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Controversial constitutional and institutional reforms voted in May 2019 in parliament opened the way for President Gnassingbé to stand for a fourth and fifth term because the law does not apply retroactively. In February 2020, the President won again the disputed presidential elections and thus consolidated his power, assisted by the loyal army and security services. The outbreak of the Corona epidemic in Togo in March and the subsequent economic recession may have contributed to limit popular protest against the Gnassingbé regime. The human rights record of the government has improved, but remains poor. Yet, the international community followed a 'laissez faire' approach in the interests of regional stability. The economy dropped into recession due to the worldwide economic negative effects of the corona-crisis. The democracy index of the Economic Intelligence Unit, London, still rated Togo as an 'authoritarian regime'.

Controversial constitutional and institutional reforms voted in May 2019 in parliament opened the way for President Gnassingbé to stand for a fourth and fifth term because the law does not apply retroactively. In February 2020, the President won again the disputed presidential elections and thus consolidated his power, assisted by the loyal army and security services. The outbreak of the Corona epidemic in Togo in March and the subsequent economic recession may have contributed to limit popular protest against the Gnassingbé regime. The human rights record of the government has improved, but remains poor. Yet, the international community followed a 'laissez faire' approach in the interests of regional stability. The economy dropped into recession due to the worldwide economic negative effects of the corona-crisis. The democracy index of the Economic Intelligence Unit, London, still rated Togo as an 'authoritarian regime'., Umstrittene verfassungsrechtliche und institutionelle Reformen, die im Mai 2019 im Parlament verabschiedet wurden, eröffneten Präsident Gnassingbé den Weg für eine vierte und fünfte Amtszeit, da das Gesetz nicht rückwirkend gilt. Im Februar 2020 gewann der Präsident erneut die umstrittenen Präsidentschaftswahlen und festigte damit seine Macht, unterstützt von der loyalen Armee und den Sicherheitsdiensten. Der Ausbruch der Corona-Epidemie in Togo im März und die anschließende wirtschaftliche Rezession trugen dazu bei, den Protest der Bevölkerung gegen das Gnassingbé-Regime zu begrenzen. Die Menschenrechtsbilanz der Regierung hat sich verbessert, bleibt aber defizitär. Die internationale Gemeinschaft verfolgte trotzdem im Interesse der regionalen Stabilität einen Laissez-Faire-Ansatz. Die Wirtschaft geriet aufgrund der weltweiten wirtschaftlichen negativen Auswirkungen der Coronakrise in eine Rezession. Der Demokratieindex der Economic Intelligence Unit in London bewertete Togo weiterhin als "autoritäres Regime"., Les réformes constitutionnelles et institutionnelles controversées votées en mai 2019 au Parlement ont ouvert la voie au président Gnassingbé pour se présenter pour un quatrième et un cinquième mandat parce que la loi ne s'applique pas rétroactivement. En février 2020, le président a remporté à nouveau les élections présidentielles disputées et a ainsi consolidé son pouvoir, assisté par l'armée fidèle et les services de sécurité. Le déclenchement de l'épidémie de Corona au Togo en mars et la récession économique qui a suivi a peut-être contribué à limiter les protestations populaires contre le régime de Gnassingbé. Le bilan du gouvernement en matière de droits de l'homme s'est amélioré, mais reste médiocre. Pourtant, la communauté internationale a suivi une approche de «laissez-faire» dans l'intérêt de la stabilité régionale. L'économie est entrée en récession en raison des effets négatifs économiques mondiaux de la crise corona. L'indice de démocratie de l'Economic Intelligence Unit, à Londres, classait toujours le Togo comme un «régime autoritaire».

Ebook published 31 December 2020.

Controversial constitutional and institutional reforms voted in May in parliament opened the way for President Gnassingbé to stand for a fourth and fifth term (2020 and 2025) because the law does not apply retroactively. The first local elections since more than 30 years resulted in the victory of the ruling party. Grand expectations of the opposition which had hoped for a fundamental change at least at the grass-roots were again dashed. The human rights situation sharply deteriorated due to growing political and social tensions related to the prospects of the head of state running for a fourth term. Islamist terrorist violence spread from Mali to the northern frontier region of Togo. The autonomous deep-water port of Lomé developed as a growth pole and hub for the sub-region. China became the major partner beside the established partners the EU, France and Germany. The informal sector still dominated the economy. Economic freedom remained with the overall status ‘mostly unfree’., Des réformes constitutionnelles et institutionnelles controversées votées en mai au Parlement ont ouvert la voie au président Gnassingbé pour se présenter aux quatrième et cinquième mandats (2020 et 2025) car la loi ne s'applique pas rétroactivement. Les premières élections locales depuis plus de 30 ans ont abouti à la victoire du parti au pouvoir. Les grandes attentes de l'opposition qui avait espéré un changement fondamental au moins à la base ont de nouveau été déçues. La situation des droits de l'homme s'est fortement détériorée en raison des tensions politiques et sociales croissantes, liées aux perspectives d'un quatrième mandat du chef de l'État. La violence terroriste islamiste s'est propagée du Mali à la région frontalière nord du Togo. Le port autonome en eau profonde de Lomé s'est développé comme un pôle de croissance et un hub pour la sous-région. La Chine est devenue le principal partenaire aux côtés des partenaires établis, l'UE, la France et l'Allemagne. Le secteur informel dominait toujours l'économie. La liberté économique est restée avec le statut global "pour la plupart non-libre"., Umstrittene verfassungsrechtliche und institutionelle Reformen, die im Mai im Parlament verabschiedet wurden, eröffneten Präsident Gnassingbé den Weg für eine vierte und fünfte Amtszeit (2020 und 2030), da das Gesetz nicht rückwirkend gilt. Die ersten Kommunalwahlen seit mehr als 30 Jahren führten zum Sieg der Regierungspartei. Die großen Erwartungen der Opposition, die zumindest an der Basis auf eine grundlegende Veränderung gehofft hatte, wurden erneut völlig enttäuscht. Die Menschenrechtssituation hat sich aufgrund wachsender politischer und sozialer Spannungen im Zusammenhang mit den Aussichten des Staatsoberhauptes für eine vierte Amtszeit stark verschlechtert. Islamistische terroristische Gewalt breitete sich von Mali bis in die nördliche Grenzregion von Togo aus. Der autonome Tiefwasserhafen von Lomé entwickelte sich als Wachstumspol und Drehscheibe für die Subregion. China wurde neben den etablierten Partnern EU, Frankreich und Deutschland zum wichtigsten Partner. Der informelle Sektor dominierte nach wie vor die Wirtschaft. Die wirtschaftliche Freiheit blieb beim Gesamtstatus "größtenteils unfrei".

Controversial constitutional and institutional reforms voted in May in parliament opened the way for President Gnassingbé to stand for a fourth and fifth term (2020 and 2030) because the law does not apply retroactively. The first local elections since more than 30 years resulted in the victory of the ruling party. Grand expectations of the opposition which had hoped for a fundamental change at least at the grassroots were again dashed. The human rights situation sharply deteriorated due to growing political and social tensions related to the prospects of the head of state running for a fourth term. Islamist terrorist violence spread from Mali to the northern frontier region of Togo. The autonomous deep-water port of Lomé developed as a growth pole and hub for the sub-region. China became the major partner beside the established partners the EU, France and Germany. The informal sector still dominated the economy. Economic freedom remained with the overall status 'mostly unfree'., Umstrittene verfassungsrechtliche und institutionelle Reformen, die im Mai im Parlament verabschiedet wurden, eröffneten Präsident Gnassingbé den Weg für eine vierte und fünfte Amtszeit (2020 und 2030), da das Gesetz nicht rückwirkend gilt. Die ersten Kommunalwahlen seit mehr als 30 Jahren führten zum Sieg der Regierungspartei. Die großen Erwartungen der Opposition, die zumindest an der Basis auf eine grundlegende Veränderung gehofft hatte, wurden erneut völlig enttäuscht. Die Menschenrechtssituation hat sich aufgrund wachsender politischer und sozialer Spannungen im Zusammenhang mit den Aussichten des Staatsoberhauptes für eine vierte Amtszeit stark verschlechtert. Islamistische terroristische Gewalt breitete sich von Mali bis in die nördliche Grenzregion von Togo aus. Der autonome Tiefwasserhafen von Lomé entwickelte sich als Wachstumspol und Drehscheibe für die Subregion. China wurde neben den etablierten Partnern EU, Frankreich und Deutschland zum wichtigsten Partner. Der informelle Sektor dominierte nach wie vor die Wirtschaft. Die wirtschaftliche Freiheit blieb beim Gesamtstatus "größtenteils unfrei"., Des réformes constitutionnelles et institutionnelles controversées votées en mai au Parlement ont ouvert la voie au président Gnassingbé pour se présenter aux quatrième et cinquième mandats (2020 et 2030) car la loi ne s'applique pas rétroactivement. Les premières élections locales depuis plus de 30 ans ont abouti à la victoire du parti au pouvoir. Les grandes attentes de l'opposition qui avait espéré un changement fondamental au moins à la base ont de nouveau été déçues. La situation des droits de l'homme s'est fortement détériorée en raison des tensions politiques et sociales croissantes, liées aux perspectives d'un quatrième mandat du chef de l'État. La violence terroriste islamiste s'est propagée du Mali à la région frontalière nord du Togo. Le port autonome en eau profonde de Lomé s'est développé comme un pôle de croissance et un hub pour la sous-région. La Chine est devenue le principal partenaire aux côtés des partenaires établis, l'UE, la France et l'Allemagne. Le secteur informel dominait toujours l'économie. La liberté économique est restée avec le statut global "pour la plupart non libre".

Throughout the year the controversial legislative elections dominated the political landscape. Huge anti-government demonstrations that called in vain for political alternance. The legislative elections of 20 December 2018, boycotted by the major opposition parties, resulted in an easy victory of the ruling party, however without the expected constitutional amendment majority. Therefore, the prime minister and his cabinet were replaced. The local elections, crucial for democratization at the grass-roots, but postponed time and again since 1987, were again postponed in December 2018 sine die. Economic growth remained stable at about 5% per annum. Public investment in infrastructure (e. g. roads, harbour) and increases in agricultural productivity, notably of export crops, had been the key drivers of economic growth. Moreover, money-laundering, illegal money transfers and trafficking grew alarmingly. Unemployment and lacking political change caused increasing migration., Während des ganzen Jahres dominierten die umstrittenen Parlamentswahlen die politische Diskussion. Andauernde große Demonstrationen gegen die Regierung forderten vergeblich einen Wechsel an der politischen Macht. Die Parlamentswahlen vom 20. Dezember 2018, die von den großen Oppositionsparteien boykottiert wurden, führten zum leichten Sieg der Regierungspartei, jedoch ohne die erwartete qualifizierte Mehrheit für eine Verfassungsänderung. Deshalb traten der Premierminister und sein Kabinett zurück. Die für die Demokratisierung an der Basis entscheidenden Kommunalwahlen, die seit 1987 immer wieder verschoben wurden, wurden im Dezember 2018 erneut auf unbestimmte Zeit verschoben. Das Wirtschaftswachstum blieb stabil bei etwa 5% pro Jahr. Öffentliche Investitionen in die Infrastruktur (z.B. Straßen, Häfen) und die Steigerung der landwirtschaftlichen Produktivität, insbesondere von Exportkulturen, waren die Haupttreiber des Wirtschaftswachstums. Darüber hinaus nahmen Geldwäsche, illegale Geldüberweisungen und Menschenhandel alarmierend zu. Arbeitslosigkeit und mangelnde politische Wende führten zu einer zunehmenden Migration., Tout au long de l'année, les élections législatives controversées ont dominé le paysage politique. D'énormes manifestations antigouvernementales réclamaient en vain une alternance politique. Les élections législatives du 20 décembre 2018, boycottées par les principaux partis de l'opposition, ont permis une victoire facile du parti au pouvoir, sans toutefois obtenir la majorité requise pour un amendement constitutionnel. Par conséquent, le Premier ministre et son cabinet ont été remplacés. Les élections locales, cruciales pour la démocratisation à la base, mais reportées à plusieurs reprises depuis 1987, ont été à nouveau reportées en décembre 2018 sine die. La croissance économique est restée stable à environ 5% par an. Les investissements publics dans les infrastructures (routes, ports, etc.) et l'augmentation de la productivité agricole, notamment des cultures d'exportation, ont été les principaux moteurs de la croissance économique. En outre, le blanchiment d’argent, les transferts d’argent illégal et le trafic se sont multipliés de manière alarmante. Le chômage et l'absence de changement politique ont provoqué une migration croissante.

The Africa Yearbook covers major domestic political developments, the foreign policy and socio-economic trends in sub-Sahara Africa – all related to developments in one calendar year. The Yearbook contains articles on all sub-Saharan states, each of the four sub-regions (West, Central, Eastern, Southern Africa) focusing on major cross-border developments and sub-regional organizations as well as one article on continental developments and one on African-European relations. While the articles have thorough academic quality, the Yearbook is mainly oriented to the requirements of a large range of target groups: students, politicians, diplomats, administrators, journalists, teachers, practitioners in the field of development aid as well as business people.

Peace is not just the absence of conflict. The self-interest lying behind external ‘support’ can take many shapes. The pursuit of justice can sometimes thwart peace efforts. And, last but not least, simply adding more women to peace negotiations will not break male-centric norms.

The chapter is an overview of major events and key developments in the West African sub-region in 2017.

The chapter summarises major developments in sub-Sahara Africa focusing on the themes of elections, conflicts and the status and performance of sub-Sahara Africa in the world economy.

This chapter attempts to address three key questions: First, how is Professor Sulayman Nyang’s scholarly contributions and policy prescriptions understood and responded to in broad intellectual discourse on Africa and international terrorism? Second, what is the status of the war against terrorism in the external relations of Africa states with special attention to relations with the United States and other Western Powers? Third, what is the relevance of the global war on terrorism in international relations today? The chapter notes Professor Sulayman Nyang’s contributions to the scholarship on Islamic militancy, international terrorism and the US-led global war against terrorism including his deep insights on changes in the international system and Africa. Africa is generally regarded in the West as the weakest link in the war against international terrorism; it is the political territory that can easily be penetrated by international terrorists. African states are poor, weak and corrupt. These failed states do not have effective government that is able to deliver public goods to its population or even exercise control over much of its territory. In this way these states are threat both to their citizens and the international community that comes under risk as a result of possible violent reactions by deprived and frustrated citizens that generate global problems including international terrorism. However, while many African governments have not earned the respect of the Western countries, the latter have maintained close economic relationship with them most arguably for economic and geo-political importance. These strong ties between Africa and Western countries have spill over to the security sector with the United States and other Western Powers providing assistance and support to help African governments develop and manage their anti-terrorist and counter insurgencies strategies.

The People’s Democratic Party (PDP) was established in 1998 at the time when Nigeria was under pressure from the international community to undertake political reform in preparation for anticipated return to civil rule. The PDP formed the first government after the country re-introduced civil rule in May 1999 and remained the ruling party at the national level and also in government in the majority of states of the federation until May 2015 when it lost to the All Progressives Congress (APC) in the presidential election, and unexpectedly recorded defeat in the other elections. The climax was on March 28, 2015 when Nigeria held its fifth presidential election and an incumbent president, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan was defeated by retired Major-General Mohammed Buhari who was contesting the presidential election for the fourth time. Apart from its remarkable victory in the previous four successive presidential elections, the PDP had a comfortable majority in the national legislature between 1999 and 2015. However, towards the end of President Obasanjo’s tenure, the party had started to experience disturbing cracks in its internal cohesion. It eventual defeat by the APC at both the presidential and state levels puts an abrupt end to the hegemony of the self-styled “largest political party in Africa” with a vision of “ruling Nigeria for sixty years”. This chapter presents analysis of the remote and immediate causes of the poor performance of the PDP in the 2015 elections. What are the remote and immediate causes of the defeat of the PDP in the 2015 elections? What was the nature of public support for the party and its presidential candidate? Was the dwindling public support for the party linked to its diagnostic analysis of the challenges of governance and development in the country? What was the role of the Jonathan presidency in the political misfortune of the party? What was the capacity of the party to cope with some of the changes and innovations in the electoral proces

The Global South is generally understood to refer to less economically developed countries. It is a broad term that comprises a variety of states with diverse levels of economic, cultural, and political influence in the international order. Although International Relations is an interdisciplinary field of study, it has historically been studied from a very Eurocentric perspective that does not always help us to understand developments occurring in the Global South. Understanding Global South perspectives starts with a discussion of the Western-centric focus of mainstream IR theories. It also recognises the challenges facing scholars from the Global South that might help to explain why Global South perspectives are largely absent from mainstream debates. The ultimate goal is to broaden the field of view within IR theory to incorporate a more just and representative understanding of international relations.

In comparison with other African countries, faith in democracy is strong in Ghana. But the legal tussles that followed the last general election in 2012, and the disqualification of some candidates on trifling grounds in the lead-up to this year’s presidential elections, has spurred public mistrust. This policy note issues a warning about hate speech, violent demonstrations and macho-men militias.

The concept of ‘supranationalism’ covers procedures and processes of decision-making in multi-national political communities that encourages the transfer of power to an authority broader than governments of member states. This paper acknowledges that the world is experiencing a re-awakening of supranationality, and that contemporary globalisation processes is contributing to this development that has not only checkmated the state and dissolves the absolutes of the Westphalian system, but has brought in other non-state actors including the civil society to be closely associated with the operations of international organizations. Globalisation processes have come with new challenges for governance and the management of global public goods (such as health, education, human security, etc.). The established of the African Economic Community (AEC) motivated other African regional organisations to introduce elements of supranationality in their operations. From various provisions in the Abuja Treaty, the understanding of supranationality as a situation where an international organization is endowed with powers to take decisions that are binding on it and all the member states is quite clear. The influence of this development is significant for regional integration in Africa. Using historical data and information on the performance of ECOWAS, this paper contextualizes the experience of ECOWAS in its practice of supranationalism. It highlights the opportunities, pressures and constraints for the effective and efficient operation of the supranational organization for ECOWAS These developments are important given that inter-governmentalism for long dominated the process of regional integration in Africa with each member states of regional organization retaining and exercising their full sovereign power in their separate decisions on the application and implementation of regional agreements. The paper concludes by arguing that ECOWAS, with the support of an efficiently run supr

An underlying assumption of fiscal federalism is that it should create incentives for both the central and constituent governments to efficiently and effectively deliver services to their citizens. Recent discontents with Nigeria’s federal practice, especially since 1999 when the country returned to civil rule, are mostly associated with issues of fiscal federalism. Disputes and conflicts now occur more frequently between the federal and state governments that have to do with resource allocations and intergovernmental finance especially the intergovernmental fiscal transfers. The perceived vertical and horizontal inequalities engendered by the extant revenue sharing formula and the strident demands in several quarters for “true federalism” have become one of the critical sources of threat to Nigerian nationhood. These trends point to contradictions in the conceptualization and implementation of the Nigerian federalism including its fiscal components. This chapter discusses the challenges of fiscal federalism in Nigeria within the context of the principle of decentralisation, which is understood generally as the devolution by a central government of political, administrative and fiscal powers to local-level government. It also assesses the effects of decentralisation on government performance and the implications for good governance especially since 1999 when the country returned to civil rule. In order to understand decentralisation it is essential for one to study how government is working at the sub-national levels. Fiscal federalism is treated in this chapter from a broad perspective, which is not limited by either the discipline of Economics especially its classical notion of “fiscal federalism” or the discourse in Political Science on “federalism and democracy”. The approach adopted here is the historical perspective; one that presents a holistic analysis of the challenges of Nigeria’s fiscal federalism in relation to their origins as well as current phases. T

Nigeria's status and role as a regional power continues to impact the entire West African sub-region. However the country is facing serious security challenges that are complicated by transnational threats which are associated with organised crime and the activities of jihadist movements. Threats to security linked to the activities of illegal migrants, smugglers, drug traffickers and human traffickers in West Africa have attracted considerable attention from scholars, policy makers and practitioners alike. As the activities of the Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad) also known as Boko Haram are spreading fast through the northern part of the country into a number of countries in West and Central Africa - notably Chad, Niger, and Cameroon - fears and anxiety have become more noticeable among stakeholders. Also, the challenge of piracy and maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea threatens Nigeria's national security as well as regional stability. This study presents the role of Nigeria as a regional hegemon, and also discusses its response to transnational organised criminality and jihadist activities in the sub-region, highlighting Nigeria's official response as well as other interventions undertaken through bilateral and multilateral platforms. The study concludes that there is no controversy about the desirability of the Nigerian government to curb transnational organised crime and jihadist activities in the country. However, the complexities of strategies and modalities for effective curbing of transnational threats still requires in-depth and concerted efforts than have been given by stakeholders. One may argue that the prospects for effective control of cross-border crime in West Africa are positive. Both at bilateral and multilateral levels, Nigeria has shown commitment to working with other countries within the West African sub-region to address the menace of transnational cri

The conflicts in the Jos metropolis are not different from other identity conflicts over land in Africa. Studies have shown that dispute over environmental resources is not sufficient by itself to cause violence. When it does contribute to violence, it interacts with other political, economic, and social factors. This perspective draws attention to the social, economic and political contexts underlying environmental resource scarcity’s causal role in African conflicts. This is useful for situating the Jos sectarian conflicts within the context of the interplay of political, economic and social forces in the Jos metropolis. The conflicts connect more strongly to a long historical process on the Jos Plateau than some of the immediate problems widely reported in the media. At the centre of this historical process were British colonialism, the growth of the tin mining economy that brought the early Hausa and Fulani migrant labour to Jos, and the struggles over land. The British colonial administration through its policy of Indirect Rule, and the organization of ethnically segregated communities of ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’ created the settler-indigene divide. The Berom, Afizere and Anaguta who see themselves as the ‘first comers’ refer to themselves as ‘indigenes’ while they regard the Hausa and Fulani as ‘later comers’ and derogatorily labelled them as ‘settlers’. Both the indigenes and non-indigenes have always demonstrated strong emotional appeals to historical factors in their autochthonous claims. This paper examines the role of ethnicity, religion and other primordial sentiments in the Jos conflicts including the politics of belonging and how it relates to land ownership. This paper draws data from the author’s close observations of events in the Jos metropolis for a period of over two decades. Informal interviews, events analyses and qualitative data complement historical and contemporary documentary secondary sources on people, economy and politics of the city of

Since its establishment in the beginning of the twentieth century, the inhabitants of the ethnically and religiously diverse Nigerian city of Jos have inhabited very different places and travelled along opposite trails – patterns that in recent years, with an escalation of violence, have gained new dimensions. By bringing people’s movements into focus, this article highlights how movement comes in different ways to mediate between people and a city in flux. Brought to light is how movement in several different modalities – fast, slow, in total arrest; clothed in Christian or Muslim attires; by car, on foot, or on horseback; assertive or explorative, in triumph as well as in fear – by mediating between people and the city, brings forth a metaphysical landscape that otherwise is hard to get hold of. In this vein, movement as a medium has become a form of ‘social envisioning’ – a tool for understanding and foretelling the city.

This article discusses the political economy of the Arab Spring. It draws attention to the economic and social factors underlying the recent uprisings in the Arab world. Essentially the article relates the internal dynamics in the Arab countries with their status and role in the global economy. It also notes especially the rising awareness in the Arab world on the role of the civil society in domestic politics, especially its capacity to demand political and economic change. The article is divided into five sections. The first section introduces the main issues, while the second section conceptually interprets the Arab Spring within the intellectual discourse on social revolution mainly but with a brief overview on regime change and democratic transition. The third section examines the relationship between oil, politics, and economy in the MENA region. The fourth section contains an analysis of the economic crisis and the various adjustment measures adopted by some governments on the eve of the uprisings. The fifth section examines the external dimensions of the Arab Spring including the international responses. The discussion of the lessons learned and policy recommendations concludes the article.