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1. Propositional or non-propositional attitudes?

Author

Crawford, Sean

Subjects
*PROPOSITION (Logic), *BELIEF & doubt, *JUDGMENT (Logic), *PREDICATE (Logic), *REASONING
Abstract

Propositionalism is the view that intentional attitudes, such as belief, are relations to propositions. Propositionalists argue that propositionalism follows from the intuitive validity of certain kinds of inferences involving attitude reports. Jubien (Philos Stud 104(1):47-62, ) argues powerfully against propositions and sketches some interesting positive proposals, based on Russell's multiple relation theory of judgment, about how to accommodate 'propositional phenomena' without appeal to propositions. This paper argues that none of Jubien's proposals succeeds in accommodating an important range of propositional phenomena, such as the aforementioned validity of attitude-report inferences. It then shows that the notion of a predication act-type, which remains importantly Russellian in spirit, is sufficient to explain the range of propositional phenomena in question, in particular the validity of attitude-report inferences. The paper concludes by discussing whether predication act-types are really just propositions by another name. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2014
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2. Propositional or non-propositional attitudes?

Author

Sean Crawford

Subjects
Propositions, Philosophy of mind, Event type, Philosophy, Appeal, Metaphysics, propositions, propositional attitudes, quantifiers, belief, plural quantification, multigrade relation, multiple relation theory of judgement, predication, Michael Jubien, Stephen Schiffer, Bertrand Russell, Tyler Burge, Wayne Davis, Epistemology, Philosophy of language, Range (mathematics), Predication, TheoryofComputation_MATHEMATICALLOGICANDFORMALLANGUAGES, Quantification, Act-type, Multiple relation, Propositional attitudes, Plural quantification
Abstract

Propositionalism is the view that intentional attitudes, such as belief, are relations to propositions. Propositionalists argue that propositionalism follows from the intuitive validity of certain kinds of inferences involving attitude reports. Jubien (Philos Stud 104(1):47-62, 2001) argues powerfully against propositions and sketches some interesting positive proposals, based on Russell's multiple relation theory of judgment, about how to accommodate "propositional phenomena" without appeal to propositions. This paper argues that none of Jubien's proposals succeeds in accommodating an important range of propositional phenomena, such as the aforementioned validity of attitude-report inferences. It then shows that the notion of a predication act-type, which remains importantly Russellian in spirit, is sufficient to explain the range of propositional phenomena in question, in particular the validity of attitude-report inferences. The paper concludes by discussing whether predication act-types are really just propositions by another name. © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.

Published
2013

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