Search

The main aim of this article is to reconstruct and comment on Bernard Suits' argument concerning the paradoxicality of the perfectly played game and explain how the argument might contribute to the game vs. performance distinction. The argument was mentioned by Suits in 'Tricky Triad: Games, Play and Sport' in the course of argumentation for the distinction between games and performances but it has not been presented in any of Suits' works published during his lifetime. However, Suits' fonds deposited in the Special Collections and Archive of the University of Waterloo contains two texts that were nevertheless meant for publication: 'A Perfectly Played Game' (recently published as Appendix III to Suits' Return of the Grasshopper) and unpublished 'The Search for a Perfectly Fair Game'. The latter is a modified version of the former; there is an overlapping core in both texts, but there are also some essential differences between them. To provide a formula capable of embracing Suits' ideas from both texts and remove the tension between the ideas of a perfectly played and perfectly fair game, I introduce the concept of a perfect game. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since its beginnings, modern bodybuilding has been accompanied by the background issue of whether it should be considered a sport. The problem, culminating in its provisional acceptance as a sport by the International Olympic Committee, was later retracted. The uncertainty of whether bodybuilding is a sport or not seems to linger. Addressing this issue, Aranyosi (2018) provided an account to determine the status of bodybuilding as a sport that arrives at the negative answer: bodybuilding is not a sport but rather a form of artistic presentation. In this paper, we disagree with Aranyosi. We argue that by the standards he presents in his first argument, bodybuilding should be considered a sport. Further, we argue that his alternative approach on how to evaluate a discipline as more sport- or art-like on a spectrum, is not a valid basis to make such a judgment regarding bodybuilding. Further, even if his spectrum was modified to enable such a judgment, again it would result in bodybuilding being evaluated as a sport. Therefore, we conclude that everyone who accepts Aranyosi´s (or any less restrictive) requirements to decide whether bodybuilding is a sport, has to consider bodybuilding as a sport or refrain from making claims about its status. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Argument visual states are helpful for detecting structured components of events in videos, and existing methods tend to use object detectors to generate their candidates. However, directly leveraging object features captured by bounding boxes overlooks a deep understanding of object relations and differences between them and real arguments. In this work, we propose a novel framework to generate selective contextual representations of videos, thereby reducing the interference of useless or incorrect object features. Firstly, we construct grid-based object features as graphs based on the internal grid connection and then use graph convolutional network to execute feature aggregation. Secondly, a weighted geometric attention module is designed to obtain the contextual representation of objects, which explicitly combines visual similarity and geometric correlation with different importance proportions. Then, we propose a dual relation-aware selection module for further feature selection. Finally, we utilize labels as the ladder to bridge the gap between object features and semantic roles, while considering the proximity in the semantic space. Experimental results and extensive ablation studies on the VidSitu indicate that our method effectively obtains a deep understanding of events in videos and outperforms state-of-the-art models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate whether ordinary quantification over objects is an extensional phenomenon, or rather creates non-extensional contexts; each claim having been propounded by prominent philosophers. It turns out that the question only makes sense relative to a background theory of syntax and semantics (here called a grammar) that goes well beyond the inductive definition of formulas and the recursive definition of satisfaction. Two schemas for building quantificational grammars are developed, one that invariably constructs extensional grammars (in which quantification, in particular, thus behaves extensionally) and another that only generates non-extensional grammars (and in which quantification is responsible for the failure of extensionality). We then ask whether there are reasons to favor one of these grammar schemas over the other, and examine an argument according to which the proper formalization of deictic utterances requires adoption of non-extensional grammars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present numerical algorithms for efficient and highly accurate computations of Fresnel's sine and cosine integrals S(z) and C(z) for real (z = x) and complex (z = x + iy) arguments. The algorithms are based on series expansion for small values of |z|, expansion in Chebyshev subinterval polynomial approximations for intermediate real values (y = 0), toggled with sum of half-integer order Bessel functions for complex arguments, together with asymptotic series expansion for large values of |z|. The present algorithms, implemented in a Fortran elemental module, can be run using any of the single, double, or quadruple precision arithmetic. Results from the present code have been benchmarked versus comprehensive data tables, generated using Maple, Mathematica, and Matlab symbolic toolbox. Compared to a maximum of 16 significant digits in the literature, the present algorithms can calculate S(x) and C(x) up to 28 significant digits in the range xϵ[0, 106] and S(z) and C(z) to the same accuracy in the domain where |S(z)| and |C(z)| each is less than the largest finite floating point number in the precision under consideration with ∣ arg z ∣ < π 2 or more specifically 3 × 10 - 4 < y x < 2 × 10 3 for S(z) and 4 × 10 - 4 < y x < 2.2 × 10 3 for C(z). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is a critique of the current version of Derk Pereboom's "disappearing agent argument" against event-causal libertarianism. Special attention is paid to a notion that does a lot of work in his argument—that of settling which decision occurs (of the various decisions it is open to the agent to make at the time). It is argued that Pereboom's disappearing agent argument fails to show that event-causal libertarians lack the resources to accommodate agents' having freedom-level control over what they decide. The connection between the disappearing agent argument and the problem of present luck is explored, as is the connection between settling which decision one makes and luck. Pereboom's disappearing agent argument also is distinguished from another argument with the same name that targets intentional action itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1984, Bressoud and Subbarao obtained an interesting weighted partition identity for a generalized divisor function, by means of combinatorial arguments. Recently, the last three named authors found an analytic proof of the aforementioned identity of Bressoud and Subbarao starting from a q-series identity of Ramanujan. In the present paper, we revisit the combinatorial arguments of Bressoud and Subbarao, and derive a more general weighted partition identity. Furthermore, with the help of a fractional differential operator, we establish a few more Bressoud–Subbarao type weighted partition identities beginning from an identity of Andrews, Garvan and Liang. We also found a one-variable generalization of an identity of Uchimura related to Bell polynomials. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

M. Goresky and R. MacPherson intersection homology is also defined from the singular chain complex of a filtered space by H. King, with a key formula to make selections among singular simplexes. This formula needs a notion of dimension for subspaces S of an Euclidean simplex, which is usually taken as the smallest dimension of the skeleta containing S. Later, P. Gajer employed another dimension based on the dimension of polyhedra containing S. This last one allows traces of pullbacks of singular strata in the interior of the domain of a singular simplex. In this work, we prove that the two corresponding intersection homologies are isomorphic for Siebenmann's CS sets. In terms of King's paper, this means that polyhedral dimension is a "reasonable" dimension. The proof uses a Mayer-Vietoris argument which needs an adapted subdivision. With the polyhedral dimension, that is a subtle issue. General position arguments are not sufficient and we introduce strong general position. With it, a stability is added to the generic character and we can do an inductive cutting of each singular simplex. This decomposition is realised with pseudo-barycentric subdivisions where the new vertices are not barycentres but close points of them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The skeptical solution is based on two assumptions — the rejection of semantic facts and the denial of semantic nihilism. On the basis of the non-factualist interpretation of this solution, these two assumptions are reconciled by stating that meaning ascriptions possess non-descriptive function. Nonetheless, Alexander Miller argues that this position is self-refuting since, as despite its non-descriptivism, by rejecting any kind of semantic facts, it inevitably leads to semantic nihilism. In this text, I demonstrate that Miller's argument is not sound. I argue that a coherent non-factualist way of formulating the conditions of correct use of meaning ascriptions may be performed by rejecting the closure principle of assertibility of meaning ascriptions. On this basis, I demonstrate that argument formulated against non-factualist interpretation by Miller may be refuted. What is more, I argue that rejection of the closure principle should be regarded as the central aspect of Kripke's skeptical solution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One crucial premise in the argument from illusion is the Phenomenal Principle. It states that if there sensibly appears to be something that possesses a sensible quality, then there is something of which the subject is aware that has that sensible quality. The principle thus enables the inference from a mere appearance to an existence (usually a mental one). In the argument from appearance, a similar move is taken by some philosophers—they infer a content from a mere appearance. There are two kinds of defences for the Phenomenal Principle in the literature, namely, the epistemological one (e.g. H.H. Price) and the semantic one (e.g. Frank Jackson). I argue that neither consolidates the Phenomenal Principle. I particularly demonstrate that the appearance verb in premise 1 of the argument from illusion is not used in the phenomenal sense as it is used in the Phenomenal Principle, which renders the argument essentially invalid. To avoid invalidity, the proponents either give up the phenomenal use, which makes the argument unable to serve its original purpose, i.e. inferring an unusual existence, or they insist on the phenomenal use in all premises of the argument, which will trivialise the argument. I also demonstrate that a similar objection applies to the argument from appearance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Panpsychism may be roughly defined as a view that at least some of the properties constituting the fundamental level of reality are mental or proto-mental. Despite its long history, it has been revived in recent discussions as a solution to the problems raised by the mind, especially to the so-called hard problem of consciousness. Contemporary panpsychism differs significantly from incarnations known from the history of philosophy mainly due to the fact that the former is often combined with so-called Russellian monism. According to Russellian monism, the intrinsic properties of physical things remain unknown. This encourages panpsychists to argue that those properties are in fact mental. In my paper, I examine the three most common arguments for panpsychism: the Continuity Argument, the Hegelian Argument, and the Agnostic Argument. I take a closer look at each of them to assess their advantages and weaknesses. As I point out, the way in which one argues implies the version of panpsychism one adopts. This turns out to be especially important with regard to the Hegelian Argument and the Agnostic Argument. Both can be combined with Russellian monism, resulting in Russellian panpsychism. However, I claim that the philosophical consequences of these arguments are different, so it is legitimate to distinguish two kinds of Russellian panpsychism. In conclusion, I hold that there are reasons to prefer panpsychism based on the Agnostic Argument, which is more promising, as it responds to some general problems of panpsychism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The epistemic argument against epiphenomenalism aims to prove that even if epiphenomenalism is true, its adherents are not able to justify their inferential beliefs. This would mean that they cannot know that they are right which is a self-stultifying consequence. I elaborate on this problem and then present an updated version of epiphenomenalism based on property dualism. I argue that this position is capable of refuting the conclusion of the epistemic argument even in spite of accepting its essential assumptions. This was made possible by an upgraded property exemplification account of events. I also argue against a view which, if true, gives substantial support to the epistemic argument: that a belief justified by other beliefs is knowledge only if it is caused by those beliefs in virtue of their contents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nietzsche's perspectivism has received restricted and unrestricted interpretations. The latter take the cognitive effects of 'perspectives' to be pervasive and general; the former argue they are restricted to special subject matters, have limited effects, or are not essentially cognitive at all. I argue on textual grounds that Nietzsche was committed to the unrestricted view. Comparison to A.W. Moore's treatment of perspectival representation in Points of View illuminates both the nature of perspectivism and key arguments needed to defend it. Nietzschean perspectivism must deny the very possibility of absolute representations (sensu Moore), and to do so, it must block a form of argument that promises to integrate perspectival representations into progressively less restricted, and ultimately absolute, representations of the world. Such arguments depend on a strong assumption about the unity of the independent world, which Moore accepts and Nietzsche denies. Nietzsche's pluralism about perspectives thereby turns out to rely on pluralism about the world, which shapes his understanding of us as essentially bounded cognitive agents. Nietzsche holds that the longing for absolute representation manifest in Moore, Leibniz, and many other philosophers, which aspires to overcome the limitations of perspective, amounts to ascetic self-denial about our cognitive condition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines Kirzner's contribution to the study of the equilibrating tendency in economics. By analyzing his interpretation of Jevons' law of indifference, we participate in the debate on Kirzner association with neoclassicals when discussing the equilibrating tendency. A reconstruction of Kirzner's use of Jevons' law is conducted, considering his argumentative strategy when presenting the Austrian economics ideas to other professionals in the field. We conclude that Kirzner drew close to neoclassical economics to emphasize the relevance and uniqueness of Austrian economics. By doing so, we highlight the main differences between the two currents of economic thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely recognized that Emil Kraepelin explicitly advocated for eugenic ideas in his academic works. Given the renewed interest in related concepts such as self-domestication and neo-Lamarckism in different contexts, this article revisits his eugenic arguments by scrutinizing a section of his seminal work, the 8th edition of his textbook published in 1909. Our analysis reveals that Kraepelin's arguments consisted of multiple theories and ideas prevalent at the time (i.e. self-domestication hypothesis, neo-Lamarckism, degeneration theory, social Darwinism, racism and ethnic nationalism), each of which presented individual fundamental claims. Nevertheless, Kraepelin amalgamated them into one combined narrative, which crystallized into an anti-humanistic psychiatry in the next generation. This paper cautions that a similar 'packaging of ideas' might be emerging now. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate the dissipative structure for the system of Moore–Gibson–Thompson (MGT) thermoelasticity in the whole space. To analyze the dissipative structure, it is very useful to rewrite the equations into a symmetric hyperbolic system and apply the so‐called stability condition. When we rewrite our system into the symmetric hyperbolic form in the multidimensional case, it is important to take the constraint conditions into account. Indeed, the stability condition with the constraint conditions guarantees the dissipative property for our system in some cases. In this paper, we introduce the stability condition with constraints for the general problem and apply this argument to the system of MGT thermoelasticity. Furthermore, we discuss the optimality of the decay estimates we obtain, together with the no regularity‐loss phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Roche and Sober (2013; 2014; 2017; 2019) have offered an important new argument that explanatoriness lacks confirmatory significance. My aim in this paper is not only to contend that their argument fails to show that in confirmation 'there is nothing special about explanatoriness' (Roche & Sober, 2017: 589), but also to reveal what is special confirmationwise about explanatoriness. I will argue that much of the heavy work in Roche and Sober's argument is done by the dichotomy into which they carve up the philosophical options: either explanatory considerations per se are confirmatorily relevant or they acquire whatever confirmatory significance they may possess only by way of background beliefs and so no differently from non‐explanatory considerations. I will argue that this is a false dichotomy: Explanatoriness per se can have confirmatory relevance even while explanatory considerations acquire their confirmatory relevance only through background opinions. Furthermore, there is 'something special' about the background opinions concerning explanations that allow explanatoriness in itself to have confirmatory impact. Unlike other sorts of background, having some background opinions expressly about explanations is indispensable to being an observer at all. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Michael Almeida has recently tried to show that if S5 correctly represents metaphysical necessity, there can be no non-trivial evidence for or against the existence of the traditional God. Evidence would thus be irrelevant to the reasonability of traditional theistic belief. Almeida's argument has implications beyond its announced target: it amounts to a new argument for sweeping scepticism. Almeida's argument for the irrelevance of evidence to the existence of God would apply to any state of affairs that entails some metaphysical necessity. In S5, every state of affairs entails some metaphysical necessity, so Almeida should conclude that non-trivial evidence for or against any state of affairs is impossible. I argue that the problem is not with S5 but with inadequately motivated assumptions about evidential support. Avoiding those assumptions disables the argument for sweeping scepticism and without foreclosing the possibility of non-trivial evidence for or against the existence of the traditional God. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Religious expressivism is the view that religious sentences, like 'God is all-loving' and 'God offers us the gift of salvation', are devoid of cognitive meaning. Such sentences are not truth-evaluable: they cannot be judged as true or false. In Religious Language , Michael Scott asked what explains the seeming logical behaviour of religious sentences if they are not truth-evaluable, as religious expressivists claim. In particular, religious expressivists need to explain (i) how a given religious sentence and its negation seem inconsistent and (ii) how religious sentences could figure in logically valid arguments. In this article, I develop a version of Weak Kleene semantics that could address these two 'logic' challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thomas Ward explicates and defends a version of divine exemplarism called Containment Exemplarism to make good on the claim that God is a 'totally original artist'. According to Containment Exemplarism, (i) God ex nihilo creates according to divine ideas, (ii) divine ideas are about an aspect or part of God, and (iii) God has the ideas he has by knowing himself. Containment Exemplarism, we are told, secures the rationality and creativity of the divine creative act. I argue, first, that Ward's God is not a totally original artist since, on Containment Exemplarism, God does not act creatively in creating. Theistic Activism, the view that God makes up the ideas he has, can secure the creativity of the divine creative act. I argue, second, that Ward's argument against the rationality of God making stuff up fails. Thus, there is one version of divine exemplarism that satisfies key desiderata for divine creation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The past decade has seen a burgeoning of scholarly interest in conscientious objection in healthcare. While the literature to date has focused primarily on individual healthcare practitioners who object to participation in morally controversial procedures, in this article we consider a different albeit related issue, namely, whether publicly funded healthcare institutions should be required to provide morally controversial services such as abortions, emergency contraception, voluntary sterilizations, and voluntary euthanasia. Substantive debates about institutional responsibility have remained largely at the level of first-order ethical debate over medical practices which institutions have refused to offer; in this article, we argue that more fundamental questions about the metaphysics of institutions provide a neglected avenue for understanding the basis of institutional conscientious objection. To do so, we articulate a metaphysical model of institutional conscience, and consider three well-known arguments for undermining institutional conscientious objection in light of this model. We show how our metaphysical analysis of institutions creates difficulties for justifying sanctions on institutions that conscientiously object. Thus, we argue, questions about the metaphysics of institutions are deserving of serious attention from both critics and defenders of institutional conscientious objection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We apply new results on free boundary regularity to obtain a quantitative convergence rate for the shape optimizers of the first Dirichlet eigenvalue in periodic homogenization. We obtain a linear (with logarithmic factors) convergence rate for the optimizing eigenvalue. Large scale Lipschitz free boundary regularity of almost minimizers is used to apply the optimal L2$L^2$ homogenization theory in Lipschitz domains of Kenig et al. A key idea, to deal with the hard constraint on the volume, is a combination of a large scale almost dilation invariance with a selection principle argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The object of the present paper is to derive some argument properties associated with meromorphic close-to-starlike and Bazilević functions in the punctured open unit disk. Furthermore, we investigate integral-preserving properties in a sector with some special cases of the main results presented here. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is a response to Zain Ali's critique in this journal of our presentation of a 'right relationship' normatively relativised 'logical' Argument from Evil. Our argument aims to show that the existence of horrendous evils (as defined by Marilyn Adams) is incompatible with the existence of the personal omniGod (a person or personal being who is all-powerful, all-knowing, and perfectly good), given certain reasonable judgments about what a personal God's perfect goodness would imply about the way God relates to those caught up in horrendous evils. We reply to Ali's main criticism that our assumptions about divine goodness are unjustified, and show a lack of intellectual humility. We defend the claim that, if God is a person, then God's goodness is moral goodness according to our best human theory of what that implies. We accept that God's situation as creator and sustainer of all that exists may justify 'divine exceptionalism': God's personal moral goodness may be consistent with ways of relating to others that would fall far short of perfection in human-to-human relationships. But in that case, we argue, intellectual humility may be better served by accepting that God is so exceptional that God should not be understood as a person at all, which is the prevailing Muslim view, as Ali himself acknowledges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Universals are properties that are shared by multiple objects. In classical South Asia, Brahmanical thinkers from Vyākaraṇa, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Mīmāṃsā text traditions were realists about universals, while most Buddhists were nominalists. In this paper, my aim is to reconstruct the early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of universals, with special emphasis on the arguments of the Nyāya philosopher Uddyotakara (6th century CE) against a Buddhist strand of resemblance nominalism. I show that Uddyotakara's contribution to this debate is twofold. First, he is possibly the first Naiyāyika to adopt a sparse theory of universals, a theory according to which it is necessary to posit only those universals which explain how objects resemble each other in the most fundamental or irreducible respects. On the other hand, he offers a few arguments for realism, which are explicitly motivated by a causal constraint on intentionality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the viability of an argument asserting that belief is inseparable from knowledge, with topics including counterexamples to this argument and objections raised by Leite and Shaw. Leite presents counterexamples to the argument, particularly focusing on unconscious beliefs, while Shaw challenges the idea that knowledge is necessary to act in light of a belief, ultimately questioning whether every belief is self-known, debate which Marcus engages with throughout the article.

Demands for free time protections are often justified with appeal to a concern for individuals' welfare. The idea is that people would enjoy greater levels of welfare if they had more access to free time. This article shows that the currently most sophisticated version of the welfare argument is inconclusive. It then shows how this argument can be modified and extended to become conclusive. The main claim is that policymakers have a decisive welfare‐based reason to implement free time protections that go even further than those already in place in countries that are known for their good work–life balance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we extend an unknottedness theorem for compact self-shrinkers to the mean curvature flow to shrinkers with finite topology and one asymptotically conical end, which conjecturally comprises the entire set of self-shrinkers with finite topology and one end. The mean curvature flow itself is used in the argument presented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We establish existence results for a class of mixed anisotropic and nonlocal p-Laplace equations with singular nonlinearities. We consider both constant and variable singular exponents. Our argument is based on an approximation method. To this end, we also discuss the necessary regularity properties of weak solutions of the associated non-singular problems. More precisely, we obtain local boundedness of subsolutions, the Harnack inequality for solutions and the weak Harnack inequality for supersolutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the basis arguments of so-called legal logic and their relation to logic in its standard meaning. There is no doubt that legal arguments belong to logic in the wide sense (sensu largo), but their reduction to schemes of formal logic (logica sensu stricto) is a controversial issue. It can be demonstrated that only some legal arguments fall under explicit rules of formal logic, that is, having a deductive character. Most such reasoning is fallible, and its correctness depends on appealing to extra-logical principles taken from legal norms. For instance, if we say, "If it is permitted more, then it is permitted less" (argumentum a maiori ad minus), we assume that the concepts expressed by the words "more" and "less" are already defined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I examine Aristotle's position on the theory of the soul as a self-moving entity in the light of a less negative conception of his discussion with his predecessors. For this purpose, I discuss the hypothesis according to which Aristotle is producing the concepts necessary for his own research through a critique of Plato's claims. I show that, more than a criticism, what we are witnessing is a process of conceptual appropriation where Aristotle filters an opinion to make a better use of it. I support my argument by showing how Aristotle's exegetical device works and how it could be connected to his own definitional procedures in De Anima's book II. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article describes the group of ninth-century Zoroastrian philosophers I call the 'Dēnkard School' and sketches the way they do philosophy. It presents their argument against substance dualism, which the Zoroastrians argue is in tension with the belief in repentance. From an analysis of this polemic, there follows a reconstruction of the Dēnkard School's own doctrine of the consubstantiality of body and soul. To understand these arguments, I describe some background eschatological and ontological beliefs upheld by the Dēnkard School and their specific conception of substance, which includes the notions of ownership and responsibility. Overall, the argument can be seen as a new position on a traditional problem, and so increasing the scope of philosophy in a more global perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Buddhist doctrine of transmigration (saṃsāra) offers a coherent model of a cycle of existence wherein a sentient being continues throughout life, survives death, traverses the afterlife, and is, sooner or later, reborn, thus inaugurating another lifecycle as a new life-form. The Buddhist tenets of no-self (anātman) and impermanence, however, deny the possibility of a self, soul, or any form of spiritual substance that persists throughout the cycle of transmigration. This article examines the argumentation developed by the Indic Buddhist philosopher, Saṅghabhadra (fl. fifth- century ce), as part of his effort to reconcile the doctrines of no-self and karmic continuity. In his *Nyāyānusāraśāstra and the *Samayapradīpikāśāstra , two seminal, yet vastly understudied, doctrinal treatises of Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma Buddhism that survive only within the translation corpus of the Sinitic scholar-monk Xuanzang (602?–664 ce), Saṅghabhadra defines the antarābhava , the 'intermediate state of existence', as the interstitial space and interim time-period existing between the locus wherein the sequentially reproducing psychic constituents of an individual sentient being, including consciousness, desert the no-longer viable body at the moment of biological death, and the locus wherein these psychic constituents become associated with a new gross physical body in the form of a new viable embryo at the moment of rebirth. By instantiating the antarābhava as an actual interval with real extension in space and time, necessarily traversed by the vast majority of sentient beings after dying in order to reach the next gross physical body, Saṅghabhadra provides, for Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma Buddhism, a rigorous account for how karma is transmitted, via the psychic constituents of a sentient being, beyond biological death into future lives, as well as future afterlives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to examine Takada Shinji's (1893–1975) view of the 'Mandate of Heaven (天命 tenmei)'. Takada understood the 'Imperial Way (皇道 kōdō)' as one of two axes, the 'Mandate of Heaven' and the 'Rectification of Names (正名 seimei)', together they made possible a theoretical systematization of the 'Imperial Way' discourse as well as its concrete political embodiment. It is undeniable that the ideas of the 'Imperial Way' received heavy criticism after WWII. Because it was used as a problematic ideology in Imperial Japan. Nonetheless, it is necessary to grasp its original meaning as understood by its theoretical founder and innovators. This paper thus turns to examine Takada's unique understanding of the 'Mandate of Heaven' from the belief that such an examination should precede before starting a more systematic and comprehensive discussion of the 'Imperial Way' discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sethi (2020) attempts to show that even if we keep Price's intuition: the claim that having an experience as of an F make us aware of an instance of Fness, we can still block the Argument from Hallucination, and so reject the conclusion that we are aware of mind-dependent rather than mind-independent items when we undergo successful perceptions. In an attempt to demonstrate this, she formulates the Argument from Hallucination so that it relies on the principle that if the existence of a neural state is sufficient for the existence of a property-instance, that property-instance is mind-dependent. I show how to reformulate the argument to avoid reliance on this, thus demonstrating against Sethi that it is possible to argue from acceptance of Price's intuition to the claim that the items we're directly aware of in the successful perceptual case are mind-dependent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reconsiders Ezekiel's alleged anti-imperial attitude toward the Babylonian empire. It nuances the alleged attitude with Frantz Fanon's theory of colonized subjects' desire to be like their colonizer. Looking at Ezekiel's privileged social location, I argue that the book exhibits a desire to be like the Babylonian empire. Ezekiel intertwines Babylonian's "anti-Egyptian" propaganda with Yahweh's interest in maintaining loyalty toward the empire. To support this argument, the paper first surveys the Babylonian and Egyptian conflict over the Levant. It then reconsiders the situation of Ezekiel and his community in exile. Further, it discusses Fanon's theory of colonized subjects' desires and how Ezekiel operates within it. It concludes by looking at what Ezekiel might gain through this maneuver. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The distance effect (comparing objects becomes easier with increasing differences in their magnitude) is observed in tasks ranging across domains, and its existence has been interpreted as evidence for analogue magnitude representation. Similarly, associations between response side and magnitude (faster left/right-sided responses to small/large objects, respectively) are observed across domains. We investigated the analogue processing of angles and the association between angle magnitude and response side in relation to geometric expertise. We compared the behavioural pattern of two groups—architects and controls—in a direct angle magnitude classification task (i.e., judge whether a presented angle was greater or less than 90°) and in an indirect task (i.e., judge whether an angle was drawn with a dashed or continuous line). We found a robust distance effect for reaction times and accuracy at the whole sample level and in each group separately. Architects revealed a smaller distance effect for accuracy than controls. This could be interpreted as an argument for a more precise analogue representation of angles in experts compared to non-experts. However, we did not find evidence for an association between angle magnitude and response side in any group. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reassesses the Cooper‐Hadot debate surrounding how students are converted to philosophy as a way of life (section 1) through engagement with philosophical protreptics. In section 2, the paper identifies the core "argument from finality" in philosophical protreptics seeking to convert non‐philosophers to philosophy, starting from the universal human interest in securing eudaimonia. In line with Cooper, this argument seeks to persuade prospective students on rational grounds, so that their choice to philosophise would be rationally motivated. In section 3.1, the paper illustrates how in Plato's Euthydemus (a) the choice to undertake philosophy is rationally justified by Socrates, using the eudaimonistic argument from finality. In section 3.2, by recourse to Aristotle's Protrepticus, the paper shows how the protreptic texts also compared philosophy to other intellectual pursuits, notably rhetoric, so as to recommend philosophy specifically for delivering a directive wisdom concerning how to live. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ethnophilosophy debate in African philosophy has been primarily concerned with the nature and future direction of African philosophy, but this paper approaches the debate in search of lessons about philosophy in general. The paper shows how this ongoing debate has been obscured by varying understandings of "ethnophilosophy" and that a de facto victory has long since transpired, since "ethnophilosophy," in the sense recommended here, is flourishing. The paper argues that the political arguments with which Hountondji and Wiredu initiated the debate in the 1970s supervene on the metaphilosophical view that ethnophilosophy, if philosophy at all, is of a poor standard. Showing that ethnophilosophy must indeed be philosophy, it argues that the critics' low opinions of it depend on unrealistic assumptions about how philosophy makes progress. The paper concludes that Africa is lucky to have ethnophilosophies and that the rest of the world should hope to develop some. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides a thorough analysis of two often informally stated claims. First, successful argumentation in the sense of persuasive argumentation requires agreement between the interlocutors about the rationality of arguments. Second, a general agreement about rationality of arguments cannot itself be established via argumentation, since such an attempt leads to an infinite meta‐regress. Hence, agreement about the rationality of arguments is a precondition for successful argumentation. As the paper argues, these plausible claims hold under the assumption that interlocutors are subjectively rational and follow their own standards of rationality when engaging in argumentation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A queue‐jumping argument concludes that some course of action is impermissible by likening it to the presumptively impermissible act of jumping a queue. Arguments of this sort may be found in a disparate range of contexts and in support of policies favoured by both left and right. Examples include arguments against private education and private health care but also arguments against accommodations for learning disabilities, refugee resettlement, and birthright citizenship. We infer that, although queue‐jumping arguments are strictly analogies, they constitute a sufficiently distinct class of arguments to justify their separate treatment. The paper proposes an argumentation scheme for queue‐jumping arguments and demonstrates its applicability to some existing arguments of this type. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a new interpretation of the later Neoplatonists' reading of Chaldean Oracles fragment 138. In doing so, it exploits, for the first time in this context, Proclus' distinctive interpretation of the myth of Er in In Rempublicam II. The central argument posits that the so-called pure and perfect souls (e.g., Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato) are tantamount to the highest theurgists as 'functional' angels—i.e., they function as angels when engaging in their highest activity. By drawing on Iamblichus, Proclus, and Hermias of Alexandria, the article thus delves into the profound synthesis of philosophy and revelation in Late Antiquity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that Metaphysics H.6 is not an isolated chapter but the conclusion of an argument begun in H.3. This view will provide further and better arguments for the following view about long-standing interpretative debates: first, Aristotle provides a substantive account of the unity of the composite substance (although he also briefly addresses the unity of the form); second, neither Aristotle's conception of matter nor his account of form changes between H.1–5 and H.6; and third, H does not rely on and is not completed by book Θ in any significant way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While arguing a strong defense of the humanities, this paper highlights its spirit and makes clear some misunderstandings and errors regarding the humanities. Nonetheless, a history of the humanities is left aside, here. Quite ion the contrary, this paper claims that capitalism is the main detractor and enemy of the humanities; not the contradictors and opponents of the free market system. A number of arguments and justifications are provided. The humanities basically consist in reaching a voice of its own. Several arguments make clear what this consists of. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the issue of the import of convergence arguments in theory assessment. A first part is devoted to making the point of the different types of strategies based on convergence, providing new distinctions with respect to the existing literature. Specific attention is devoted to robustness vs consilience arguments and one representative example for each category is then discussed in some detail. These are: (a) Perrin's famous robustness argument on behalf of the atomic hypothesis on the grounds of the concordance of thirteen different procedures to the same result for the Avogadro number; (b) the consilience argument motivating the trust in the viability of the extra-dimension conjecture in the context of early string theory. These two cases are expressly chosen in order to highlight possible differences, also including whether the convergence obtains in terms of empirical or theoretical procedures. Notwithstanding these various differences, in both cases the evaluation of the assessment strategy similarly depends, in a significant way, on how the convergence argument is interpreted, as shown in the final part of the paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Gruber et al. (2022) offered a framework how to explain "Physical time within human time", solving the 'two times problem'. Here, I am asking whether such a problem exists at all. To question the question, I will appeal to neurobiological, evolutionary, and philosophical arguments suggesting that human time does not need to be reconciled with physical time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between one-quarter and one-third of the population in developed economies do not travel, but our understanding of this group is rather limited. Studies looking at constraints and motivation often treat non-travelers as an homogeneous group compared to a spectrum of traveler types. Non-travel is also often implied as being a deficit rather than a voluntary decision. A mixed-method approach is applied in this study to explicitly explore the variety within non-travelers in general and voluntary non-travelers in particular. Qualitative interviews with non-travelers were used to gain a more in-depth understanding of the underlying reasons for non-travel. Non-travelers were then segmented based on constraints and motivation in a large-scale survey representative for Germany. The resulting non-traveler typology clearly shows distinct non-travelers types. By adding a pro non-travel preference instead of using deficit-oriented arguments, voluntary types of non-travelers were identified. This implies that non-travel is not necessarily something people want to overcome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Job 40:15–24 describes a monstrous creature named Behemoth, whom ancient Jewish literature treats as a supernatural monster. In contrast, much literature of the thirteenth century and later applies a zoological approach, interpreting Behemoth as a species of animal, usually the hippopotamus in publications from 1663 onward. Since 1974, numerous advocates of the zoological approach have reinterpreted Behemoth as a dinosaur, usually a sauropod. Arguments for Behemoth as a sauropod include allegations that Job 40 describes an animal that is herbivorous, aquatic, docile, and indomitable; drinks large amounts of water; has strong bones, strong hips, a bulbous midsection, tight sinews, and a cedar-like tail; and is the largest land animal that God made. Here, I investigate the relative popularity and temporal duration of each such argument and determine which such arguments are based on sound interpretations of the Hebrew text. This investigation reveals that no argument for Behemoth as a dinosaur survives scrutiny. Several, notably including the argument that Behemoth’s tail is like a cedar, are based on misinterpretations of the Hebrew text. In contrast, all parts of the Hebrew text are consistent with the interpretation of Behemoth as a primordial, supernatural monster. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops the idea that valid arguments are equivalent to true conditionals by combining Kripke's theory of truth with the evidential account of conditionals offered by Crupi and Iacona. As will be shown, in a first-order language that contains a naïve truth predicate and a suitable conditional, one can define a validity predicate in accordance with the thesis that the inference from a conjunction of premises to a conclusion is valid when the corresponding conditional is true. The validity predicate so defined significantly increases our expressive resources and provides a coherent formal treatment of paradoxical arguments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The link between civilization and technology has long been a hotspot of research around the world. Mobile phone addiction has become a common social phenomenon with advances in society and technology, wreaking havoc on people's emotional health, physical fitness, and personal connections. Considering the positive effects of mindfulness, this study used the diary method to explore the relationship between mindfulness and mobile phone addiction based on the mindfulness reperceiving model. We conducted a 14-day diary study among 198 Chinese youth participants. The results showed that there was a circular argument relationship between mindfulness and mobile phone addiction: mindfulness of the previous day could significantly negatively predict mobile phone addiction of the following day, and vice versa. These results, based on the mindfulness reperceiving model, effectively extend theories and profoundly reveal the circular argument relationship between mindfulness and mobile phone addiction. Besides, it also provides new thought for the mechanism of the interrelationship between mindfulness and mobile phone addiction, as an important theoretical support for the intervention of mobile phone addiction from the perspective of mindfulness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]