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Introduction In this project, I seek to present discretion as an organizing principle in public law that will be useful for evaluating the legal and political legitimacy of algorithmic decision-making. [...], Automated decision-making takes up an increasingly significant place in the administrative state. This article presents a conception of discretion that is helpful for evaluating the proper place of algorithms in public decision-making. I argue that the algorithm itself is not a site of discretion. The threat is that automated decision-making alters the relationships between traditional actors in a way that can cut down discretion and human commitment. Algorithmic decision-makers can serve to fetter the discretion that the legislature and the populace expect to be exercised. We must strive to maintain discretion, moral agency, deliberative ideals, and human commitment through the system that surrounds the use of an algorithm and to develop a new expertise that can retain and exercise the expected discretion. Backing this argument are traditional legal constraints, public expectations, and administrative law principles, tied together through the organizing principle of discretion. Keywords: Administrative law; Automated decision-making; Discretion; Artificial intelligence

ABSTRACT Students of the policymaking process are familiar with the fashion in which the policies underlying crisis-driven legislation are gradually eroded during the implementation process. A substantial body of administrative-law [...]

ABSTRACT: The role of "political reasons" in agency decision making has tremendous importance for administrative law. The conventional wisdom posits that an agency's policy decisions should be justified based on [...]

The Congressional Review Act gives Congress increased power to review and terminate federal agency rules. This was announced as a way to give greater oversight of bureaucrats to elected representatives. Actually, it has been used not for this purpose, but rather in the service of special interests.

INTRODUCTION In recent years, a new account of administrative law, favoring private ordering over state-imposed solutions, has bolstered the acceptability of negotiated approaches to regulatory problems. (1) Consistent with this [...]

The author argues against giving the Immigration and Naturalization Service power to revoke the citizenship of naturalized citizens, because administrative agencies are subject to political pressures and objectives. If the INS is allowed this power, however, safeguards should be put in place to ensure that it makes objective decisions.

The Republican Party's goal of overhauling the federal government's regulatory affairs is facing much opposition from the Clinton administration and environmental and public health groups. Consequently, they are adding regulatory provisions into appropriations bills, putting political pressure on government agencies, and may create an agency to study the costs and benefits of regulations.

Congressional oversight of agency action has been, in the fifty years since the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act, the most fundamentally important aspect of government. Although no codified procedures control the application of this oversight, the processes of Congress instill an order on oversight acts. Overall, no other judicial, administrative or congressional process can match the flexibility and responsiveness of congressional oversight.

An aspect of administrative law to watch in 1998 and beyond is the judicial tendency to view the President as the major constitutional actor in regulatory policies. As the President gains in authority, constitutional perspectives either in support or opposition to the Chief Executive role lags behind. Without a watchful eye on this situation, courts may stumble into making bad laws.

Administrative agencies should develop priority setting procedures that balance the need to promulgate new regulations, review existing regulations and respond to concerns raised by the public and other branches of government. Political pressure from both the Clinton Administration and Congressional Republicans has increased the interest in rule review, but historically agencies have focused on creating new regulations. Agencies must commit time to responding to concerns to promote accountability.

It appears that the Republican members of Congress are determined to pass a legislative moratorium on all regulations issued between Nov 9, 1994 and July 1, 1995, despite appeals from all sides that such a move would hurt both taxpayers and the government. Critics claim that the Republicans are attempting block needed clarification of existing tax laws for purely political purposes. Without regulations, many say, the taxpayer cannot be sure if they are complying with the law or not.

The charge of NLRB "politicization" contains a kernel of truth but is nearly always an overstatement. Most cases involve relatively fact-specific applications of the National Labor Relations Act by administrative [...]