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Using contract-level supervisory data, we show that dollar forward sales by non-U.S. banks that are initiated at the end of a quarter and mature shortly after it concludes trade at higher prices and higher volumes. These effects are driven by banks with large net on-balance-sheet dollar assets that they can hedge around quarter ends by selling dollars forward (increasing off-balance-sheet short positions), which suggests regulatory arbitrage to reduce capital charges for open foreign exchange (FX) exposure. Our results indicate that demand effects related to banks’ management of FX exposure are an important driver of deviations from covered interest rate parity.

When firms trade forward contracts with banks to protect foreign currency cash flows against exchange rate movements, foreign exchange risk migrates to the banking sector. We show how this migrated risk may induce systemic repercussions with severe implications for the real economy. For identification, we exploit the Brexit referendum in June 2016 as a quasi-natural experiment in combination with detailed microdata on forward contracts and the credit register in Germany. Before the referendum, firms substantially increased their use of derivatives in response to the heightened uncertainty; banks, in providing these contracts, did not fully intermediate the risk and retained a large share of it on their own books. The depreciation of the British pound in response to the referendum's outcome posed a shock to the capital of ex ante exposed banks. Banks, especially weakly capitalized ones, absorbed these losses by cutting back credit to all firms, including those unlikely to have had any exchange rate exposure to begin with. Firms that had ex ante borrowing relationships with banks facing losses experienced a larger reduction in credit and a greater decline in investment compared with their industry peers, thereby contributing to the aggregate investment contraction. We also find these effects to be more pronounced for small firms, which is consistent with credit market frictions being rooted in asymmetric information problems.

We study the role of bargaining power and outside options with respect to the pricing of over-the-counter interbank loans using a bilateral Nash bargaining model, and we test the model predictions with detailed transaction-level data from the euro-area interbank market. We find that lender banks with greater bargaining power over their borrowers charge higher interest rates, while the lack of alternative investment opportunities for lenders lowers bilateral interest rates. Moreover, we find that when lenders that are not eligible to earn interest on excess reserves (IOER) lend funds to borrowers with access to the IOER facility, they do so at rates that are below the IOER rate; in turn, these borrowers put the funds in their reserve accounts to earn the spread. Our findings highlight that this persistent arbitrage opportunity is not merely a result of the lack of alternative outside options for some lenders, but rather it crucially depends on lenders' limited bilateral bargaining power, leading to a persistent segmentation of prices in the euro-area interbank market. We examine the implications of these findings for the transmission of euro-area monetary policy.

We analyze how the Lehman and sovereign crises affect international financial integration, exploiting euro-area proprietary interbank data, crisis and monetary shocks, and loan terms to the same borrower during the same day by domestic versus foreign lenders. Crisis shocks reduce the supply of cross-border liquidity, with stronger volume than pricing effects, thereby impairing international financial integration. On the extensive margin, the cross-border credit crunch is independent of quality, while—on the intensive margin—riskier borrower banks suffer more. Moreover, the cross-border liquidity crunch is substantially stronger for term loans, and weaker for foreign lender banks that have a subsidiary in the same country than the borrower. Nonstandard monetary policy improves interbank liquidity, but without fostering strong crossborder financial re-integration.

We analyze how international financial integration is affected by the recent financial and sovereign crises, exploiting euro-area proprietary interbank data, crisis and monetary shocks, and loan terms to the same borrower during the same day by domestic versus foreign lenders. Crisis shocks reduce the supply of cross-border liquidity, with stronger volume than pricing effects, thereby impairing international financial integration. On the extensive margin, the cross-border credit crunch is independently of quality. On the intensive margin, however, GIPSheadquartered debtor banks suffer in the Lehman crisis, but effects are stronger in the sovereigndebt crisis, especially for riskier banks. Consistent with asymmetric information being the key driver, the cross-border liquidity crunch is stronger for longer-term loans, and weaker for foreign lender banks that are located in the same country than the borrower. Nonstandard monetary policy improves interbank liquidity, but without fostering strong cross-border financial reintegration. José-Luis Peydró acknowledges financial support from project ECO2015-68182-P (MINECO/FEDER, UE) and the European Research Council Grant (project 648398). The views expressed in the paper are only those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of any of the institutions to which the authors are affiliated.

We use transaction-level data on foreign exchange (FX) forward contracts for the period 2014 through 2016 in conjunction with supervisory balance sheet information to study the drivers of banks' dollar hedging costs. Comparing contracts of the same maturity that are initiated during the same hour of the same day, we find large heterogeneity in banks' hedging costs. We show that these costs (i) are higher for banks with a larger FX funding gap, (ii) depend on banks' FX funding composition in terms of the source (interbank versus retail) and rollover structure (long-term versus short-term), (iii) are lower for banks with deeper internal dollar capital markets, and (iv) increase with banks' shadow cost of capital. Our results are important for understanding how shocks are transmitted internationally through the FX hedging market.

We study the role of bargaining power and outside options for the pricing of over-the-counter interbank loans using a bilateral Nash bargaining model and test the model predictions with detailed transaction-level data from the euro-area interbank market. We find that lender banks with greater bargaining power over their borrowers charge higher interest rates, while the lack of alternative investment opportunities for lenders reduces bilateral interest rates. Moreover, we find that lenders that are not eligible to earn interest on excess reserves (IOER) lend funds below the IOER rate to borrowers with access to the IOER facility, which in turn put these funds in their reserve accounts to earn the spread. Our findings highlight that this persistent arbitrage opportunity is not a result of the mere lack of alternative outside options of some lenders, but it crucially depends on their limited bilateral bargaining power, leading to a persistent segmentation of prices in the euro interbank market. We examine the implications of these findings for the transmission of euro-area monetary policy.

We analyze the relation between market-based credit risk interconnectedness among banks during the crisis and the associated balance sheet linkages via funding and securities holdings. For identification, we use a proprietary dataset that has the funding positions of banks at the bank-to-bank level for 2006-13 in conjunction with investments of banks at the security level and the credit register from Germany. We find asymmetries both cross-sectionally and over time: when banks face difficulties to raise funding, the interbank lending affects market-based bank interconnectedness. Moreover, banks with investments in securities related to troubled classes have a higher credit risk interconnectedness. Overall, our results suggest that market-based measures of interdependence can serve well as risk monitoring tools in the absence of disaggregated high-frequency bank fundamental data.

We study the intraday interest rate in a CCP-based GC pooling repo market and its key determinants. Since collateral used in this market is identical to collateral eligible for the daylight overdraft facility of the Eurosystem, any intraday rate in this market cannot be a result of collateral constraints keeping banks from using the overdraft for arbitrage. Nevertheless, we find that in the crisis period a statistically and economically significant intraday spread (up to 60 basis points) prevailed that was only somewhat mitigated by the ECB's unconventional monetary policy measures. Our results show that this spread was mainly determined by the market liquidity of the repo market, suggesting that the intraday spread is largely a liquidity premium.

We analyze the impact of financial crises and monetary policy on the supply of wholesale funding liquidity, and also on the compositional supply effects through cross-border and relationship lending. For empirical identification, we draw on the proprietary bank-to-bank European interbank dataset extracted from Target2 and also exploit the Lehman and sovereign crisis shocks as well as the main Eurosystem non-standard monetary policy measures. The robust results imply that the crisis shocks lead to worse access, volumes and spreads (in both the overnight and longer-term maturities). The quantitative impact on interbank access and volume is stronger than on spreads. Liquidity supply restrictions are exacerbated for cross- border lending after the Lehman failure; for banks headquartered in periphery countries, the impact is quantitatively stronger in the sovereign debt crisis. Moreover, the interbank market - unlike other credit markets - allows to exploit the price dispersion from different lenders on identical credit contracts, i.e. overnight uncollateralized loans in the same morning for the same borrower. This price dispersion increases massively with the crisis, and even more for riskier borrowers. Cross-border and previous relationship lenders charge higher prices for identical contracts in the crisis. Importantly, this price dispersion substantially decreases when the Eurosystem promises unlimited access to liquidity at a fixed price in October 2008 and announces the 3-year LTRO in December 2011, with economically stronger effects for borrowers in weaker countries.

We use a unique data set that comprises each bank's bids in the Eurosystem's main refinancing operations and its recourse to the LOLR facility (a) to derive banks' willingness-to-pay for liquidity through a one-week repo and (b) to show that a bank's willingness-to-pay is a good indicator for the probability that this bank draws on the LOLR facility. Our results suggest (i) that banks' willingness-to-pay for liquidity indeed reflects refinancing conditions in the interbank market and (ii) that the willingness-to-pay can serve as an early warning indicator for banking distress.

The Eurosystem's main refinancing operations (MRO) are key for the interbank money market and the monetary transmission process in the euro area. This paper investigates how money market rates respond to the information revealed by various aspects of an MRO auction outcome. Our results confirm that the level of MRO rates governed short-term money market rates before the financial crisis. Since the start of the financial crisis, however, the information content of MRO rates has changed. While the levels of MRO rates have lost much of their pre-crisis significance, the spread between the weighted average and the marginal MRO rate has become an important barometer for the actual situation in the money market during the crisis.

The recent financial crisis deeply affected the money market yield curve and thus, potentially, the proper functioning of the interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission. Therefore, we analyze the effectiveness of monetary policy in steering euro area money market rates using two measures: first, the predictability of money market rates on the basis of monetary policy expectations, and second the impact of extraordinary central bank measures on money market rates. We find that market expectations about monetary policy are less relevant for money market rates up to 12 months after August 2007 compared to the pre-crisis period. At the same time, our results indicate that the ECB’s net increase in outstanding open market operations as of October 2008 accounts for at least a 100 basis point decline in Euribor rates. These findings show that central banks have effective tools at hand to conduct monetary policy in times of crises.

The relation between the ECB’s main refinancing (MRO) rates and the money market is key for the monetary transmission process in the euro area. This paper investigates how money market rates respond to the new information revealed by MRO auctions. Our results confirm a stabilizing level relationship between the overnight rate Eonia and MRO rates before the financial crisis. Since the start of the financial crisis, however, we find that MRO auction outcomes even exacerbated the disconnection of money market rates from the policy-intended interest rate level. These findings support the fixed rate full allotment policy introduced by the ECB as an unconventionalmeasure to re-stabilize banks’ refinancing conditions.

The relation between the ECB’s main refinancing (MRO) rates and the money market is key for the monetary transmission process in the euro area. This paper investigates how money market rates respond to the new information revealed by MRO auctions. Our results confirm a stabilizing level relationship between the overnight rate Eonia and MRO rates before the financial crisis. Since the start of the financial crisis, however, we find that MRO auction outcomes even exacerbated the disconnection of money market rates from the policy-intended interest rate level. These findings support the fixed rate full allotment policy introduced by the ECB as an unconventionalmeasure to re-stabilize banks’ refinancing conditions.

The recent financial crisis has deeply affected money markets. We analyze the effectiveness of monetary policy in the euro area with respect to (i) how much monetary policy expectations are reflected in money market rates, (ii) how much money market rates were disturbed by liquidity and credit risk, and (iii) the impact of extraordinary central bank measures on money markets. We find that market's expectations are less relevant for money market rates up to 12 months after August 2007. At the same time, the ECB's additional liquidity provision through longer-term refinancing operations account for at least a 60 basis point decrease in Euribor rates.

The relation between the ECB's main refinancing (MRO) rates and the money market is key for the monetary transmission process in the euro area. This paper investigates how money market rates respond to the new information revealed by MRO auctions. Our results confirm a stabilizing level relationship between the overnight rate Eonia and MRO rates before the financial crisis. Since the start of the financial crisis, however, we find that MRO auction outcomes even exacerbated the disconnection of money market rates from the policy-intended interest rate level. These findings support the fixed rate full allotment policy introduced by the ECB as an unconventionalmeasure to re-stabilize banks' refinancing conditions.

The maturity of the operational target of monetary policy is a distinguishing feature of the SNB's operational framework of monetary policy. While most central banks use targets for the overnight rate to signal the policy-intended interest rate level, the SNB announces a target range for the three-month Libor. This paper investigates the working and the consequences of the SNB's unique operational framework for the behavior of Swiss money market rates before and during the financial crisis.