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In the 1960s, Australia's commitment to collective security and its grand strategy of forward defense spurred its intervention in Vietnam. As British and American allies signaled retreat from Southeast Asia in 1968-1969, Prime Minister John Gorton sought to encourage U.S. resolve by keeping Australian forces there. With more American soldiers coming home under the guise of Vietnamization, the Australian public increasingly demanded troop withdrawals. The political facts of life became paramount, with Gorton's government buckling in 1970. This article explains the military, strategic, diplomatic, and political considerations that produced Canberra's decision to begin troop reductions in Vietnam. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between 1975 and 1983, Indonesia's handling of the integration of East Timor caused a decline in Australia–Indonesia relations. This article argues that Australian foreign policy to isolate East Timor from its bilateral relationship with Indonesia failed because it conflicted with the activities of interested Australians who exposed Indonesia's military campaigns in East Timor. Activists created a powerful counter‐narrative about the conflict that mobilised public opposition to the official policy, and complicated Australia's co‐operative policies towards Indonesia. To demonstrate the challenge of public opinion to Australian foreign policy, the article examines a brief prepared by the First Assistant Secretary at the Department of Defence, William Beale Pritchett in October 1975, which warned that Indonesia's integration of East Timor would involve "force on a scale that could not be hidden from the Australian public eye". Applying Pritchett's brief to three case studies — Balibo (October 1975), invasion and occupation (1975–76), and humanitarian crises (1977–82) — the article demonstrates the conflict between public and official policy to illustrate why the official Australian policy failed, and how the East Timor issue had become inseparable from Australia–Indonesia relations by 1983. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses Australia's foreign relations in the first half of 2020. Topics covered include the impact and implications of the COVID-19 pandemic on the international system and Australia's response to the crisis, the deterioration of Australia-China relations, and efforts to set the conditions of international security in favor of Australia.

After a 14-year gap, Australia's 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper advanced a 'comprehensive framework to advance Australia's security and prosperity in a contested and competitive world' (Australian Government 2017a, "2017 Foreign Policy White Paper." ., v). Focused on regional stability, partnerships and global cooperation, it identifies 'risks and opportunities' in an altered external environment. In this article, we argue that the neglect of gender and conflict prevention in the White Paper has implications for its stated aspirations with regard to peace and security. This is striking considering the attention that gender—particularly in the context of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda—has received in other policy areas and documents. Building on feminist security scholarship, conflict prevention approaches, and bringing in civil society voices, we argue that the White Paper contains a gendered, masculinist logic, separating domestic and international issues and paying insufficient attention to the structural and systemic causes of conflict. This article pursues a gender analysis in order to illuminate the gaps present in the White Paper and its limited vision of security and makes the case that conflict prevention from a gender perspective is key to sustainable peace, security and national interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses key issues in Australian foreign policy during the second half of 2019. It examines the first official visit made by Prime Minister Scott Morrison to the U.S. in September, as well as the foreign policy speech he delivered soon after his return. It explores the consensus that has emerged that Australia has entered a new phase in its relationship with China. It also describes issues related to climate change.

The article presents key dynamics of Australian foreign policy during the period from January to June 2019. It explores the impact of the rise of China on Australia's foreign policy, highlighting the economic impact of the Belt and Road Initiative. The Pacific Step Up policy announced by Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison is discussed, as well as the issues addressed at the Group of 20 Summit in Osaka, Japan.

The article offers news briefs related to international politics. Topics discussed include call for renewed Australian and New Zealand engagement in the Pacific; diplomatic ties to China were critical of the patronizing tone emanating from Australia and the U.S.; and The Cook Islands' status as an accredited National Implementing Entity for both the Global Climate Fund and the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund.

Among both elites and the mass public, conservatives and liberal differ in their foreign policy preferences. Relatively little effort, however, has been put toward showing that, beyond the use of force, these differences affect the day-to-day outputs and processes of foreign policy. This article uses United Nations voting data from 1946 to 2008 of the five major Anglophone democracies of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand to show that each of these countries votes more in line with the rest of the world when liberals are in power. This can be explained by ideological differences between conservatives and liberals and the ways in which the socializing power of international institutions interact with preexisting ideologies. The results hope to encourage more research into the ways in which ideological differences among the masses and elites translate into differences in foreign policy goals and practices across governments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses Australian foreign policy issues from July to December 2018. Topics explored include the economic challenges associated with the escalating trade dispute between the U.S. and China that need to be addressed by Australia, the bilateral relations maintained by the country with China acknowledged by then Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, and the decision of the country to stop contributions to the United Nations (UN) Green Climate Fund (GCF).

Relations between Australia and the United States have developed for long time notably during World War II. Over the following decades, cooperation has become more intense as Australians adopt many cultural patterns from the Americans. Australia declared and supported US presidents in military operations, which is why some have called Australia, America's sheriff for working to stabilize this part of the world. One cannot overlook the personal arrangements between leaders that help shape the dynamic of deepening the mutual relations these two nations. Donald Trump's personal interactions' with the Prime Ministers of Australia play a significant role in this regard. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Within the context of the war on poverty and an acknowledgement of the wider global phenomenon of a ‘post-industrial society’, the Australian Labor Party under Gough Whitlam sought out a range of reforming and innovative social policy programs. This article explores the origins of one such program, the Australian Assistance Plan (AAP), and its connections, similarities and differences to the Canada Assistance Plan. Drawing on extensive archival and oral history sources, it offers a comparative analysis of both national programs, then outlines how international social planning and community development ideas, especially from Canada, infused the AAP and its predecessor, the Geelong Experiment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The process towards Brexit will impact on the entire global trading system and significantly influence the global value chains that rely on ease of trade and investment within a single European market. In light of this process, Australia with its high levels of international economic integration and interdependency of trade and investment to and from the European region, now faces a stark challenge in forging an economic position that best suits its national interests. This paper analyses the possible implications of Brexit on Australia's economic governance position, with specific regard to the global value chains that rely on ease of trade and investments in the European single market. The exploration relies on empirical analysis that distinguishes between and disaggregates data on Australian trade and investment with the UK and the rest of the European Union. This analysis indicates that it is in Australia's best interest is to prioritise a preferential partnership with the EU over a new free trade agreement with the UK. However, in order to maximise Australia's position, the paper argues that, under the present political climate and technical difficulties, a multi-pronged and decoupled approach of concerted unilateralism with the UK and preferential bilateralism with the EU is best placed to enhance Australia's geo-economic role in Europe in the post-Brexit era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Structural realists might reasonably predict that foreign policy elites in countries like Japan and Australia would view China's economic and military rise as a potential threat and seek to balance against it. However, the actual policy behaviour of Japanese and Australian policy elites has been quite complex—pushing forward at times, hesitating at others and generally uncertain if an explicit counter-coalition against China through bilateral security cooperation is the right policy path. Why is this? This paper explains the puzzle by focusing on the perceptions of policy-makers regarding the risk of provoking China; entrapment with the other; and entrapment with the United States. The paper demonstrates how policy-makers' concerns regarding entrapment or abandonment related to their mutual US ally—as well as concerns about potentially provoking China—have had an instrumental effect on the degree to which Japan and Australia have strengthened their security commitments to each other. While the rise of China—and the relative decline of US power—has shaped the overall direction of Japan–Australia security ties, such structural imperatives are of course also complicated by how domestic actors think about the tactical aspects of understanding and surviving these structural features. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since January 2003, the European Union (EU) has launched over 30 civilian and military crisis management missions under the Common Security and Defence Policy. These missions have involved the participation of both EU member states and third states. In order to help facilitate the participation of third states in these missions, the EU established the Framework Partnership Agreements on crisis management, setting out the legal framework for third-state participation. In April 2015, Australia became the seventeenth country to sign such an agreement with the EU. This agreement reflects both the common interest and values shared by Australia and the EU and the extent to which EU-Australia relations have evolved and deepened over the years. In addition, the increased engagement and socialisation of Australian military and civilian personnel with individual EU member states through their participation in such operations as the International Security Assistance Force operation in Afghanistan, led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Combined Maritime Force have further facilitated opportunities for security cooperation at the EU level. Shared concerns and interests on counterterrorism, counter-piracy, instability and capacity-building have also opened up opportunities for increased cooperation between the EU and Australia. This article assesses the significance of the Framework Partnership Agreements on crisis management for EU-Australia relations within the area of security cooperation, and examines future prospects for cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the development of Australia’s relationship with the European Union (EU) by focusing on drivers and obstacles. Underlying the relationship are the burden of memory and common interests and values. It argues that, although the past still resonates, the changes to the range and depth of interests and values have resulted in a more fruitful engagement. It suggests that a history of a negatively framed context of engagement, characterised by Australian critiques of the EU and, in turn, by EU neglect of the relationship, has contributed to distance between the two interlocutors. It is only in recent years that this distance has been bridged and perceptions have changed. Australia has chosen partnerships with the EU that enhance its economic and political choices. Links with a long-term partner, the UK, are being recast as Brexit presents a new challenge at a time of Australia’s stronger engagement with the EU through a key agreement and trade talks. Finally, the article argues that Australia and the EU are critical friends. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2015, Australia and the European Union successfully negotiated a Framework Agreement. This agreement is an essential step in establishing a stronger Australia-European Union partnership and achieving closer bilateral cooperation. For years, negotiating such an agreement had proved impossible. In the 1970s, successive Australian governments showed interest in enhanced collaboration with the European Community, but the political climate for closer relations was far from encouraging. This article explains why this was the case. In doing so, it also explores how the Whitlam and Fraser governments envisaged, framed and developed Australia’s ties with the European Community in the 1970s, and asks whether a more positive approach on their part could have led to a stronger relationship. Based on recently declassified government files, this article shows that although both Whitlam and Fraser fully grasped the importance of the European Community as an emerging international actor and were willing to deepen Australia’s ties with it, significant constraints existed against enhanced bilateral cooperation. With the Common Agricultural Policy still a considerable challenge to Australian economic interests and with the European Community focused mainly on the management of its internal market, broader political considerations were inevitably relegated to the margins of Australia-European Community consultations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After decades of tension, Australia and the European Union (EU) now have a substantive relationship, interacting and cooperating with each other within a wide range of areas. The relationship is currently at a critical turning point. The Framework Agreement has, for the first time, elevated the relationship to a treaty level. It strengthens Australia-EU actions and interests on bilateral, regional and multilateral issues. There is considerable potential for closer cooperation and more extensive pooling of the resources and capacities of both interlocutors on a range of policies and within the multilateral context. This article provides an assessment of the relationship, the current state of play and key challenges facing the relationship as the EU and Australia forge stronger ties through the conclusion of a Framework Agreement and the commencement of discussions on a Free Trade Agreement at the same time as the UK’s exit negotiations from the EU. It demonstrates that, although there are challenges facing the relationship, there are also significant opportunities to further develop and strengthen ties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes the nature of Australia's remarks to the first year administration of U.S. President Donald Trump in the White House. Topics discussed the relations between Ausralia and the U.S., the ongoing debate regarding the direction of Trump's foreign policy, and the issue of sentimentalism.

This article, based on the Robert Menzies Lecture delivered by the author in London on 31 October 2017, provides a survey of Britain and Australia’s bilateral relationship from the 1930s to the present. In the earlier period particular attention is given to the role of Sir Robert Menzies. The relationship is examined in the light of Britain’s accession to the EEC/EU with reference to bilateral trade, security and global politics, and migration, with emphasis on strong people-to-people links. The author expresses hopes for renewed co-operation over free trade, a rules-based world outlook and links between universities in a post-Brexit world. He argues that although the bilateral relationship went through some troubled times in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, it is now getting back to the natural strength that it deserves. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The conflict over French nuclear testing in the South Pacific has dominated discussion of Australia’s relations with France while Gough Whitlam was Prime Minister (December 1972 to November 1975). Nonetheless, other issues were also important. To an extent not previously appreciated, Whitlam took a very positive view of France, despite his opposition to French nuclear testing. He understood the implications for Australian interests of France’s leading role in Western Europe, notably with respect to trade access, and was attracted by French scientific and industrial expertise. He was open to possible French involvement in uranium enrichment in Australia, and to Australian participation in the French/European Airbus aviation project. The French government reciprocated Whitlam’s interest in closer engagement. His efforts to establish stronger relations with France (and Europe), though unsuccessful, provide a further example of his commitment to greater independence for Australia from its traditional allies and partners, the United States and Britain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Australian Government's attitudes towards major events in international politics such as the UK's entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) in the past and Brexit negotiations today, carry greater weight than previously assumed in political science literature. Australia was critical of the EEC (now called the European Union, EU) in the early 1960s, when its then most important trading partner, the United Kingdom (UK) first applied for membership. Australia was ill-prepared to deal with the repercussions from Britain's entry into the EU, as Australian foreign policy was heavily influenced by local as well as international anti-EEC attitudes. This paper will analyse political debates in Australia during the 1960s and early 1970s with reference to parliamentary Hansard records and newspaper articles in order to suggest a new framework for Australian foreign policy analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a growing consensus that the international system needs to be reformed to reflect the changing distribution of power with the rise of the Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRICs). The Group of Twenty (G20) has been at the centre of these discussions. Within the G20, emphasis has been on great powers or rising powers and their capacity to drive reform. Less attention has been given to the preferences and strategies of middle powers in the G20 and their capacity to shape global governance reform. Drawing on interviews with G20 officials, this paper considers the role of Australia as president of the G20 in 2014. Australia’s presidency presents a unique opportunity to examine the behaviour of a middle power as it balances the competing global governance claims of the USA and the BRICs. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses several developments involving Australian foreign policy issues between July 2016 and December 2016, and it mentions Australia's 2016 Federal Election, Great Britain's Brexit Referendum vote, and the inauguration of politician Rodrigo Duterte as the new President of the Philippines. Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull is addressed, along with the nation's refugee policy, Australian-U.S. relations, and political volatility in 2016.

The article highlights foreign policy issues in Australia from January-June 2016. Topics discussed include reasons the 2016 Defence White Paper (2016 DWP) is an important document to consider in relation to Australia's foreign policy, four priority areas for Australian foreign policy as integral to the achievement of the Strategic Defence Objectives, and debate over the proper relationship between foreign and defence policy.

The issue of bipartisanship in Australian foreign policy is not often substantially addressed. The country's relations with the world appear to exhibit strong continuity regardless of the political party in government. And yet, when it comes to engagement with African states and issues, the last two decades have seen highly prominent partisan differences in Australian foreign policy. This article utilises the example of Australia's foreign policy engagement with Africa to argue that there may be two levels of understanding bipartisanship in Australian foreign policy. On the one hand, aimed at relationships and issues perceived to be of primal and significant security and economic well-being for the country, Australian foreign policy does indeed appear to be bipartisan. However, aimed at relationships and issues that have traditionally been perceived as holding minimal security and economic interest and importance for the country, Australian foreign policy does exhibit partisanship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the strategy adopted by the Green Party for the Australian foreign relations policy. Topics addressed include the impact of failed and failing post-colonial states and war zones on the international order, the response pf Australia to natural disasters, and the role of the United Nations (UN) and UN Security Council in conflict management. Australia's subservience to U.S. defense policy is mentioned.

Twenty-three years ago, questions posed in this journal asked whether and how the Australian public service was prepared to engage effectively in Asia. More recent meta-analyses of public policy scholarship suggest that Western policy scholars and administrators continue to pay limited attention to Asian policymaking, despite the rise of Asia in the 21st century. This article contributes a research-derived Asia capabilities framework for Australia's public service, distilled from a qualitative study with public administration leaders at Commonwealth, state, and local government levels. It taps scholarly literature in 'cultural intelligence', global leadership competencies, and training to provide a robust conceptual underpinning for the framework. The framework defines the knowledge, skills, capabilities, and experiences vital for Australia's public service to engage effectively with the region in a rapidly changing policy environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses several issues involving Australian foreign policy as of June 2016, and it mentions how various world leaders such as U.S. President Barack Obama telephoned politician Malcolm Turnbull to congratulate him on his election as the Prime Minister of Australia. Outgoing Prime Minister Tony Abbott's foreign policy style is mentioned, along with political leadership in Australia and Turnbull's five-nation tour which included stops in Indonesia and Germany.

Utilising a comprehensive data set for Australian firms, we examine a range of competing asset-pricing models, including the four- and five-factor models where the equity-risk premium is augmented by size, value, momentum and liquidity premia, and find that none of the models tested appears to adequately explain the cross section of Australian returns. A model accounting for Australia's integration with the US equity market appears to be the best of the competing models we study. Our argument that a model recognising Australia's integration with the USA is supported when we apply the portfolio and factor construction methodology suggested by Brailsford et al. (2012a,b). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article talks about the history of Australia's Cold War engagement with East Asia during 1950 to 1974. Topics discussed include Canberra's Cold War policy of forward defence in Southeast Asia, the security treaty of Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) signed in 1951, and the Australian governments efforts through the1950s and 1960s to keep the British and Americans militarily engaged in Southeast Asia.

In the late 1940s and the 1950s, in the context of the White Australia policy and strong anti-Japanese sentiment, Australia mounted a successful diplomatic campaign against the use of Japanese contract labour in New Caledonia. Australia also campaigned, but with only partial success, against the use of Japanese labour in the nearby New Hebrides. These initiatives further illustrate Australia's traditional assertiveness, when it saw its interests threatened, in the South Pacific. Blocking the use of Japanese labour probably contributed, as Alan Ward has argued, to increased permanent migration to New Caledonia from the other French South Pacific territories and France, shifting the population and voting balance against the indigenous Melanesian nationalist movement which later emerged. But Ward overstates his case: immigration of this kind would have happened anyway, especially from resource-poor and over-populated Wallis and Futuna. In its campaign on the Japanese labour issue Australia profited from its strong relationship with France, which resulted from comradeship in the two world wars, and from the lack of contentious bilateral issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Any consideration of classifying the relationship between the European Union (EU) and Australia as a strategic partnership would not have entered the lexicon of either partner in past decades. This article traces the development and maturing of this relationship from decades of tension and recrimination to mutual understanding and engagement on issues of common interest. It illustrates that although the relationship cannot be regarded as a strategic partnership, there is evidence of increasing common ground as the two interlocutors are no longer worlds apart. There is less perception of the tyranny of distance and the burden of memory. The relationship may not be a strategic partnership, but it is a partnership that has elements that are comprehensive, reciprocal, empathetic, long-term oriented, regional and global. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The alliance between the United States and Australia (Australia New Zealand United States or ANZUS), while one of America's least problematic Asia-Pacific strategic relationships at present, could face a series of new challenges as structural change in this region continues apace. This article analyzes five such challenges facing ANZUS: the rise of China; changing American expectations of its allies and partners; the intensification of Australia-Japan security relations; the emergence of a divide between Australian public and elite opinion on ANZUS; and the rise of Indonesia. The article concludes by offering a series of policy-relevant recommendations designed to ameliorate the worst effects of these challenges. These include the generation of greater policy debate on ANZUS in Australia; the introduction of new public education programs highlighting the alliance's costs and risks; and the establishment of a new Australia-Indonesia-U.S. trilateral dialogue process at the second track or 1.5 track level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a consequence of its membership of a US-centred global alliance network, Australia's regional obligations in the South Pacific are as pertinent to Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands's drawdown as they were to its inception. Canberra's imperatives in the Pacific have been stabilization and the exclusion of hostile interests. Three challenges-the rise of China, the Islamic State insurgency, and the democratic discontinuities in key regional players-have undermined interest in interventions in both Australia and the US. The growing influence of Asian powers in the Pacific has given rise to new exclusion concerns in Australia, and to a greater degree in the US. Rather than retrench from the South Pacific, Canberra has an opportunity to re-conceive the Pacific as an arc of opportunity, particularly in developing new forms of engagement with rising regional powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The UN Charter gives the Security Council the extraordinary function of being responsible for international peace and security. Although the Permanent Five members are disproportionately powerful, there is nevertheless scope for elected members to influence the Council's decisionmaking processes during their short two-year terms. This article uses Australia's membership in 2013 and 2014 as a case study to examine why states seek election to the Council, means through which they can strengthen their influence, how they can navigate P5 power, how successful they are in achieving their objectives, and how the effectiveness of both elected members and the Council as a whole could be improved. Despite the substantial constraints facing elected members, those that are imaginative and industrious can nevertheless make influential contributions to achievement of the Council's purposes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Australia has historically been perceived as a state of limited direct relevance to European Union (EU) interests. This perception was influenced to a significant extent by disagreement over the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the obvious geographical distance that exists between the EU and Australia. Beginning with the 1990s, this article will argue, however, that the EU's decision to make a conscious effort to increase engagement with the Asia-Pacific region during this period has seen Australia become an international partner of increased relevance. During the 1990s, the EU slowly became more cognisant of the extent to which it had a commonality of values and interests with Australia in the Asia-Pacific region. This recognition facilitated increased cooperation on regional issues over subsequent decades on issues such as trade, security, development assistance and the promotion of regional integration. This article draws on interviews with EU and Australian officials to demonstrate the extent to which close cooperation on Asia-Pacific issues is taking place. Moreover, it will also argue that the extent of shared interests and cooperation with respect to the Asia-Pacific region has been reflected in the signing of a Partnership Framework agreement in 2008 and the current negotiations for a Framework Agreement. These agreements indicate how a shared recognition of norms and values in the Asia-Pacific region has resulted in Australia becoming an increasingly important partner of the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]