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We investigated how people think about their personal life and their country by testing how participants in the U.S. and China think about personal and collective events in the past and future. Using a fluency task, we replicated prior research in showing that participants in the U.S. had a positivity bias toward their personal future and a negativity bias toward their country's future. In contrast, participants in China did not display a positivity or negativity bias toward either their personal or collective future. This result suggests that the valence dissociation between personal and collective future thinking is not universal. Additionally, when people considered the past in addition to the future, they displayed similar valence patterns for both temporal periods, providing evidence that people think about the past and the future similarly. We suggest political and cultural differences (such as dialectical thought) as potential explanations for the differences between countries in future thinking and memory.

People belong to many groups, and their group membership forms part of their individual identity. In this chapter, it is argued that people inflate the importance of their own groups at the expense of other groups to which they do not belong. At the level of nations, this tendency is referred to as national narcissism. In the United States, where people are born and grow up in a particular state, this tendency is referred to as state narcissism. To measure or operationally define both these constructs, a paradigm was adapted in which people are asked how much their group contributed to either a particular event, such as World War II, or to, for example, U.S. history (for states). It was found that people claimed extremely high levels of responsibility for their own groups. When people were asked to reflect on contributions of people from different groups, this narcissistic tendency was reduced but not eliminated. This chapter argues for both motivational and cognitive underpinnings of such group overclaiming. In particular, support theory provides a workable understanding of the cognitive mechanisms underlying these effects.

Prior research has demonstrated that Americans massively overestimate how much their home state has contributed to US history. Why does such collective overclaiming occur? We argue that although self-serving biases undoubtedly influence overclaiming, non-motivated factors, such as a failure to consider the contributions of other states, also play a large role in overclaiming effects. In the current studies, subjects read descriptions of territories within a fictitious country and evaluated how much a territory within that country contributed to its history. Experiment 1 showed that overclaiming of responsibility increased as more territories were added to the country. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that requiring subjects to explicitly consider all territories reduced estimations of responsibility. Experiment 4 showed that people provided higher ratings of responsibility when more details were provided about the territory. Finally, Experiment 5 showed that retrieval fluency did not affect overclaiming. We conclude that support theory - based on the availability of content - provides a strong explanation for why the collective overclaiming of responsibility occurs, with both theoretical and practical implications.

What is the best way to predict future memory performance? The intuitive answer is through judgments of learning (JOLs), in which people estimate how likely they are to remember something in the future. Recent theory, however, suggests that a retrospective confidence rating made just after a retrieval attempt might be a better predictor in some situations. In three preregistered experiments, we compared delayed JOLs to confidence ratings. People studied paired associates (E1) or psychology vocabulary terms (E2E3), then took a practice cued-recall test in which they made either a JOL or confidence rating after each response. They then took a final test. In Experiment 1, confidence ratings offered higher resolution (metacognitive accuracy) of memory for paired associates than did JOLs, but in Experiments 2 and 3, the advantage of confidence ratings was much smaller. A mini meta-analysis indicated that confidence ratings have a small advantage in predicting future performance over delayed JOLs. We argue that the two judgments rely on similar cues, and that even though JOLs explicitly ask people to predict future performance, doing so does not enhance prediction accuracy. Rather, the presence of a retention interval in the JOL cue adds variability to the judgment process.

Following a survey asking many questions about world history, 6185 students from 35 countries were asked, “What contribution do you think the country you are living in has made to world history?” They provided an estimate from 0 to 100%, where 0% indicated that the country made no contribution to world history and 100% indicated that all contributions came from the country. U.S. students provided an estimate of 30%, quite high in some regards, but modest compared to other countries (e.g., 39% by Malaysians). Country-level estimates varied widely, ranging from 11% (Switzerland) to 61% (Russia). The total estimate (summing for all countries) was 1156%. We argue that students’ exaggerated estimates provide evidence for national narcissism and may be caused by several mechanisms, such as the availability heuristic—when students think about world history, they mostly think about the history of their country and thus assume their country must be important.

Collective memory studies show that Americans remember their presidents in a predictable pattern, which can be described as a serial position curve with an additional spike for Abraham Lincoln. However, all prior studies have tested Americans’ collective memory for the presidents by their names. How well do Americans know the faces of the presidents? In two experiments, we investigated presidential facial recognition and compared facial recognition to name recognition. In Experiment 1, an online sample judged whether each of the official portraits of the US presidents and similar portraits of nonpresidents depicted a US president. The facial recognition rate (around 60%) was lower than the name recognition rate in past research (88%), but the overall pattern still fit a serial position curve. Some nonpresidents, such as Alexander Hamilton, were still falsely identified as presidents at high rates. In Experiment 2, a college sample completed a recognition task composed of both faces and names to directly compare the recognition rates. As predicted, subjects recognized the names of the presidents more frequently than the faces. Some presidents were frequently identified by their names but not by their faces (e.g. John Quincy Adams), while others were the opposite (e.g. Calvin Coolidge). Together, our studies show that Americans’ memory for the faces of the presidents is somewhat worse than their memory for the names of the presidents but still follows the same pattern, indicating that collective memories contain more than just verbal information.

Even though retrieval practice typically has a robust, positive influence on memory, response format (overt vs. covert retrieval) may moderate its effect when students learn complex material. Overt retrieval is likely to promote exhaustive retrieval, whereas covert retrieval may not be exhaustive for familiar key terms. In two experiments, students were instructed to study key-term definitions and were asked to practice retrieval overtly, to practice retrieval covertly, or to restudy the definitions. Students also made metacognitive judgments. A final criterion test was administered two days later. Students’ final recall was greater after overt retrieval practice than after covert retrieval practice or restudy, with a continuously cumulating meta-analysis establishing the effect as moderate in size (pooled d = 0.43). Thus, response format does matter for learning definitions of key terms, supporting the recommendation that students use overt retrieval when using retrieval practice as a strategy to learn complex materials.

In two experiments, we explored the effects of noticing and remembering change in the misinformation paradigm. People watched slide shows, read narratives containing misinformation about the events depicted in the slide shows, and took a recognition test on which they reported whether any details had changed between the slides and the narratives. As expected, we found a strong misinformation effect overall. In some cases, however, misinformation led to improved recognition, which is opposite the usual finding. Critically, misinformation led to improved recognition of the original event when subjects detected and remembered a change between the original event and the postevent information. Our research agrees with other findings from retroactive-interference paradigms and can be interpreted within the recursive-remindings framework, according to which detecting and remembering change can enhance retention. We conclude that the misinformation effect occurs mostly for witnessed details that are not particularly memorable. In the case of more memorable details, providing misinformation can actually facilitate later recollection of the original events.

Collective narcissism—a phenomenon in which individuals show excessively high regard for their own group—is ubiquitous in studies of small groups. We examined how Americans from the 50 U.S. states ( N = 2,898) remembered U.S. history by asking them, “In terms of percentage, what do you think was your home state’s contribution to the history of the United States?” The mean state estimates ranged from 9% (Iowa) to 41% (Virginia), with the total contribution for all states equaling 907%, indicating strong collective narcissism. In comparison, ratings provided by nonresidents for states were much lower (but still high). Surprisingly, asking people questions about U.S. history before they made their judgment did not lower estimates. We argue that this ethnocentric bias is due to ego protection, selective memory retrieval processes involving the availability heuristic, and poor statistical reasoning. This study shows that biases that influence individual remembering also influence collective remembering.

During political campaigns, candidates often change their positions on controversial issues. Does changing positions create confusion and impair memory for a politician's current position? In 3 experiments, two political candidates held positions on controversial issues in two debates. Across the debates, their positions were repeated, changed, or held only in the second debate (control). Relative to the control condition, recall of the most recent position on issues was enhanced when change was detected and recollected, whereas recall was impaired when change was not recollected. Furthermore, examining the errors revealed that subjects were more likely to intrude a Debate 1 response than to recall a blend of the two positions, and that recollecting change decreased Debate 1 intrusions. We argue that detecting change produces a recursive representation that embeds the original position in memory along with the more recent position. Recollecting change then enhances memory for the politician's positions and their order of occurrence by accessing the recursive trace.

In five experiments, we extended the production effect-better memory for items said aloud than for items read silently-to paired-associate learning, the goal being to explore whether production enhances associative information in addition to enhancing item information. In Experiments 1 and 2, we used a semantic-relatedness task in addition to the production manipulation and found no evidence of a production effect, whether the measure was cued recall or item recognition. Experiment 3 showed that the semantic-relatedness task had overshadowed the production effect; the effect was present when the semantic-relatedness task was removed, again whether cued recall or item recognition was the measure. Experiments 4 and 5 provided further evidence that production can enhance recall for word pairs and, using an associate recognition test with intact versus rearranged pairs, indicated that production may also enhance associative information. That production boosts memory for both types of information is considered in terms of distinctive encoding.

In two experiments, we explored the effects of noticing and remembering change in the misinformation paradigm. People watched slide shows, read narratives containing misinformation about the events depicted in the slide shows, and took a recognition test on which they reported whether any details had changed between the slides and the narratives. As expected, we found a strong misinformation effect overall. In some cases, however, misinformation led to improved recognition, which is opposite the usual finding. Critically, misinformation led to improved recognition of the original event when subjects detected and remembered a change between the original event and the postevent information. Our research agrees with other findings from retroactive-interference paradigms and can be interpreted within the recursive-remindings framework, according to which detecting and remembering change can enhance retention. We conclude that the misinformation effect occurs mostly for witnessed details that are not particularly memorable. In the case of more memorable details, providing misinformation can actually facilitate later recollection of the original events.

Every fall, thousands of college students begin their first college courses, often in large lecture settings. Many students, even those who work hard, flounder. What should students be doing differently? Drawing on research in cognitive psychology and our experience as educators, we provide suggestions about how students should approach taking a course in college. We discuss time management techniques, identify the ineffective study strategies students often use, and suggest more effective strategies based on research in the lab and the classroom. In particular, we advise students to space their study sessions on a topic and to quiz themselves, as well as using other active learning strategies while reading. Our goal was to provide a framework for students to succeed in college classes.

Authors use in-text citations to provide support for their claims and to acknowledge work done by others. How much do such citations increase the believability of an author's claims? It is possible that readers (especially novices) might ignore citations as they read. Alternatively, citations ostensibly serve as evidence for a claim, which justifies using them as a basis for a judgment of truth. In six experiments, subjects saw true and false trivia claims of varying difficulty presented with and without in-text citations (e.g., The cat is the only pet not mentioned in the bible) and rated the likelihood that each statement was true. A mini meta-analysis summarizing the results of all six experiments indicated that citations had a small but reliable effect on judgments of truth (d = 0.13, 95% CI [0.06, 0.20]) suggesting that subjects were more likely to believe claims that were presented with citations than without. We discuss this citation effect and how it is similar and different to related research suggesting that nonprobative photos can increase judgments of truth.

The testing effect is the finding that retrieval practice can enhance recall on future tests. One unanswered question is whether first-test response mode (writing or speaking the answer) affects final-test performance (and whether final-test response mode itself matters). An additional unsettled issue is whether written and oral recall lead to differences in the amount recalled. In three experiments, we examined these issues: whether subjects can recall more via typing or speaking; whether typing or speaking answers on a first test can lead to better final-test performance (and whether an interaction occurs with final-test response mode) and whether any form of overt response leads to better final-test performance as compared to covert retrieval (thinking of the answer but not producing it). Subjects studied paired associates; took a first test by typing, speaking, or thinking about responses; and then took a second test in which the answers were either spoken or typed. The results revealed few differences between typing and speaking during recall, and no difference in the size of the testing effect on the second test. Furthermore, an initial covert retrieval yielded roughly the same benefit to future test performance as did overt retrieval. Thus, the testing effect was quite robust across these manipulations. The practical implication for learning is that covert retrieval provides as much benefit to later retention as does overt retrieval and that both can be effective study strategies.

Students are often provided with instructions that are intended to influence their attention to particular sections or elements of their reading materials. To date, the bulk of the work on such prereading instructions has focused on drawing reader attention to relevant text information. In the current project, we examined whether instructions might also be useful in helping readers ignore irrelevant (albeit inherently interesting) information in text. In two experiments, prereading instructions asked readers to (a) focus on specific relevant text segments, (b) ignore specific irrelevant text segments, (c) maintain an awareness that the text contained irrelevant segments without specifically identifying them, or (d) read without warnings. Participants generally exhibited longer reading times and enhanced recall for irrelevant segments compared to base content, except in cases for which general instructions warned about but did not specifically identify those irrelevant elements. The implications of these findings for research on seductive details and text processing, as well practical applications for the design of reading instruction, are discussed.

Testing in school is usually done for purposes of assessment, to assign students grades (from tests in classrooms) or rank them in terms of abilities (in standardized tests). Yet tests can serve other purposes in educational settings that greatly improve performance; this chapter reviews 10 other benefits of testing. Retrieval practice occurring during tests can greatly enhance retention of the retrieved information (relative to no testing or even to restudying). Furthermore, besides its durability, such repeated retrieval produces knowledge that can be retrieved flexibly and transferred to other situations. On open-ended assessments (such as essay tests), retrieval practice required by tests can help students organize information and form a coherent knowledge base. Retrieval of some information on a test can also lead to easier retrieval of related information, at least on delayed tests. Besides these direct effects of testing, there are also indirect effects that are quite positive. If students are quizzed frequently, they tend to study more and with more regularity. Quizzes also permit students to discover gaps in their knowledge and focus study efforts on difficult material; furthermore, when students study after taking a test, they learn more from the study episode than if they had not taken the test. Quizzing also enables better metacognitive monitoring for both students and teachers because it provides feedback as to how well learning is progressing. Greater learning would occur in educational settings if students used self-testing as a study strategy and were quizzed more frequently in class.