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The Philosophy of Right presents us with a vision of bureaucratic paternalism that is designed to check the excesses of free markets set in motion by the triumph of natural-law thinking, which abstracted the principles of private property and subjective freedom from the institutions that had tamed them and situated them in a stable context. Against these excesses Hegel pits the agricultural estate, which has not succumbed to natural-law thinking; and a "universal estate" of bureaucrats who are educated in Hegel's philosophy itself, freeing them of the natural-law conflation of human needs with arbitrary and endlessly expanding preferences. Taught by Hegel to look after the needs of the organic whole that is society rather than the gratification of their own preferences, the task of the bureaucrats of the universal estate is to curb the tendency of free markets to produce the social preconditions for an alienated "rabble" to bring down the system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The issue of the work is an analysis of characteristics of land debt, known as non-accessory real right securing claims in German and Swiss law. Using the method of comparative analysis of the characteristics of this property right, author determines the similarities and differences of land debt in relation to similar types of rights, in particular in relation to a mortgage, as most similar security right, from the group of liens. Since the Draft Code of ownership and other property real rights in Serbia in 2006. proposed the introduction of real debt in Serbian law, the author of the paper examines the advantages and disadvantages of this concept in order to evaluate this assessment.. As an essential difference to the lien, the author defines the non-accessory character of land debt and multifunctional purpose. The author advocates the introduction of institute of land debt in future Serbian law, as the original non-accessory real security right (sui generis) that represents functional addittion to accessory mortgage.

In this paper, I argue for the existence of pathologies of juridicism. I attempt to show that the Western regime of right tends to colonize our intersubjective relations, resulting in the formation of affective and habitual dispositions that actually hinder participation in social life. Speaking of pathologies of juridicism is to claim that the legal form fundamentally contaminates the way in which we relate to ourselves, to others, and to the world, resulting in an ethically deformed, distorted or deficient form of (inter-) subjectivity. To support my thesis I consult a philosopher, whose work still provides a powerful analysis and critique of juridicism, namely, Hegel. Hegel provides an historic and a systematic theory of the pathologies of juridicism. His historical theory locates the origin of the abstract subjectivity of right in Roman antiquity. His systematic theory understands the negative effects of an absolutization of the legal domain as a persistent threat to social integration and an individual's pursuit of the good life. I clarify these argumentative dimensions in two steps, beginning with Hegel's historical analysis of right in his Lectures on the Philosophy of History. I then reconstruct Hegel's critique of the subjectivity of right in the short chapter on the 'Condition of Right' in his Phenomenology of Spirit. In conclusion, I argue that, although Hegel's diagnosis is correct, his prescribed therapy must fail: instead of radically altering abstract right in terms of content and form, it only recommends its complementation through other ethical spheres. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his book Das Recht der Freiheit (2011), Axel Honneth develops a theory of social justice that incorporates negative, reflexive and social forms of freedom as well as the institutional conditions necessary for their reproduction. This account enables the identification of social pathologies or systemic normative deficits that frustrate individual efforts to relate their actions reflexively to a normative order and inhibits their ability to recognize the freedom of others as a condition of their own. In this article I utilize Honneth’s theory in the diagnosis of a contemporary social pathology, which impedes social recognition and thereby contributes to social injustice. I argue that this particular social pathology – associated with the Second Amendment right to bear arms – has given rise to a pernicious form of subjectivity, which I call self-defensive. I conclude with some remarks concerning what this application reveals about the strengths and weaknesses of Honneth’s account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

El comienzo de la Filosofía del Derecho con el concepto de "Derecho abstracto" y la "moralidad" presenta la apariencia de una forma de tratamiento típica del individualismo metodológico de las teorías jusnaturalistas. Hegel aclara sin embargo que el plan de la exposición no refleja ni el orden genético, o temporal, ni la estructura ontológica de la cosa. La pregunta que tratará de responder este artículo es, entonces, a qué criterios responde esta problemática estructura del plan de la obra. La tesis que sostiene el autor es que las dos primeras partes de la obra se tienen que leer principalmente como una exposición crítico-negativo de las teorías vigentes, y que recién la tercera parte sobre las instituciones de la eticidad expone positivamente el pensamiento de Hegel. Pero el tratamiento del derecho y la moralidad no es tampoco meramente negativo, sino que retoma y hace suyos al mismo tiempo principios fundamentales del jusnaturalismo y de Kant, como condiciones necesarias para comprensión de las instituciones de la sociedad y del Estado modernos.The beginning of Philosophy of Right with the concept of "Abstract Right" and "morality" presents the appearance of a form of treatment typical of the methodological individualism of natural right theories. Nevertheless, Hegel makes it clear that the expository plan does not reflect the genetic, temporal or ontological structure of the issue. This article will thus try to give an answer to the question about the criteria to which this problematic structure of the work plan responds. The thesis sustained by the author is that the first two parts of the work have to be read mainly as a critical-negative exposition of the current theories, and only the third part about the institutions of Sittlichkeit provides a positive exposition of Hegel's thought. The treatment of Right and morality is not merely negative either, but takes up again and at the same time conforms to Kant's and Natural Rights fundamental principles, as necessary conditions for the comprehension of the institutions of modern society and modern State.