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Alfred Korzybski maintained that training in 'consciousness of abstracting' would lead people beyond the paradoxes of abstraction. Gregory Bateson, on the other hand, argued for the inability to achieve this [...]

Recently, during an interval in another of those melancholy conferences about the ruinous imbalance of the United States' foreign trade, I ran across four consultants comparing prophecies in the bar. [...]

When creating theory to understand or implement change at the social and/or organizational level, it is generally accepted that part of the theory building process includes a process of abstraction. While the process of abstraction is well understood, it is not so well understood how abstractions 'fit' together to enable the creation of better theory. Starting with a few simple ideas, this paper explores one way we work with abstractions. This exploration challenges the traditionally held importance of abstracting concepts from experience. That traditional focus has been one-sided--pushing science toward the discovery of data without the balancing process that occurs with the integration of the data. Without such balance, the sciences have been pushed toward fragmentation. Instead, in the present paper, new emphasis is placed on the relationship between abstract concepts. Specifically, this paper suggests that a better theory is one that is constructed of concepts that exist on a similar level of abstraction. Suggestions are made for quantifying this claim and using the insights to enable scholars and practitioners to create more effective theory. Keywords Conceptual systems * Theory building * Abstraction * Metatheory * Theory of theory, 1 Introduction I begin with the view that the social sciences have not yet developed theories that are unarguably highly effective in practical application. One reason for this lack of [...]

EJ: You have recently published work on the affinities between Deleuze and McLuhan. Do you see any affinities between Korzybski and Deleuze as well? PZ: I thought about mentioning Korzybski [...]

Abstract This essay introduces the concept of deictic abstraction (deictic ideation), taking as a point of departure Husserl's prototypical but insufficient description of the act of ideation in which a [...]

Several data-sets are collected and analyzed to analyze the different patterns of action that can be used for an empirical analysis of the organizational routines. The patterns as observed in the different contexts of events, pair of events and for different abstraction levels are also analyzed.

Two notions of objectification, namely Buber's I-thou relations which relates to the treatment of humans, and I-it relations that apply to objects, are compared and analyzed.

There has recently been considerable interest in accounts of fiction which treat fictional characters as abstract objects. In this paper I argue against this view. More precisely I argue that such accounts are unable to accommodate our intuitions that fictional negative existentials such as 'Raskolnikov doesn't exist' are true. I offer a general argument to this effect and then consider, but reject, some of the accounts of fictional negative existentials offered by abstract object theorists. I then note that some of the sort of data invoked by the abstract object theorist in fact cuts against her position. I conclude that we should not regard fictional characters as abstract objects but rather should adopt a make-believe theoretic account of fictional characters along the lines of those developed by Ken Walton and others.

The manner in which Derrida's dialogue with Levinas and his investigation of the Greek/Jew opposition becomes a debate about ethics and hospitality is examined. The process of abstraction that supports the opposition is highlighted as also the way in which such abstraction conflicts with the ethical aims of their respective objects.

59 art collectors (30 men, 29 women) were given the Gregorc Style Delineator to classify them by thinking styles and a questionnaire regarding their art preferences. Their ages ranged from 33 to 99 years (M = 59.5 yr.). Abstract art was preferred by 34% of the sample. Representational art, such as Dutch Masters and Impressionism, was preferred by 66% of the sample. Of the collectors who preferred nonobjective abstract paintings, such as works by color field artists like Mark Rothko, and Abstract Expressionist paintings, such as works by Jackson Pollock, 62% had scores on the Gregorc Style Delineator by which they were classified as showing abstract thinking styles. Of the collectors who preferred representational painting, 86% were classified as showing concrete thinking styles.

A debated topic in Avicennan psychology is whether for Avicenna abstraction is a metaphor for emanation or to be taken literally. This issue stems from the deeper philosophical question of whether humans acquire intelligibles externally from an emanation by the Active Intellect, which is a separate substance, or internally from an inherently human cognitive process, which prepares us for an emanation from the Active Intellect. I argue that the tension between these doctrines is only apparent. In his logical works Avicenna limns an account where through the internal human process of abstraction accidents accruing to an essence existing in matter are extracted, thus preparing the essence for new accidents emanating externally from the Active Intellect, which make the essence something conceptualized in the intellect. This study, then, outlines the epistemological and metaphysical framework presented in the logical works that underpins Avicenna's theory of abstraction presented in his psychological works.

ALFRED KORZYBSKI maintained that training in 'consciousness of abstracting' would lead people beyond the paradoxes of abstraction. Gregory Bateson, on the other hand, argued for the inability to achieve this [...]

ABSTRACT. The process of abstraction and concretisation is a label used for an explicative theory of scientific model-construction. In scientific theorising this process enters at various levels. We could identify [...]

Various defenses of amodal symbol systems are addressed, including amodal symbols in sensory-motor areas, the casual theory of concepts, supramodal concepts, latent semantic analysis, and abstracted amodal symbols. Various aspects of perceptual symbol systems are clarified and developed, including perception, features, simulators, category structure, frames, analogy, introspection, situated action, and development. Particular attention is given to abstract concepts, language, and computational mechanisms.

Alexander Pope's poem 'Dunciad' is flawed rather than enhanced by its duality of language and content. Despite successive attempts by other authors to salvage the poem's continuity, it fails to achieve coherence due to the abstraction of language needed for object reference. This abstraction interferes with the poem's ability to generate material effects on readers.

Abstraction in music and its representation is a weak approximation of the totality of the experience as experienced by the composer. It is only a feeble communication device aimed at repeatability.

An experiment classifying computer programming knowledge into five different levels of abstraction confirms that the experts have better abstract knowledge than the novices. The experiment also tests whether mastering of knowledge at different abstraction levels changes with skill levels indicates and indicates that differences in levels depend on what abstract or concrete knowledge is involved. The experts have better concrete knowledge than the novices at the physical but not at the logical level, and better abstract knowledge at the conceptual and functional but not objective level.

This paper presents a new technique for helping managers to talk through and develop their view of difficult and complex issues, which are given expression by arranging a collection of objects, some of them symbolically rich, in an arrangement or 'sculpture'. At the same time, the managers describe and develop the meanings being given to, and the relationships between, the objects. The technique is in the tradition of elicitation techniques, such as cognitive mapping, in that it encourages a person or a group to dialogue with a physical representation of their ideas. Meanings are not merely described but sometimes actively constructed or negotiated. Theoretically, the technique draws on recent work in cognitive psychology and linguistics on metaphors. The paper describes and evaluates our experience with using the technique in a variety of different circumstances, and argues that, more than two-dimensional techniques, cognitive sculpting offers the 'requisite variety' to capture and communicate the richness and metaphoric complexity of managers' views of their world. Key words - cognitive mapping, elicitation, group decision, modelling, subjectivity

Philosophers have squabbled endlessly over Rene Descartes' assertion that the mind is distinct from the body. In support of Descartes' assertion, an epistemic standard is extrapolated from his 'Fourth Set of Replies,' which allows inferences from de re conceivability claims to de re modal claims, without transgressing the norm that governs abstraction. This epistemic standard respects both the presupposition relations and the superordination relations inherent within the idea of a unified mind and body.

Graphical representation limit abstraction in cognitive actions, and thus aid 'processibility'. External and internal graphical and linguistic representational system show that a cognitive theory of peoples reasoning performance explain the logical 'equivalence' of inferences evident in graphical and linguistic form and the implementational 'difference' which influences facility of inference. Mental models data is covered to find new empirical predictions. Architecture of working memory's capacity to store specific representations easily is also considered.

Perruchet (1994) suggested that 'neither a specific-item retrieval process nor abstractive capacity' is required to explain Vokey and Brooks (1992) results, which instead can be accounted for in terms of knowledge of item fragrments. The literature contains 2 definitions of abstractive. Rejecting abstractive in the sense of nonliteral units requires rejecting the results of studies on changed-letter transfer, some of which do not need the control group Perruchet claims and thus stand, confirming nonliteral (relational) abstraction. However, the rejection of pooled across items abstraction even in the form of our proposed retrieval-time pooling is feasible, which we had not previously appreciated. Perruchet's rejection of item retrieval ignores Vokey and Brooks' coding and retrieval variations. The coding and retrieval results cannot be ignored simply because they are nonstandard, however. Integrating this literature with known memory phenomena requires incorporating these processing factors, rather than assuming fixed, literal fragments.

Four experiments examined sensitivity to feature frequencies and feature correlations as a function of intentional and incidental concept learning. Feature frequencies were encoded equally well across variations in learning strategies, and although classification decisions in both intentional and incidental conditions preserved correlated features, this sensitivity was achieved through different processes. With intentional learning, sensitivity to correlations resulted from explicit rules, whereas incidental encoding preserved correlations through a similarity-based analogical process. In incidental tasks that promoted exemplar storage, classification decisions were mediated by similarity to retrieved examples, and correlated features were indirectly preserved in this process. The results are discussed in terms of the diversity of encoding processes and representations that can occur with incidental category learning.

Mathematicians do not have a different type of brain to everyone else but are able to comprehend abstraction. They can use their ability to reason with abstract concepts rather than just objects.

The meanings of abstract concepts depend on context. Perceptual symbol systems (PSS) provide a powerful framework for representing such context. Whereas a few expected difficulties for simulations are consistent with empirical findings, the theory does not clearly predict simulations of specific abstract concepts in a testable way and does not appear to distinguish abstract noun concepts (like truth) from their stem concepts (such as true).

We propose a way in which Barsalou could strengthen his position and at the same time make a considerable dent in the category/abstraction problem (that he suggests remains unsolved). There exists a class of connectionist models that solves this problem parsimoniously and provides a mechanistic underpinning for the promising high-level architecture he proposes.

Barsalou's hypothesis that mental representations are constructed by selecting parts of percepts encounters the same difficulties as other empiricist theories: They cannot explain concepts for which instances do not share perceptible features (e.g., furniture) or for which there are no relevant percepts (e.g., the end of time). Barsalou's attempt to reduce falsity to failed pattern matching is an elementary error, and the generativity of his simulators cannot be attained without nonterminal symbols. There is not now, and there never was, any reason to be interested in empiricist theories of knowledge. Abstraction is a fundamental aspect of human cognition.

Barsalou's interesting model might benefit from defining simulation and clarifying the implications of prior critiques for simulations (and not just for perceptual symbols). Contrary to claims, simulators (or frames) appear, in the limit, to be amodal. In addition, the account of abstract terms seems extremely limited.

Barsalou's move to a perceptual basis for cognition is welcome. His scheme contrasts with classical logical schemes in many ways, including its implications for the status of individuals. Barsalou deals mainly with perceived individuals, omitting discussion of cognized individuals. It is argued that the individuality of cognized individuals is an abstraction, which conforms in its manner of formation to other cognitive abstractions which Barsalou discusses, such as truth and disjunction.

We agree with Barsalou's claim about the importance of perceptual symbols in a theory of abstract concepts. Yet we maintain that the richness of many abstract concepts arises from the metaphorical mapping of recurring patterns of perceptual, embodied experience to provide essential structure to these abstract ideas.

Amodality is not incompatible with being originally derived from sensory experience. The transformation of perceptual symbols into amodal abstractions could take place spontaneously through self-organizing processes such as autocatalysis. The organizational role played by 'simulators' happens implicitly in a neural network, and quite possibly, in the brain as well.

Our concerns fall into three areas: (1) Barsalou fails to make clear what simulators are (vs. what they do); (2) activation of perceptual areas of the brain during thought does not distinguish between the activation's being constitutive of concepts or a mere causal consequence (Barsalou needs the former); and (3) Barsalou's attempt to explain how modal symbols handle abstraction fails.

Ballard et al. claim that fixations bind variables to cognitive pointers. I comment on three aspects of this claim: (1) its contribution to the interpretation of indexical language; (2) empirical support for the use of very few deictic pointers; (3) nonetheless, abstract pointers cannot be taken as prototypical cognitive representations.