers should approach and assess their innovation choices in ecosystem settings. Keywords: innovation * ecosystem * judgment and decision making * interdependence, Introduction Confronted with mounting pressures to grow and enabled by improvements in information and communication technologies, organizations across the economic spectrum are increasingly turning to collaboration to meet their goals [...]

Many important managerial outcomes hinge on the co-occurrence of multiple uncertain events, a situation termed conjunctive risk. Whereas past literature has addressed the psychology of choosing to enter situations with conjunctive risk, this article elucidates a novel way in which the psychology of managing conjunctive risk is importantly distinct. We examine a case in which there are two independent events, one is currently less likely than the other, both are required for overall success, and the decision maker must evaluate opportunities to increase the chance of the less-likely or more-likely requirement. We introduce the hypothesis of a worst-first heuristic. Decision makers intuitively evaluate improvements in conjunctive risk according to their impact on the biggest barrier to success, the least likely of the required events. We find evidence for such a worst-first heuristic across nine experiments (n = 3,653, including samples from the United States and United Kingdom in Studies 1–5 and Studies S1–S3 in the online supplement, as well as a sample of managers in Study 6). Participants invest more to improve chances of less-likely requirements than more-likely requirements, even when the latter improvements have at least as much impact on the aggregate chance of success. Moreover, we find that decision makers exhibit this behavior particularly when managing conjunctive risk, as doing so makes them attend to which threat is the worst. Conversely, they do not appear to exhibit the behavior when making formally equivalent decisions about choosing between conjunctive risks. This bias toward underinvesting in stronger-links holds important implications for decision making in contexts subject to conjunctive risk—both managerial and societal. This paper was accepted by Yuval Rottenstreich, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Supplemental Material: Data and the e-companion are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4411. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If you were Kodak navigating digital photography or if you're the automotive industry today, how can you discern that there's a shift in value proposition that's cutting across industry boundaries and could really redefine things? But think about competition today: the competitors you need to worry about no longer look like GM and Toyota, even as those firms are still rivals in the game. Tesla is in the fuel business through its charging stations, for example, but in the past, the auto manufacturing industry and the fuel industry were distinct. [Extracted from the article]

Product innovation often hinges on technological changes in underlying components and architectures, requiring extensive coordination between upstream component development tasks and downstream product development tasks. We explore how differences in [...]

Strategies for reworking older technologies include relocating to a new market in which the technology is the superior option, or re-establishing in a niche of a traditional market where the technology has advantages over newer ones.

An innovation ecosystem enables companies to develop value that individual companies would not be able to produce on their own. Steps for creating and implementing an ecosystem include assessing interdependence and integration risks, and setting and modifying performance expectations.

We explore the implications of a real and common alternative to attempting the transformation required to embrace a new, dominant, technology—the choice to maintain focus on the old technology. In considering this choice, we distinguish between “racing” strategies, which attempt to fight off the rise of the new technology by extending the performance of the old technology, and “retreat” strategies, which attempt to accommodate the rise of the new technology by repositioning the old technology in the demand environment. Underlying our arguments is the observation that the emergence of a new technology does more than just create a substitute threat—it can also reveal significant underlying heterogeneity in the old technology’s broader demand environment. This heterogeneity is a source of opportunities that can support a new position for the old technology, in either the current market or a new one. Using this lens, we explore the decision to stay with the old technology as a rational, proactive choice rather than as a mark of managerial and organizational failure. We then consider the distinctive challenges and organizational dynamics that arise in technology retreats, and their implications for the ways in which managers and scholars should approach questions regarding the management of capabilities, lifecycles, and ecosystems. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article introduces this issue of "Academy of Management Review" which focuses on topics such as the performance differentials between diversified companies and new business enterprises, the prediction of business mortality that is based on the industry conditions at the time of the company's founding, and the free-rider problem.

The commentaries on our article fail to come to grips with the distinct challenges raised by a process of experimentation that leads to the discovery of new possible initiatives. These challenges differ from those posed by an investment that provides privileged access to a prespecified set of possible follow-on investments. By treating these challenges as simple problems of implementation, the commentaries ignore the strategic tradeoffs implied by efficient abandonment processes and, therefore, fail to clarify where the logic of real options is likely to be more (and less) helpful to strategy thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is discontinuous about the moment of radical technological change? Discontinuity typically does not lie in a radical advancement in technology itself; rather, it stems from a shift of an existing technical lineage to a new domain of application. Seeming revolutions such as wireless communication and the Internet did not stem from an isolated technical breakthrough; rather, their spectacular commercial impact was achieved when an existing technology was re-applied in a new application domain. The biological notion of speciation events, which form the basis for the theory of punctuated equilibrium, can reconcile the process of incremental technical change with the radical change associated with the shift of an existing technology to a new application domain. This concept can assist managers to cope with, and potentially exploit, such change processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]