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In general, there are laws that provide protection to banks as lenders to obtain repayment of their debts when the debtor is in default, this is stated in Article 1131 of the Civil Code which reads: "All assets of the Debtor, whether movable or immovable, whether existing ones or those that will be in the future become dependents/guarantees. Debtor's assets, both movable and immovable, both present and future will become dependents/guarantee for their debts”. Then Law Number 4 of 1996 was born which specifically regulates the implementation of Mortgage (UUHT). One of the characteristics of the UUHT is that it is easy and certain to execute, which means executing the mortgage certificate. must be carried out but can still provide legal certainty for interested parties, in this case, the auction seller, auction buyer and auctioneer. Therefore, in carrying out executions based on parate execution, it must be able to provide convenience and legal certainty for all interested parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We survey the uses of combinatorial auctions that have been deployed in practice, giving emphasis to their key representational and economic aspects. In addition, we discuss behavioral economics considerations on both the bidder and auctioneer sides of the market, and the interrelated topics of simplicity and trust, highlighting key opportunities for future work. (JEL D44, D91) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The FDIC resolves insolvent banks with scoring auctions. Although the structure of the scoring rule is known to bidders, they are uncertain about how the FDIC trades off different bid components. Scoring-rule uncertainty motivates bidders to submit multiple bids for the same failed bank. To evaluate the effects of uncertainty and multiple bidding for FDIC costs, we develop a methodology for analysing multidimensional bidding when the auctioneer's scoring weights are unknown to bidders. We estimate private valuations for failed-bank assets during the great financial crisis and compute counterfactuals in the absence of scoring uncertainty. Our findings imply a substantial reduction in FDIC resolution costs of between 29.8% ($8.2 billion) and 44.6% ($12.3 billion). These savings can reduce policy-driven banking-sector distortions, since FDIC resolution costs are covered either through special levies on banks or through loans from the US Treasury. Our analyses also shed new light on optimal bid portfolio choice in combinatorial auctions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Quantum sealed-bid auction protocol with post-confirmation is the one that ensures the fairness of the auction by verifying whether there is cheating after the winner is announced. To guarantee fairness, it is necessary to have both privacy and public verification simultaneously. In this paper, we make a first attempt to use the blind feature of the information in the blind signature to protect the bids' privacy and use two-state vector formalism to achieve public verification. Compared to previous quantum sealed-bid auction schemes, the utilization of these techniques gives our scheme a novel and distinctive quantum flavor. Through analysis and comparison, our scheme can resist malicious bidder attacks as well as collusive attacks. In addition, the efficiency of our scheme is also considerable. Participants only need to prepare EPR states, not complex multi-particle entangled states, and even the auctioneer can be purely classical. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is concerned with multi-object, multi-unit auctions with a budget constrained auctioneer who has noisy value estimates for each object. We propose a new allocation mechanism, the endogenous reference price auction, with two key features. First, bids are normalized across objects using "reference prices." Second, reference prices are set endogenously using information extracted from the bids submitted. We report on an experiment showing that a simple endogenous process mitigates value inaccuracies and improves three performance measures: the seller's profit, allocative efficiency and total surplus. These results have important implications for large auctions used in practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We apply three equilibrium selection techniques to study which equilibrium is selected in a hawk–dove game with a multiplicity of equilibria. By using a uniform-price auction as an illustrative example, we find that when the demand in the auction is low or intermediate, the tracing procedure method of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) and the quantal response method of McKelvey and Palfrey (1998) select the same equilibrium. When the demand is high, the tracing procedure method does not select any equilibrium, but the quantal response method still selects the same equilibrium as when the demand is low or intermediate. The robustness to strategic uncertainty method of Andersson, Argenton and Weibull (2014) selects two of the multiple equilibria irrespective of the demand size. We also analyze the impact of an increase in the minimum bid allowed by the auctioneer in the equilibrium selection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Auctioneering as a profession has been in existence for many years. The advantage of selling goods through a public auction compared to a normal willing buyer-willing seller process is that the consignor of the goods is likely to get a better price through a competitive bidding process. A professional consignee known as an auctioneer moderates the competitive bidding process during the sale of goods. However, because of the nature of the business and the frequent huge amounts of money involved in the transactions, there is a need to regulate the auctioneering. Every jurisdiction where auctioneering has specific rules that dictate regulate auctioneer standards. This article looks at the auctioneering standards that have been set and legislated in Alberta (Canada) and Vietnam. The paper has identified the minimum requirements that a prospective auctioneer has to meet in the jurisdictions for them to be given a licence to practice. Also, the paper has identified some regulations that guide the auctioneering process in the said jurisdictions. In the article, the researcher further identified key legal prohibitions that are part of the auctioneering standards. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This update of the Shakespeare First Folio Census (2003) records all sales and discoveries of First Folios since 2000. Each of the seven 'new' Folios, ones that did not appear among the 228 Folios in the Census , is given a new 'West' number, accompanied by information on provenance and seller, auctioneer or bookseller, and buyer and price, plus comments as appropriate. There are now 235 extant First Folios in the world, each with an identifying number, and the precise location is known of almost all. It is likely there are more First Folios lurking somewhere. The two addenda may help to find them: Pursuing Leads to 'New' Folios; and Some Targets for First Folio Hunters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A common practice in many auctions is to offer bidders an opportunity to improve their bids, known as a best and final offer stage. This improved bid can depend on new information either about the asset or about the competitors. This paper examines the effects of new information regarding competitors, seeking to determine what information the auctioneer should provide assuming the set of allowable bids is discrete. The rational strategy profile that maximizes the revenue of the auctioneer is the one where each bidder makes the highest possible bid that is lower than his valuation of the item. This strategy profile is an equilibrium for a large enough number of bidders, regardless of the information released. We compare the number of bidders needed for this profile to be an equilibrium under different information structures. We find that it becomes an equilibrium with fewer bidders when less additional information is made available to the bidders regarding the competition. It follows that when the number of bidders is a priori unknown, there are some advantages to the auctioneer not revealing information and conducting a one-stage auction instead. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers an auctioneer who has a non-monotonic utility function with a unique maximizer. The auctioneer is able to reject all bids over some amount by using rejection prices. We show that the optimal rejection price for such an auctioneer is lower than and equal to that maximizer in first-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions, respectively. Further, in each auction we characterize a necessary and sufficient condition that by using the optimal rejection price not only the auctioneer but also bidders can be better off, compared to a standard auction. Finally, we find that the auctioneer strictly prefers a first-price sealed-bid auction if he is risk-averse when his revenue is lower than the maximizer or if the distribution of revenues which are lower than the maximizer in a standard first-price sealed-bid auction is first-order stochastic dominant over the one in a standard second-price sealed-bid auction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]